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ABSTRACT 
The Royal Navy’s main—but not only—weapon at the beginning of the First World War 
was the Grand Fleet, whose pre-war title was the Home Fleet. The Home Fleet was brought into 
being in April 1907 after a controversial and confusing series of communications between Sir 
John Fisher at the Admiralty, the Cs-in-C. of the three main battle fleets, and Admiral Francis 
Bridgeman, who was Fisher’s choice to command the new organization. The initial motive for 
this reorganization was a financial one: the new Liberal government demanded economies in 
naval expenditure on top of those introduced by Fisher for the now-ousted Conservatives. During 
the internal discussions on the proposed Home Fleet in the fall of 1906, three new motives were 
introduced: 
1) A desire to improve on the existing reserve force structure. 
2) Furtherance of a trend towards centralized Admiralty control of war operations 
replacing the previous independence of fleet and station commanders. 
3) The shift from a primarily anti-Dual Alliance strategic posture to a primarily 
anti-German one. 
 
This combination of financial and strategic motives would set the stage for future Admiralty 
policy throughout the remainder of the Prewar Era. The developments related to these motives 
ensured the Home Fleet would not remain in its initial form for long. Attacks on the Home Fleet 
from within the Navy resulted in the accelerated demise of the Navy’s previous first-line 
organization in home waters, the Channel Fleet, and shifting geostrategic paradigms reduced the 
importance of theatres outside the North Sea. Despite efforts by advocates of both those who 
wished to reduce naval expenditure and advocates of new technologies such as the submarine, 
the dreadnought-based Home Fleet remained the principal defence of the realm in July 1914, and 
was likely to remain so into the immediate future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Just after the end of the First World War, the Admiralty produced a secret memorandum 
that included the following paragraph: 
‘The war has been fought and the final decision reached on land; but the land 
campaign was rendered possible only by reinforcements and supply from overseas. 
The armies of the Western Front, where the main offensive lay, have to a great 
extent been transported thither across the seas. The passage of allied troops to the 
Dardanelles, Salonika, Egypt, Palestine, and Mesopotamia depended entirely on 
the security of our sea communications. The campaigns of East Africa, Samoa, 
New Guinea, South West Africa and the Cameroons, and of Archangel in the far 
north rested on the same foundation. All these depended on the supremacy of the 
allies at sea – guaranteed by the Grand Fleet – and on the carrying power of the 
British Mercantile marine. The Navy and Mercantile of Great Britain have, in fact, 
been the spearshaft of which the Allied armies have been the point.’1 
 
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, the Grand Fleet’s first wartime commander, felt strongly enough to 
express similar sentiments in his book The Grand Fleet, where he stated that ‘our Fleet was the 
one and only factor that was vital to the existence of the Empire, as indeed to the Allied cause.’2 
The context for these quotes must be remembered. Contrary to prewar expectations there had 
been no great decisive battle at sea, no ‘Armageddon’, to use Lord Fisher’s evocative term.3 The 
closest approximation of such a battle was the Battle of Jutland, which was inconclusive and a 
disappointment to the extent that a Midshipman from the dreadnought Neptune recounted that 
when ‘we heard that our seamen going to hospital had been jeered at and “boo’ed” by some 
shore folk, it was almost too much’.4 
                                                 
1
 Admiralty, ‘The British Naval Effort: 4th August 1914 to 11th November 1918’, 24 December 1918, ADM 167/57, 
Admiralty MSS, TNA. Quoted in Eric Grove, Royal Navy Since 1815, paperback ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005), pp. 142-143. 
2
 Italics original. Admiral Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, The Grand Fleet 1914-1916: Its Creation, Development and 
Work, reprint ed. (Ringshall: Ad Hoc Publications, 2006), p. 255. 
3
 Fisher used this term often. One example is Lord Fisher to A.J. Balfour, 23 October 1910, Add MS 49712, A.J. 
Balfour MSS, BL. 
4
 Quoted in H.W. Fawcett and G.W. Hooper, The Fighting at Jutland: The Personal Experiences of Forty-five 
Officers and Men of the British Fleet, abridged ed. (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd.: 1921), p. 102. 
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Compared to the Army’s much more visible experiences on the Western Front, the Navy’s 
role in the hard-fought victory of 1918 could be easily diminished, necessitating reminders of its 
unglamorous but essential roles such as Jellicoe’s, or Churchill’s famous remark that the Grand 
Fleet C.-in-C. ‘was the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon.’5 Even 
when the importance of the Grand Fleet’s contribution to the Allies’ cause is recognized, it is not 
without reason that Professor Eric Grove describes it as ‘an unspectacular strategy of 
containment’.6 Sweeps out of Scapa and a ceaseless patrol against German merchantmen and 
commerce raiders between the Shetlands and Norway were rarely the stuff of high drama, 
especially to ‘those who wished to break out of the strait-jacket of trench warfare and costly 
offensives in Flanders and northern France.’7 The importance of the defeat of the U-Boats, and 
the Admiralty’s supposed incompetence regarding that campaign—whose effects hit the British 
public more directly than any other German naval effort—further obscured the Grand Fleet’s 
steady strangling of German trade and war industries. The Royal Navy’s sterling performance 
twenty years later in the Second World War distorted discussions of the Grand Fleet’s 
performance even more, such that even today revisionist opinions are still perhaps more guarded 
than they might be. It is quite reasonable for the distinguished maritime historian Professor 
N.A.M. Rodger to warn that ‘it may be that the contrast between the navy’s performances in the 
                                                 
5
 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918, ii, new ed. (London: Odhams Press Limited, 1939), p. 1015. 
The paragraph leading up to this statement deserves quotation as well: 
‘The standpoint of the Commander-in-Chief was unique. His responsibilities were on a different 
scale from all others. It might fall to him as to no other man—Sovereign, Statesman, Admiral or 
General—to issue orders which in the space of two or three hours might nakedly decide who won 
the war. The destruction of the British Battle Fleet would be fatal. Jellicoe was the only man on 
either side who could lose the war in an afternoon.’ 
6
 Eric Grove, in Jellicoe, op. cit., p. 10. 
7
 Paul Hayes, ‘Britain, Germany, and the Admiralty’s Plans for Attacking German Territory, 1906-1915’, in 
Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes, and Robert O’Neill (eds.), War, Strategy, and International Politics: Essays in 
Honour of Sir Michael Howard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 95. 
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two wars has been overdrawn.’8 After all, he states immediately afterward, the Royal Navy in the 
First World War ‘had all the advantages but few of the opportunities’.9 
 It has been tempting to blame the Admiralty, and many have done so. It has been taken 
largely as truth that their thinking was dominated by senior officers’ ‘old theories on the 
application of naval force.’10 Opinions to the contrary have always been argued over hotly. As a 
result, Michael Dash felt the need practically to apologize for his own research on British 
submarine policy; since, after all, the French took the lead in submarine deployment at the turn 
of the twentieth century and it was German U-Boats that were the scourge of shipping in 1917-
18. Dash thought that ‘It may seem perverse, then, for this study to concentrate on British 
submarine policy.’11 One popular author has a great deal of bad, and nothing good, to say about 
the Admiralty of the period.
12
 
No small wonder then that one of the most recent works on the period notes that ‘[a] 
belief has thus persisted that the Navy’s plans for war were puerile, ill-informed, and based on 
the whims of senior officers such as Fisher.’13 This statement can just as easily be applied to the 
contemporary Admiralty, and it often has been. 
Many astute naval historians have recognized why this should be so. For instance, N.A.M. 
Rodger wrote: 
‘It is an ingrained assumption of many writers that Britain is always in the lead.… 
If anything goes wrong it must therefore be the fault of someone in Britain – 
usually someone in Whitehall. Even sophisticated scholars find it hard to accept 
                                                 
8
 N.A.M. Rodger, ‘The Royal Navy in the Era of the World Wars: Was it fit for purpose?’, The Mariner’s Mirror 97, 
no. 1 (February 2008), p. 284. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Nicholas A. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, paperback ed. (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 2002), p. 5. Hereafter JFNR. 
11
 Emphasis original. Michael Wynford Dash, British Submarine Policy 1853-1918, Ph.D. Thesis (King’s College 
London, 1990), p. 7. 
12
 Geoffrey Regan, Geoffrey Regan’s Book of Naval Blunders, paperback ed. (London: André Deutsch, 2001). 
13
 Shawn T. Grimes, Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 
2012), p. 2. 
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that British leaders might ever have been at the mercy of events which were out of 
their control or forces more powerful than they could master.’14 
 
Similarly, Nicholas Lambert declared: 
 
‘Even today … it is still not recognized that the core histories of the pre-1914 
period were written without recourse to systematic examination of financial, 
economic, technological, administrative, or personnel records. Or that when 
writing these narratives their authors placed theory ahead of fact and 
description.’15 
 
Finally, Andrew Lambert
16
: 
‘It is assumed that the world’s navies were reactionary, or at best unduly 
conservative in their handling of technical change in the nineteenth century. This, 
it has been argued, was symptomatic of large hierarchically structured 
bureaucracies opposed to change in any area, from uniform regulations to 
weapons procurement. This view is reflected in the work of historians of the 
liberal progressive school for whom conservatism in technology, as in politics, is 
the mark of an unthinking and bigoted reactionary. They contend that, had the 
world’s navies been more adventurous, technical progress would have been more 
rapid, and more economical. As the largest and among the best documented, 
navies the Royal Navy has often been criticized for technological conservatism 
throughout the long nineteenth century (1815 – 1914). This line has been adopted 
in studies of the introduction of steam power, iron ships, the screw propeller, 
armour plate, turrets, and a number of other important new systems.’17 
 
Having accepted these statements, the problem becomes illustrating how the Navy and the 
Admiralty were not moribund creatures of habit only reluctantly dragged into the light of 
progress and change. This matter is intimately tied up with the historiography of the Prewar Era, 
which will now be explored in some detail. 
The Royal Navy’s history during the decade prior to the First World War is one marked 
by rapid changes. Numerous reorganizations ranging from root-and-branch reforms to almost 
entirely cosmetic changes took place, many (but not all) were initiated by one remarkable man: 
                                                 
14
 Rodger, op. cit., p. 273. 
15
 Nicholas Lambert, op. cit., p. 5. 
16
 No relation to Nicholas Lambert. 
17
 Andrew Lambert, ‘The Royal Navy, John Ericsson, and the Challenges of New Technology’, IJNH 2, no. 3 
(December 2003), p. 17-18. 
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Admiral Sir John Fisher. Fisher, in fact, dominates the period. The great Arthur Marder wrote in 
the opening of his famous five-volume magnum opus From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow that 
‘[f]rom October 1904 to January 1910 the redoubtable ‘Jacky’ Fisher dominated the Navy as it 
has never been dominated by a single individual. Thereafter, until his restoration in October 1914, 
he exerted a powerful influence on naval policy behind the scenes.’18 This, and the influence of 
Fisher’s most famous creations—H.M.S. Dreadnought and all her subsequent progeny—justified 
Marder’s terming the entire period from Fisher’s promotion to First Sea Lord through the 
scuttling of the Kaiser’s Hochseeflotte in 1919 as the ‘Fisher Era’. Indeed, Admiral Fisher and 
his Dreadnoughts are still seen as icons of the prewar period. 
This ad perpetuam rei memoriam is not a new phenomenon. Even in his own time, Fisher 
was considered to be a remarkable man and the Dreadnought was considered to be a remarkable 
creation. Fisher’s biographical sword-bearer Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon began his biography by 
stating that ‘Lord Fisher of Kilverstone was a great man; in fact, history will probably record that 
he was the most remarkable Englishman that this century has so far seen.’19 Fisher’s ‘New 
Testament’ battleship was an equally remarkable symbol for Edwardian Britons, and 
Dreadnought symbolism flourished as far afield as the Suffragette movement, where Sylvia 
Pankhurst’s faction published a journal titled The Woman’s Dreadnought.20 This very ubiquity, 
both of Fisher and of Dreadnought, has had much to do with the manner in which the historical 
narrative of the turn-of-the-century Royal Navy’s policies has developed. And what is more, this 
                                                 
18
 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, i (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. vii. 
Hereafter FDSF. 
19
 Admiral Sir R. H. Bacon, The Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone Admiral of the Fleet, vol. 1, Kessinger Publishing 
reprint ed. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1929), p. v. 
20
 Lucy Delap, ‘The Woman’s Dreadnought: Maritime Symbolism in Edwardian Gender Politics’, in Robert J. Blyth, 
Andrew Lambert and Jan Rüger (eds.), The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age (London: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 95-
108. 
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narrative has become mature enough a subject to support a historiographical corpus of 
considerable depth and sophistication.
21
 
At the admitted risk of generalizing too much for the sake of categorizational pigeon-
holing, the study of the Fisher Era—a period which henceforth will be described as the ‘Prewar 
Era’ in what is perhaps a vain effort to allow other men their place on stage with Fisher the prima 
ballerina—can be grouped into three different phases. Calling them ‘generations’ is perhaps 
appropriate, because these phases can be said to loosely follow the careers of three generations of 
historians. Admittedly this is a somewhat artificial structure to employ, since some historians can 
fall into more than one ‘generation’ depending on how their publications are approached. In 
addition, certain specialist histories of vital importance must be excluded from categorization 
entirely. For instance, the extensive technical histories written by the late D.K. Brown do not fit 
easily into any of the three generations due to their general independence from the main 
historical narrative of the Prewar Era. This independence results from Brown’s especial focus on 
the marine engineering and architecture of the period rather than high Admiralty policy; however, 
specialization of subject does not necessarily preclude a work’s inclusion. Jon Sumida and John 
Brooks’ gunnery-focused monographs are both products of an identifiable generation of 
scholarship—and in Sumida’s case his work defines the generation to which it belongs. This 
brief discussion is meant to illustrate that, while imperfect and in some places simplistic, the 
generational categories discussed below are at least a useful starting point for a study of the 
Prewar Era. Broadly, the three generations are i) Foundational Works, ii) Revisionist Works, and 
3) Post-revisionist Works. 
 
                                                 
21
 Two major historians of the period—the aforementioned Arthur Marder and Captain Stephen Roskill—now have 
their own biography cum historiographical review of their work: Barry Gough, Historical Dreadnoughts: Arthur 
Marder, Stephen Roskill and Battles for Naval History (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2010). 
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Generation I: The Foundational Works 
Arthur Marder’s From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow marks the zenith of the first 
generation of historiography regarding the prewar Royal Navy. A marked feature of this 
generation was the firm belief that ‘Radical Jack’ Fisher and the myriad reforms he instituted as a 
member and then as the head of the Board of Admiralty—in particular those reforms concerned 
with the Dreadnought and the redeployment of the Navy’s battle fleet strength—were due to 
Fisher’s awareness of the German Kaiserliche Marine’s transformation into the greatest threat to 
British naval preponderance, and thus to Britain’s command of the sea itself, for at least a 
century.
22
 That transformation was driven by a man considered every bit Fisher’s Teutonic equal, 
Admiral Alfred Tirpitz.
23
 One historian has described Tirpitz as ‘ruthless, clever, domineering, 
patriotic, indefatigable, aggressive yet conciliatory, pressing yet patient, and stronger in character 
than the three chancellors and seven heads of the Foreign Office who were destined to be his co-
actors’, words which can with appropriate modification equally apply to Fisher.24 Another made 
this comparison explicit, stating that ‘John Arbuthnot Fisher was England’s sufficient if not quite 
stable answer to Alfred Tirpitz.’25 From this it is hardly a leap to reach the conclusion that the 
subsequent Anglo-German naval rivalry was, to some extent, a duel of wits between these two 
visionary men—an international strategic arms race distilled to a personal duel. When writing of 
                                                 
22
 Marder, op. cit., pp. 40-43; E.L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1935). 
23
 For the similarities between these two men see Paul M. Kennedy, ‘Fisher and Tirpitz: Political Admirals in the 
Age of Imperialism’, in Gerald Jordan (ed.), Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century 1900-1945: Essays in honour 
of Arthur Marder (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1977), pp. 45-59. 
24
 Holger Herwig, ‘Luxury’ Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918, paperback ed. (London: The Ashfield 
Press, 1987), p. 34. For Tirpitz generally, see Patrick J. Kelly, Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 2011). Still valuable is Jonathan Steinberg, Yesterday’s Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth 
of the German Battle Fleet (London: Macdonald & Co, 1965). 
25
 Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, paperback ed. (London: John 
Murray, 2005), p. 340. 
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Fisher’s reforms, Marder claimed that ‘[e]conomy and efficiency or war readiness were the 
motives underlying Fisher’s great reforms’26 and that 
‘The war readiness of the Fleet was absolutely essential in view of the rapidly 
developing German naval challenge. It was Fisher’s settled conviction that the 
Germans would bide their time until they could catch the Royal Navy unprepared, 
since they could not hope to match it in numbers. At the selected moment and 
without warning they would make war on England and attempt to wrest from her 
the mastery of the seas. He worked and planned for a sufficient and efficient navy 
with that conflict always in mind.’27 
 
This view was supported by the memoirs and early biographies of many of the notable figures of 
the period including those of both Fisher and Tirpitz, as well as another ‘foundational’ work, 
1935’s Great Britain and the German Navy by E.L. Woodward, (later Sir Llewellyn 
Woodward).
28
 To understand the subsequent historiography of the Prewar Era, Marder’s and 
Woodward’s output as well as their methods and sources need examination. 
Woodward produced one of the earliest scholarly treatments of the Anglo-German 
estrangement and subsequent the arms race. ‘The subject cannot be ignored’, Woodward wrote in 
his introduction, ‘yet, curiously enough, no English, French, or American writer has made a 
special study of this important question.’ He attributed this to the fact that until only a few years 
earlier, ‘the relevant documents on the British side were not published’ in sufficient quantity for 
‘a scientific treatment of the negotiations between Great Britain and Germany’ to be anything 
besides ‘impossible’.29 Woodward regarded the publication of Gooch and Temperley’s British 
Documents on the Origins of the War—a process complete up to 1913 when he commenced 
Great Britain and the German Navy—as providing sufficient material for his own purposes, at 
                                                 
26
 Arthur J. Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of 
Kilverstone, ii (London: Jonathan Cape, 1956), p. 18. Hereafter FGDN. 
27
 Ibid., p. 19. 
28
 Jon Sumida, ‘Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Sources of Naval Mythology’, The Journal of Military 
History 59, no. 4 (October 1995), pp. 619-638. 
29
 Woodward, op. cit., p. 1. 
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least when combined with the already-released official French, German, and Austrian collections. 
Every study that has come afterward has reacted to Great Britain and the German Navy in one 
way or another, either accepting it as a basic narrative of the period or attempting to correct that 
narrative. 
Following only a few years after Great Britain and the German Navy was The Anatomy 
of British Sea Power, the first major work of a man later described as ‘the premier historian of 
the Royal Navy’. 30  Anatomy was written partially as a reaction to Woodward’s work, who 
Marder felt ‘relies too much on the published documentary sources and treats British public 
opinion very superficially’, and that Anatomy was intended as ‘the first reasonably complete 
study of British naval policy in all its ramifications in the vital pre-dreadnought era.’31 The result 
remains a crucial history of the period even today, largely because Marder had been the first 
scholar able to access material from the Admiralty’s own archives, as well as some notable 
private material and correspondence with surviving figures from the period including former 
First Lord of the Admiralty the Earl Selborne, and Fisher’s nemesis Admiral Sir Reginald 
Custance.
32
 
The success of Anatomy led Marder to produce further works, each built around new 
primary sources that he was able to secure access to owing to his ever-increasing reputation as a 
specialist in the period. Portrait of an Admiral and the three volumes of Fear God and Dread 
Nought were created from the diaries of Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond and the private 
correspondence between Admiral Fisher and the wide-ranging group of personalities.
33
 All these 
                                                 
30
 John S. Galbraith quoted in Henry Cord Meyer, ‘Arthur J. Marder, 1910-1980’, Military Affairs 45, no. 2 (April 
1981), p. 87. 
31
 Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought 
Era, 1880-1905, reprint ed. (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1964), p. v. 
32
 Gough, op. cit., pp. 9-10; Marder, op. cit. 
33
 Arthur J. Marder, Portrait of an Admiral: the Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1952); Idem, FGDN. 
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works were generally well received, notwithstanding some of Richmond’s contemporaries being 
uncomfortable with Marder’s uncritical praise of that radical Admiral,34 and remain extremely 
influential, for better or worse. In all these works Marder followed a basic philosophy: 
‘I bring no theories of history to my research and writing, nor do I arrive at any 
startling conclusions. I am essentially a narrative historian. I want to tell a story 
and to tell it well, and with a liberal infusion of the personal, the human, 
component, for at bottom, to quote Sir Lewis Namier: ‘The subject matter of 
history is human affairs, men in action, things which have happened and how they 
happened.’ … One aspect of this outlook is my conviction that the writing of 
history must include a sense of how events appeared to the participants, bereft of 
the knowledge possessed by historians and others writing long afterwards.’35 
 
This simplicity of approach is one reason why the foundational works—and especially 
Marder’s—have endured to the point of becoming the historical orthodoxy—ignoring the 
obvious but usually unstated fact that the foundational works, being the oldest, have thus had the 
greatest opportunity of reaching public consciousness. So while the Prewar Era has always been 
acknowledged as being ‘important and complex’, so too was the ‘superficial outline of events’ 
always considered ‘in most respects, clear enough’,36 and as a result the works of Marder and 
Woodward have remained the popular view of the period. 
Despite the popularity of the ‘foundational’ interpretation with the broader public, that 
interpretation is now recognized as being, at the very least, narrow and incomplete by the 
majority of naval historians. Paul Kennedy writes of Fisher’s redeployment of British capital 
ship—a term which Fisher himself detested37—strength that ‘it has been pointed out that the pace 
                                                 
34
 See Admiral Sir Frederic Dreyer to Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair, 19 September 1952, quoted in Barry D. Hunt, 
‘Richmond and the Education of the Royal Navy’, in James Goldrick and John Hattendorf (eds.), Mahan Is Not 
Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond 
(Newport, CT: Naval War College Press, 1993), p. 67. 
35
 Quoted in Gough, op cit., p. 23. 
36
 Ruddock Mackay, ‘Historical Reinterpretations of the Anglo-German Naval Rivalry, 1897-1914’, in Gerald Jordan 
(ed.), op. cit., p. 33. 
37
 In a fragmentary letter Fisher complained about the use of the term in a ‘silly’ Times article: 
‘Capital’ ships… is a most silly name! Who is going to draw the line? 
 ‘About Battleships there can be no mistake[.] It’s thick armour alone that puts them in that category. 
11 
 
of this reorganization of British naval policy from an anti-Dual Alliance to an anti-German 
posture should not be exaggerated’.38 Many go further still than this.39 Nevertheless the German-
centric interpretation of the era has not yet disappeared from contemporary historical accounts of 
both the Prewar Era and the First World War itself, and the same is true of those First Sea Lords 
of the Prewar Era not named Fisher. Hew Strachan repeats the common contention regarding 
these men: ‘The combination of frequent change and weak appointees ensured that the 
professional leadership of the Royal Navy lost its direction in the four years preceding the war.’40 
Yet the facts do not, and in most cases cannot, entirely support this interpretation, and in 
some cases they suggest strongly that completely different motives and rationales were at work.
41
 
The second generation of historians to focus upon the Prewar Era, the Revisionists, recognized 
that much in the old narrative structure could be challenged. 
 
Generation II: Revisionist Works 
History does not stand still, and neither does the historical narrative. Some of the most 
important works to be written in the field of historical studies are those meant to revise an 
existing narrative. This is as applicable to the Prewar Era as it is to any other field. Where 
Marder and Woodward began, others followed and in the process discovered additional details 
with which to broaden understanding of the period. By 1977 Fisher biographer and major early 
revisionist figure Ruddock Mackay could safely declare that ‘new evidence has latterly been 
                                                                                                                                                             
 ‘Tell [Private Secretary to the First Lord Vincent] Baddely [sic] I hope the First Lord won’t swallow 
“capital” ships! It would be endless argument!’ Fisher to Unknown, 29 December 1907, MSS 254/930/20, 
Baron Tweedmouth MSS, NMRN. 
38
 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914, paperback ed. (London: The Ashfield Press, 
1987), p. 279. 
39
 Matthew S. Seligmann, ‘Switching Horses: The Admiralty’s Recognition of the Threat from Germany, 1900-1905’, 
IHR 30, no. 2 (June 2008), pp. 240-242. 
40
 Hew Strachan, The First World War, Volume I: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 380. These 
‘weak appointees’ are Fisher’s three prewar successors: Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, VC, Admiral Sir 
Francis Bridgeman, and Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg. 
41
 Ruddock F. Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973), pp. 236-238. 
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brought to light by research on a scale requiring periodic reassessments of the subject as a 
whole.’42 
Greatly assisting this process was the public availability of governmental archives, which 
had previously been closed to the scholastic community at large. While Marder had been given 
exceptionally privileged access to the Royal Navy’s own historical archives several years before 
they were to be publically released under the 50-year rule, he was still largely at the mercy of the 
Admiralty in terms of what official material he could or could not use. The fiftieth anniversary of 
the end of the First World War and the increasing number of personal document collections being 
released to the public through museums and libraries meant that historians could now draw from 
much deeper wells of primary source material than those previous works. 
Additional developments in historical scholarship meant that revisionists approached the 
subject of the prewar Royal Navy from different directions than had previously been used. 
Resultantly, older truisms such as the Royal Navy being constitutionally resistant to any sort of 
new technologies were challenged. Professor Bryan Ranft wrote that Mahan’s argument that the 
slowness apparent in the changing of tactics to mean the advance of technology could not be 
attributable to the ‘professional conservatism’ of senior naval officers as this ‘is too simple a 
cause to be satisfying.’43 For the Revisionists, simple monocausal explanations were no longer 
adequate for many events during the Prewar Era. Paul Kennedy, in ‘the first detailed 
reconsideration of the history of British sea power’ since Mahan’s epochal The Influence of Sea 
Power upon History placed the Royal Navy’s rise and eventual ‘decline’ over the centuries 
‘within a far wider framework of national, international, economic, political, and strategical 
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considerations without which the terms “sea power” and “naval mastery” cannot properly be 
understood.’44 
It was in this period of rapid expansion of both source availability and scope that Jon 
Sumida made his mark by studying both the origins of Dreadnought and her cruiser equivalents 
the Invincibles, and Arthur Hungerford Pollen’s work on fire control machinery and their relation 
to subsequent British construction policy. The ultimate result of Sumida’s investigations was In 
Defence of Naval Supremacy, described by one reviewer as an ‘extraordinarily impressive piece 
of detective work which will change the way in which historians look at British pre-1914 naval 
policy.’ A brilliant culmination to Sumida’s research, In Defence is also one of the most 
important, and possibly the most important, pieces of scholarship produced by the second 
generation of historians studying the Prewar Era. It further contains, in the introduction to its 
second addition, a statement that might almost be considered a manifesto for the revisionist 
generation’s collective work: 
‘The present monograph on what has been called “the Dreadnought Revolution” 
of the early twentieth century deals with national security decision making as a 
multi-level process that was influenced heavily by budgetary pressure, technical 
uncertainty, flaws in bureaucratic organization, and the vagaries of chance. Such 
an approach differs sharply from previous treatments of British naval policy, 
which have for the most part focused on the actions of a few senior officers and 
politicians, paid scant attention to finance, greatly oversimplified the technical 
issues, ignored administrative context, and largely factored out the role of 
happenstance. This book, as a consequence … not only depart[s] from established 
accounts, but taken collectively raise[s] serious doubts about their fundamental 
narrative and interpretive integrity.’45 
 
The degree in which the various historians of the Revisionist approach share the above view is, 
naturally, as varied as the number of their various published works. Ruddock Mackay, who was 
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one of the first to challenge the premise that Fisher’s reforms were directed primarily against 
Germany in his thorough and groundbreaking biography Fisher of Kilverstone, wrote with great 
sympathy for the preceding generation: 
‘Inevitably, the present writer is much indebted to the works of Professor Arthur J. 
Marder. However it should doubtless be mentioned here that some sources for 
Fisher and his times were not available when Marder was collecting material for 
his volumes… Moreover, even so remarkable a researcher as Professor Marder 
could not be expected to see every document in the collections which he 
investigated.’46 
 
Others have been far less kind, in some cases bordering on abusive. H.P. Willmott, well-known 
for his eccentric and unconventional views on naval history, felt confident enough to declare 
with a very much undue smugness that Marder’s corpus was ‘slavish worship of Fisher by an 
author who was hooked on the Carlyle portrayal of history as the deeds of great men’.47 
Regardless of their feelings toward those who came before them, many of the major 
Revisionist monographs and articles have come to take an honoured position alongside the best 
of the preceding generation. Attempting to write a history of the Fisher Era without reference to 
books like In Defence or Nicholas Lambert’s Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution leads, almost 
inevitably, to the creation of an unbalanced and incomplete result. 
One of the most obvious lapses that result from disregarding the Revisionist accounts of 
the Prewar Era is a persistent misconception of the battleship Dreadnought and the resultant 
‘Dreadnought Revolution’ mentioned by Sumida. As another historian put it, ‘the dreadnought 
revolution appears clearer in retrospect than at the time: the basic facts that appeared in 1905-6 
were less simple than those now taken by us to constitute the revolution.’48 The illumination of 
Fisher’s intended function for the Dreadnought—or at least a clearer understanding of Fisher’s 
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intentions—is one of the major accomplishments of writers such as Mackay, Sumida and 
Nicholas Lambert. Rather than a weapon designed to hobble Germany’s naval expansion49 and 
that was intended from the start for long range gunnery, Dreadnought was largely a prototype for 
the ships Fisher truly saw as the future of the Navy’s capital ship construction: the large 
armoured cruiser—later to become better known as the battlecruiser. The development of this 
interpretation is largely the work of Sumida, beginning with his 1979 article in The Journal of 
Modern History
50
 and continuing after In Defence in the form of several more articles on prewar 
development of gunnery tactics.
51
 Fisher had in fact ‘preferred the battle cruiser to the 
dreadnought battleship from the start and was later convinced that foreign dreadnoughts could be 
trumped by battle cruisers equipped with a fire-control system proposed by Arthur Pollen.’52 
Fisher’s intentions were to give the Royal Navy a qualitative edge over their foes, which would 
be more economical by far than the quantitative advantage required by the two-power standard 
which served as a political benchmark for the Royal Navy’s strength at the start of the twentieth 
century.
53
 Put another way, a Royal Navy composed largely of battle cruisers and submarines—
another technological development Fisher strongly advocated—would be cheaper and more cost 
effective than the traditional force structure of battleships and the various species of cruisers.
54
 
The idea of Fisher’s interest in submarines and battlecruisers being in part a manifestation 
of his desire to make the Royal Navy a more economic armed service and to ultimately produce 
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an asymmetrical force structure—to use a very anachronistic term—has received fullest 
development in the studies of Nicholas Lambert. The primary thesis of these works is that at the 
turn of the century the Navy faced a major financial crisis because the willingness of the 
Treasury and successive governments to fund new construction dropped as the cost of new 
capital ships—both conventional battleships and, after the development of sufficiently strong and 
light steel, armoured cruisers—rose dramatically. Fisher’s goals and reforms as First Sea Lord 
were dedicated towards economizing the annual naval estimates. To achieve this goal he was 
willing to take the dramatic step of employing torpedo craft, especially submarines, in Home 
Waters as a ‘flotilla defence’ against much-feared but far-fetched ‘bolt from the blue’ invasions 
of or raids on the British Isles by an enemy power. That power was initially France but this 
quickly changed when Germany came to be seen as principal threat in Europe. The heavy units 
previously kept in home waters were thus available to be deployed elsewhere should the situation 
call for it, and both the major redeployment of the Fleets in late 1904 and the re-establishment of 
the Home Fleet in 1907 were intended to be steps on this road. While this effort did not fully 
succeed, after leaving the Admiralty in 1910 Fisher was able to convince Winston Churchill of 
the validity of this plan, and when the latter became First Lord in 1911 he attempted several 
times to revive the ‘flotilla defence’ approach in response to repeated political crises involving 
the naval estimates in 1912 and 1914. Churchill had even managed by the summer of 1914 to 
bring the Sea Lords around to a radical policy of increasing submarine construction by 
substituting them for some of the capital ships funded under the 1914-15 Estimates a few days 
before the outbreak of war called off all bets.
55
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The above summary does not perhaps entirely do justice to the many points Lambert 
makes and neglects several major themes, such as the intensive cooperation between the 
Admiralty and the private shipbuilding and heavy armaments firms; however it is sufficient for 
present purposes. Like Sumida’s work, Lambert explicitly challenges the previously-held view 
that the Admiralty was ‘in the grip of a conservative, even reactionary, group who had been 
obsessed with battleships’ who ultimately left the Navy at the outbreak of war using ‘an outdated 
strategic doctrine better suited to a navy from the age of sail than a fleet in the age of steam.’56 
Also like Sumida and the other Revisionists, Nicholas Lambert uses a myriad of primary sources 
to advance his argument, many of which are not widely known or were unavailable to the 
historians of Marder’s day. The result is that Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, In Defence of 
Naval Supremacy, and other key Revisionist works often challenge the older conventional 
assumptions regarding the motives and intentions of various figures from the Prewar Era. In fact, 
Revisionists often stress that they rely on extensive dissection of their primary sources, with the 
implication that they are most always convinced that those sources contain more and often 
different information than their face value can suggest, or at any rate more than was previously 
ascribed to them. This is especially true of Admiral Fisher. In Revisionist eyes, Fisher was very 
evasive (to say the least!) regarding his true motivations even in his publications intended for 
internal use by the Admiralty, to such an extent that ‘even scrupulous assessment of all the prints 
[issued by Fisher] would have yielded only fragments of Fisher’s actual line of thinking’.57 The 
difficulties in understanding Fisher’s ‘actual line of thinking’ led many of Marder’s successors 
‘to seek sanctuary in the older accounts… whose main elements are familiar, plausible, relatively 
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simple, and consistent with existing presentations of imperial and military policy, and diplomatic 
parliamentary affairs.’58 
While primary source material such as manuscript collections ‘are essentially the flesh 
and blood’ of history,59 extant sources certainly give cause for concern of the kind shown by the 
revisionists. Fisher most of all. His memoirs and later letters often contained statements totally at 
odds with actual fact, a tendency for which he made no apology.
60
 In addition he was known for 
dissembling, and is recorded as claiming that he ‘never in all my life have ever yet explained, 
and don’t mean to.’61 The trouble is by no means restricted to Fisher, although it is not always of 
the same variety. ‘Experience has shown, however, that unforeseen disasters may overtake 
private papers unless their future is explicitly cared for’, is how one director of the National 
Maritime Museum summarized the matter.
62
 The principal players in the Prewar Era often 
destroyed their more controversial letters and documents before passing them on for preservation, 
so that for every officer like Sir Herbert Richmond who left vivid accounts of controversial 
occurrences, there were many more like Sir Henry Oliver who out of a sense of gentleman’s 
probity disposed of his wartime diaries.
63
 Other individuals left collections focused on a few 
incidents in their long careers.
64
 In some cases, such as Sir Arthur Wilson and Sir George 
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Callaghan, no papers at all were left behind.
65
 Not for nothing did Arthur Marder write a relative 
of one flag officer, Admiral Sir Alexander Bethell, ‘There should be an Act of Parliament 
forbidding flag officers to destroy primary source material of value to the historian!! But, alas, 
they all do it.’66 Official archives fare little better, with one work citing as ‘a general rule’ that 
perhaps ‘1 per cent of the paper produced by government departments survives in archives’.67 
These facts taken together more than justify the caution exhibited by Revisionists in 
taking the accuracy of their sources for granted, and in many cases it is the extreme care taken in 
interpreting sources as well as the large quantity of materials cited that make the most important 
works of the Revisionists as monumental as they are. One review of Naval Revolution concludes 
rightly that ‘[t]he history of the Royal Navy before 1914 will never be the same again.’68 
This status as indispensable parts of the historical corpus, however, does not prevent 
further reinterpretation of the Prewar Era any more than it did for those historians who followed 
Marder’s generation. 
 
Generation III: The Post-revisionist Works 
While the foundational interpretation of pre-1914 Royal Navy development still holds 
sway in popular historical accounts, the Revisionist generation has supplanted it among 
specialists to the point where their views, perhaps inevitably and perhaps ironically, make up the 
current academic orthodoxy. The passage of time since their publication—more than thirty years 
in the case of Jon Sumida’s original 1977 article on the battlecruiser and Pollen’s apparatus—has 
enabled them to be digested and accepted. Time has also greatly reduced the likelihood of further 
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large primary source collections appearing, although some collections remain in private hands.
69
 
Thus the members of the third generation of historians to approach the Prewar Era are largely 
devoted to either filling in gaps in the historical record using already available material, or going 
over the works published by the previous two generations with a very fine comb. While the term 
‘Post-revisionist’ might imply fundamental disagreement with the members of the previous 
generation of historian, this is largely not the case in practice, and ‘Post-revisionist’ is used here 
more for lack of a better expression. Having said this, in certain areas this third generation 
scholarship, perhaps inevitably, contradicts earlier work by either one of both of the preceding 
generations and in some cases, the results have been unpleasant for all involved. It should be 
noted, however, that there are just as many occasions where third generation research has 
reaffirmed the conclusions reached by the previous generations. 
One of the major figures among Post-Revisionists is John Brooks. Like Sumida, Brooks 
concentrated on the question of how the Royal Navy handled issues regarding fire control prior 
to 1914, and in particular the choice of Captain Frederic Dreyer’s systems over those offered by 
Arthur Pollen and what are assumed as the subsequent results of that decision on British 
accuracy of fire during the battle of Jutland. Brooks took issue with several claims about the 
Dreyer Table, and the result was Dreadnought Gunnery at the Battle of Jutland, a spirited 
defence of Dreyer’s work.70 Instead of a systematic conspiracy by various serving officers to 
‘crab’ Pollen’s equipment in favour of Dreyer’s, it was mostly Pollen’s extravagant promises and 
difficult attitude during discussions with the Admiralty that proved to be the downfall of his own 
system. This, incidentally, is confirmation of a point made by Professor Andrew Lambert: the 
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Admiralty was much more willing to accept new technologies when they could be obtained from 
established manufacturing interests rather than typically much smaller individual concerns, no 
matter how skilled the latter might be.
71
 Dreadnought Gunnery is also a textbook example of 
how Post-revisionist narratives function. They take the work of revisionists and subject them to 
additional analysis of the sort the Revisionists themselves applied to their own predecessors, and 
as a result they tend to both confirm certain aspects of the revisionist work and correct other 
aspects, or at least provide a new perspective on them. 
Another Post-revisionist is Matthew Seligmann, whose major work focuses on British 
intelligence efforts in Germany, in particular the work of Naval and Military Attachés.
72
 As 
Seligman observes most sagely, ‘Nicholas Lambert makes a strong case for financial 
considerations rather than the German threat being the motivation for the redistribution of the 
fleet. I regard his case as compelling, but am not convinced the two considerations are mutually 
exclusive’.73 Other Post-revisionists are engaged in work that could legitimately fall into the 
Revisionist rubric. An example is Nicholas Black’s work on the Admiralty War Staff during the 
First World War.
74
 
This is an appropriate moment to note that these works only tangentially discuss the 
creation and evolution of the Grand Fleet in the years prior to the war when it was known as 
simply as the Home Fleet. Jellicoe’s The Grand Fleet, which has been quite unfairly called an 
‘insipid apologia’,75 includes only a few of the major details, leading Professor Grove to lament 
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this exclusion.
76
 Both Fisher’s biographer and cupbearer Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon and the 
great historian of the period Professor Arthur Marder discuss the creation of the Home Fleet, but 
their accounts, while valuable, leave something to be desired by modern standards. Marder in 
particular is now out of favour. Once regarded as the ‘Olympian adjudicator of the Anglo-
German naval race’,77 from the publication of Ruddock Mackay’s biography of Admiral Fisher 
onwards to the present day, ‘Marder’s arguments have come in for detailed and sustained 
criticisms.’ 78  As a result, ‘few historians now accept his analytical framework.’ 79  Bacon, 
meanwhile, while still considered a valuable source, is considered too partisan towards Fisher. 
This is unsurprising since even during Fisher’s term as First Sea Lord Bacon was seen by fellow 
naval officers as being Fisher’s factotum, and Fisher himself once explained during a minor 
argument with Controller Sir Henry Jackson and Director of Naval Construction Sir Philip Watts 
that ‘I don’t want them to imagine I’ve put Bacon on to them’.80 
With these objections borne in mind, the closest there is to a detailed modern account of 
the Home Fleet’s birth and subsequent development comes from Nicholas Lambert’s widely 
praised Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution.81 However, as will be shown, Lambert’s general 
approach to the Home Fleet—and in fact to the heavy units of the prewar Royal Navy in 
general—is in places unsatisfactory and often focused in such a way as to produce what can just 
possibly be described as an inaccurate interpretation of events. Lambert’s insistence that Fisher 
was striving to replace the battleship with flotilla craft as the guarantor of British security in 
Home Waters, and that his reforms were likewise in pursuit of this objective, has meant his 
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treatment of the Home Fleet is based on the assumption that the torpedo-armed vessels were its 
centrepiece, not the battleships and armoured cruisers. This was also the reason Fisher declared 
to the First Lord of the Admiralty at the time of the Home Fleet’s creation that the new 
organization would be a ‘real fighting fleet of the first quality and peculiarly adapted for the first 
onslaught of war’. 82  Lambert’s contention is that the Home Fleet was ‘peculiarly adapted’ 
because it was built around the torpedo instead of the heavy gun. 
Such a narrative is tempting. It challenges both Fisher’s reputation as an enthusiastic but 
generally erratic strategist, and the idea of an Admiralty that shut its eyes and ears to the advance 
of technology, as the ‘self-serving, politically naïve and technologically determinist accounts left 
by nineteenth century engineers, who wished to portray themselves as high minded servants of 
humanity’ would have it. 83  Unfortunately, the ‘flotilla defence’ theory of the Home Fleet’s 
origins is, it will be shown, incomplete. This also means very attractive theories based on 
Lambert’s work, such as Professor Grove’s assertion that the Home Fleet was ‘a conservative 
reaction to [Fisher’s] radical ideas of torpedo-armed flotilla defence and battle cruiser squadrons 
for more distant work’, must also be abandoned.84 The result is that, once again, a satisfactory 
account of the genesis of the Grand Fleet is, one might say, conspicuous by its absence. 
 
Research Tasks and Methods 
It is this absence that this thesis means to fill, at the same time answering the general 
question of what Fisher and the Admiralty intended from the new organization. This is not an 
easy question to answer, since those intentions changed rapidly even before the Home Fleet was 
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formally created in 1907. The Home Fleet (or properly, the Home Fleets) of 1914 were vastly 
different from what was initially proposed in the summer of 1906. To understand fully the 
processes at work that created this difference, the previous events and developments that led to 
the creation, as well as the subsequent expansion and development of the Home Fleet and the 
Admiralty’s intentions for its use in an Anglo-German war shall be examined in detail, and 
hopefully in as thorough a manner as is possible. To achieve this goal a large number of primary 
sources have been employed. This includes many that have been previously cited but perhaps not 
used to full advantage, as well as several that have escaped serious usage in previous studies, and 
others that have never been cited at all. Before considering how this question will be approached 
in this study, however, it is worth considering briefly how the Home Fleet developed 
 
A Brief History of the Home Fleet 
Professor Marder wrote that the Home Fleet ‘was a logical development of the policy of 
concentration at home which had been initiated in December 1904.’85 Contrary to the arguments 
put forward by members of the Revisionist school, this venerable assessment is more or less right. 
However, Marder’s discussion of the Home Fleet does not tell the whole story.86 A major reason 
for the Home Fleet’s creation was indeed the growing maritime strength of Imperial Germany. 
Germany replaced the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance as the Royal Navy’s most likely opponent 
after the entente cordiale and the destruction of most of the Russian Navy during the Russo-
Japanese War. With this change in Britain’s strategic position, the Admiralty had to re-orient 
themselves away from the Channel and the Mediterranean and towards the North Sea and the 
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Baltic. This reorientation began in the middle of 1905, although there were those in the 
Admiralty that had been forecasting such a change in policy for some time.
87
 It is here that 
Marder’s analysis requires serious revision, as the revisionists are generally correct that Fisher’s 
initial reforms were oriented against the Dual Alliance and not Germany.
88
 
At the same time, Germany had not been entirely ignored, although it took time for the 
Admiralty to begin specific planning for an Anglo-German war.
89
 Untangling the exact details of 
this reorientation is difficult enough, but an added complication arises from British domestic 
politics, specifically the Liberal Party’s landslide victory in the General Election of 1906. 
Committed to reform and retrenchment, the new Cabinet demanded naval economies on top of 
those Fisher had introduced for the previous Tory administration (economies that were, not 
incidentally, the great and primary reason Fisher was made First Sea Lord in the first place).
90
 It 
is against this background that the initial proposal for the Home Fleet was put forward in the 
summer of 1906. Initially this plan was simply a consolidation of the existing reserve divisions 
together with a reduction in active capital ship strength. The controversy this ignited was 
increased when Fisher added an active-duty division to the planned Home Fleet based in The 
Nore that would include Fisher’s revolutionary dreadnoughts. 
Opposition intensified because of the activities of the bombastic and almost 
pathologically insubordinate Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, who had been appointed 
Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet. For all its prestige, Beresford’s new command had 
been stripped down to a small core of armoured vessels while the Home Fleet was being built up 
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gradually and, Fisher argued, discretely. Beresford’s campaign against Fisher was only partially 
due to disagreements over the Home Fleet; Beresford had his eyes on Fisher’s purple day and 
night.
91
 It was a battle that culminated in the final abolition of the Channel Fleet and Beresford 
spearheading a Cabinet enquiry into Admiralty policy which despite the serious nature of the 
matters being discussed often veered towards the farcical.
92
 
In the fallout from this affair, Fisher determined that it was time to hand over the 
Admiralty to a suitable successor, and with the support of and ultimate personal intervention 
from King Edward VII, convinced the retired Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Knyvet Wilson, VC, 
to return to active service as First Sea Lord. Wilson, who was obstinate and taciturn—even 
obstructive—by nature, undertook no major changes of strategic policy during his term of office, 
although to extrapolate from this that he achieved little of consequence is incorrect. Indeed, it 
was under Wilson’s aegis that the Royal Navy began to develop naval aviation in earnest.93 This 
lack of apparent zeal for reform coupled with a disastrous showing at a crucial meeting of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, proved a death sentence for Wilson and First Lord Reginald 
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McKenna’s careers at the Admiralty. Replacing them were the unassuming but talented Admiral 
Sir Francis Bridgeman and a young Cabinet highflyer named Winston Churchill. 
Sir Francis Bridgeman had been specially chosen as the Home Fleet’s initial Commander-
in-Chief in 1907, and by 1911 had a better knowledge of that force than any other man in the 
Navy. His broad support for Fisher’s policies was another strong item in his resume, especially 
since he retained the respect of both Fisherites and Beresfordians. Despite this wealth of practical 
seagoing experience, Bridgeman was not in his element as a member of the Admiralty, though 
this was a trait shared by many flag officers of the period. Bridgeman and Churchill, despite a 
poor working relationship that ended in the former’s scandalous departure from the Admiralty 
after thirteen months in office, managed to accomplish a great deal together. A Naval Staff, 
something long objected to (especially by Fisher and Wilson) was brought into being, although it 
was perhaps inevitably imperfect in form and function.
94
 The Home Fleet was also reorganized 
on a greater scale than had been undertaken since its absorption of the Channel Fleet in 1909—
which included a rearrangement of command responsibilities, which found favour with 
influential fleet commanders.
95
 
At the same time the Navy’s old basis for strategic planning—the seizure of advanced 
bases for flotilla craft to enable tripwire-like observational blockades of enemy naval bases—was 
at last replaced by a more ‘passive’ strategy of distant blockade which had originated from the 
pioneering 1907 studies which formed the basis for new War Plans specifically targeted against 
Germany.
96
 Crucial in this change of strategy was the last pre-war Commander-in-Chief of the 
Home Fleet, Admiral Sir George Callaghan, who alongside his staff objected to the older 
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strategic schemes as being unsuited for operations against a German fleet with powerful torpedo 
boat strength and a rapidly growing submarine force.
97
 Callaghan’s concern over enemy torpedo 
craft—and not just submarines—was a major driving force in the development of the Home 
Fleet’s strategic planning and tactical doctrine.98 As a matter of interest, Callaghan was no deep 
theorist. Instead, like Bridgeman, he was a practical sailor. A prewar Home Fleet staff officer 
recalled that he was ‘of the old sea-dog type like Charlie Beresford and A.K. Wilson.’99 
This concern over enemy torpedo craft, combined with the problems of controlling an 
armada the size of the 1914 fleet with only signal flags and spotty wireless telegraphy, led to the 
rigid and much-derided Grand Fleet Battle Orders. These gave Jellicoe (and subsequently Sir 
David Beatty) reliable control over the entire fleet at the expense of flexibility farther down the 
chain of command, although this loss of flexibility is sometimes exaggerated.
100
 
Bridgeman’s replacement was Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, whose relationship 
with Churchill has been criticized for its lack of internecine conflict—Fisher referred to 
Battenberg derisively as ‘the Jelly Fish’ on at least one occasion.101 Tempting as it may be to 
accuse Battenberg of being unfit for the job after the disastrous beginning of the First World War 
at sea, a more nuanced view of his relationship with a difficult First Lord is required. Battenberg, 
though often libelled by colleagues for his German origins, was nonetheless widely admired for 
his intelligence. The truth of the matter seems to be that Battenberg was very good at keeping 
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Churchill in check, but in a way which left a poor impression on most onlookers, especially those 
within the service. 
The beginning of 1914 is seen by Nicholas Lambert as the point where Churchill and the 
Admiralty finally abandoned the battleship as a standard of strength in favour of a new concept 
transmuting the four dreadnoughts funded in the 1914-15 Estimates into ‘units of power which 
could, if desirable, be expressed in any other form.’102 It is also said that the Admiralty was on 
the verge of replacing two battleships from the 1914-15 Navy Estimates with submarines or even 
a novel ‘torpedo cruiser’ design.103 This is not accurate, since equal evidence exists suggesting 
adoption of this ‘substitution policy’ was not a serious likelihood,104 as even after the outbreak of 
war design work on at least two of the 1914-15 battleships continued.
105
 Furthermore by the 
Admiralty’s later reckoning the two complete Turkish battleships taken over in August 1914 had 
replaced the second two projected battleships as far as procurement considerations went.
106
 
In conclusion, the Home Fleet at the commencement of the First World War was the 
direct descendent of Admiral Fisher’s initial 1906 scheme for a new reserve force in Home 
Waters that he later expanded to include an active-duty component that, although never stated 
explicitly at the time, was likely meant to one day replace the existing Channel Fleet as Britain’s 
principal naval force for defence of Britain itself. The controversy which the creation of the 
Home Fleet brought about, and the historical debates over Fisher’s motives—both in creating the 
Home Fleet and his overall intentions for the Royal Navy in general—have left an already-
difficult to disentangle story of naval reform even more complicated to describe. In the end, 
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however, the oft-maligned works of Marder are closer to the mark than has often been allowed, 
although they are still incomplete for the reasons the revisionists like Nicholas Lambert and Jon 
Sumida have pronounced over the years. 
 
Some Final Notes on Structure and Content 
This study, with the exception of a few necessary digressions, uses a chronological 
approach. Events and intentions are described in the order in which they occurred as far as this is 
possible. This approach is the best way to explain many of the complexities surrounding the 
Home Fleet in the Prewar Era; indeed, it offers many advantages over a thematic approach. It 
may help in untangling many of the misperceptions and false conclusions drawn about this 
subject by others. 
Chapter 1 details the strategic and financial situation facing the Royal Navy in the first 
years of the twentieth century, and Fisher’s responses to them. It is very much a synthesis of 
previous historians’ work with the exception of a more detailed analysis of Fisher’s initial 1904-
1905 redistribution of the fleets. The purpose is to throw more light on Fisher’s initial intentions 
for this reorganization. Hopefully the results of this will provide an accurate, comprehensible 
illustration of the Navy’s ‘state of play’ on the eve of the creation of the Home Fleet. 
Chapter 2 describes first the strategic shift by the Navy towards a confrontation with 
Germany—as opposed to the Dual Alliance—that occurred roughly simultaneously with the 
Russian Navy’s destruction in the Russo-Japanese War. It will be seen, however, that these two 
events were not as closely related as sometimes thought. The great political shift to the Liberal 
Party in 1906 will be shown as the major engine of the Home Feet’s creation, and the details of 
that creation will be discussed in detail. 
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Starting in Chapter 3, the focus will increasingly shift towards general Admiralty policy, 
starting with a discussion of British naval planning for an Anglo-German War. This will give 
additional context for the Home Fleet’s creation. Subsequent chapters will follow the pattern of 
greater emphasis on the Admiralty versus the fleets themselves, because the Home Fleet by 1909 
was the largest and most important of the Royal Navy’s organizations. By 1912, it will be seen, 
the Home Fleets in large part were the Royal Navy, and the concerns and opinions of the fleet’s 
officers (especially the C.-in-C., Admiral Sir George Callaghan), were the concerns driving the 
Admiralty as a whole. 
An exception to this rule is the final chapter, which focuses on the month prior to the 
outbreak of war. The Admiralty decision to mobilize towards the end of July sent the Home Fleet 
into action, and the details of this mobilization are of interest. They were the culmination of 
years of planning, practice, and paperwork. They deserve close study. However, before 
considering how this question will be approached in this study, it is worth considering briefly 
how the Home Fleet developed. Additionally, prior to now the period between Battenberg’s order 
to ‘stand the fleet fast’ and the outbreak of war has in large part fallen through the cracks. It is 
often noted how the Royal Navy’s mobilization for war proceeded smoothly, but the finer details 
are overlooked. It seems therefore appropriate to close by shining a light on such details. 
A final word regarding the historiographical background of this thesis. It belongs to the 
Post-revisionist generation, and is an expansion of work previously done for a Masters' thesis on 
the wider subject of the Anglo-German naval rivalry and the place of the Revisionists’ work in 
the history of that period.
107
 That thesis closed with a plea for further research on the subject. The 
results of that research make up what follows. As always in history, more work remains possible. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Admiral Fisher’s Reforms, 1904-1906 
 
 So much has been written about Admiral Fisher’s tenure as First Sea Lord that to attempt 
yet another complete narrative here would be pointless. That being said, any attempt to trace the 
Navy’s development during this period (whether referred to as the ‘Fisher Era’ or the ‘Prewar 
Era’)—even after his retirement in January 1910—would be next to impossible without at least a 
cursory discussion of what Fisher did, and in some cases did not, achieve during his half-decade 
as First Sea Lord. Strong emphasis must also be placed on his initial plans presented to the 
Government prior to his taking office, a package of reforms collectively known as ‘The Scheme’. 
These plans have been the subject of much discussion and criticism since they were first written 
in mid-1904. The creation and subsequent development of the Home Fleet cannot be adequately 
described without placing it in the context of Fisher’s work as First Sea Lord. 
 Before examining Fisher’s accomplishments, some words on Fisher’s personality and 
methods seem appropriate here. Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher was a great international public figure. 
A rumour that his mother was a Cingalese princess—an accusation whose undertones scarcely 
need elaboration—gained such currency that when a comprehensive denial came out, it appeared 
not only in British newspapers but in the New York Times as well.
1
 When Fisher took office as 
First Sea Lord the U.S. Navy’s attaché in London described him in a communique to the Navy 
Department as ‘a man of great ability and force of character’ who had made his mark ‘as an 
energetic flag officer, great administrator and ready organizer’. 2  This was an adequate 
description of a man who had risen to the top of a service then dominated by the upper middle-
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class élite largely through his own abilities and energies.
3
 Those energies were extraordinary in 
their scope, as were his goals upon taking office, but while Fisher was naturally the prime mover 
in every major reform and reorganization that took place, he rarely acted alone. In fact it is 
hardly likely that Fisher could have accomplished as much as he did without the remarkably 
broad coalition of fellow officers, civil servants, politicians, and public figures who, if not 
entirely of like mind with Fisher, nevertheless believed in his being ‘almost entirely a force for 
good’, at least when kept under firm supervision.4 These men were of both parties, and Fisher 
himself never announced any personal loyalty to either the Liberals or the Conservatives. As 
evidence of this attitude, Admiral Sir George King-Hall records the following anecdote, which 
dates from just before his ennoblement to the title of Baron Fisher of Kilverstone: 
‘Lord Rosebery wrote and asked him which side of the house he was going to sit. 
He said on the cross benches and quoted the following lines: 
Sworn to no party, 
Of no sect am I. 
I can’t be silent 
And, I will not lie.’5 
 
This non-partisan attitude and the broad composition of his friends served Fisher well. ‘Had it 
not been for the loyalty of his friends,’ Marder wrote, ‘he would have gone under.’6 Aside from 
his co-workers at the Admiralty, and the members of his unofficial brain trust known as the 
‘Fishpond’, his allies included major figures from both the Tory and Liberal aisles, the most 
important of whom was probably A.J. Balfour, whose confidence in Fisher’s abilities checked a 
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surge of anti-Fisher feelings amongst the Tories before and after their defeat in 1905.
7
 Of the 
major Liberals Fisher relied on Viscount Esher and Reginald McKenna once the latter took over 
as First Lord of the Admiralty. Fisher also cultivated ties with the eminent naval historian Julian 
Corbett and many prominent newsmen such as Arnold White, W.T. Stead, and J.L. Garvin. 
Finally King Edward lent Fisher a great deal of moral if not constitutional support. 
It was as well that Fisher enjoyed this broad base of support. His ‘Scheme’ as it was 
presented to First Lord of the Admiralty the Second Earl of Selborne in May 1904 was an almost 
root-and-branch reorganization of the Royal Navy. The most relevant details of this Scheme and 
numerous other Fisherite reforms will be discussed in due course, but two examples show that 
notwithstanding his natural gift for showmanship he possessed the attention to detail necessary to 
earn him the plaudit of ‘Britain’s preeminent naval administrator during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.’8 First of all was his decision to run down the enormous quantities of 
commons stores built up by his predecessors, the economic savings thus achieved were 
substantial.
9
 The second is an indication of his awareness of the human factor in fighting 
efficiency: during a consideration of reforming the Navy’s steward organization he noted: 
‘In spite of the liberal increase in variety and amount of the seamen’s rations 
lately instituted, one still hears grumbling on the lower deck. The root of the 
trouble lies with the cooks, who have no idea how to make the best of the food 
supplied. They have no idea beyond ‘copper rattle’ baking and boiling, and, 
although the food supplied is of the highest quality, it is completely 
unrecognizable in the nasty mess that leaves the ship’s galley.’ 
 
Fisher’s suggested solution was a ‘School of Cookery’ for both ships’ cooks and officers’ 
messmen. ‘It is not proposed that ships’ cooks should be instructed in “larding larks” and making 
“pate de foie gras in aspic,” but even three weeks of minor instruction in what is known as “plain 
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cooking”… would make an incredible difference to the comfort and contentment of the lower 
deck.’10 Although not related to Fisher’s strategic designs, this attentive detail proves Fisher was 
no typical administrator. 
Even for a man with Fisher’s mighty energies—one physician’s remark that the Admiral 
ought to have been born twins is well known, less remembered was the reaction of a colleague to 
this anecdote: terror at the prospect of two Fishers in the Navy
11—the wide-ranging nature of the 
Scheme ensured that implementation would be a difficult proposition. However this was not due, 
as was once widely believed, to a lack of willingness for reform in the turn of the century Royal 
Navy. The rapid technological changes of the Late Victorian Era had certainly caused frictions, 
especially between older officers raised on the routines of the sailing navy and the younger 
technically-minded generation. There are many anecdotes told similar to the following: 
‘The captain of a destroyer, labouring in a heavy sea, was told by a senior officer 
by semaphore—“House your topmast.” Back came an immediate reply—“Very 
well, thank you!”’12 
 
These tensions being admitted, however, the classical view of the pre-Fisher Admiralty as being 
a shambolic creature, ‘engines running sweetly, and no-one at the helm’13 (the consequences of 
which was a Royal Navy that was ‘in certain respects a drowsy, inefficient, moth-eaten 
organism’14) is, to say the least, simplistic. Similarly, the statement that Fisher was ‘the instigator 
of the redeployment of the Royal Navy’15 is accurate only with certain caveats.16 There were, in 
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fact, many reform-minded senior officers besides Fisher. A contemporary German periodical saw 
definite signs of vitality: 
‘[A recent naval manoeuvre] clearly indicates that the British Navy has, during 
these last years, been at work with iron energy and systematically, on the further 
development of the readiness for war of its several fleets, both from the point of 
view of organization as well as of strategy and tactics.’17 
 
This self-confidence was exemplified in a bold 1902 proposal by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, 
the Commander-in-Chief, China Station, to dispose of several warships he considered useless by 
either sale or outright destruction!
18
 The same year saw the introduction of unified entry and 
training for all naval cadets, which was intended to improve harmony between the engineering 
branch and the rest of the officer corps.
19
 This latter reform was largely the work of Fisher, who 
was then Second Naval Lord. However these changes could not have occurred if the Admiralty 
was as retrograde an institution as it is sometimes described. Fisher, force of nature though he 
seems to us, was not an irresistible force. 
 Despite this general approval of reforms, or at least those reforms seen by the Admiralty 
as being of tangible and practical value,
20
 the pace of reforms prior to Fisher’s taking office can 
be described as being quite gentle. Gradualism was the order of the day. Fisher, however, was 
never a man to do things by gradual stages. Late in life he wrote: ‘The 3 Requisites for 
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Success—Ruthless, Relentless, Remorseless (The 3 R’s.)’ 21  Understandably—and also 
unfortunately—this rankled quite a few of his colleagues, including several senior naval figures 
who would otherwise have probably sided with his intentions. 
 
The Admirals’ Bill 
 Stated simply, by the end of the Victorian Era ‘British naval expenditure was running into 
the limits of what many financial experts believed the state could afford.’22 Maintaining the 
Royal Navy’s ability to, as one officer put it, ‘safeguard law and order throughout the world—
safeguard civilization, put out fires on shore, and act as guide, philosopher and friend to the 
merchant ships of all nations,’23 was an expensive proposition at the best of times, and the turn of 
the century was not the best of times. A renewal of explicit commitment to the Two Power 
Standard beginning with the Naval Defence Act of 1889 had greatly increased not only the size 
and capability of the Royal Navy’s battle fleet, 24  but had driven up the size of the Naval 
Estimates as well despite the initial costs being checked somewhat by Chancellor George 
Goschen’s debt conversion measure.25 The following year saw the publication of Captain Alfred 
Thayer Mahan’s epochal The Influence of Sea Power upon History, which helped to ignite a new 
era of navalism when ‘the immediate success of his book made naval history and naval strategy 
fashionable’.26 
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At almost the same time, three important new warship types reached maturity: the 
torpedo boat destroyer, the submarine, and the armoured cruiser. The armoured cruiser—usually 
defined as a large, fast cruiser with a belt of armour—proved the most immediately pressing to 
the Navy, although perhaps paradoxically it was actually the oldest of the three. Early efforts at 
the type like Russia’s General-Admirals and the British Shannon of the 1870s were qualified 
successes at best. Naval architecture was not enough advanced for the ships to meet their high 
specifications,
27
 but advances in steel making, and especially the Harvey and Krupp processes 
for hardening armour, enabled the construction of ships like the French Jeanne d’Arc, which 
could carry a belt capable of withstanding the fire of existing trade protection cruisers. These 
ships were perfectly suited to attacking Britain’s greatest weakness, her vulnerable mercantile 
fleet.
28
 The French fully appreciated this fact, and began building armoured cruisers in large 
numbers to implement a strategy of guerre industrielle, a development of the theories of the old 
jeune école. Direct confrontation with Britain’s battle fleet was to be avoided, the main weight of 
French attack falling on British merchantmen. The important difference between the guerre 
industrielle and the jeune école was the former’s advocation of employing the new armoured 
cruisers as commerce raiders rather than the dubious prospect of using the flimsy torpedo boats 
of the day for that role.
29
 While the first of this series of French armoured cruisers, the Dupuy de 
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Lôme, proved a disappointment,
30
 subsequent designs (especially from the Jeanne d’Arc onwards) 
were much improved. The Admiralty did not lack the wit to divine French intentions, and 
Goschen, now First Lord, told the Cabinet in 1898 that ‘so far as … can be gauged, [the French] 
have begun to recognize that it is by cruisers rather than battleships that they can damage us 
most.’31 
 Despite some scepticism in the Navy over the potential effectiveness of guerre 
industrielle,
32
 there was much for French cruisers to damage. The burgeoning Victorian 
population left Britain reliant on overseas sources for food. In 1882 wheat imports from 
Californian ports to Britain equalled 186 pounds per head and employed more than six hundred 
merchantmen, and by 1913 four-fifths of the nation’s wheat and flour were obtained by 
importation.
33
 Even these statistics may not tell the true story, since figures relating to 
international trade in grains do not record those portions of the harvest used for meat production 
and subsequently ‘travelled as pork bellies and chilled beef.’34 Regardless of statistical accuracy, 
disruption of this trade would ‘throw great numbers of people out of employment, thus lowering 
the rates of wages, while the scarcity of food will cause a rise in the prices.’35 Small wonder, then, 
that Fisher was blunter still: 
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 ‘It’s not invasion we have to fear if our Navy is beaten 
 It’s Starvation!’36 
 
 Matters were made worse since protecting the vast and scattered bottoms carrying 
Imperial commerce was not the only task of the Navy’s cruisers, armoured or otherwise. Cruisers 
were the Royal Navy’s maids-of-all-work, having inherited from their sailing predecessors the 
responsibilities for training, diplomatic ‘showing the flag’ deployments, Colonial and overseas 
police duties, and supporting the battle fleet as scouts and dispatch vessels.
37
 Such was their 
importance that Admiral Sir Frederick Richards, the Senior Naval Lord, wrote in 1893 that more 
than 106 cruisers of all types would be needed for their various duties in a hypothetical war 
against the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance.
38
 The resulting strain on the Navy’s cruiser strength 
was counterbalanced to some extent by Britain’s possession and monopolization of the lion’s 
share of the so-called ‘Victorian Internet’ infrastructure, the worldwide oceanic cable network, 
which gave a decisive advantage in global communications during any potential conflict.
39
 
The obvious but expensive remedy to the guerre industrielle threat was to construct 
armoured cruisers for the Royal Navy, and between 1897 and 1905 Britain laid down thirty-five 
such ships.
40
 Attempts were made to economize through ‘moderate dimensions’, but the resulting 
‘County’ class were in retrospect inferior ships. Some alternatives were suggested, former 
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Director of Naval Construction Sir Nathaniel Barnaby advocated either treaties protecting 
commerce from attack or building merchantmen easily convertible to auxiliary cruisers in 
wartime.
41
 Neither of these options was politically favourable, but something had to be done. In 
1901 Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Michael Hicks Beach warned that the ‘tide of prosperity 
was at least slackening and some symptoms of a change’ were already visible.42 This slackening 
was only partially the result of ballooning expenditure resulting from the Boer War. Behind the 
scenes, stronger stands were being taken as deficit spending mounted and the Naval Estimates 
increased from £20.9 million in 1897-1898 to £36.8 million in 1904-1905.
43
 The conflict 
between the Admiralty and the Treasury, a crucial yet sometimes neglected aspect of peacetime 
planning, can be summarized in excerpts from two letters written in 1901, one by the Chancellor 
and the other by the First Lord of the Admiralty: 
‘In the present enormous military expenditure … I don’t think I am unreasonable 
in asking the Admiralty to remember that for 5½ years, with hardly anything that 
can be called an exception, I have assented to everything that the First Lord 
proposed to me in the Navy Estimates… I have proved therefore that I am not 
unsympathetic, and it is too much to ask me in the present circumstances for a 
further increase of 2 ¾ millions this year[.]’44 
 
‘Beach of course is absolutely right to say to the Cabinet “We cannot afford navy 
estimates beyond such & such a figure, & I will not consent to more”. … What 
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Beach has no right to do, what he is always trying to do, and what I shall steadily 
resist, is to dictate how the Admiralty is to spend the money allotted to it. It is for 
me for instance to advise the Cabinet what ships or guns are wanted. It is for the 
Cabinet to accept or reject my advice. Beach has no right to say as he will “We 
have plenty of destroyers. I won’t consent to any more expenditure on 
Destroyers”.’45 
 
As late as February of 1904, First Lord Selborne felt unable to assure his colleagues in the 
Cabinet that substantial savings could be made in the year’s Navy Estimates despite the 
destruction of the Russian First Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur.
46
 This was despite his earlier 
plea to the Board of Admiralty that they must take financial economy 
‘to their fireside to sit beside efficiency and not leave the derelict orphan in my 
sole charge. Further they must reverse their mental process. They must cease to 
say “This is the ideal plan; how can we get money enough to carry it out?” They 
must say instead “Here is a sovereign; how much can we squeeze out of it that 
will really count for victory in a Naval war?”’47 
 
Of the senior Admirals considered to replace Lord Walter Kerr as First Sea Lord, only Fisher, 
despite his unpopularity in some quarters,
48
 offered the needed qualities of administrative talent 
and a desire to minister to the orphan of economy.
49
 There was much riding on Selborne’s efforts 
towards economy, a matter that he understood all too well: ‘I understand the situation to be that 
the whole character of the Budget, vile or passable, depends on what I can do.’50 In response, 
Chancellor Austen Chamberlain told Selborne that a ‘good Budget’ was ‘out of the question’ and 
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Selborne had been correct: ‘I think you accurately represent the financial situation when you say 
that it depends upon the Navy Estimates whether the Budget is “vile or passable”’.51 
Despite the major importance of economies in expenditure, Fisher’s certitude of 
achieving them, and (likely) the recognition that, economy or no, Fisher was the best of a very 
thin crop of candidates,
52
 it still may have taken some “‘wire-pulling’” for Fisher’s nomination to 
go through successfully.
53
 This may be to do with Fisher’s divisive reputation amongst the upper 
ranks of the Navy. Despite the controversy Fisher could generate, however, the Government had 
more important matters to consider when making their choice, and Fisher ultimately got the nod. 
 
The Scheme: Designs and (Re-)Distributions 
When Fisher took office he immediately began putting the Scheme into effect. In a letter 
to Selborne written in the summer of 1904, he claimed that once the Scheme was enacted the 
Navy ‘shall be Thirty per cent. more fit to fight and we shall be ready for instant War!’54 
Furthermore, he declared in no uncertain terms that 
‘The Scheme herein shadowed forth must be adopted as a whole! 
Simply because all portions of it are absolutely essential—and it is all so 
interlaced that any tampering will be fatal!’55 
 
This bold declaration was typical of Fisher’s unique combination of showmanship, vision and 
ruthless determination. The most famous element of the Admiralty actions resulting from the 
Scheme was the design and construction of the Dreadnought. The story of this remarkable ship 
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has been told sufficiently elsewhere,
56
 but discussing Dreadnought in isolation obscures how she 
was conceptualized as just another interlaced component of the Scheme—though admittedly a 
hugely important component. Dreadnought was just one of a series of designs resulting from 
Fisher’s Committee of Designs appointed to standardize future naval construction into a few 
distinct types in accordance with Fisher’s theories of naval warfare, and “probably no design in 
naval architecture was ever so frankly sown in the pure soil of theoretical study and practical 
experiment.”57 The initial philosophy behind the Committee can be seen in this excerpt from 
commentary on Fisher’s initial proposal for disposing of warships considered unsuitable for 
modern conditions: 
‘No ship is really useful below the strength of a 1st Class Cruiser which cannot 
keep a seagoing speed of 25 knots in average weather. … 
‘This limits [a proposed list of effective warships] to— 
Battleships.—Nothing below “Admiral” Class. 
1
st
 Class Cruisers.—Nothing below “Theseus” Class. 
2
nd
 Class Cruisers.—Nothing below “Dido” Class. 
Destroyers. 
Scouts. 
Submarine Boats.’58 
 
The disposal of the myriad old ironclads, sloops, gunboats, and other ships that did not belong to 
the above list was only the beginning. Fisher had good reason for wishing to clear such dead 
wood from the naval list: ‘Courageous scrapping is the whole secret of fighting efficiency. You 
won’t get new ships at the top if you keep on old ships at the bottom.’59 Fisher, of course, had his 
ideas of what those new ships would be. His plan was to build only four broad classes of 
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warships: a 15,900 ton battleship, an armoured cruiser of the same tonnage, a 900 ton, 36 knot 
destroyer, and a 350 ton submarine with a surfaced speed of 14 knots.
60
 When this plan reached 
the Committee on Designs the specifics had been changed slightly. The question of submarine 
designs was not considered,
61
 and the destroyer was split into two distinct types. Thus five 
potential designs emerged from the Committee’s report: 
1) 21 knot, ‘all big gun’ battleship 
2) 25 knot, ‘all big gun’ armoured cruiser 
3) 33 or 34 knot, 600 ton ocean-going destroyer 
4) 26 knot, ‘Coastal Service’ destroyer 
5) Experimental 36 knot torpedo-armed vessel 
 
These five designs were subsequently built as, respectively, Dreadnought, Invincible, the Tribals, 
the Coastal Destroyers, and the Swift. The three proposed torpedo craft are of special interest as 
their specifics reveal a major, and until recently, unappreciated part of Fisher’s reorganization. 
While splitting Fisher’s original single destroyer type into two seems to go against the principle 
of simplification, there were very good reasons for such a bifurcation. In the Committee’s words 
the coastal destroyers were ‘capable of effectively dealing with the large majority of foreign 
torpedo craft against which we have to provide… at moderate cost.’62 The larger and faster ocean 
destroyers were, meanwhile, meant ‘to accompany the fleets in all weathers, anywhere and to 
any part of the world’.63  
 This was a reflection of the somewhat schizophrenic nature of the destroyer’s place in 
British strategy. One of the major innovations that emerged from Fisher’s time as C.-in-C. 
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Mediterranean was the employment of destroyers as an integral part of the fleet, using their 
torpedo batteries as a force multiplier for the battle line.
64
 The idea of using destroyers as a 
counter to torpedo attacks on battlefleets was also considered; one result of the 1904 manoeuvres 
was that Channel Fleet C.-in-C. Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson considered that destroyer screens 
around the fleet as good an anti-submarine tactic as could be devised at the time.
65
 These tactics 
were in opposition to the original intention of destroyers as patrolling off enemy ports and 
running down any torpedo craft that attempted to slip out to sea, a role that they still performed 
in the Channel at the time of the Committee of Designs’ report.66 The division between coastal 
and ocean destroyers was presaged by the development of the high-freeboard River-class 
destroyers, which had much superior seakeeping abilities versus the older turtleback destroyer 
types.
67
 
The 36-knot experimental design, meanwhile, was meant to use her torpedoes and 
extreme speed to ‘render the time honoured function of battleships impossible, and should make 
the convoy of slow ships along defined routes, keeping lines of communication with overseas 
bases open, and blockading operations, impossible to conduct with certainty.’68 In other words, it 
seems the intention was to replace existing small gun-armed trade protection cruisers with fast 
cruising torpedo vessels. The Committee was more reticent and in discussion of the type did not 
specify a raison d’être, instead writing that the 36-knotter had ‘a great future’ if she proved 
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affordable.
69
 As it happened, none of these hopes were achieved—the resulting Swift was 2,131 
tons on trial, cost £236,000, never made her contract speed, and owing to her massive and 
vulnerable power plant she was considered fit only to be little more than a fleet scout.
70
 
The ‘ocean destroyer’ design also went awry. The design requirements were cutting edge 
and the initial November 1904 submissions from destroyer firms—every one produced in haste 
since the Admiralty only allowed eleven days for replies—were all rejected.71 Ten months passed 
before the Admiralty and the shipbuilders reached agreement on acceptable designs, meaning 
none could be ordered under the 1904-5 Estimates.
72
 The resulting Tribals had their share of 
good qualities but were hamstrung by their extremely short operational range (a result of fuel-
hungry turbines and inadequate fuel capacity), and their high cost was a fatal drawback,
73
 
especially when the Naval Estimates were being stripped of every penny that could be spared. 
The resultant small number of functional seagoing destroyers begun prior to the coal-burning, 
River-descended Beagles of the 1909 Estimates
74
 left one officer complaining that from 1902 on 
Britain’s destroyer procurement had been ‘spasmodic’ and resulted in the Royal Navy being ‘the 
unfortunate possessors of a number of Destroyers which may be classed as “Good”, “Bad” and 
“Indifferent”.’75 
These disappointments, however, were still in the future when Fisher and the Committee 
of Designs reported to Selborne. The division of destroyer construction into what Norman 
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Friedman terms a ‘high-low mix’76 was not only in line with previous developments in British 
destroyer designs and tactics, but also fit in with Fisher’s intentions regarding the new battleship 
and armoured cruiser designs and his plans for redistributing the Royal Navy’s existing naval 
strength. 
Fisher’s dicta for the Dreadnought and Invincible were that ‘[t]he two governing 
conditions which have definitely fixed on are guns and speed’.77 Both these characteristics had 
been guiding interests of Fisher’s since his days as a Lieutenant in H.M.S. Excellent in the 1860s, 
and his year of service as Gunnery Officer of the revolutionary ironclad frigate Warrior cannot 
be discounted as a major influence on his thinking.
78
 Warrior and her sister Black Prince were 
the most powerful warships on the seas when completed, being faster than their nearest foreign 
equivalents and possessing armour that was essentially impregnable.
79
 They could confidently 
outpace any ship that might possess sufficient armament to overpower them, and their eventual 
re-designation as first class cruisers in 1891 was apt (although one which has until recently been 
overlooked because of their status as near-obsolete relics not yet deleted from reserve), as they 
were in many ways the forerunners of the Drakes.
80
 When reading Fisher’s comments about the 
Invincibles it is tempting to imagine he was trying to recreate the absolute supremacy enjoyed by 
Warrior when he was her Gunnery Officer.  
However, focusing too much on a hypothetical ‘Warrior connection’, despite its 
attractiveness, obscures the other important influences on Dreadnought and Invincible. Above all, 
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both designs were ‘the logical outcome of many years of steady development in ship and engine 
design, hastened by rapid developments in gunnery.’81 The influence of those gunnery advances 
on Dreadnought and Invincible are evident not just from their ‘all big gun’ armament, as opposed 
to previous ships carrying several sizes of gun ‘as if you were peopling the Ark, and wanted 
representatives of all calibres’.82 Said main armament was disposed to give equal weight of fire 
at any point of the compass, a characteristic demonstrating how important the armoured cruiser 
heritage was in the design process.
83
 Combined with Fisher’s now well-known preference for the 
Invincible, we can see that Dreadnought’s function was not merely a revolutionary warship, but a 
prototype and test bed for Fisher’s ultimate hope of creating an all-purpose capital ship. Her 
rapid construction time was not only to display what could be done by British shipbuilding 
industry in a simulated crisis, but to prove sound the features planned for subsequent capital 
ships like the Invincibles.
84
 Like many other Fisher reforms, he had been championing this for 
years, as was evident by his love of the fast second-class battleship Renown, a ship he had helped 
to design,
85
 which became his preferred flagship. In 1900 Fisher had written Selborne that: 
‘I on one occasion [as C.-in-C. North America] “mopped up” all the cruisers one 
after another with … Renown. The heavy swell and big seas had no corresponding 
effect on the big Renown as it had on the smaller Talbot, Indefatigable, and other 
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cruisers, and for that reason in my plans of battle on this station [the 
Mediterranean] I put the fast battleships Canopus and Ocean, with their 17½ 
knots speed, with the cruisers, as I feel perfectly sure they will stand me in good 
stead in dealing with the enemy’s cruisers and protecting the retreat of our own 
when occasion requires them to fall back.’86 
 
Fisher went still further subsequently, proposing in his initial notes on the Scheme that ‘[t]here is 
good ground for enquiry whether the naval supremacy of a country can any longer be assessed 
by its battleships. To build battleships merely to fight an enemy’s battleships, so long as cheaper 
craft can destroy them, and prevent them of themselves protecting sea operations, is merely to 
breed Kilkenny cats unable to catch rats or mice.’87 Selborne was sceptical, noting on the same 
paper that battleships were ‘essential, just as much as 100 years ago.’88 These exchanges were 
not merely theoretical discourses. In fact they hinged heavy in regards to Fisher’s plans for 
redistributing the Royal Navy’s fighting squadrons. 
In his initial Scheme, Fisher exposited a plan to deploy the Navy’s active strength into 
five ‘great fleets’ that would each have a ‘strategic centres’. The fleets were the Home, Atlantic, 
Mediterranean, Western, and Eastern Fleets. Their centres were Dover, Gibraltar, Alexandria, the 
Cape, and Singapore respectively. While Fisher did not define the term ‘strategic centre’ 
explicitly in any of the memoranda, he left no doubt what it meant: ‘Five keys lock up the world!’ 
Fisher declared, and proclaimed that ‘[t]hese five keys belong to England, and the five great 
fleets of England will hold those keys!’89 The next paragraph expanded on the principles behind 
this redeployment: 
‘The old system of stations was undoubtedly a good one in past years, but our 
present stock-taking reveals the fact that the cruiser of today is a totally different 
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vessel to that of a few years ago. Speed, range of action, and fighting qualities are 
all immeasurably improved, telegraphy has been enormously developed, hence 
transmission of orders, and mutual conference of thought enormously bettered. 
Instead of a number of isolated squadrons acting under different heads, al actuated 
from different views of the same state of conditions, each independent of the 
strategy pursued by the other, we will have a co-ordinated whole. Unity of 
purpose is strength, ever so much more is unity of strategy. The very essence of 
our naval strategy is to hunt out and destroy the enemy.’ 
 
This was another of Fisher’s long-standing ideas. He described a similar plan in one of his 
Mediterranean lectures. Said to date from 1899, Fisher’s ‘Outline of a Scheme to Govern the 
Disposition of the Fleet’ suggested four main commands to be created by merging many of the 
Navy’s existing stations. The ‘Eastern Fleet’ comprised the China, Pacific, Australian, and East 
Indian Stations, the ‘Atlantic Fleet’ the Cape, South Atlantic, and North American and West 
Indian Stations, the ‘Mediterranean Fleet’ the added the Channel and Cruiser Squadrons to the 
existing Mediterranean force, and the ‘Home Fleet’ would remain as then organized. The 
following is a detailed breakdown of the proposed fleets: 
The Eastern Fleet would have its headquarters ‘probably at Ceylon’ and the C.-in-C., a 
full Admiral, would have an armoured cruiser as flagship, part of a full cruiser squadron ‘which 
he would make the tour of his whole Station’. A battleship squadron in China would be under the 
command of a Vice-Admiral, and four Rear-Admirals or Commodores 1
st
 Class would command 
the local detachments. The entire fleet would combine ‘at stated periods’ for exercises. The 
Atlantic Fleet would be based at the Cape Station’s headquarters and be commanded by a Vice-
Admiral with two Rear-Admirals and Commodore. As with the Eastern Fleet, the entire strength 
would combine for manoeuvres. The Mediterranean Fleet would remain based on Malta, but the 
former Channel Squadron would work from Malta and the Cruiser Squadron at Corfu. These two 
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forces would be renamed the Second and Third Divisions of the Mediterranean Fleet respectively. 
The Home Fleet would be commanded by a Vice-Admiral assisted by two Rear-Admirals.
90
 
In 1904 however, Fisher presented a detailed plan for how the Royal Navy’s active 
strength was to be deployed to forge the five keys.
91
 
Home Fleet Channel 
Fleet 
Cruiser 
Squadron 
Mediterranean 
Fleet 
China Fleet Australian 
Squadron 
East 
Indian 
Squadron 
Cape of 
Good Hope 
Squadron 
West 
Atlantic 
Pacific 
Squadron 
8 
battleships, 
2 third-class 
cruisers, 24 
destroyers. 
8 
battleships, 
2 third-class 
cruisers 
4 armoured 
cruisers 
12 battleships, 4 
first-class 
armoured 
cruisers, 4 third-
class cruisers, 20 
destroyers. 
4 armoured 
cruisers, 4 
first-class 
protected 
cruisers, 4 
second-
class 
cruisers, 12 
destroyers, 
8 river 
gunboats. 
2 armoured 
cruisers, 2 
protected 
cruisers, 4 
third-class 
cruisers 
2 second-
class 
cruisers, 2 
third-class 
cruisers. 
2 protected 
cruisers, 2 
second-class 
cruisers, 4 
third-class 
cruisers. 
2 
protected 
cruisers, 4 
second-
class 
cruisers. 
3 second-
class cruise 
 
The Home and Channel Fleets (the latter of which was the same as the proposed Atlantic Fleet) 
would be supplemented in wartime by ships from the new system of reserves based on partial 
‘nucleus crews’. These consisted of enough officers and specialist ratings to operate with the 
active fleet on a few hours’ notice, e.g. an emergency too critical to allow for the delay of 
mobilizing reservists.
92
 The importance of these changes in the organization of the reserve fleet 
will be examined shortly. 
It can be a dangerous business to try to summarize Fisher’s often-enthusiastic proposals 
into a coherent vision.
93
 There is something to be said for the characterization of Fisher as a man 
who ‘thought in large brush-strokes and primary colours’ with a vision that ‘was as broad, as  
grandiose and as ephemeral’ as Churchill at his most grandiloquent. 94  However this 
generalization can easily be pushed too far, as analysis of his proposals for the ‘Scheme’ shows. 
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They are as wide-ranging as they are in places disjointed, nevertheless several quite coherent 
themes and ideas do emerge from the myriad proposals and appendices. 
By withdrawal of the China Fleet’s battleships and a thorough weeding out of the Navy’s 
extensive collection of small, martially questionable foreign service craft, enough men could be 
found to reorganize the existing fleets in European waters. This allowed maintenance of ‘a 
sufficient fleet in permanent commission’ to ‘provide nucleus crews for all the remaining ships 
on the war list not in commission’ and enabling ‘sufficient elasticity to commission six 1st class 
ships, i.e., battle-ships or armoured cruisers (two at each of the home ports), without upsetting 
the mobilization of the remainder of the fleet in reserve.’95 The new Atlantic Fleet, ‘based on 
Gibraltar, where all repairs will be carried out’, would ‘act as a reinforcement to either the Home 
or Mediterranean fleets as required.’96  The Atlantic Fleet would be the hinge on which the 
Navy’s war strength would deploy.  
Soon a committee led by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain Prince Louis of 
Battenberg, was created to make Fisher’s redeployment plans manifest. An early report made its 
views on geopolitics, and thus Fisher’s as well, explicitly clear: 
‘It has been accepted that the most likely combinations against us to be provided 
for are, in order of probability— 
1. Germany and Russia; 
2. France and Russia; 
The United States being regarded throughout as friendly.’97 
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The report also noted however that beyond those generalities ‘it was not considered necessary to 
enter into political considerations of an international character.’ Apart from some natural and 
inevitable broad-based strategic considerations, the reorganization was primarily another part of 
Fisher’s economy drive.98 
The final redistribution plan produced by Battenberg’s Committee differed slightly from 
the original Scheme proposals: 
 Channel Fleet Atlantic Fleet Mediterranean Fleet Eastern Fleet 
Battleships 12 (14)
α
 8 (9)
α
 8 (9)
α
 - 
Armoured 
Cruisers 
6 6 4 6 
2
nd
 Class 
Cruisers 
1 1 4 9 
3
rd
 Class 
Cruisers 
1 1 - 7 
Scouts 2 2 4 - 
Destroyers 36 - 40
β
 8
γ
 
α When available. 
β Fifteen in reserve on station with nucleus crews. 
γ Two in reserve with nucleus crews. 
 
The Eastern Fleet was further divided among the four stations as follows:
99
 
 China Station Australian Station East Indies Station Cape Station 
Armoured Cruisers 5 1 - - 
1
st
 Class Unarmoured Cruisers - - - 1 
2
nd
 Class Cruisers 4 3 2 2 
3
rd
 Class Cruisers - 5 2 - 
Destroyers 8 - - - 
River Gunboats 9 - - - 
 
The armoured cruisers in European waters were grouped into numbered squadrons, each attached 
for administrative purposes to one of the fleets. Their duties were far more expansive than 
supporting the battle fleet, however. In fact, they were meant as flying squadrons capable of 
deployment to any point on the globe coordinated centrally by telegraph.
100
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The Scheme into Action 
Fisher was able to begin implementing his reforms almost immediately. Two days after 
becoming First Sea Lord, the Russian Second Pacific Squadron opened fire on British fishing 
trawlers off Dogger Bank, mistaking them for Japanese torpedo boats.
101
 Fisher used the furore 
that followed as a pretext for bringing home the crews of various gunboats and sloops on foreign 
stations that were tying up manpower. Then-D.N.I. Battenberg would later recall: 
‘Lord Fisher dictated to me the following telegram to all C. in C.’s and S.N.O.s on 
foreign stations: 
‘“War with Russia is imminent. Concentrate your fleet at Station Headquarters. 
Pay off immediately the following ships (here followed the names of all the 
sloops and gunboats). Send home by first packet and wire date of arrival in 
England.” 
‘By the time these parties arrived home we had enough officers and men for the 
scheme which was put into execution.’102 
 
Despite this success, the final redistribution likely remained something of a compromise for 
Fisher. Selborne was much more reticent about disposing of older battleships than Fisher. In 
response to Fisher’s initial list of ships to be disposed of he noted that ‘I do not agree about Nile, 
Trafalgar, Thunderer, and Devastation. I would treat then the same as [the] “Admirals”. After 
Armageddon we shall want them badly. The Japs would give a million apiece for them to-
morrow.’103 Apart from these, there also remained quite a few ships from Fisher’s original list of 
‘bonâ fide fighting vessels’104 still in reserve for lack of crews even with the great reductions in 
‘non-effective’ ships. Overall, ‘the Royal Navy’s fighting efficiency had certainly been increased, 
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the worst administrative problems had been solved, and over three and a half million had been 
shaved from the naval estimates.’105 
The men brought home were not merely intended to crew the restructured fleets. The 
‘nucleus crew’ system required these men. Fisher explained that this system was, in conjunction 
with the fleet redistribution: 
‘(a) To maintain in commission at home and abroad as large an effective fleet as 
possible consistent with Imperial requirements, both political and diplomatic. 
‘(b) To maintain in reserve at home the remainder of the effective fleet manned 
with about a two-fifths complement consisting principally of the most important 
ranks and ratings, except ships in dockyard reserve.’106 
 
These nucleus crew ships were to be organized into divisions ‘suitably distributed between the 
three home ports’ each initially to be commanded by a Rear-Admiral but later to have separate 
Rear-Admirals ‘one … to command the battle-ship division and one to command the cruiser 
division at each port’ as the size of the reserve fleet was increased.107 Furthermore there was to 
be ‘a sufficient floating surplus of personnel in barracks to enable six battle-ships or first-class 
cruisers—two at each home port—to be fully commissioned on emergency without dislocating 
general mobilization arrangements.’ The choice of which type to mobilize was, significantly, 
only to be determined on the day, so twelve ships—six battleships and six cruisers—were to be 
maintained in heightened readiness.
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Battenberg’s Committee recommended the following distribution of nucleus crew ships:109 
 
Portsmouth Plymouth Chatham 
King Edward VII, Renown, 
Canopus, Goliath, Prince George. 
Powerful, Terrible, Royal Arthur, 
Gladiator, Indefatigable, Latona, 
Amethyst, Pandora. 
All reserve torpedo boats. 
Commonwealth, Barfleur, Hood, 
Trafalgar, Nile. 
Niobe, Europa, Edgar, Blake, 
Arrogant, Eclipse, Cambrian, 
Hermione, Diamond, Harrier, 
Hussar. 
All reserve torpedo boats. 
Dominion, Repulse, Ramillies, 
Resolution. 
King Alfred, Diadem, Argonaut, 
Spartiate, Blenheim, Vindictive, 
Talbot, Scylla, Sapphire, Pegasus, 
Pioneer, Pyramus, Dryad, Speedy. 
All reserve torpedo boats. 
 
The large number of modern ships in this initial schedule is deceptive; it was intended they 
would pass into the active fleets once sufficiently worked up. They were to be exchanged over 
the course of 1905 by the older ships they would replace on active service—and by the beginning 
of 1906 the estimated nucleus crew reserve would be:
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Portsmouth Plymouth Chatham 
Barfleur, Renown, Centurion, 
Canopus, Ocean, Goliath. 
Cressy, Aboukir, Powerful, Terrible. 
Gladiator, Indefatigable, Iphigenia, 
Pandora. 
12 Destroyers and all reserve 
torpedo boats. 
 
Royal Sovereign, Revenge, Empress 
of India, Hood, Nile, Trafalgar. 
Devonshire, Roxburgh, Niobe, 
Ariadne, Europa. 
Arrogant, Eclipse, Diamond. 
12 Destroyers and reserve torpedo 
boats 
Majestic, Repulse, Resolution, 
Ramillies, Royal Oak. 
King Alfred, Argyll, Amphitrite, 
Argonaut, Spartiate. 
Vindictive, Talbot, Terpsichore, 
Thetis, Sapphire. 
12 Destroyers and reserve torpedo 
boats. 
 
The addition of destroyers to the nucleus crew reserve illustrates another part of the 
Scheme not yet touched upon: the adoption of torpedo craft as a major element of defence 
against invasion, a perennial bogey that often aggravated relations between the Navy and the 
Army.
111
 In the strained financial conditions of the post-Boer War period, the Balfour 
government’s Cabinet Defence Committee was trying to bring order to British strategic policy, 
and cuts in expenditure would be one result. With these cuts looming, both services escalated 
their traditional turf war and the responsibility for defence against invasion became a political 
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tool.
112
 The Admiralty challenged the Army’s avocation for a sizable force of soldiers by 
exploiting the potential of the submarine as a defensive weapon.
113
 In October 1903, Battenberg 
wrote that establishing submarine bases in the Channel ports: 
‘ought to go a long way towards dispelling the ever-recurring fears of invasion so 
dear to the “old women of both sexes” mentioned by Lord St. Vincent. To these (a 
few live in the War Office) it may be pointed out that the French in all their 
utterances on the subject… point out with pride that the existence of submarines 
as part of the defense mobile makes any attempt at [amphibious] invasion of 
French territory the act of lunacy. They are quite right and the argument cuts both 
ways.’114 
 
The défense mobile Battenberg refers to was another part of Admiral Fournier’s aforementioned 
guerre industrielle strategy. The role of the new generation of French armoured cruisers has 
already been mentioned, but submarines were another essential element. Combined with the 
Marine Française’s substantial force of torpedo craft that was the jeune école’s legacy, they were 
based in groups at various French ports to keep the traditional British battleship blockade at arms’ 
length, thus enabling the armoured cruisers to sortie during the night.
115
 
Fisher, like Battenberg, recognized that this use of torpedo craft cut both ways. In May 
1903 he spoke to the Royal Academy, telling his audience that when the submarine and wireless 
telegraphy were perfected: 
‘we do not know what a revolution will come about. In their inception they were 
weapons of the weak. Now they loom large as weapons of the strong. Will any 
fleet be able to be in narrow waters? Is there the slightest fear of invasion with 
them, even for the most extreme pessimist?’116 
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By 1904 Fisher clearly felt both the submarine and wireless communications were sufficiently 
perfected for his Scheme, as the use of wireless to vector armoured cruiser squadrons has already 
been shown. To defend against invasions or raids, Fisher planned to use submarines and surface 
torpedo craft. In his original Scheme he proposed ‘a “Defense Mobile” [sic] of torpedo boats 
consisting of four flotillas of eight each’, to be based at Dover, Portland, Plymouth, and Milford. 
Similar units were considered a possibility for Malta and Gibraltar.
117
 Selborne’s only objection 
was to the term ‘Defense Mobile’118, and he felt that one of the flotillas should be based in the 
Thames.
119
 The Battenberg Committee modified this proposal to three new torpedo boat flotillas 
in permanent commission, one at Chatham of four boats, and two of eight boats, one at 
Devonport and the other at Portsmouth.
120
 
 Taken together, the new ‘nucleus crew’ policy and the new torpedo flotillas were a 
sweeping change in the structure of the Navy’s reserve force. Yet this was not an unprecedented 
move. The new Channel Fleet had been the result of a similar reorganization, begun in 1902, of 
the ‘curious, not to say inappropriate and parlous, distribution of the naval assets that were 
stationed in Britain’s home waters’.121  The then-existing system under the command of the 
Admiral Superintendent of Reserves comprised partially manned Coast Guard ships scattered in 
various ports as district ships, their officers expected to undertake various tasks not at all 
conducive to fighting efficiency. At the same time the main naval force in Home Waters, the 
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Channel Squadron, was becoming more and more of a flying squadron, expected to reinforce the 
Mediterranean Fleet during a projected war with the Dual Alliance.
122
  
 As then-D.N.I. Rear-Admiral Reginald Custance noted, the absence of the Channel Fleet 
would leave the naval defence of the British Isles ‘to a fleet composed of ships inferior in quality, 
and manned by crews not hitherto kept in the same high state of efficiency as are those of the 
Mediterranean and Channel ships.’ 123  After lengthy discussion between Lord Walter Kerr, 
Battenberg, Selborne, Custance, and Sir Gerard Noel, it was decided to form the disparate Coast 
Guard ships and the Port Guardships into a new organization called the Home Fleet with its own 
C.-in-C.
124
 It was initially to be based around the four Port Guardships, regrouped into a single 
Home Squadron, supplemented by the Coast Guard vessels which would join the Home 
Squadron for training exercises. The Admiral Superintendent of the Naval Reserves was to 
become C.-in-C. Home Fleet and would be freed to concentrate on sea duties by the appointment 
of a junior flag officer to manage much of Reserves’ administrative work. It soon became clear 
there was room for improvement, as Battenberg noted in an essay entitled ‘The Home 
Squadron’.125 Of especial concern were the tethering of the Coast Guard ships to certain ports 
and the unwieldy nature of the C.-in-C. Home Fleet’s role as both fleet commander and 
Superintendent of Reserves, a measure Noel had insisted on. Once Sir Arthur Wilson took over 
from Noel on 21 March 1903, the Admiralty instituted another reorganization that made the 
Home Fleet a truly separate entity.
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 This reorganization, which effectively doubled the Navy’s battle strength in Home Waters, 
was opportune for more reasons than increased peacetime efficiency. As of 1902, the C.-in-C. 
Home Fleet would play a leading role in an Anglo-French naval war. He ‘would have under his 
orders, besides the main fleet, the Bay of Biscay and Milford Squadrons of Cruisers and the 
Western Squadron of Cruisers and Destroyers.’127 With this force he would ‘watch and bring to 
action, if they put to sea, the French ships at Brest and in the Biscay ports and thus keep the 
entrance to the English Channel and to the St. Georges Channel, as well as the Bay of Biscay, 
clear of the enemy and free for the passage of our merchant ships.’128 Significantly, the Channel 
was to be swept by two cruiser-destroyer squadrons. The Admiralty evidently saw nothing to 
gain by exposing capital ships to the French défenses mobile in the narrow waters of the Channel, 
although the Home Fleet’s wartime base was still to be Portland. Furthermore the Admiralty 
recognized the French desire for a guerre industrielle: 
‘The weakness of the French Northern Squadron and the assembly of a strong 
force of cruisers in Northern ports points to a design to attack our trade. The 
arrangements for the distribution of the cruisers should bear this in view… 
‘At the commencement of hostilities the most essential point would seem to be 
the concentration of a fast and powerful squadron of large cruisers with a view to 
dealing with the similar squadron which it is believed to be the intention of the 
French to assemble at Brest.’129 
 
The Ententes, first with France and then with Russia, undermined the importance of this thinking 
as regards commerce protection. As the threat of war with the Dual Alliance receded, the 
importance of interdicting raiders as they left their ports became less obviously imperative.
130
 
Other pressure for change came from domestic politics with the departure of the Conservatives at 
the end of 1905. The new Liberal Government, elected in a landslide victory in January 1906, 
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would put great pressure on the Admiralty for further economies at the same time as the 
Admiralty’s strategic outlook began to shift northeastwards to the growing German battlefleet 
based on the North Sea. 
63 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
The Creation of the Home Fleet, 1906-1907 
 
The first round of reformist initiatives—the Scheme—as put into practice during 1905, 
were the product of Admiral Fisher’s efforts to reduce the Navy’s expenditure in a time of 
financial stringencies and to optimize its fighting power to face a multi-theatre threat—the 
Franco-Russian Dual Alliance. Between the French Navy’s armoured cruisers and Toulon Fleet 
and the Russian Black Sea and Pacific Squadrons, the Royal Navy had to maintain substantial 
forces overseas. This fact was overlooked after the war as the men involved published their 
memoirs, all of which were written with the benefit of hindsight and the memory of the Great 
War and the co-operation between France and Britain on their consciousness. The timing of 
Fisher’s initial Scheme and the increasingly anti-German position Britain took were in large part 
coincidental, but once the connection between these events had been made it has been very hard 
to properly separate them again. 
 Like many problems, this cuts both ways. In some cases, events and decisions driven or 
at least partially influenced by concerns over Germany have now been recast by historians as 
being the results of other events. Such is the case with the birth of the Home Fleet. While 
Germany playing a role in the Home Fleet’s inception and development has never been outright 
denied, other motivations have been put forward that to a large degree exclude the growth of the 
German Kaiserliche Marine from consideration. Nicholas Lambert considers the Home Fleet 
was established as a cost-cutting measure combined with Fisher’s desire to use submarines and 
other torpedo craft as the basis of Britain’s strength in Home Waters.1 Professor Eric Grove has 
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gone farther still, once imagining the Nore Division of the Home Fleet as a sort of imperial rapid 
reaction force, ready to be deployed anywhere in the world.
2
 
 The problem, ultimately, is to evaluate exactly what Fisher, the Admiralty, and the 
government had in mind during the latter half of 1906 when the Home Fleet scheme was being 
worked out between the Cabinet and the Admiralty. Before that can be done, the state of the 
Royal Navy in 1906 and the general political situation should be sketched out, for many events 
of importance to the Navy were happening simultaneously, and all had bearing on the eventual 
creation of the Home Fleet. The three major events were the destruction of the Russian Navy in 
the Far East, the end of the Conservative Government, and the continuing expansion of the 
German Navy. 
 
Germany Rises, Russia Falls 
Contrary to some statements, Germany’s fleet can definitely be considered a threat to 
Britain from 1898 onwards, although a minor one compared to the fleets of the Dual Alliance. 
While as late as 1895 the principal threats German naval strategy and construction was directed 
against were ‘the French North Fleet and the Russian Baltic Fleet’3 only two years later Tirpitz 
was, from his position as State Secretary of the Reichsmarineamt, able to begin earnestly turning 
the Kaiserliche Marine towards Britain. His Memorandum of June 1897 stated that ‘the most 
dangerous naval enemy at the present time is England.’4 While there is reason to question, as 
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Patrick Kelly does in his recent biography of Tirpitz,
5
 whether the subsequent Navy Bills of 1898 
and 1900 were deliberate steps taken against the Britain, the growth of a powerful German Navy 
was unlikely to be greeted with enthusiasm across the North Sea, as Tirpitz was well aware.
6
 
 One of the earliest tocsins within the Admiralty to ring a warning of Germany’s rise was 
D.N.I. Custance, who would soon become Fisher’s most powerful critic within the Navy in terms 
of intelligence, if not rank and influence.
7
 In September 1901, while Fisher and Lord Charles 
Beresford were working together (if not exactly in harmony
8
) to press for strengthening the 
Navy’s Mediterranean presence, Custance was trying to secure more strength at home to counter 
Germany. His response to a typical demand for reinforcement from Fisher shows this clearly: 
‘The wants of the Mediterranean Fleet have been repeatedly pressed upon the 
attention of their Lordships by the C.-in-C. The Home Fleet has had no such 
advocate, but it is believed that the manoeuvres have shewn that the necessity of 
practice and frequent exercise together … is important, if it is to be on par with 
the formidable German force which is being rapidly developed in the North Sea.’9 
 
Neither Selborne nor Kerr were swayed into taking immediate action by these words, and the 
entreaties from the Mediterranean continued.
10
 Several months later in May 1902 Custance 
complained to his close friend Sir Cyprian Bridge that: ‘After pounding away for a long time, the 
German menace has at last been brought partially home … The worst thing I know is the advent 
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of Fisher [as Second Sea Lord] with all his wild superficial ideas.’ 11  The phrase ‘brought 
partially home’ signifies that Custance’s department was at work on a memorandum regarding 
the British naval position vis à vis Germany, and the finished product was submitted at the end of 
the month.
12
 This document, sometimes called the Custance Memorandum despite being largely 
the work of Commander George Ballard,
13
 was the first significant Admiralty discussion of the 
potential German threat. Then in November the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, Hugh 
Arnold-Forster, returned from a visit to the German Navy’s home in Wilhelmshaven and 
submitted a report of his observations to the Cabinet.
14
 Thus by the end of 1902 the Admiralty 
can be said to have been fully aware of the as-yet nascent German challenge across the North 
Sea, as evidenced in a letter from Selborne to Marquess Curzon where he observed that 
Germany’s navy was ‘becoming very formidable’.15 Nevertheless the Dual Alliance remained the 
greater threat, and the Admiralty was content to bide their time. Fisher too had concerns 
regarding the German Fleet’s growth, which as early as November 1900 he had described as 
‘another disturbing naval element.’ 16  The use of ‘another’ is instructive—Germany was 
becoming a concern for Fisher, but it was not yet the primary concern.
17
 It was the Far East and 
the Mediterranean that were foremost in the minds of their Lordships during the next two years 
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as tensions between Russia and Japan over Port Arthur, Manchuria, and the Korean Peninsula 
grew ever more intense.
18
 Britain's alliance with Japan strengthened her hand against the 
Russians in the Far East and 1904 entente with France neutralised the threat of French help for 
Russian ambitions–just in time, as it turned out. 
It is probably significant that one of the Navy’s most capable flag officers, Vice-Admiral 
Sir Gerard Noel, was chosen to succeed Sir Cyprian Bridge as C.-in-C. China during the 
deepening crisis. If Britain was dragged into the conflict, Noel’s battleships would be on the 
front line. In the event Russia did not attack Britain; in fact she could not cope with Japan alone. 
Perhaps fortunately for Noel and Britain, no intervention was required. The Russo-
Japanese War was a disaster for the Russian Navy. The culmination came on the morning of May 
15, 1905, when Admiral Nebogatov surrendered his surviving ships after the Battle of Tsushima. 
His reasoning was simple humanity, a trait often denied the Russians in popular imagination: 
‘God help me, I do not want to drown my people.’19 Thus ended a ten month ‘voyage of the 
damned’ by the bulk of the Russian Baltic Fleet cum Second Pacific Squadron. Russian hopes for 
victory in the Russo-Japanese War died with their fleet. In addition to Tsushima, the original 
Russian Pacific Squadron had been wiped out by the Japanese during their siege of Port Arthur, 
Russia’s prized warm water base in the Far East. With Tsushima, Russian strength in the Baltic 
also disappeared.
20
 Worse quickly followed revolution swept the nation. All told, Tsarist Russia 
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‘became second-rate in its image, its military capabilities, and its actual ability to influence 
others.’21 
Fisher’s announcement of the victory at Tsushima to Balfour was suitably Biblical: ‘See 1 
Kings 22. 31’22 Custance’s successor as D.N.I., Captain Sir Charles Ottley, and his Assistant the 
now-Captain Ballard, wrote less dramatically that the ‘crushing and decisive’ victory at Tsushima 
‘must clearly exert its influence… upon the naval policy of all other nations.’23 Britain was no 
exception, as the demise of the Russian fleet allowed Germany’s to take its place in the Two-
Power Standard alongside France. 
 Britain now possessed, as long as the United States was excluded from the calculations as 
was customary
24
 a de facto three-power standard
25
 that would last until the end of 1907.
26
 The 
withdrawal of the China Station’s battleships was not a direct reaction to Tsushima, and even 
before the destruction of Russia’s armadas the Admiralty had been losing interest in maintaining 
the China Station at its current strength. Proposals had been rattling around the Admiralty since 
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before Fisher succeeded Lord Walter Kerr,
27
 and during his work on the committee in charge of 
turning Fisher’s redistribution proposals into reality, Battenberg wrote that: 
‘As soon as the political situation allows of the withdrawal of the China 
battleships, it is suggested to add two to Home Fleet and 1 each to the other two 
fleets; to allow for ships re-fitting two and one at a time respectively ... bringing 
the total of battleships down to 32 (as against 33 now) which number my 
calculations show to be permissible with the system of nucleus crews and two 
year commissions.’28 
 
 The totality of Japan’s victory at sea gave the Admiralty sufficient cause to act. Only a 
few days after Tsushima, Sir Gerard Noel was informed that ‘His Majesty’s Government and 
Japanese Government have decided that all the British Battleships in China shall return 
immediately to European waters’. Noel fired back a telegram to the First Lord asking whether 
the presence of three American battleships in the Philippines had been considered. Fisher and the 
other Sea Lords were taken aback over Noel’s behaviour, and with Cawdor’s support brusquely 
told Noel to obey his orders.
29
 While Noel would become a member of the ‘Syndicate of 
Discontent’, his telegram was most likely not meant to be as insubordinate as it seemed. Cawdor 
attempted to smooth Fisher’s ruffled feathers by reminding him that Selborne had encouraged the 
station chiefs to give him their views on strategy, and this explanation is confirmed by surviving 
correspondence between Noel’s predecessor and Selborne. 30  Whether Cawdor’s effort at 
diplomacy had any effect on Fisher’s feelings is open for questioning since relations between 
Fisher and Noel remained bad long afterwards. The withdrawal of the China Station’s battleships 
has been seen as the beginning of the end of Britain’s global naval supremacy.31 In fact, the 
presence of large armoured battle squadrons in Chinese waters was the anomaly. Prior to the 
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creation of the Russian Pacific Squadron there were only a few armoured warships—usually 
cruisers—in that theatre apart from those of the Imperial Japanese Navy, and once the Russo-
Japanese War ended almost all were withdrawn.
32
 
 
New Year, New Reforms, New Government 
 Balfour resigned on December 4
th
, 1905, ceding Downing Street to a minority Liberal 
government on the eve of a General Election. The leading Liberals were not caught off guard, 
Lewis Harcourt writing in late November that ‘I think C.B. [Campbell-Bannerman] ought to 
refuse to ‘accept office in this Parliament’ and to compel A.B. [Arthur Balfour] to dissolve or go 
on.’33 Of Balfour’s motives, Rhodri Williams suggests a desire to drive a wedge between the 
leading Liberals on foreign policy issues, setting the ‘Liberal Imperialists’ who had supported the 
destruction of the Boer states against those who had decried the entire South African enterprise 
and wished, mostly, for ‘Peace, Retrenchment and Reform’.34 This would force the new Prime 
Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman to include men such as R.B. Haldane, Sir Edward 
Grey, and H.H. Asquith in any Liberal cabinet at the expense of more radical personages. Sir 
George Clarke supposed that Balfour desired a brief spell in opposition to settle the issue of 
tariffs once and for all.
35
 If this were truly Balfour’s intention, it failed utterly. The Liberals won 
in a landslide. Campbell-Bannerman’s biographer described the results as being ‘almost 
embarrassingly overwhelming.’36 
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While free trade and tariffs may have been the most glorified issues of the election, there 
was also the less-spoken-of promise of social reforms on the Liberals’ agenda. These measures 
out demanded funds, and instead of instituting any new and radical budgetary changes Campbell-
Bannerman and his Chancellor, H.H. Asquith, planned to divest money from the defence 
estimates. This strategy had the added benefit of appeasing the Radicals, for whom every pound 
sterling spent on armaments rubbed nerves raw: 
‘The Liberal dilemma was obvious. Each dreadnought cost approximately 
£2,000,000. If the Cawdor programme of November 1905, which called for four 
large armoured ships (dreadnoughts and battle-cruisers) annually, accepted 
‘without prejudice’ by Campbell-Bannerman, was put into effect, it would mean 
about £8,000,000 a year less for domestic social reforms. On the other hand, if the 
ships were not built the Royal Navy might lose control of the seas.’37 
 
Clearly, the new Liberal First Lord would have to undertake an onerous balancing act between 
Navy and Party. 
The new First Lord of the Admiralty was Baron Tweedmouth, whose appointment came 
at Fisher’s suggestion.38 Tweedmouth has long been considered the runt of the prewar First Lords. 
Marder described him as ‘a pleasant, colourless man of barely average abilities’.39 Esher shared 
this opinion: ‘Good fellow as he is, his capacity is unequal to his task as First Lord.’40 Not all 
have agreed with this assessment; Admiral Sir Herbert King-Hall felt Tweedmouth was ‘an 
honourable, loyal gentleman… a man who, though perhaps past his best and doomed to break 
down before long, was a patriotic servant of his country and a staunch upholder of the necessity 
of a strong Navy.’41 
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Tweedmouth’s failure to prevent further major cuts in the Navy Estimates is seen as 
evidence of his weakness.
42
 In fairness to Tweedmouth, however, his position in the Cabinet may 
well have been untenable by design. He was appointed to a post he possessed little knowledge of, 
leading the Tory National Review to grouse that he was equally well qualified ‘for the Office of 
the Astronomer Royal’,43 while the ‘economist’ faction seeking further spending cuts counted 
amongst its members such luminaries as Churchill, David Lloyd George, McKenna, and Asquith. 
Even with Fisher’s guidance and the sympathy of Esher and Sir Edward Grey, this was a most 
overwhelming opposition, and the inevitable conclusion is that Tweedmouth was probably 
doomed from the start no matter his own qualities. 
 
The Home Fleet is Born 
In August 1906, Fisher sent a letter to the three principal fleet Commanders-in-Chief 
regarding a fleet redistribution planned for completion by March 31
st
 1907. Foreign relations 
were now ‘such that the Mediterranean Fleet can be reduced, and the Atlantic Fleet regarded as 
primarily a reinforcing squadron for the main (Channel Fleet). It also permits some reduction in 
the Channel Fleet itself, provided that the units composing it are of the most powerful 
character.’44 The commissioned strength of the Navy in capital ships would fall from thirty-three 
battleships and twenty-four armoured cruisers to twenty-six and twenty respectively.45 However 
the Admiralty insisted that ‘the reduction they contemplate is one of numbers rather than fighting 
strength’, since by April 1907 eight new armoured ships would be available, each superior in 
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fighting power to the ships it was proposed to pay off.46 Fisher and the Board softened the blow 
by affording the fleet commanders an ‘opportunity of offering any suggestions that you may 
wish, as regards dates or other details, which will, in your opinion, facilitate the alterations or 
prevent their giving rise to unnecessary inconvenience.’ 
 This proposal had been under consideration by the Admiralty for several months as a 
result of the newly elected Liberal Government’s demand for further economies in the Navy 
Estimates. Nicholas Lambert covers the fighting over the Navy’s finances in detail, but some of 
this ground must be re-travelled here. In brief, the Liberal government had demanded further cuts 
in the subsequent year’s estimates, and the Admiralty had determined this could only be 
accomplished by a reduction in the number of ships in full commission. The previous technique 
of financing naval works via borrowing was set to end in the 1907-8 financial year. The 
Admiralty had been informed of this decision the year before by the previous government and 
Asquith had no intention of proposing something ‘altogether inconsistent with the position which 
we took up in the House of Commons in 1905[.]’47 The Chancellor loftily added that ‘nothing Sir 
John Fisher could say would affect my judgement as to the propriety of a new Loans Bill’, and 
the First Lord’s reply that serious additions to the 1907-8 and 1908-9 estimates ‘must be 
considered owing to [this] decision’ cut no ice.48 
Fisher informed Lord Tweedmouth at the end of May that he had been ‘discussing the 
details with the Controller[,] the Accountant General and the Director of Naval Intelligence as to 
the financial effect of withdrawing six Battle Ships and four Armoured Cruisers now in full 
commission and placing them in Commission in Reserve (that is with nucleus crews) and 
reducing the personnel by 2000 men’. Fisher continued that ‘the conclusion has been reached 
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that we should save about a quarter of a million in 1907-08’ although this number would be 
partially offset by automatic increases in parts of the Estimates.
49
 These and other proposals went 
before the Cabinet in a memorandum on 26 June.
50
 Tweedmouth put forward three proposals for 
reductions on the lines of Fisher’s earlier report to the First Lord: 
1. Reducing new construction by dropping a fourth Invincible and substituting a 
single ‘small unarmoured vessel’ [i.e. a small cruiser] in place of three Tribals and 
four submarines from the 1905-1906 estimates. A further armoured vessel would 
be cut from the next year’s estimates. 
2. The aforementioned reduction of seven battleships and four armoured cruisers 
to nucleus crew reserve. 
3. Reducing the personnel vote (Vote A) from 129,000 men to 127,000. 
 
Together these three measures would save £1,600,000, but that figure shrank to £1,250,000 after 
increases elsewhere in the estimates were taken into consideration. 
Despite offering further reductions described as ‘the unanimous conclusion’ of the Board 
of Admiralty, the memorandum cannot be described as conciliatory. Most of its length was 
dedicated to enumerating foreign progress in naval armaments and warning that ‘[m]any facts 
stand in the way of further reductions at present’. The previous twelve years had seen great: 
‘development of personnel, establishments, and materiel that … has involved 
greatly increased annual outgoings. Vote A for men has risen from 84,000 to 
129,000; an expenditure on works to be executed by loan to the estimated cost of 
32,000,000 l. has been sanctioned by Parliament, of which 26,500,000 l. has 
already been expended; new docks, breakwaters, barracks, hospitals, colleges, and 
training establishments have thus been brought into existence, and at the same 
time the increase in the size, complexity, and cost of ships of war has gone on 
apace in response to the demands for heavier armament, stronger armour, and 
greater speed and mobility.’ 
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 This last point was expanded on greatly. Besides Dreadnought, other large battleships and 
armoured cruisers were on order elsewhere.
51
 The memorandum also stressed the expense caused 
by the Navy’s takeover of coastal defence responsibilities, and that ‘[m]ore than ever the whole 
measure of the adequacy of the fleet must be its capacity to discharge he duty of protecting our 
coasts at home and those of our oversea Colonies … and to safeguard British ocean commerce, 
which is the very foundation of national prosperity and existence.’52 At the same time, Britain 
was extremely fortunate that not only were relations with other powers good and the Navy’s 
strength well above the Two Power Standard, these conditions were only temporary, and 
‘alliances and ententes are not everlasting, and the unexpected must never be neglected.’53 
Effective maintenance of Britain’s maritime position, Tweedmouth suggested tentatively, meant 
that an adjustment of the naval standard to ‘roughly the equivalent strength of the next two most 
powerful navies in the world plus 10 per cent.’ would be ‘not unreasonable’ until further Cabinet 
discussion could clarify matters. 
Asquith counterattacked on the 9
th
. The Chancellor noted that the ‘governing factor in 
naval expenditure … is the cost of new construction; just as in the case of the Army it is the 
number of men to be maintained’. Resultantly he declared that ‘naval expenditure lends itself 
much more easily to retrenchment, because the amount of new construction to be put in hand is 
entirely within the discretion of the Government.’54 While Asquith allowed that the Two Power 
Standard ‘may itself require revision’, the Chancellor was derisive about maintaining such 
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strength as to a combination of France and Germany. ‘Is it reasonable to expect us to build 
against a combination of that character—in the whole sphere of speculative politics by far the 
most improbable that can be conceived?’55 Asquith went on to argue Britain’s existing naval 
strength was sufficient for any reasonable standard, and that furthermore a reduction in 
shipbuilding would be a show of the nation’s sincerity regarding the coming Hague Conference. 
Three days later Campbell-Bannerman called a meeting at 10 Downing Street to settle the 
question, and the memorandum subsequently issued summarizing the results shows the hand of a 
fine mediator, likely Campbell-Bannerman himself.
56
 While Tweedmouth’s arguments were 
rebuffed, the Admiralty’s construction budget still came through in seaworthy condition: all three 
armoured ships authorized for 1906-7 were spared and the two new armoured ships for 1907-8 
were definitely confirmed, meanwhile the third was made conditional to the outcome of the 
forthcoming Hague Conference. This condition no doubt satisfied the First Sea Lord, who is well 
known for his dim views on such gatherings, once thundering that ‘Moderation in war is 
imbecility!’ 57  Doubtless Fisher thought the failure of that conference was an inevitability. 
Elsewhere the Prime Minister was less generous, and the Admiralty’s offer of reductions in 
active strength was confirmed along with various other ‘heavy sacrifices’.58 
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This did not entirely put matters to rest. On July 12
th
 Fisher scrawled a hasty note 
(‘Excuse haste & pencil’) to Tweedmouth requesting 
‘in case by chance you should be seeing Prime Minister or Chancellor of 
Exchequer tonight that after seeing you & showing you the proposed 2 Millions 
reduction I had a very long interview with my colleagues & I got their reluctant 
consent of to the reductions because of its being associated with obtaining the two 
millions under a fresh Loan act[.]’ 
 
Fisher ominously continued 
‘if that act is not carried out we must withdraw the proposed reduction[;] more 
especially as the reductions are mixed up with the obtaining of the Loan. It is 
desirable I think to be very explicit with the Chancellor of the Exchequer & the 
P.M. on this point, as I feel bound to admit the justice of what my colleagues 
say.’59 
 
Asquith’s reply to this letter indicates he may not have noticed the subtext that the Admiralty was 
consenting to the reductions only reluctantly and that any further cuts would be bitterly 
opposed.
60
 Alternatively, it is possible that he did not care. 
This effort by the Admiralty to preserve funding for new construction, especially the 
‘extraordinary lengths to which Fisher went to defend the battleship standard’61 is, according to 
Nicholas Lambert, explained by what he terms the ‘Naval-Industrial Complex’.62 Briefly put, the 
Admiralty had a symbiotic relationship with the private industrial interests. The Admiralty 
depended on shipbuilders and those firms that supplied such essentials as armour plating and 
heavy ordnance. In turn, these firms required Admiralty contracts to remain in business.
63
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In summary then, the proposed reduction in active strength was a result of a new 
government seeking economies in defence expenditure to free up money for other programmes, 
and Fisher and the Admiralty were forced to safeguard the Navy’s future strength by reducing its 
immediate strength. The problem was events proved such goals would not be that simple to 
achieve. Furthermore, other considerations would soon come into play. 
One of these concerns was the matter of the Reserve Divisions of the fleet. As constituted 
under the initial scheme they were three separate units, one at each of the three Home Ports. 
Each of these divisions represented a sizable collection of naval force, as can be seen by their 
strength given in the January 1907 Navy List: 
Chatham Division Portsmouth Division Devonport Division 
Six battleships Four battleships Five battleships 
Twelve cruisers Thirteen cruisers Eleven cruisers 
 
This powerful force remained in three distinct pieces. Worse, they did not operate together except 
for the possible exception of annual naval manoeuvres. They were thus, in the words of a later 
Admiralty paper, ‘without an organization enabling them to act together.’64 While unmentioned 
in the surviving July and August correspondence on fleet redistribution, this consideration must 
have played an important part in the decision to create the Home Fleet. Such influence is implied 
in an Admiralty letter stating the new organisation would allow more efficient training and 
operation of the ships in reserve ‘than has heretofore been practicable.’65 
As frank-bordering-on-direct as the earlier inter-departmental clashes may seem, they 
paled in comparison to what resulted from the Admiralty’s tentative letter to the three C-in-Cs. 
                                                                                                                                                             
McNeil, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, paperback ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), esp. pp. 223-306. 
64
 Admiralty, ‘Reason for and Constitution of Home Fleet.’, F.P. 4822, p. 4, FISR 8/23, Fisher MSS. 
65
 Admiralty, ‘Organisation of Ships in Commission in Reserve, and Rearrangement of Ships in Commission at Sea.’, 
draft copy, 23 October 1906, MSS 252/5/4, Tweedmouth MSS. 
79 
 
Fisher, on his annual Alpine holiday, summarized the situation in an October 5 letter to 
Tweedmouth: 
‘We sent very confidentially to the Commanders in Chief what the Board had in 
view & invited them to offer any remarks before we issued the final orders 
officially & publicly & evidentially some of these officers have broken faith and 
have been writing privately to the King or those who have told his Majesty as 
mentioned in your last letter or else those officers are writing entirely in the dark 
as to what is being arranged for.’66 
 
The previous day Fisher, despite an earlier letter swearing ‘the same sort of oath as 
Jeptha’s to murder anyone who caused me to write [on official matters] while away from the 
Admiralty’,67 found himself reassuring the First Lord about the proposed reductions: 
‘This subject, as you will remember, was most extensively gone into by the Sea 
Lords, and we unanimously came to the conclusion to state to you that there was 
no justification for keeping such an immense Naval Force in full service at sea as 
at present, i.e., the present Naval Force at sea is greater in power than at the time 
of the Dogger Bank incident, when it was possible for France and Russia to have 
thrown in their lot against us, and we considered our naval strength then amply 
sufficient. Now Russia is annihilated, France our friend, and Germany our only 
possible foe, many times weaker than ourselves; so how can we support of justify 
keeping up our strength at a higher pitch that then? But not only this—the nucleus 
crews are by this new arrangement increased in strength, and more vessels ready 
in home waters against our own possible foe—Germany. It’s a vital necessity to 
carry out this arrangement.’68 
 
Whether this soothed Tweedmouth’s mind is questionable, since he wrote to Campbell-
Bannerman on October 15
th
 that: 
‘I am afraid we are likely to be in a great hucker about naval affairs[.] [T]he 
proposed redistribution of the fleets including the placing of 6 battleships & 4 
armoured cruisers in the nucleus crew ship reserves at home has now come out 
and there is a great outcry arising about it.’69 
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 This outcry was made worse because of the leak. Because the Home Fleet proposal, it 
seems, went straight from fleet officers to journalists, several senior officials may only learned of 
the redistribution over their breakfast or evening newspapers.
70
 One important opponent was Sir 
George Clarke, the Secretary of the C.I.D., whose relationship with Fisher ran hot and cold 
depending on the issues under consideration.
71
 Already opposed to the Dreadnought and the 
Invincibles, he had tweaked the Admiralty’s nose during the estimates debate by offering 
Campbell-Bannerman his own assessment of the Royal Navy’s future capital ship needs.72 Fisher 
had responded with a detailed complaint, noting that Clarke was ‘a retired soldier, and entirely 
without knowledge of the fighting requirements of the Fleet’ and that ‘his conduct is 
indefensible’.73 Clarke now opposed the Home Fleet on the grounds it would dilute the Channel 
Fleet’s strength without providing a corresponding replacement.74 In addition, he felt the new 
organization was conceived and created by the Admiralty and the Cabinet without regard for the 
                                                                                                                                                             
some time it was hoped Montagu could be salved, but this proved impossible and she was written off. Resultantly 
the number of ships going to the Home Fleet was given as either eleven or ten for several months. 
70
 Nicholas Lambert, JFNR, p. 159, cites C.I.D. Secretary Sir George Clarke as one such official. This is unlikely, 
since the October 15
th
 letter to Esher which Lambert references is predated by another of September 26
th
 also 
referencing the reductions. In addition, his citation of a cutting from The Times as appearing in the former letter is 
wrong, as it was enclosed in the September 26
th
 letter. 
71
 During the summer of 1906, Fisher vented to Tweedmouth that ‘[t]he sooner we send Clarke to die of yellow fever 
as Governor of some West Indian island the better!’ Fisher to Tweedmouth, 9 July 1906, in Marder, FGDN, ii, p. 83. 
On the other hand, Fisher wrote to Clarke in 1907 after the ‘Invasion Bogey’ reappeared thanking him for penning a 
suitable broadside against it to The Times. See Fisher to Clarke, 12 September 1907, in ibid., p. 131-133. Two 
months after wishing him to contract a fatal Governorship, Fisher described a memorandum by Clarke titled ‘Note 
on the Strategic Aspects of Wireless Telegraphy’ as ‘one of the “best things he ever saw”’, adding ‘You see though I 
can never forget a friend, yet I can forgive an enemy.’ Esher to Campbell-Bannerman, 24 September 1906, f. 207-
210, Add MS 41213, Campbell-Bannerman MSS. 
72
 Clarke to Ponsonby, 2 July 1906, Add MS 41213, f. 182-191, Campbell-Bannerman MSS. See also Admiralty, 
‘Relations between Admiralty & the Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence (Sir G.S. Clarke).’, 1906, 
ADM 116/3095. 
73
 Admiralty, ‘Statement Regarding Admiralty Responsibility for the Strength of the Navy’, July 1906, F.P. 4776, p. 
1, FISR 8/18, Fisher MSS. 
74
 Clarke to Esher, 15 October 1906, ESHR 10/39, Esher MSS. 
81 
 
C.I.D.’s opinion, and that ‘to increase our torpedo boat and submarine preponderance’ was no 
replacement for a sufficient battleship force.
75
 
Fisher was undeterred by the growing opposition and three days after his return to work 
on the 20
th
 an official Admiralty Minute was issued on the Home Fleet. The text of the Minute 
set down the basics of the new organization. The Home Fleet would be ‘constituted from the 
Ships in Commission in Reserve… under the supreme command of a Flag Officer with the status 
of Commander-in-Chief and Head Quarters at Sheerness’. The Home Fleet was further intended 
‘in every respect organized with a view to enhancing its value as a fighting force, and Battle 
Practice and other Fleet exercises not at present carried out by the Reserve Divisions will be 
introduced. The primary object aimed at will be sea-going efficiency, and for this purpose the 
cruises of the Home Fleet will be made as frequent as practicable.’ Home Fleet ships were to be 
interchangeable with those in the other three fleets, and transferring Home Fleet ships to the 
other fleets in place of ships in Dockyard hands was explicitly mentioned. Likewise the Home 
Fleet’s cruisers were to exercise with their counterpart squadrons ‘from time to time’. The minute 
concluded that: 
‘The Board of Admiralty are satisfied that the constitution of a Home Fleet will 
increase the immediate striking strength of the Navy, and that the more active 
training which the Nucleus Crews will receive under the new system will add to 
the sea experience of the Fleet as a whole.’76 
 
 This was the public consumption version. The letter issued to the Cs-in-C. of the Fleets 
and the Home Ports the same day was much more extensive, but nonetheless covered much of 
the same ground. An initial draft survives in the bound Tweedmouth papers, and several of the 
passages omitted from the letter as issued are revealing. The new Home Fleet was being 
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constituted to ‘enable their Lordships to provide more efficiently than at present for the 
exigencies of War’.77 Ten battleships and cruisers were to be added to the existing Reserve 
Divisions, which would be redesignated as the Home Fleet. The ships marked for reduction were 
the battleships Glory, Goliath, Canopus, and Caesar from the Channel Fleet and London and 
Bulwark from the Mediterranean Fleet, and the armoured cruisers Cornwall and Cumberland of 
the First Cruiser Squadron and Antrim and Devonshire from the Second Cruiser Squadron. The 
Admiral (D)—the officer in charge of the Navy’s torpedo craft—was to be placed under the 
Home Fleet’s C.-in-C. ‘for administrative purposes’, a move described in another passage cut 
from the final draft, ‘as being a measure better suited to the War arrangements Their Lordships 
have adopted.’ 
While these documents suggest there was little more to the new Home Fleet but another 
reorganization of the reserves and perhaps an unmentioned financial motivation at work, that 
impression is misleading. This is not an accident of history, but was actually a quite deliberate 
subterfuge on Fisher and the rest of the Board’s part. Throughout the next month Fisher and his 
subordinates drew up a highly secret set of memoranda setting out the long-term plan for the 
Home Fleet. These papers were bound and issued within the Admiralty in January 1907.
78
 
Tweedmouth, of course, received the memoranda individually, and his copy of the first included 
a covering letter in Fisher’s unmistakable hand. This letter is reproduced in its near-entirety 
(except for a few words made illegible by the volume’s binding) here to illustrate the extreme 
secrecy involved: 
‘First Lord 
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‘Herewith the programme of arrangements for constitution of Home Fleet as 
concurred in by the Sea Lords & all those concerned in the detailed copying out 
of the orders. 
‘It would be extremely unwise to make this programme public or even to issue it 
confidentially as it would tie our hands in arranging from time to time any 
modifications in it which may be for the greater convenience of the Service. 
‘Further it is most undesirable to let Foreign admiralties know beforehand what 
the constitution of our Squadrons are going to be. 
‘Propose to adhere to the Parliamentary answer … that the Board of Admiralty do 
not propose to make public the varying disposition of the fighting units of the 
Fleet which is their sole responsibility and it is not in the interests of the public 
service to do so[.]’79 
 
 The memorandum that followed laid out the long-term plan for another rearrangement of 
the command structure in the British Isles.
80
 The creation of the new Home Fleet was only the 
first of three steps, and was scheduled for April 1907. Another amendment would happen in 
November 1907, followed by a final change that would bring the programme to completion in 
April 1908. The overall goal was explicitly spelled out in boldface type: 
‘These Phases are so arranged as to bring in the newest ships now completing 
building into the Home Fleet, so that in April 1908 the Escadre d’Élite of the 
Home Fleet stationed at the Nore or Dover, will of itself be largely superior to the 
whole German Fleet, and consequently remove all cause for anxiety should a 
crisis at any time arise when the Channel and Atlantic Fleets are cruising in the 
Atlantic.’ 
 
Similar terms appeared in the orders to the officer chosen to take command of the new Home 
Fleet, Rear-Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman: 
‘3. The Home Fleet which will come under your command will comprise the 
existing Reserve Divisions and certain Battleships which are being withdrawn for 
this purpose from the Channel, Mediterranean, and Atlantic Fleets. 
‘4. This fleet will be organized, as regards the larger vessels, in three divisions, 
which will be based respectively at the Nore, Portsmouth, and Devonport. The 
Nore Division, which will be the Escadre d’Élite of the Home Fleet, will be 
subdivided into a Battleship Division and a Cruiser Division, the latter being 
organized as a distinct command, and comprising the Fifth Cruiser Squadron. … 
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‘5. The primary object My Lords have had in view of constituting the Home Fleet 
is increased readiness for war, and, as contributing to this end, increased seagoing 
efficiency of all ships in Home Waters. … 
‘12. The cruising ground of the Home Fleet will be in home waters and the North 
Sea, with occasional cruises on the Scandinavian coasts.’81 
 
 The ‘Escadre d’Élite’, when completely formed in April 1908, would comprise 
Dreadnought, the three Invincibles, both Lord Nelsons, and the ex-Chilean battleships Swiftsure 
and Triumph.
82
 Except for Dreadnought, these ships were to be added to the Chatham-based 
Nore Division as they were completed. In the meantime the Nore Division would be populated 
with Dreadnought and several other battleships. The inclusion of the Invincibles is possibly less 
suggestive than it appears. Despite Fisher’s ambitions for the type, their inclusion in the Home 
Fleet’s battleship strength was probably meant to be a temporary measure until the three 
Bellerophons entered service, as the Nore Division also included the powerful Fifth Cruiser 
Squadron populated with some of the Navy’s best armoured cruisers. 
As, and possibly more, important than these is Fisher’s condensed description of his 
intentions in a letter written to Tweedmouth while the Admiral was in Germany. As has been well 
documented, Fisher preferred to trust to ad hoc committees and his own oral powers of 
persuasion instead of the written word, fluent a letter writer though he was. The result is that 
most major decisions were never put on the record and thus there has been plenty of room for 
various interpretations of what Fisher’s real agenda was. This makes the letter of 11 October 
particularly valuable, as it is probably as close as we can get to Fisher’s vision of the Home 
Fleet’s purpose in late 1906: 
‘I had better anticipate by a few lines now what I am going to explain in detail 
when we meet, in order to remove any impression that may possibly exist in your 
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mind that the rearrangement of the strength of our various Squadrons … in any 
degree implies any diminution in our fighting strength! 
‘On the very contrary I don’t know anything that we have done which will more 
add to our fighting efficiency! And this is the main lesson:- that by this new re-
arrangement whereby 7 Battleships and Armoured Cruisers are brought home we 
are able to constitute a fresh “Home Fleet” (as I should like to term it) & by a 
reorganization which this addition of 11 powerful armoured ships admits of as 
regards our present Reserve Divisions & placing them all under one Admiral who 
I have in mind to suggest to you as “par excellence” fitted for it (and it so happens 
all the circumstances peculiarly lend themselves to this project), we get a 
homogenous perfectly constituted Reserve Fleet always in “home waters” 
working under the Supreme Command of one Admiral & I hope you will see that 
when this Fleet goes out for Manoeuvres next Summer in the manner I propose to 
suggest to you that everyone will see what another great stride forward we have 
taken in our strategic policy of collecting our fighting strength in the place we 
want to fight. 
‘Intimately associated with this project, and indeed the very basis of it, is the great 
fact that for years to come, Dover, the Nore & the North Sea are our “points 
d’appui” & you will see when I explain the details (too intricate for a letter) how 
everything fits in to our purpose. … 
‘The silly cry (which I am assured on excellent authority has fallen perfectly flat 
on the Country) that the fighting efficiency of the Navy is being reduced & our 
naval supremacy impaired will be met in the most conclusive manner by the 
British Public seeing a new Fleet emerge into being complete in all its parts 
instead of the presently disconnected & inorganically incomplete Reserve 
Division which we have not sooner formed up simply because the time was not 
ripe, nor had the psychological moment arrived for the New Dispensation to be 
brought forward.
 83
 
 
 This letter is classic Fisher, at once both starkly written and frustratingly vague. Most of 
the letter is meant to reassure a nervous politician about the potential ramifications of the 
proposed changes, albeit that reassurance is tempered with a warning that secrecy is still 
paramount. The exact purpose of the new Home Fleet is only discussed tangentially, although the 
heavily emphasized reference to ‘Dover, the Nore & the North Sea’ as ‘points d’appui’ leaves 
little room for misunderstanding. Fisher was even more direct in a letter written for the Prince of 
Wales’ benefit twelve days later. As the Prince was a fellow naval officer and, at this point, still 
regarded by Fisher as a friend, the First Sea Lord saw no reason to mince words: 
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 ‘These are the absolute facts of the case:-- 
‘Our only probable enemy is Germany. Germany keeps here whole Fleet 
concentrated within a few hours of England. We must therefore keep a Fleet twice 
as powerful concentrated within a few hours of Germany. 
‘If we kept the Channel and Atlantic Fleets always in the English Channel … this 
would meet the case, but this is neither feasible or expedient, and if, when 
relations with foreign powers are strained, the Admiralty attempt to take the 
proper precautions … then at once the Foreign Office and the Government veto it, 
and say such a step will precipitate war! … The Board of Admiralty don’t 
intend … to subject themselves to this risk, and they have decided to form a new 
Home Fleet always at home, with its Headquarters at the Nore and its cruising 
ground the North Sea.’84 
 
 Furthermore, as Fisher contended elsewhere, the Home Fleet was ‘the gradual and logical 
development of the Redistribution of the Fleet, as arranged in October 1904, but the full 
development was not feasible at that date as the strength of the outlying fleets and squadrons was 
disproportionate to the number of ships at home, and so the necessary personnel was not 
available.’85 While Ruddock Mackay wrote that ‘no evidence is adduced to substantiate this 
claim’ in the official prints regarding the Home Fleet,86 an examination of the previous reforms 
to the Navy’s reserve system shows this is not strictly true. The new scheme was in many ways a 
repetition of the 1902-1903 reorganization which had created the original Home Fleet that Fisher 
converted into the Channel Fleet at the same time he set up the nucleus crew reserve. Now, with 
the 1906 Summer Manoeuvres showing the nucleus crew ships were generally efficient and 
could be filled out from naval barracks and reservists in a crisis, Fisher intended to amalgamate 
the existing reserve forces split between the three Home Ports into a single organization. The 
only confusing part of this development is, according to some, the fully-commissioned Nore 
Division. 
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This brings us back to the Home Fleet’s initial organization. As mentioned previously, the 
Nore Division based on Chatham was to be the most powerful element of the Home Fleet, but 
would not be at full strength until April 1908, and upon formation it would consist of six 
battleships including Dreadnought. Alongside these would be the six ships of the Fifth Cruiser 
Squadron, plus six smaller cruisers. Two of these cruisers, Sapphire and Attentive, were to be 
flagships to the Rear-Admiral (D) and Commodore (D) respectively.
87
 The Commodore (D)’s 
command would be the forty-eight destroyers with full crews as well as their attending 
auxiliaries; the Rear-Admiral (D) commanded of the remaining Home Fleet torpedo craft. Aside 
from the Rear-Admiral (D), four other Rear-Admirals were to serve under the C-in-C Home 
Fleet, two for command of the two Nore Divisions and two for command of the Portsmouth and 
Devonport divisions.
88
 
 The inclusion of the Navy’s torpedo craft in the Home Fleet has led Nicholas Lambert to 
argue that Fisher was attempting to change how the Navy was organized by replacing the 
armoured capital ship with the torpedo craft. Lambert cites one passage from ‘the order in 
council which created the Home Fleet’ as being extremely significant, although he omits a 
portion which is reproduced here: 
‘3. The entire flotilla of torpedo craft and submarines, consisting of 3 scouts, 48 
destroyers, and all submarines in full commission which are not allocated for 
local defence of Home Ports, together with all scouts, torpedo gunboats, 
destroyers, and their respective parent vessels, repair ships, and mine-laying 
vessels now in commission with nucleus or special crews, under the command of 
the Admiral D and respective Captains D, will be affiliated to the Home Fleet, and 
be placed under the supreme command of Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet.’89 
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 Fisher employed similar language in a memorandum on the redistribution of the fleet to 
be sent to fleet commanders smarting over the loss of some of their destroyers: 
‘It has to be observed that new strategic conditions necessitate the employment of 
the largest practicable number to be obtained of these vessels for North Sea 
service, and for this reason a number of torpedo-boat destroyers have been 
brought home from China, the Mediterranean and Gibraltar to strengthen the 
home force, leaving only a small proportion of torpedo craft abroad. … the 
political circumstances were quite different when originally 24 destroyers were 
attached to the Channel Fleet.’90 
 
 Equally important for the ‘flotilla defence’ case is a proposal to redeploy several 
submarine flotillas along the East Coast. Captain Sydney Hall, the Inspecting Captain of 
Submarines considered that, after 1909, ‘It would not seem necessary to distribute submarines 
along the coast in peace time, and I suggest that for Home Ports the best policy will be to provide 
a sea-going base [i.e. a submarine tender] with 9 submarines’ at Pembroke, Rosyth, and Grimsby. 
Each flotilla ‘can be moved according to the strategical requirements of the case.’91 A reinforced 
flotilla was moved to Harwich.
92
 
Thus it would seem there was in fact a large focus on torpedo craft in the Home Fleet’s 
creation. In fact, this is undeniable, although at the time few recognized the importance of the 
flotilla in Fisher’s new organization, instead focusing on the movements of the Navy’s capital 
ships.
93
 At the same time, assuming the entire organization was meant for ‘flotilla defence’ is 
also a misconception. While the submarine and destroyer flotillas were used for anti-invasion 
duties, this was not their sole function—especially in the case of the destroyers. Fisher, like the 
majority of the Royal Navy’s flag officers, was not terribly concerned by the prospect of an 
invasion, and while there was certainly an element of deterrence to the Home Fleet, this aspect 
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should not be overestimated. It is perfectly true that with strong flotillas at home ‘gave the 
Admiralty far greater flexibility in deployment of armoured warships’,94 but the question must be 
asked, where was the most likely place for a naval confrontation between Britain and another 
Great Power during this time? The answer is, of course, the North Sea, since that Great Power 
would almost certainly be Germany. It was not the ‘outer marches of the Empire’ that had need 
of those armoured warships. As Fisher had emphasized in his October 11
th
 letter to Tweedmouth, 
the Navy’s ‘points d’appui’ were in the North Sea. Fisher hoped to reinforce this point on his 
return to the Admiralty, such that 
‘I hope to make so transparently obvious to you that I have not the very faintest 
doubt but that you will cordially approve the whole arrangement in toto! The only 
one thing I specifically beg of you is to keep the matter private until the time 
arrives to make the public announcement on the subject as if it leaks out presently 
we shall be subject to extreme disadvantages in the manipulation of the details of 
the scheme.’95 
 
 There was certainly reason to fear ‘extreme disadvantages’ if the full Home Fleet scheme, 
and especially the attachment of the dreadnoughts to the Nore Division, became public 
knowledge. Even amongst Fisher’s allies, there was consternation when they learned of it. Prince 
Louis of Battenberg (now Vice Admiral, Second Cruiser Squadron) had been involved in the 
initial discussions on redistribution in the summer of 1906, where he expressed a desire ‘to 
submit some suggestions to you for gilding the pill of reduced sea-going squadrons as regards 
the British Public & Press.’96 However Battenberg was left out of the later discussions, as he 
wrote to another Fisher supporter, naval journalist James Thursfield, that ‘the first and so far only 
scheme … brought out by J.F. of which I had not a previous inkling’ was the Home Fleet.97 Of 
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Fisher’s plan ‘to form the Sheerness/Chatham division of the Home Fleet of our eight best 
battleships… and our eight best armoured cruisers’, Battenberg was mystified and wondered 
‘Where is the sense of this, even the sense of proportion?’98 
Fisher’s opponents were just as vituperative. Sir George Clarke wrote a long letter on the 
Home Fleet proposal to the Prime Minister on 15 November, complaining that he found it 
‘difficult to follow & understand the new schemes which the Admiralty now evolves at brief 
intervals, or the principles, if any, which guide those schemes.’99 Fisher, whose attitude toward 
the C.I.D. grew more hostile as the Army gained in influence, ignored related objections to the 
Home Fleet, leading Esher to rap the Admiral’s knuckles over his attitude: 
‘I deprecate, if you will allow me to say so, your method in dealing with … 
opponents. 
‘In a country like ours, governed by discussion, a great man is never hanged. He 
hangs himself. Therefore pray be Machiavellian, and play upon the delicate 
instrument of public opinion with your fingers and not your feet—however 
tempting the latter may be.’100 
 
Esher implored Fisher to ‘condescend to convert the “six men who count”’, and with regard to 
the C.I.D. specifically, the proper course was ‘to give it plenty to do!’ thus giving Clarke less 
time to meddle in naval affairs. Fisher seems to have ignored this sound counsel, and in February 
a frustrated Esher wrote ‘You are always chaffing me about the excellent “advice” which I now 
and then diffidently give you. You never take it!’101 While Knollys thought that Esher’s ‘letter to 
Jacky has terrified him’102 and some modification would be made to the Home Fleet prior to its 
formation a few weeks in the future, this did not happen.
103
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Commanding Admirals 
While Fisher felt secure enough to ignore both the C.I.D. and Esher’s suggestions, there 
was one man whose opinions Fisher could not ignore. This was Rear-Admiral Sir Francis 
Bridgeman, the officer chosen for command of the Home Fleet. Bridgeman, sadly, is something 
of a forgotten man in the history of the Navy. Marder’s description of him is typical—according 
to him, Bridgeman was not ‘a particularly forceful person, and more of a follower than a leader,’ 
however he ‘did possess sound judgment’.104 This does not do the man justice, nor does his only 
biographer’s depiction of Bridgeman as an archetypal English gentleman suffice.105 Bridgeman 
can be described as generally unassuming but nonetheless possessing a considerable charm 
which comes through in his surviving correspondence (he had an endearing habit of ending many 
sentences with exclamations). Bridgeman was popular within the Navy despite belonging to 
neither the ‘Fishpond’ nor the ‘Syndicate of Discontent’, as can be illustrated by the fact that 
both even at the height of the Fisher-Beresford feud, Bridgeman had friends in both camps 
despite his Home Fleet being one of the most bitter points of dispute.
106
 Another example of this 
respect is a young Lieutenant writing in his diary of ‘the very welcome intelligence that I am 
most likely going to the “Dreadnought” on Admiral Bridgeman’s Staff. By Jove I hope it’s 
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true.’107 Upon being informed that Bridgeman was to succeed him as Second-in-Command of the 
Channel Fleet, Admiral Sir Hedworth Lambton wrote to Fisher that ‘I think they have picked the 
right man in Bridgeman to succeed me.’ 108  Fisher himself paid the following tribute to 
Bridgeman in his Memories: 
‘There are few people living to whom I am under a greater obligation that 
Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman, G.C.B. This distinguished sailor aided me in the 
gradual building up of the Grand Fleet. … Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman’s 
command, with whom the Grand Fleet originated under the humble designation of 
the Home Fleet—a gathering and perpetuation of the old more or less stationary 
coast-guard ships scattered all round the United Kingdom and, as the old phrase 
was, “Grounding on their beef bones” as they swung with the tide at their 
anchors. … I hope Sir Francis Bridgeman will forgive me for hauling him into 
this book—I have no other way of showing him my eternal gratitude; and it was 
with intense delight that I congratulated Mr. Churchill on obtaining his services to 
succeed Sir Arthur Wilson[.]’109 
 
In either December 1906 or January 1907 Bridgeman, then second-in-command of the 
Mediterranean Fleet, wrote to the Admiralty in forceful terms regarding his forthcoming 
command. He insisted that the ‘Sheerness Division’ of the Home Fleet be fully manned and 
placed ‘on a similar footing to Mediterranean or Channel Fleets’, and that ‘if this cannot be 
done… that I am relieved of all responsibility[.]’ Bridgeman also wanted the Nore Division to 
have ‘ample opportunities for exercising at sea.’110  While Bridgeman’s orders regarding the 
Home Fleet specified that the Nore Division would, as has previously been mentioned, be the 
new fleet’s ‘Escadre d’Élite’, those orders did not refer to the Home Fleet’s manning 
arrangements. However Tweedmouth (and by extension, Fisher) took Bridgeman’s concern about 
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his crews seriously, and Tweedmouth attempted to allay the prospective Commander-in-Chief’s 
fears in a letter dated January 30
th
: 
‘With regard to your own active striking squadron I think you may consider that 
they will be really fully manned: 
3
/5
ths
 of nucleus crews to be permanent during 
commission[,] 
2
/5
ths
 mostly trained men who be from time to time moved en bloc 
in order to meet the necessities of service in other ships on more distant berths but 
who will not be moved oftener than from 8 to 12 months[.] I am told this system 
was practically in force in the Channel Fleet in 1903.’111 
 
The ‘active striking squadron’ was, of course, the Nore Division. Bridgeman seems to 
have felt reasonably reassured by this reply. However, some concerns remained, as he expressed 
to his colleague Captain Doveton Sturdee, who was about to join the Channel Fleet: 
‘I also know that you will recognize the difficulties of my prospective command, 
& how necessary intercommunication between us will be. As regards the 
employment of Cruisers & destroyers, for it is once though that these two bodies 
have two masters, bang goes all interest, discipline, & the rest of what makes up 
an efficient fleet!— 
‘In a sense! The Nore Division will be fully manned, also 48 Destroyers if they 
can be found (I mean the Destroyers) but I hear many are quite unfit to go to sea 
& no prospects of their being put into repair! The repairs laying exclusively with 
the Admiralty! 
‘The proper defence of our trade & coasts, & the general preparedness for Battle, 
is what we must work at together, and so long as I am taken fully into the 
counsels of the Senior C in C, I should help him to the best of my ability; always 
& at the same time expecting him to receive with sympathy & patience whatever I 
may have to propose! There are plenty of rocks to get stranded on in this scheme, 
and careful piloting, will be the surest road to success...’112 
 
Those familiar with the subsequent history of the Royal Navy in this period will take special note 
of the final paragraph, since Bridgeman’s hopes for a smooth working relationship with the new 
Channel Fleet Commander-in-Chief would remain mere hopes. 
Bridgeman’s numerous connections throughout the service made him useful for enquiring 
exactly what certain critics of the Home Fleet wanted in its stead. Most important amongst these 
was Lord Charles Beresford, another Admiral who Fisher and the rest of the Board could not 
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ignore—no matter how much they may have wished to. Beresford was the man chosen to replace 
Sir Arthur Wilson as C.-in-C. Channel Fleet, thus being the ‘Senior C in C’ mentioned in 
Bridgeman’s letter to Sturdee. 
One of the many members of the Anglo-Irish Protestant ascendancy to join the Navy, 
Beresford was the second son of the clergyman-heir of the Marquisate of Waterford. He was also, 
more importantly, a naval officer of no small distinction, having earned the nation’s affection in 
1882 with his handling of the gunboat Condor during the bombardment of Alexandria and again 
in 1884-1885 through his efforts during Sir Garnet Wolseley’s expedition to save General 
Gordon and his men from annihilation at Khartoum.
113
 Nevertheless he, like Fisher, possessed ‘a 
gigantic personality’, and ‘both men sought credit for their works and neither liked to share the 
limelight.’114 Although by his own admission he was by no means a first-class mind,115 Beresford 
could usually be counted to make up the deficit with ‘charm, geniality, high spirits, humour, and 
his unvarying kindness and thoughtfulness.’116 
Beresford had been offered—and had accepted—command of the Channel Fleet in 
September 1906, having received the Admiralty’s August letter regarding the proposed fleet 
redistribution at roughly the same time. About the latter, he informed Tweedmouth that he would 
‘overhaul it, and send some remarks.’117 Press speculation of Beresford’s appointment seems to 
have preceded the Admiralty’s official offer.118 Beresford left no doubt of his intentions, as he 
wrote to Tweedmouth that ‘I have all ready [sic] made out many plans for War Organisation for 
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Channel Fleet in all details. Cruisers, T.B.D, Battle Fleet &c. provided I do not find them there, 
which is unlikely.’119 The same letter stressed again Beresford’s desire to have exact plans laid 
out. Speaking of his own plans, Beresford said they were ‘personally corrected on the 1st of each 
month and signed by me. This keeps things as they are for a sudden emergency and not as they 
might[,] could[,] or should be. Ships laid up and ships not available like “Prince of Wales” are all 
illuminated [sic] from list for sudden emergencies.’120 He also objected—quite ironically—to the 
appointment of Reginald Custance as his second-in-command: ‘Custance impossible person 
either he or I would separate in two months.’121 He found other things worrying as well: 
‘I am told privately that all T. craft are to be under Bridgeman, an excellent 
arrangement but their organization for war corrected every week, must be made 
out by me or submitted to me. I imagine if Lambton with his Cruisers made out 
all his plans and details of what they were to do in War, and for practising &c for 
War where would the C. in C. be knowing nothing till war was declared, the man 
who has got to fight and command in War must make out all the details for what 
is to be done, where ships are to go, how they are to practice for war &c himself, 
then the Ad
l
 in command of squadrons or T.B.D’s, &c, can carry out the orders. If 
reports that Ad
l
 Bridgeman will be a C. in C. which would appear to indicate that 
the C. in C of Channel is to have nothing to do with the organization for War, of 
by far the most important item of the initial steps of a Channel War.’122 
 
Beresford was obviously under the impression that as commander of the Channel Fleet he would 
be the overall commander during hostilities.  
 Tweedmouth’s notes for a reply are instructive, but nevertheless failed to disabuse 
Beresford of this illusion: 
‘With regard to the question of the Destroyers one of the reasons for Admiral 
Bridgeman being made Commander in Chief of the Home Fleet was the certainty 
that he would cordially cooperate with you. And he will have orders to consult 
you on all matters of strategy, subject to the lines of Admiralty policy. And you 
will receive copies of all instructions given to him from time to time on that and 
War preparation questions. 
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‘The present system has been found inconvenient for Administrative purposes[,] 
especially when the Commander in Chief Channel Fleet is out of touch of 
Destroyer bases. The active flotilla of Destroyers will from time to time be placed 
under the orders of C in C Channel Fleet for exercise.’123 
 
Fisher prepared a draft letter for Tweedmouth towards the end of the year that the First Sea Lord 
thought ‘meets all you want as regards to [Beresford’s] relations with Bridgeman.’124 Meanwhile 
another letter of Beresford’s must undoubtedly have raised eyebrows at the Admiralty, if there 
were any eyebrows not already at their zenith: 
‘I am sending you home shortly my view of the subject of the strength of the Fleet 
under the new scheme of reduction, you may not agree with me, and the Board 
may not agree with me, and no doubt you & your Board ought to know more than 
I do, but you told me to write to you on points I thought important and so I have 
done so.’125 
 
 Beresford’s follow-up to this letter seems not to have clarified the situation at all, and by 
January 1907 the situation was becoming critical. Bridgeman, as seen, was worried enough to 
ask for reassurances from the Admiralty regarding his forthcoming command. Simultaneously, 
Tweedmouth asked Bridgeman, still Beresford’s subordinate, ‘to get from him something 
definite as to his requirements’. What Bridgeman got amounted to a list of demands; Beresford 
‘said he would be content with 14 good Battle ships, 6 Big Cruisers, 4 smaller ones, and 3 
Divisions of destroyers with their accompanying auxiliary vessels!’ Furthermore, ‘he wished the 
Constitution of the Home Fleet entirely altered! Or, as he described it “Swept Off”.’ With evident 
frustration, Bridgeman reported Beresford was vague on just how this sweeping would manifest 
itself ‘but, as far I could gather he wants the “Escadre d’elite” or “Nore Division” to be an 
addition to the Channel Fleet, in fact an extra Division of it & to be composed of 6 or 8 Battle 
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Ships & a similar number of big Cruisers, Torpedo craft &c.’ This force would be fully-manned 
and commanded by a Vice-Admiral (under Beresford, of course), and would join up with the 
Channel Fleet a few times a year for exercises. The other Port divisions of the Home Fleet would 
be a reserve. Ignoring Bridgeman’s explanation of ‘how difficult the Board would find it’, 
Beresford ‘declared he would be satisfied with nothing less’.126 
Exchanges of letters having proved useless, Tweedmouth proposed a summit meeting in 
hopes of clearing the air. After all, Tweedmouth reminded Fisher, ‘I do think we sometimes are 
inclined to consider our own views to be infallible and are not ready enough to give 
consideration to the views of others who may disagree with us but who will still give us ideas 
and information which can be turned to great use.’127 
Any hope Tweedmouth held for something constructive to result from the conference was 
an illusion, and one can only imagine the mood at the conference between Beresford and Fisher 
and Tweedmouth that happened on January 20
th
 at the Admiralty. Whatever was said between the 
three, an agreement was reached whereupon it was decided that the forty-eight destroyers under 
the Commodore (D)’s command as well as the Fifth Cruiser Squadron would be detached from 
the Home Fleet to the Channel Fleet ‘[w]henever desired for Exercise and Manœuvres’. 
Furthermore the Home and Atlantic Fleets would exercise together with the Channel Fleet under 
Beresford’s overall command, since they would be under the C.-in-C. Channel Fleet during 
wartime by virtue of Beresford’s position as the ‘Senior Flag Officer afloat’. However the 
frequency of these combined exercises were to be decided by the Admiralty and did not ‘in any 
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way derogate from the position and authority of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Atlantic and 
Home Fleets’.128 
In the long term this meeting achieved little in terms of soothing the conflict between 
Beresford and the Admiralty, and Fisher at least must have suspected as much when wrote to his 
friend George Lambert of the results: 
‘I had three hours with Beresford yesterday, and all is settled, and the Admiralty 
don’t give in one inch to his demands, but I had as a preliminary to agree to three 
things:-- 
I. Lord C. Beresford is a greater man than Nelson. 
II. No one knows anything about the art of naval war except Lord C. Beresford. 
III. The Admiralty haven’t done a single d—d thing right!’129 
 
Of course, things were by no means settled. However, Beresford suddenly had to depart for 
North America and this made further discussion impossible for the moment.
130
 Meanwhile, 
Beresford left his wife, Lady Mina Beresford, and the Liberal Unionist M.P. Carlyon Bellairs to 
manage a press campaign against the Home Fleet.
131
 Fisher was also in a vituperative mood. Just 
before Beresford’s departure he told Arnold White that the nation ‘can sleep quiet in our beds! 
Beresford, having had one month’s leave, has asked for another month to go abroad … so that 
‘bolt from the blue’ can’t be coming, or the ‘one man on whom all depends’ would surely ask 
that some other Admiral should take his place (and that he resign), to be ready for the German 
invasion, which is to come without warning like the last trump!’132 
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Meanwhile the Channel Fleet remained under the taciturn Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson’s 
command, leaving him to draw up and oversee a combined series of manoeuvres involving not 
only the Channel Fleet but the Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets as well.
133
 
 
The Day Approaches 
Public reaction to the Home Fleet announcement varied, and much of the most strident 
denunciations unsurprisingly came from those already opposed to the Fisher’s policies. In 
November 1906 The Gentlemen’s Magazine commented: 
‘This new departure has been viewed askance in certain quarters as 
foreshadowing a reduction of the fighting strength of the substantive Fleet; but 
there seems to be nothing in the text of the memorandum to warrant such a 
construction.’134 
 
The Saturday Review had earlier taken a reserved stance, stating that ‘In the absence of evidence 
to the contrary, the decision of the Admiralty to effect a rearrangement of ships in the Channel, 
Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Reserve Fleets must be assumed to be in accordance with the 
principle that the peace distribution of the Navy should also be its best strategical distribution for 
war.’ Although the Admiralty’s announcement was ‘too slight to allow any safe opinion to be 
expressed on the merits of this fresh shuffling of units’, the tentative conclusion was that ‘It is 
not yet a constitutional maxim that the Board of Admiralty can do no wrong, and the general 
hymn of praise is premature.’135  
 Others were much less reticent. In a long criticism of the Admiralty based on the writings 
of Bridge and Custance amongst others, an anonymous writer in the Edinburgh Review 
complained: 
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‘But if a North Sea fleet is in itself necessary, what are we to think of an 
Administration which, while talking of improving the ‘striking power’ of the 
Navy, can give us, on our most exposed front, nothing better than a miscellaneous 
collection of ships, not fully manned, and in many of its units not above the 
suspicion of having been allowed, by want of necessary repairs, to fall into a state 
of comparative inefficiency?’136 
 
 The pages of periodicals was not the only place the Home Fleet was attacked, indeed the 
issue became another round of ammunition for Carlyon Bellairs to use in his regular attacks on 
the Admiralty in the House of Commons. Bellairs however was not the first to bring the Home 
Fleet up in Parliament. Soon after the Admiralty’s official announcement in October, Liberal M.P. 
for Brighton Aurelian Ridsdale asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, Edmund 
Robertson, if the new organization would decrease the number of battleships in full commission. 
Robertson replied with the not-quite-straight answer that the Navy’s battleships would be 
‘arranged in what the Board consider to be a more efficient fighting disposition.’137 Less than a 
week later Bellairs, who could be counted on to regularly ask something regarding the Admiralty, 
asked when a full statement on the Home Fleet, including details of the sliding scale of nucleus 
crews, would be made. Robertson responded that as the Home Fleet was still in development, 
and in any case the Admiralty did not wish to give such specific information publically.
138
 
During the same session, Sir Gilbert Parker asked Robertson ‘whether it is considered by the 
Admiralty and the Committee of Defence that ships … in the Reserve or Home Fleet, are 
immediately effective as a striking force in the emergency of war?’ Parker’s question stirred the 
Prime Minister to life: 
‘The Answer is—Yes. The Board of Admiralty consider that the redistribution of 
ships about to be made adds to the fighting efficiency of the Fleet. Questions of 
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this nature are not referred to the Committee of Defence, but I thought I would 
give this reply in order to save time.’139 
 
The next day, Parker asked for the names of the ships that would be withdrawn from the other 
fleets to constitute the Home Fleet. When Robertson replied it would be ‘premature’ to give their 
names so long before the Home Fleet was actually organized, he came under fire from several 
other M.Ps including Bellairs, Sir Howard Vincent, and the Viscount Turnour, leaving Robertson 
to finally snap that ‘I will give the names as soon as the Admiralty thinks I ought to.’140 The 
matter was not left there, as F.E. Smith asked a similar question on November 12
th
.
141
 
 From there, many of the questions asked of Robertson contained more and more 
innuendo. Bellairs implied that the Coastguard would be abolished upon creation of the Home 
Fleet.
142
 Major William Anstruher-Gray asked ‘whether the sea-going squadrons are to be 
reduced by six first-class battleships and four armoured cruisers, thus reducing the battleships at 
sea in full commission from thirty-two to twenty-six, and the cruisers from twenty-one to 
seventeen, and the first line of defence by one-fifth.’143 
 There remained one last change yet to be made before the Home Fleet was officially 
constituted. The transfer of the Reserve Divisions at the Home Ports would leave Bridgeman 
saddled with eight ancient ironclads Fisher had banished to harbour duties but not yet removed 
from the list of first-class battleships.
144
 It was swiftly arranged that they would be handed over 
to the individual port C-in-Cs, who would be responsible for whatever care and maintenance 
parties would be required to keep them reasonably functional until they were sold off.
145
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The Home Fleet’s First Test 
Upon its activation, there was much to do in the Home Fleet, especially in the Nore 
Division and the Fifth Cruiser Squadron. The latter, despite being expected to remain in Home 
Waters, was still meant to operate independently from the rest of the Home Fleet in the same 
manner as the cruiser squadrons attached to other fleets.
146
 
 The first major test of the Home Fleet as an operational force came in the summer of 
1907. While for reasons of economy there would be no Grand Manoeuvres as had occurred 
annually in previous years, Lord Charles Beresford was authorized to conduct a series of three 
exercises with the Channel Fleet and detachments from the Home Fleet. These, as Shawn Grimes 
notes, fitted well as an effort by the Admiralty to validate the 1907 War Plans, which will be 
described in detail in the next chapter.
147
 Aside from the surviving official reports to the 
Admiralty, a lucid narrative of events survives in the logbook kept by Midshipman Christopher 
Maude of the battleship Hindustan’s gunroom. His summary, written just after the end of the 
manoeuvres, provides a useful point of comparison with the official reports of Beresford and 
Custance.
148
 
The first exercise would run from June 24
th
 to June 27
th
. Beresford’s orders for the 
exercise give three objectives: 
‘(a) To determine whether it is possible to maintain a force of Destroyers 
supported by Cruisers off an enemy’s coast which contains the enemy’s principal 
base, the Destroyers’ base being over 150 miles from this principal base. 
‘(b) On the Battle Fleet leaving its base, to practise [sic] the Cruisers and 
Destroyers on both sides in their probable duties in War, and also to practice the 
Battle Fleet in trying to avoid attack by Destroyers after dark and in defending 
itself from such attacks. 
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‘(c) The Battle Fleet to pass through water in which submarines may be acting.’149 
 
Taking part would be the Channel Fleet and the Fifth Cruiser Squadron plus three scouts and 
thirty-six destroyers of the Home Fleet, some of the latter being nucleus crew ships.
150
 The exact 
Order of Battle was: 
‘C’ Fleet ‘X’ Fleet 
Eleven Battleships Five Cruisers 
Four Cruisers Two Scouts 
One Scout Twenty-four Destroyers 
Twelve Destroyers  
 
Beresford would command ‘C’ Fleet, while ‘X’ Fleet was commanded by the Rear-Admiral 
Commanding Fifth Cruiser Squadron, Rear-Admiral Sir George Callaghan.
151
 The battleground 
was the South Coast and the Straits of Dover. ‘C’ Fleet’s would proceed up the Channel and 
through the Straits of Dover. ‘X’ Fleet’s objective would be ‘to watch and report to its supposed 
battle fleet, represented by the Wireless Telegraph Station at Dover, all the movements of (C) 
Battle Fleet with a view to bringing it to early action, and for its Destroyers to attack (C) Battle 
Fleet, (C) Cruisers, or accompanying (C) Destroyers in any manner possible in War.’ ‘C’ Fleet’s 
objective was to proceed to sea unobserved and evade the ‘X’ Battle Fleet.152 
It might be wondered why Beresford did not ask for the Nore Division’s heavy ships to 
join these exercises, so providing an actual ‘enemy’ battle fleet. The answer seems to be that the 
Admiralty had already arranged for the Nore Division to cruise as a unit in Norwegian waters, 
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followed by goodwill visits to Trondheim and Christiania (now Oslo).
153
 However, considering 
later events it might be doubted whether Beresford would have asked for Bridgeman’s presence 
even had they been available. In company with Bridgeman’s ships were four destroyers, one of 
which was the River-class Eden with the others being older 30-knotters. Bridgeman’s favourable 
report of the Eden’s seagoing qualities was noted with pleasure by D.N.C. Sir Philip Watts.154 
Returning to the actual events of the manoeuvres, Midshipman Maude provides the 
following depiction of the action, whose directness is refreshing compared to the official reports: 
‘At about 9.a.m. we sighted the enemy’s cruisers on the Port Bow, through the 
straits. They on sighting us, dropped astern of us, and then followed us. This gave 
the C. in C. a good opportunity of getting away from them. Keeping the main fleet 
on an E.N.E course, he detached the 3 cruisers and the battleships Hindustan, 
Britannia and Juppiter [sic], to turn round and drive off the enemy. This they 
did, and when they had lost sight of the Main body, they turned round and 
followed them, in order to keep in touch with and if possible pick up the 
remainder of the fleet again. About noon, the enemy turned off onto an E.N.E.ly 
course. The detached squadron, thinking this was a ruse to see if they would 
follow the enemy, or continue on their own course, kept to their same course, thus 
making the enemy think they were following the main body.’ 
 
Callaghan’s force seems to have been taken in by this, but nevertheless things soon began going 
wrong for ‘C’ Fleet. 
‘About 6 in the evening, the Talbot being sent to determine the strength of the 
enemy’s destroyer flotilla, who had got out of sight, came within range of their 
cruisers and was put out of action. About 8 the Admiral ordered the detached 
squadron to spread on different courses, to wade [sic] the enemy’s destroyers, 
when it became dark. This however took some time to arrange, and about 9.15 the 
enemy appeared to port, and attacked.’ 
 
This attack was driven off and the detached squadron continued to spread out as ordered. The 
delay, however, had serious consequences: 
                                                 
153
 Bridgeman, ‘Home Fleet. Visit of Nore Battleships to Norway. Letter of Proceedings.’, 1 July 1907, X.169/1907, 
ADM 1/7931. 
154
 Minute by Watts, n.d. [July 1907], on Bridgeman, ‘Home Fleet. Visit of Nore Battleships to Norway. Letter of 
Proceedings.’, 1 July 1907, X.169/1907, ADM 1/7931. 
105 
 
‘They [the detached squadron] had not spread quite soon enough however, for the 
enemy’s destroyers coming down about 10.30 found the wing ship before she had 
got far enough out of her original course. From here, they found both the other 
two battleships, and of the three, the Britannia and Juppiter [sic] were sunk. The 
cruisers however escaped.’155 
 
In addition to the loss of Britannia and Jupiter, Hindustan was ruled heavily damaged. 
Beresford wrote in his report that the June 26
th
 ‘attack by the ‘X’ Scouts and Destroyers on the 
‘C’ screening battleships was well executed.’156 
The second exercise ran from July 1
st
 to July 3
rd
. Its object was ‘[t]o obtain experience in 
watching an enemy’s base with a Battle Fleet to which Cruisers and Destroyers are attached.’157 
Beresford’s ‘C’ Fleet represented the opposing force and was based in the Humber, with Vice-
Admiral Custance taking command of the observing ‘X’ Fleet at Yarmouth. Callaghan’s 
squadron was broken up between the two forces, with Callaghan himself coming under 
Custance’s orders. Beresford’s goal was to escape Custance’s patrolling destroyers and get to sea. 
Of interest is his assessment of the risks from those patrols: 
‘‘C’ Fleet runs a considerable risk from the ‘X’ Destroyers. How much risk this 
policy involves it is very desirable to determine. Much will depend on the 
efficiency of the ‘C’ Destroyers and Cruisers in driving off the ‘X’ Destroyers and 
maintaining an efficient screen for ‘C’. ‘C’ must be prepared to risk some of the 
Destroyers and possibly an Armoured Cruiser to effect the object in view.’158 
 
Custance, meanwhile, gave Callaghan command of the observation patrols, which consisted of 
three armoured cruisers, a scout, and thirteen destroyers. Custance’s main body took up a 
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position too far from the Humber and Beresford’s ships were able to escape due the slowness in 
communications between Callaghan’s patrols and Custance’s squadron. By the time Custance 
learned of Beresford’s position it was too late to force a general engagement. Nevertheless both 
sides took losses, Beresford losing a cruiser and six destroyers plus another cruiser severely 
damaged and Custance ten destroyers and a cruiser. Of these results, Beresford wrote that ‘a fleet 
in ‘X’[’s] position requires most intelligent and prompt scouting by its Cruisers and Destroyers.’ 
Furthermore, the results ‘shewed that much combined work is essential to all classes of vessels. 
Being based on a very possible war problem, it gives considerable food for reflection’. Beresford 
found fault with the deployment of the watching destroyers, which ‘were stopped in pairs close 
to the entrance.’ ‘What the exact object in view was, is not clear’, Beresford wrote with obvious 
puzzlement.
159
 Custance, meanwhile, emphasized the importance of wireless telegraphy.
160
 He 
also declared that destroyers did not undertake sufficient practice ‘to appreciate the work which 
they are more immediately required to do, which to my mind is not to torpedo the enemy’s 
battleships, but to deal with his destroyers.’ 
The third exercise took place in Pentland Firth. It was a modification of the second 
exercise divided into two related phases, running from July 8
th
 to the 10
th
, and.
161
 The premise of 
the first phase was ‘[t]wo Fleets nearly equal in strength of armoured vessels … are anxious to 
engage, but the Fleet in harbour wishes to try and reduce its opponent by a torpedo attack before 
leaving harbour.’ The second phase was meant to practice cruisers in driving away destroyers 
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from around a battle fleet while the destroyers attempted to tail a battle fleet with the object of 
attacking during the night. ‘X’ Fleet, now commanded by Custance would be the watching fleet. 
Based at Queensferry, Custance had five battleships, four armoured cruisers, two scouts, and the 
First and Third Destroyer Flotillas with which to carry out his observation duties. The sortieing 
‘C’ Fleet at Aberdeen was commanded by Beresford, who had now returned from haranguing the 
Admiralty on July 5
th
, and comprised seven battleships, two armoured cruisers, three second-
class cruisers, the scout Sentinel, and twelve destroyers from the Portsmouth and Devonport 
nucleus crew divisions of the Home Fleet.
162
 
Custance placed his four smaller cruisers and twelve destroyers watching the ‘C’ torpedo 
base at Aberdeen under the command of Captain Bentinck Yelverton of the protected cruiser 
Talbot while he stayed with his battlefleet seventy miles farther to sea.
163
 ‘X’’s watching force 
was deployed with Sentinel a mile off land and the destroyers in three quartets out from 
Sentinel’s position. During the ensuing sortie by Beresford’s ships, Yelverton’s watching force 
was badly mauled, losing two cruisers and five of his destroyers, with the Sentinel listed as a 
probable loss as well. In exchange, Beresford lost six of his destroyers, but four others had 
indeed reached Custance’s main force and attacked it.164 In his summary of the third exercise, 
Beresford thought that while Custance’s distribution of watching destroyers in quartets instead of 
pairs was superior but twelve were not enough versus Beresford’s twenty-four, 165  and the 
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question of if they should ‘patrol and not be stopped requires experiments.’166 Beresford also felt 
the exercise had shown ‘the danger to which any Fleet is exposed when within 70 miles of a 
Torpedo base.’ General instructions were also needed for officers in command of inshore 
watching forces. 
The Admiralty found several points on which to disagree with Beresford’s conclusions. 
Custance’s deployments were criticized as Their Lordships felt that ‘[n]o British Admiral 
conceivably would remain for a whole night with his Fleet within 70 miles of a Destroyer base 
known to contain double the number of Destroyers that were at his own disposal.’ Furthermore, 
it was felt that the dispositions chosen for the watching destroyers ‘appear[ed] to have facilitated 
the escape of “C’s” destroyers.’167 Custance likely did himself few favours by describing the 
Home Fleet destroyers’ nucleus crews as ‘hastily thrown together’.168 Even before receiving an 
Admiralty reply, Beresford quickly withdrew one of his comments on Callaghan’s performance 
in the first exercise, writing that his criticisms should have been levelled at himself for writing 
poorly worded orders.
169
 
While the financial pressure from the Cabinet had led the Admiralty to abandon holding 
the annual Summer Manoeuvres for 1907, it was still perfectly happy to authorize smaller-scale 
‘combined tactical exercises’ such as those carried out in June-July 1907. Beresford was 
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subsequently authorized to carry out another series of such exercises in October 1907. Unlike the 
June-July exercises, little survives of in the way of documentation, and most detail comes from a 
long testimonial sent to Sir Edward Grey by Fisher during the course of the Beresford Enquiry.
170
  
This evidence might be considered biased, but what is beyond a doubt is that, unlike the 
June-July exercises, which were carried out amicably in terms of relations between Beresford 
and the Admiralty, the October exercises began on a sour note. Once again Beresford chose to 
give command of one side to Custance. While this had been all well and good when only parts of 
the Home Fleet were being employed, this time it was not, for it left the Home Fleet’s C.-in-C., 
Sir Francis Bridgeman, under the command of a junior officer. Quite aside from the general 
awkwardness of this arrangement, this decision was particularly annoying to the Admiralty 
because they felt it was ‘most desirable’ for Bridgeman to gain experience in operating a large 
fleet. In the terse summary prepared for the Foreign Secretary, it is noted that: ‘Objection was 
taken at the time to this arrangement, but Lord Charles Beresford replied that it rested with him 
whom he should put in command… the Board of Admiralty did not press the point.’171 
Once the exercises got under way Beresford took an opportunity to lash out at the 
commander of the First Cruiser Squadron, Vice-Admiral Sir Percy Scott. Scott was looked upon 
by Beresford and his associates as a Fisher plant sent to be, in the words of Scott’s biographer, ‘a 
poisoned thorn … in Lord Charles’ ample flank.’172 One of the exercises involved the First 
Cruiser Squadron watching a patrol line off Cromarty. As Scott recalled, his orders were ‘to 
watch Cromarty and see that the Enemy (if they were there) did not leave without being 
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observed… till certain that the Enemy were not there, and then to ask for further instructions.’173 
What Scott did not discover until later was that the ‘enemy’ had slipped out from Cromarty and 
upon its return massacred Scott’s force. Instead of asking for an explanation, Beresford and 
Custance unloaded upon Scott in a memorandum written subsequent to the exercises. Scott never 
received notice that the enemy had already left Cromarty before he arrived. As he recalled, ‘it is 
difficult to understand why the Commander-in-Chief and Sir Reginald Custance should have 
promulgated to the Fleet a Memorandum which intimated that the capture was due to my 
incapacity.’174 The nucleus crew destroyers also were a point of contention. Beresford having 
already complained to the First Lord that they ‘cannot go at high speed, or remain at sea more 
than 18 hours, without officers breaking down and so inviting a danger.’175 
Relationships between the Channel Fleet’s leadership and the Admiralty would not get 
better from here on out, and as a result the Home Fleet was increasingly drawn into the crossfire 
of the savage feud that resulted. The climax of this story will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
Creation in Perspective 
 In summary, the creation of the Home Fleet in 1906-7 was the result of numerous and 
sometimes contradictory factors relating to strategy, manpower requirements, economics, 
technology, and contemporary politics both domestic and international. There were so many 
threads that ultimately were woven together to make the Home Fleet that declaring a specific one 
to be the most important is probably more an exercise in opinion than anything else. Too many 
great events were happening practically simultaneously for one to emerge as a prime mover. In 
1905 alone the Balfour government was swept from power, the first four Dreadnoughts were 
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conceived and ordered, Russian sea power was destroyed in the Far East and her domestic 
politics were disrupted by revolution, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed and relative 
safety in Far Eastern waters thus assured, and the Moroccan crisis brought France and Britain to 
a closer but still cautious understanding, Fisher’s reforms—including the redistribution of the 
fleet—were implemented in earnest, and despite the continued growth of the German battlefleet 
Britain could at the end of the year, claim to possess a three-power standard of naval superiority 
in Europe. 
Many of these events were from the Admiralty’s point of view positive developments, 
especially the misfortunes of Russia and the various internal reforms instigated by Fisher and the 
Fishpond. Yet at the same time they had created several new problems. The initial Fisher Scheme 
was oriented towards action in the English Channel, as evidenced by the emphasis on building as 
many submarines of the current type (the ‘C’ Class) as was possible and also the entire Coastal 
Destroyer design. The thawing of relations with France and the simultaneous replacement of the 
Russian Baltic Fleet with the German Hocheseeflotte as the major threat in Northern Europe 
meant that the Admiralty’s strategic priorities would have to be shifted northeastward. At the 
same time the continued necessity for economical Navy Estimates was further reinforced by the 
Liberals’ epochal victory in the General Election. Furthermore there was still the thorny issue of 
manning the fleet. All these factors combined to force Fisher and the other Sea Lords into 
carrying out another round of strategic redistribution. 
The timing was inauspicious, coming so soon after the initial reshuffling, as was the 
secrecy with which the Home Fleet’s organization was drawn up following the stormy reception 
of Fisher’s August 1906 proposal. While such secrecy was an understandable reaction to the 
leakiness of the Navy’s Commanders-in-Chief, it was also a trait Fisher sometimes took to 
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extremes and which in the event only clouded matters further—to the point that even Fisher’s 
close allies were left steaming in the dark. As a result, historians have been left to put together an 
incomplete jigsaw puzzle, and inevitably interpretations distilling the Home Fleet’s genesis to a 
straightforward motivation or motivations have appeared as a result, be they a prophetic readying 
of the King’s Navy to fight the Germans or cloaking Britain’s coast with flotillas so her heavy 
ships could still project power around the globe without prodigious expense. Neither of these 
explanations seems to be entirely satisfactory—or at least they seem not to be—when all the 
evidence is considered thoroughly and on the assumption that Fisher’s own statements about the 
Home Fleet’s creation are trustworthy to a fair degree. 
It is clear that a simple anti-German explanation does not entirely address the financial 
and technological dimensions of Admiralty policy making. However, the alternative ‘flotilla 
defence’ narrative tends to neglect the importance of the battlefleet and in extreme interpretations 
leaves the capital ships cooling their heels offstage in like some Edwardian analogue of the U.S. 
Pacific Fleet’s Task Force One post-Pearl Harbor.176 Indeed, as has been shown, enough evidence 
exists to indicate that Germany was a major factor in the Home Fleet’s initial conception, unless 
the authors of numerous Admiralty documents were completely disassembling towards the rest 
of the government and much of the Navy itself. Yet the importance of the torpedo craft in 
Britain’s transforming strategy cannot easily be overstated. As will be seen shortly, both flotilla 
and battlefleet had their place in the Admiralty’s plans for future sea campaigns. What is more, 
the roles they would ultimately play when Armageddon came were much better developed than 
is sometimes suggested. It is to the matter of the Royal Navy’s plans for such a war that attention 
will now be drawn.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Planning for War, 1906-1909 
 
The establishment of the Home Fleet in 1907 coincides with the first of a series of 
specific War Plans being drawn up at the Admiralty for a war with Germany. By then the 
Kaiserliche Marine was the principal threat upon which the Royal Navy focused its energies, and 
this would remain true up to the outbreak of the First World War. Whether or not, as Keith 
Neilson has argued, ‘Anglo-German relations have been given greater emphasis for the period 
before 1914 than they deserve’,1 within the Admiralty at least there can be little doubt Germany 
was the focus of attention, even accepting Nicholas Lambert’s strictures about the importance of 
finance in policy making. ‘Our only probable enemy is Germany,’ quoth Fisher in late 1906, 
‘Germany keeps her whole Fleet always concentrated within a few hours of England. We must 
therefore keep a Fleet twice as powerful concentrated within a few hours of Germany.’2 This is 
why the Home Fleet, though originating as a mixture of economy measure and Admiralty 
centralization, evolved into the future centrepiece of the Royal Navy organization in Home 
Waters by the time of its inauguration in spring 1907. It is also why the Royal Navy’s War Plans 
from 1907 onwards, or at least those that survive, are almost entirely concerned with what action 
would be taken in North Sea: success or failure there would dictate the rest of the conflict. 
 This concentration on key areas was not new to Admiralty planning documents. Prior to 
1907, there were no Admiralty ‘War Plans’ per se. What there was were ‘War Orders’, which 
were, generally speaking, lists of objectives for the fleet commanders to use for drawing up their 
own plans of campaign. While this differentiation comes close to being a hair-splitting 
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technicality on a certain level, it is nevertheless important during this period. The reason for this 
importance is the change in relationship between the Admiralty and the fleet commanders, and 
the increasing centralization of strategy. Another historical importance of these War Plans, which 
will be discussed in detail below, comes not from their focus on Germany as the ‘only probable 
enemy’, but what they show of how the Royal Navy planned to use their strength, which after 
1907 meant, increasingly, the Home Fleet. Then as now, this is a matter of much contention and 
in some cases misunderstanding. 
Prior to the 1911 creation of the Admiralty War Staff, the Royal Navy had no specific 
department or body dedicated to war planning, although the Department of Naval Intelligence in 
consultation with the Board of Admiralty tended to be the de facto strategic planning organ, with 
the finer details left to the fleet Cs-in-C. Nevertheless, the documents relating to war planning 
that survive from the earliest years of the twentieth century suggest that the Navy’s planning 
process was nowhere near as chaotic or haphazard as has been suggested by certain authors. 
Historians have traditionally not been kind to the Navy’s planning efforts in the last half 
of Fisher’s first term. Marder mentioned them only in passing,3 although his working under 
Admiralty sufferance regarding access and publication of materials may explain this.
4
 When they 
were published by the Navy Records Society as part of a two-volume collection of Fisher’s 
official papers, the collection’s editor wrote of their ‘almost complete refusal to face the naval 
realities of the day’.5 Paul Haggie found them lacking and in some places, self-contradictory.6 
More recent authors have seen them in a different light. Andrew Lambert observes they were 
perfectly satisfactory for the naval situation of 1907-1908 when Germany had neither submarines 
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nor significant coastal fortifications in the Frisian Islands.
7
 Nicholas Lambert, meanwhile, writes 
that they were not ‘true war plans’ but ‘strategic studies’, and their purpose was to show the 
government the Admiralty had an alternative to the Army’s proposed ‘continental commitment’.8 
Christopher Martin agrees, although he gives much more credence to their being more or less 
representative of actual Admiralty plans for an Anglo-German war, and makes a reasonably 
convincing argument that the Admiralty also used them as ammunition against the forthcoming 
Second Hague Conference.
9
 
The principal historians of the Fisher Era agree that formal planning for a war with 
Germany began in 1905, at least partially in reaction to the Moroccan crisis.
10
 Previously, orders 
for an anti-German maritime campaign would have likely been extemporized on the day using 
such war plans as existed for a war with one or both members of the Dual Alliance.
11
 An 
exception to this is a 1904 print included in the second volume of Naval Necessities by 
Battenberg discussing the organization of torpedo craft flotillas.
12
 In this document D.N.I. 
Battenberg (doubtless recalling his experience in the 1902 Manoeuvres where, as C.-in-C. ‘X’ 
Fleet, he had used his destroyers to outfox Sir Arthur Wilson and Sir Compton Domvile and 
escape his blockaded base at Argostoli
13
) noted that while the German Bight could be watched by 
destroyers based at Harwich, Kiel would be a far more difficult proposition. The suggested 
solution was to scuttle blockships in the Elbe, forcing the German fleet to come through the 
                                                 
7
 Andrew Lambert, Admirals: The Naval Commanders Who Made Britain Great (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 
2008), p. 314. 
8
 Nicholas Lambert, op. cit., p. 180. 
9
 Christopher Martin, ‘The 1907 Naval War Plans and the Second Hague Peace Conference: A Case of Propaganda’, 
JSS 28, no. 5 (October 2005), pp. 833-856. 
10
 Andrew Lambert, op. cit., pp. 310-311; Nicholas Lambert, op. cit., p. 177; Marder, Anatomy, p. 290. 
11
 These, while fitting the general description of ‘war plans’ as strategists and historians generally understand the 
term, were known in the Royal Navy under a variety of names such as the aforementioned ‘War Orders’. 
12
 Battenberg, ‘The Organisation for War of Torpedo Craft in Home Waters’, n.d. [late 1904], A[?].1123/04, in 
Admiralty, Naval Necessities, ii, p. 508-519, ADM 116/3093. 
13
 Richard Hough, Louis & Victoria: The First Mountbattens (London: Hutchinson of London, 1974), pp. 223-225. 
116 
 
Skagerrak. Such a voyage would be a risky proposition for the main German force, and 
Battenberg continued that: 
‘If we block the Elbe entrance while the body of the enemy is at Kiel, he must if 
he means to fight do so under a disadvantage. The position of our main fleet 
would be somewhere within 30 miles of the Skaw, which would fix the position 
of the headquarters of the destroyers whose duty it was to deal with such of the 
enemy’s torpedo craft as came from Kiel by the Belts, etc., or with his larger 
vessels emerging from the same point. This duty they would carry out not by 
taking up positions in the immediate vicinity of Kiel itself, as they would at 
Cherbourg or Brest, but by occupying positions between the Skaw and the 
opposite coasts, pushed more or less forward or backward as occasion 
demanded.’14 
 
Unfortunately the feasibility of such a blocking operation was, in Marder’s words, ‘blown to bits 
by the hydrographer’ (Rear-Admiral Sir William Wharton) in July, owing to the width of the 
Elbe, the strong riverine current, and the twenty-mile distance upriver that the blockships would 
have to travel to their scuttling site. This was concurred with by Lord Walter Kerr and, again, a 
year later, by Rear-Admiral (D) Alfred Winsloe, under whose bailiwick destroyer operations fell. 
Winsloe, reflecting on the Japanese difficulties in blocking much narrower channels at Port 
Arthur, thought such an undertaking was ‘absolutely impracticable.’15 
An important aspect of Battenberg’s proposal was the acknowledgement that destroyer 
flotillas would be operating on the far side of the North Sea and that a forward base would be of 
great assistance to their operations. Battenberg lamented that best option for such an advanced 
base, Heligoland, was heavily defended and could not be captured for some time after the 
commencement of hostilities.
16
 The search for an alternative ‘advanced base’ among the many 
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islands in the German Bight had a great influence on subsequent planning against Germany, and 
has in the author’s opinion been widely confused with desires by some planners for large-scale 
amphibious operations against the German mainland. 
Another early set of orders—dating from the beginning of May 1905 but probably under 
discussion prior to then—suggests the German battle fleet was to be dealt with using the same 
basic strategy drawn up in 1903 to counter Russia’s Baltic Fleet.17 This was a sensible decision. 
The location of the Kaiserliche Marine’s main base at Kiel meant they would have to sortie 
through the Skaw to reach the North Sea, as the Russian Admiral Rozhestvensky had ultimately 
proceeded immediately prior to the Dogger Bank incident. The alternative of moving the German 
heavy forces through the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Kanal to the Elbe and thence to Wilhelmshaven was 
too ponderous and slow in comparison. 
To return to the orders in question, it was decided that in the event of a war involving 
Germany and Britain on opposite sides, the Channel Fleet was ordered to: 
 1) Watch the enemy naval forces and ‘bring them to action if they leave harbour.’ 
2) Capture or sink any enemy cruisers threatening British merchantmen in European 
waters. 
3) Prevent any amphibious landings anywhere in the British Isles. 
4) Assist any British amphibious operations. 
5) Defend British auxiliaries and store ships from enemy cruisers or other types of raiders. 
 
Exactly what form these amphibious operations would take is not explained, although given the 
later explicit discussion of occupying Borkum or another of the Frisian Islands—discussed at 
length below—it can be safely inferred that those locales were the most likely initial objectives. 
A month later it seems this arrangement was no longer considered sufficient, and the 
resultant discussion between Fisher and D.N.I. Ottley in a docket titled ‘British Intervention in 
the Event of an Attack on France by Germany’ represents what is apparently the first specific 
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official Admiralty discussion of a war with Germany alone. Sadly this important file is one of the 
multitudes which did not survive the various weedings of Admiralty files. However, Professor 
Marder viewed it during the 1930s, and included a summary with extensive quotations in his 
Anatomy of British Sea Power.
18
 
With the Moroccan Crisis in the foreground of his mind, Fisher asked Ottley to prepare a 
statement that considered ‘the possibility of manning the existing War Fleet in the event of 
sudden action… in support of France’ and how to best deploy the Royal Navy’s strength against 
Germany. Ottley replied two days later that there were men enough for the whole of the ‘War 
Fleet’, and that ‘all our pre-supposed dispositions will require to be entirely modified in view of 
the exceptionally favourable circumstances of this moment.’19 The ‘pre-supposed dispositions’ 
refer to those laid out in the previous month’s orders sent to the C.-in-C. Channel Fleet. Ottley 
elaborated further: 
‘Previous studies of the question of war against Germany have all been based on 
the assumption that Germany was supported by powerful maritime allies, such as 
France or Russia, or both, or if not directly supported at least in a position to 
know that we were so much pre-occupied with them that we could only spare a 
fraction of our force to deal with the entire German Fleet. 
‘Under the circumstances immediately to be considered the situation is entirely 
different, and our maritime preponderance would be overwhelming, as we would 
have the French Fleet acting in our support, and the Russian Fleet, even if 
assisting the enemy, has for the time being ceased to be a factor of importance.’20 
 
Ottley further reminded Fisher that the Admiralty had recently punted the explicit planning of 
both campaign and fleet distribution in a war—any war—to the C.-in-C. Channel Fleet, a fact 
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illustrated by the open-ended nature of the previous month’s orders. As a result the Admiralty 
proper had little to do ‘except carry out the necessary mobilization and call home the Atlantic 
Fleet’ including the Second Cruiser Squadron.21 The recall order was extended to include a 
portion of the Mediterranean Fleet as well.
22
 It is a testimony to the flexibility that was an 
intended feature of Fisher’s 1904-1905 redistribution Scheme that this transfer of a sizable 
portion of the world’s most powerful navy could be done with such relative ease. 
While the deployment and conduct of the potential war against Germany was left to 
Admiral Wilson, his strategic objectives were outlined clearly. Wilson was ordered to use his 
entire command and initiate a commercial blockade of all German ports, up to and including a 
sortie through the Belts into the Baltic, and Wilson was asked whether he intended to attempt the 
closure of the Elbe entrances with sunken vessels or, if he felt it advisable, mines. German 
colonial possessions would be dealt with by the foreign station C.-in-Cs and Marder records the 
exact allocation of responsibilities: 
‘Detached cruisers would attack German trade in South America and the East 
Pacific. The Cape C.-in-C. would blockade German South-West Africa, and the 
China C.-in-C. would blockade Kiaochow. The East Indies C.-in-C. would deal 
with German East Africa and German New Guinea.’23 
 
As noted, it was expected that Admiral Wilson was to be responsible for the nut-and-bolt 
constructional details of any maritime offensive, and on the night of June 26
th
 he received a 
drafted précis of the above for comment. Wilson’s reply, especially in view of his subsequent 
statements during the Beresford Enquiry and the fateful August 1911 meeting of the C.I.D., is 
very significant. Wilson felt that ‘No action by the Navy alone can do France any good.’ 
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Effective support of France would have to involve rapid diversionary action to draw off German 
troops from the critical battles on the frontier. Furthermore: 
‘In order to make an effective diversion we should be obliged to expose our ships 
in the Baltic or on the German coast in a way that would not be necessary if were 
at war with Germany alone, but under present conditions, with France on our side, 
this is a risk that can be accepted. 
 
The efficacy of any blockade depended on the attitude of the minor nations in the region, but 
regardless Wilson felt the best chance for success involved a combined attack on the Waddenzee 
focusing on the mouth of the Elbe. Wilson was very specific about what he saw as these 
operations’ principal object: 
‘As the main object would be to draw off troops from the French frontier, 
simultaneous attacks would have to be made at as many different points as 
possible. … 
‘If Denmark were on our side, a very effective diversion might be made by 
assisting her to recover Schleswig and Holstein, including the port of Kiel, and in 
that case the Fleet might operate very effectively in conjunction with a land force 
on the coast of the Little Belt or Kiel Bay in addition to the attacks proposed on 
the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. 
‘I am not in a position to judge whether the French would be any more capable of 
resisting a German invasion now, even with our assistance, than they were in 
1870, but certainly if we intervened on her behalf our honour as a nation would be 
seriously implicated by her failure, and it is only by putting forth the whole 
military strength of the Empire that we can hope to succeed.’24 
 
Wilson’s suggestions were that he and the Army’s expeditionary force commander should work 
together for a plan of operations ‘on the largest scale possible’; and that he would require every 
small craft the Navy possessed, including the gunboats Fisher had stricken but which had not yet 
been sold for scrap; that the elderly battleships and ironclads such as the Admirals and the Royal 
Sovereigns be prepared for coast bombardment missions; and that a sufficient stock of flat-
bottomed shallow-draught coastal steamers be obtained for use as landing craft and inshore 
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support vessels.
25
 Ottley agreed, though his tone suggests a certain reluctance; he wrote to 
historian and Naval War College lecturer Julian Corbett concurring with the latter’s view that 
Britain ‘should have to throw and expeditionary force ashore on the German Coast somewhere, 
in addition to any naval actions we might take.’26 
Another scrap of Wilson’s plans survives in the minutes of the July 5th, 1907 conference 
between Beresford, Fisher, and Tweedmouth. During a discussion of Wilson’s plans, Beresford 
expressed his disagreement about Wilson’s use of his destroyers. While calling Wilson’s plan 
‘splendid’, Beresford added that ‘I do not agree with him about sending the destroyers over. I get 
there with everything you give me.’27 Knowing Beresford’s preference for deploying his entire 
force close on the Bight, his remarks suggest that Wilson’s initial force dispositions matched up 
with both Battenberg’s 1904 proposals and the deployments suggested in the 1907 War Plans: 
destroyers to close with the coast for observation patrols, with the main fleet in support at a 
suitable distance to seaward. 
The value of these papers, even in this sadly incomplete form, is well-nigh incalculable. 
They lay out Wilson’s view of the strategic realities of the time, and his proposals for what 
actions could resultantly be undertaken by British as a naval and military power. Furthermore, it 
shows that, despite arguments to the contrary, there was a large amount of continuity in the 
Admiralty’s plans for an Anglo-German naval war from the earliest years through to August 
1914. The majority of the war plans and sketches drawn up over the next half-decade, right the 
whole way down to the very last days of peace in July 1914, share basic elements with Wilson’s 
commentary; furthermore they share much common ground with the early works of Arnold-
Forster and Custance’s N.I.D. staff. From this and other evidence, it can and will be shown the 
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Navy’s basic approach to an Anglo-German war changed little in its essentials throughout the 
Prewar Era. These essentials were: closure of the North Sea and the establishment of as rigorous 
a commercial blockade as possible (dependent on the stance of the neutral states), varying 
degrees of joint amphibious action with the Army to pull German troops away from France, and 
the destruction or neutralization of the Kaiserliche Marine. While these essential facets remained 
basically unchanged, it would be the working details of the various plans—principally the 
composition of the British forces as well as their basing and deployment—that evolved with the 
strategic and technological developments during the next nine years.
28
 
 
Informal Plans, 1905-1906 
The Admiralty was not alone in considering an Anglo-German war in the summer of 
1905. The July 6
th
 meeting of the C.I.D. included discussion of what should be done if Germany 
tried to obtain the Dutch East Indies.
29
 In the meantime, probably buoyed by Wilson’s report, 
Fisher had deployed the Channel Fleet on a cruise in the North Sea and the Baltic,
30
 but by then 
the crisis was becoming less and less acute, and as a result the Admiralty moved on to other 
matters, leaving war planning aside for most of the remainder of 1905. On December 19
th
, a 
conference between Esher, Ottley, Clarke, and Lieutenant-General Sir John French set down the 
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following points on British maritime strategy in an Anglo-French war with Germany.
31
 Again the 
essential elements were restated almost to the point of being a template for subsequent plans: 
‘(a.) Destruction or masking of the German fleet. 
(b.) Capture of German commerce at sea. 
(c.) Commercial blockade of German ports. 
(d.) Isolation of German Colonies, such as Kiao-Chau. 
(e.) Securing our own and French coast-lines. 
(f.) Safeguarding French communications with North Africa.’ 
 
While a caveat was added that precise details depended on whether Germany had a naval ally, 
that possibility seemed ‘most improbable.’ Again the rapid redeployment of Britain’s European 
fleets was emphasized, as ‘the Atlantic fleet and, if needed, part of the Mediterranean fleet could 
be brought into Home waters’ regardless of if French naval cooperation was obtained, although if 
it was ‘it would be easily possible to maintain a prepondering naval force on both sides of the 
Skaw.’ Sadly these meetings were of an unofficial and non-binding character for both services, 
which was a great shame as they represent the high water mark for British joint strategic 
planning in the Prewar Era. Interservice tensions, however, ensured nothing would come from 
the discussion.
32
 
 While these Conferences were in progress, the Liberals took over. As already noted they 
were disinterested in strategic policy and planning, and as a consequence the frequency of C.I.D. 
meetings fell drastically. Attitudes towards Germany also changed, though to a less extreme 
degree. Upon arrival at the Foreign Office, Sir Edward Grey seems to have had some notions of 
conciliation towards at least a part of the German claims in Morocco: 
‘In more than one part of the world I find … that Germany is feeling after a 
coaling station in a port. Everywhere we block this. I am not an expert in naval 
strategy, but I doubt whether it is vy important … to prevent Germany getting 
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ports at a distance from her base; and the moment may come when timely 
admission, that it is not a cardinal object of British policy to prevent her having 
such a port, may have great pacific effect.’33 
 
If Grey’s initial openness towards concessions regarding foreign coaling stations was seriously 
considered by the fledgling Government, it was ultimately scuppered by the Admiralty. In July 
1905 Ottley had produced a long memorandum for Balfour on the effect of Germany gaining one 
or more ports in Morocco.
34
 Unsurprisingly, he was dead against, and knowing the Prime 
Minister’s concerns about Indian defence, concluded with a warning regarding a Russo-German 
alliance: unless ‘German naval power in this part of the world’ was eliminated ‘we should not 
feel at all safe in sending our transports via the Cape with re-inforcements to India.’35 Now a 
year-and-a-half later Ottley, doubtless with certain twinges of déjà vu, produced a strong letter 
once again repudiating the idea of allowing Germany, or indeed any other power, to build a base 
on Spanish territory, especially the potential ‘second Gibraltar’ that was Ceuta.36 Ottley went so 
far as to suggest influencing Spain so that ‘she will not under any circumstances cede her 
Moroccan territories to any Power’ even at the cost of ‘some sort of guarantee to uphold her 
against Powers which coveted the places in question.’ With Fisher and First Lord Tweedmouth in 
full accord, the minute went to the Foreign Office.
37
 
 By the time Ottley wrote this letter, much had already been done in regards to war 
planning against Germany. The conferences with General French had given the Admiralty new 
impetus for refining their campaign plans in the spring of 1906. Once again Fisher and Wilson 
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corresponded, and this time one of Wilson’s replies survives in full in Fisher’s personal papers.38 
From his flagship, H.M.S. Exmouth, Wilson wrote: 
‘The more I consider the possibility of any effective action against Germany the 
more I am convinced of the importance of bringing forward our obsolete ships... 
‘We cannot afford to use our best ships against forts and they have very little 
advantage in this respect over our old ones. 
‘I think it is absolutely necessary that we should destroy the forts at Cuxhaven and 
so force our way through the entrance of the Canal and Hamburg. 
‘For this purpose the old Admiral Class if their gun mountings are put in order 
and sights adjusted are as good as any of the latest ships and it would not much 
matter if they left their bones there after the work was done. Anson, Benbow, 
Collingwood, Hood, Nile, Trafalgar, Sans pareil [sic], Conqueror, Hero, would 
form a force that could easily silence the Cuxhaven forts leaving my fleet intact at 
the entrance of the Elbe ready to come to their assistance if the German fleet 
attempts to attack them.’ 
 
After a discussion of possible ways of fitting out of these old warships for bombardment duties, 
Wilson resumed laying out his strategic vision: 
‘Once in possession of the Canal we cut Schleswig and Holstein off from the rest 
of Germany and we might be in a position to undertake the siege of Kiel from the 
rear. 
‘Anyway Hamburg would be at our mercy unless they sent a large force to defend 
it. 
‘In addition to the old battleships we should want as many vessels of the Fantome 
and Archer classes as we could lay our hands on to patrol the rivers and inlets and 
assist the military. 
‘If you really think there is a possibility of war you ought to lose no time in 
putting the armaments of these old ships in fighting condition. 
‘The condition of their main machinery is not of much importance. If they can 
steam eight knots it would be all they want.’39 
 
Once again the importance of seizing German coastal territory during the campaign was asserted. 
A strong commercial blockade was implicit in Wilson’s commentary, even if it was left 
unmentioned, as was the destruction or neutralization of the German main battle fleet, either 
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during the amphibious phase of the campaign or subsequently in a repetition of the Port Arthur 
siege. Wilson’s goal—perhaps the ultimate goal of the campaign40—of threatening Hamburg 
either by land, sea, or both, was in the best tradition of Sir George Tryon’s strategy demonstrated 
so graphically in the 1888 and 1889 Manoeuvres,
41
 and represents again the amount of continuity 
between the new Fisherite Navy and the old days often called the ‘Dark Ages’ by disparaging 
historians. 
Wilson, despite his responsibility for planning out the Navy’s operational strategy, was 
not the only one considering how to fight Germany. Edmond Slade at the War College was also 
considering the problem. Slade is one of the many interesting officers of the period who are 
sometimes overlooked. The only non-flag officer to be given the post of President of the Royal 
Naval War College (as a replacement for the respected Rear-Admiral Henry May, whose 
premature death from gastro-enteritis had been much lamented), Slade was an archetypal sailor-
scholar.
42
 Fisher’s initial impression of Slade was that he was ‘clever’,43 which likely explains 
his appointment as D.N.I. in replacement of Ottley. Slade also had a keen understanding of the 
importance of joint planning between the Army and the Navy, which has led Nicholas Lambert to 
call him ‘politically rather naïve.’44 In hindsight, a more fair description would be that Slade 
understood the importance of coordination between services that his superiors on both sides of 
the question were too factionalized to agree about. 
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In a series of letters to his colleague Julian Corbett in December 1905 he discussed 
amphibious operations similar to both Wilson’s and Ottley’s conceptions, indeed he had ‘a long 
discussion about it’ with the latter on the 15th.45 Slade’s own ‘proposition’ was ‘a mobile army of 
say 10000 or 15000 men embarked in the fastest transports we can get & to send them to with no 
indication of their objective. A force or perhaps the same force if necessary to seize Antwerp on 
the slightest infringement of Belgian neutrality, and from these to operate on the flank of the 
German line of advance. This would do more to assist France I think than anything else as 
thereby Germany would have to keep a very large force immobilized in their littoral provinces in 
case of a descent on their coasts.’46 
The major stumbling point to this proposal—besides the horror with which the Army 
would have received the suggestion of keeping so many soldiers aboard crowded troopships for 
an apparently open-ended period of time—was that, as Slade noted in a second letter after 
consulting with Ottley and George Ballard, ‘the W.O. do not consider that any attempts on the 
coast would cause the Germans to lock up any appreciable number of men and they quote the 
lack of effect that the expedition to the Baltic exercised on the Crimean War.’47 The War Office 
was not the only detractor of plans for large-scale amphibious operations. Reflecting on these 
early plans in 1911 during the discussions about the creation of the Admiralty War Staff, Ottley 
wrote to the new First Lord, Winston Churchill, that after joint-force landing manoeuvres at 
Clacton ‘the War Office and Admiralty jointly came to the conclusion that the operation of 
landing in the face of a determined enemy was out of the question.’48 This however was Ottley 
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using hindsight, and it may well be that he was backing away from his earlier enthusiasm for 
combined operations in the wake of the disastrous Agadir conference of the C.I.D. 
As has been shown, up through 1906 the Navy’s strategic planning was somewhat 
fragmented, at least from an administrative standpoint, but it nevertheless had certain coherent 
groups involved. The Board of Admiralty and the Naval Intelligence Department usually only 
provided broad policy outlines to the fleet Cs-in-C., who were then left to their own devices to 
plan their campaigns from an operational standpoint. The officers and faculty of the War College 
would occasionally contribute informally as well. That Fisher took such an active role is 
unsurprising since his October 1904 redistribution of business at the Admiralty made the 
formulation of strategy one of his most important tasks, and he was happy to allow those he 
trusted to do most of the heavy lifting involved because ‘given the options of applying his energy 
to the formulation of policy or the processing of paperwork,’ Fisher chose the former.49 This 
fragmented—it might almost be called ‘decentralized’—method of planning would remain the 
basis of the Navy’s modus operandi for creating War Plans up until the creation of the Admiralty 
War Staff in 1912. Sir Arthur Wilson even referred to it, albeit in a somewhat loose fashion, in 
his arguments against the creation of a Naval Staff, and his description gives one of the only 
officially written insights into this somewhat unofficial method of war planning: 
‘The process of thinking out a Naval policy may be said to commence with the 
Intelligence Department, whose business it is to ascertain the strength of any 
possible enemy in ships, guns, men, training etc., and the conditions under which 
they can be used to do us injury. 
‘These are the data on which our whole policy must be framed. The Navy must be 
constructed and organized definitely with a view to meeting the actual forces of 
any combination of nations that is at all probable as they are known to exist now, 
or as far as they can be foreseen for the future. 
‘The working out of this problem is spread over every branch of the Admiralty, as 
well as over the various schools for specialists, and various squadrons and flotillas 
at sea. 
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‘The results are then brought to a focus, through the heads of the various 
departments of the Admiralty, to the members of the Board concerned, and in all 
matters relating to Strategy and Tactics, and the actual use to be made of the Fleet 
in War, they are still further focused in the First Sea Lord as the principal adviser 
in these matters, who has a Naval Assistant, always one of the ablest Captains in 
the Navy, to assist him. 
‘The preparation of War plans is a matter that must be dealt with by the First Sea 
Lord himself, but he has to assist him, besides his Naval Assistant, the Director of 
Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval Mobilization, and in the latter’s 
department there is a war division, consisting of a Captain and a Commander 
especially allocated to this work. The D.N.I. and D.N.M. with the Assistant 
Secretary form the War Council from whom the First Sea Lord obtains advice, 
either by minutes on the papers or by verbal discussion as the occasion 
requires.’50 
 
The War Council mentioned by Wilson was a very late creation of the Fisher regime and has 
never been well regarded.
51
 Nevertheless it can easily be seen as a stand in for the various ad hoc 
committees that Fisher used for the purpose of formulating policy. One such body was the 
Ballard Committee, which Fisher organized for the specific purpose of creating a War Plan. 
At the end of 1906, alongside the new Home Fleet organization being set out in detail, 
Fisher appointed Captain George Ballard to head a Committee ‘to investigate the plan of 
campaign for a war with Germany.’52 Despite not holding an Admiralty appointment, Ballard had 
extensive experience working at the N.I.D. under Custance, Battenberg, and Ottley. This, in 
Fisher’s opinion, ‘gave him a more extensive official acquaintance with the subject as viewed by 
different individual authorities than any other officer then serving.’ 53  Besides Ballard, the 
Committee included a gunnery specialist and a mine warfare expert, with Maurice Hankey as 
secretary and Fisher exercising his usual personal supervision. Slade and Ottley were ‘in the 
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secret and were closely associated with the Committee’s work.’54 The Ballard Committee began 
work in December 1906 and continued meeting for four months. The final report was ‘a 
comprehensive volume of some sixty pages.’55 This report was mostly written at the War College 
in Portsmouth with the assistance of the College’s staff—doubtless including Corbett.56 The 
Ballard Committee, which was kept so secret it is not mentioned in the service records of the 
known members,
57
 may have worked in tandem with another group of officers, numbering about 
half-a-dozen, at Whitehall. 
Even less is known of this latter group than the Ballard Committee, as the main evidence 
for its existence apparently comes from Reginald McKenna’s testimony during the Beresford 
Enquiry.
58
 McKenna, who was not First Lord during the preparation of the 1907 War Plans, was 
speaking from second-hand knowledge and much of his description of what Lambert calls the 
‘Whitehall Committee’ matches Hankey’s description of the Ballard Committee of which, as has 
been noted already, Hankey was secretary. McKenna describes D.N.I. Ottley as leading the 
‘Whitehall Council’ while Slade led the group at Portsmouth.59 With the original reports from the 
Ballard Committee now gone, the accuracy of McKenna and Hankey’s recollections cannot be 
reliably determined. Therefore the existence of a second planning group cannot be solidly 
confirmed or refuted. 
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In a certain sense this does not matter since, whatever the structure of the Ballard 
Committee and any other interested parties, the resultant ‘War Plans’ were, McKenna recalled, 
‘the first plans ever issued by the Admiralty’.60 Furthermore, far from Commander Peter Kemp’s 
assertion that the plans were based on studies reminiscent ‘of those games of childhood when the 
youngest member was cast willy nilly in the role of the dragon and the elders took turning to slay 
him in the garb of St. George’ and being almost wilfully blind to the naval situation,61 the plans 
were a detailed summation of what the Admiralty felt could be accomplished at that moment 
against Germany. Apart from the sections written by Slade and Corbett with the intent to give the 
contents a veneer of historical precedent, there was nothing in them suggesting these were to be 
immutable plans.
62
 This is, in fact, a characteristic of British pre-1914 war planning as a whole, 
of which an important principle was their allowance for modification on the day.
63
 In a covering 
letter written around the time of the Beresford Inquiry, Fisher explained that 
‘There is no finality in War Plans. Every year, just as the new Shipbuilding 
Programme varies in extent and design to meet Foreign shipbuilding, so should 
the War Plan each year be re-cast to meet foreign developments and our own 
additions of new vessels, and if practicable the Annual Manoeuvres of the Fleet in 
Home Waters (properly disguised) should exercise our fleet in its War 
Organization in practicing this War Plan.’64 
 
This is in fact what happened. McKenna testified to the Beresford Inquiry that other war plans 
were drawn up later, and their existence is confirmed in the various surviving Admiralty files.
65
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The 1907 War Plans 
 The planners involved in writing the 1907 plans stressed Germany’s vulnerability to 
economic pressure, and that Britain’s primary objective must be ‘to prevent Germany from 
invading us, to protect our sea communications, and to apply economic pressure.’66 None of this 
was particularly revolutionary thinking in terms of strategy. However the means in which 
pressure would be applied was different from Britain’s past naval strategies. Whereas against the 
Dual Alliance the original ‘close blockade’ strategy had given way to flotilla-based observation 
and interdiction patrols in narrow waters and flexibly-deployed battle fleets,
67
 against Germany it 
was recognized that a primarily commercial blockade would be the heart of any successful 
strategy. Not only did Germany have few important colonies and only a handful of potential 
commerce raiders, but Britain’s geographical position was a major advantage. ‘The British 
Islands form a huge breakwater 800 miles long barring the ingress and egress of German vessels 
from the ocean,-- Dover rendered impassable by Destroyers and Submarines, and the Northern 
passage from the North Sea to the Atlantic can be as completely barred!’68 
 The Admiralty’s desire to employ commercial warfare as the centrepiece of the war effort 
is reflected in the War Plans’ introductory remarks. The German fleet was considered ‘not of 
itself a true ultimate objective’ and ‘no immediate suffering would thereby be entailed upon the 
national commerce and industries [from its destruction], such as would arise from a stoppage of 
trade’.69 To that end all four plans were focused mainly on what action would be taken within the 
North Sea since all of them provided for eliminating the German merchant marine through one 
means or another. These extended from a distant blockade and sweeps by the main fleet in Plan 
                                                 
66
 Hankey, op. cit., p. 39. 
67
 Grimes, op. cit., pp. 21-40. 
68
 Fisher, ‘War Plans and The Distribution of the Fleet’, n.d. [c. early 1909], f. 9-10, ADM 116/1043B/1. 
69
 Admiralty, ‘Part III. War Plans Introductory Remarks’, Kemp (ed.), op. cit., p. 363. 
133 
 
(A) to large-scale naval attacks on the German coast in Plan (C), depending on the intensity of 
pressure on Germany it was thought desirable to inflict. Plan (D), meanwhile, was a contingency 
against a German invasion of Denmark and targeted the German forces expected to be deployed 
for the occupation of Sjælland and Fyn.
70
 These brief descriptions only summarize each plan, 
and detailed descriptions of each will now be given. 
Plan (A) is in many ways the most fascinating of the four plans, largely because it 
resembles, in almost all important respects bar the location of the British battle fleet’s principal 
base, the Royal Navy’s standing War Plans in July 1914.71 Distant blockade of commercial 
shipping was the key, and the goal was ‘total exclusion of shipping under the German flag from 
all ocean trade.’72 The main effort of the campaign would be borne by the Navy’s large force of 
‘unarmoured vessels’, meaning the first class protected cruisers and the second and third class 
cruisers that had been built before and after the Naval Defence Act for trade protection and fleet 
work.
73
 These were the same ships which had been relegated to reserve (and ultimate destruction) 
by the Fisher Scheme. Forty-two of these vessels (thirty-eight cruisers and four torpedo gunboats) 
were estimated to be required initially for both the blockading line itself and periodic reliefs, and 
these would be reinforced later by merchantmen taken up from trade and fitted out as auxiliary 
cruisers. This force, referred to in the plans as the Northern Cordon, was to be an independent 
flag command directly responsible to the Admiralty and based in the ‘Northern Isles’. The patrol 
grounds would be on a line running Pentland Firth—Orkneys—Shetlands—Stadlandet—
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Vaagsö.
74
 The latter point chosen because merchantmen were advised to leave the three-mile 
limit of Norwegian territorial waters for safe navigation, which avoided potential controversy 
with neutrals generally and Norway specifically over the interdiction of merchantmen.
75
 
The southern counterpart to this cruiser force was called the Southern Cordon or Channel 
Cordon. It was to be made up of the eight Sentinels (referred to in the plan as ‘scouts’76) on a line 
stretching between South Goodwin and Outer Ruytingen sandbanks, backed by an Examination 
Service in the Downs of six tugs (taken up from local ports and, ideally, ‘to be selected 
beforehand by the Director of Transports’ 77 ). A single warship would deal with whatever 
uncooperative merchantmen were encountered. The Navy’s ‘B’-class submarines were assigned 
to this cordon for additional support, a task their lack of cruising radius and seakeeping relative 
to the newer ‘C’ and ‘D’ classes would not hinder. Like the Northern Cordon, this force would be 
an independent flag command reporting directly to the Admiralty. 
Inside the two cordons, the bulk of the Navy’s torpedo-armed craft would scour the North 
Sea itself as a combined sea denial and observation force. The destroyers were to be split under 
two commands; the forty-six ship Northern Command would patrol the Baltic entrances from the 
Tyne and Firth of Forth while the sixty ships of the Southern Command would ‘harry the coast 
trade between Germany and ports of Belgium, Holland (particularly the outlets of the Rhine), 
and Denmark’ from their bases at Harwich and Yarmouth.78 Fisher’s Coastal Destroyers—now 
rerated as first class torpedo boats—would be split between the two destroyer Commands for 
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anti-invasion duties while the older torpedo boats guarded the three naval ports alongside the 
earliest submarines. 
If the Hochseeflotte sortied, the heavy gunships of the Royal Navy were to sail and 
engage them. The British battle fleet was to be under a single flag officer referred to by Fisher 
elsewhere, unofficially, as the ‘Admiralissimo’ 79  with the Humber as its initial wartime 
anchorage.
80
 The Admiralissimo’s fleet would consist principally of the most modern 
battleships
81
 from the Home, Atlantic and Channel Fleets and seventeen armoured cruisers 
mostly from the County and Devonshire classes.
82
 The older first and second-class battleships in 
Home Waters would be attached to the battlefleet to be used at the Admiralissimo’s discretion. 
This armada would possibly be reinforced as the war continued by the older first and second-
class battleships and, political circumstances permitting, the battleships of the Mediterranean 
Fleet. The most powerful armoured cruisers were to operate under the battle fleet’s C-in-C but 
were detached to support the cordons against potential attacks by the German fleet, the eight 
most modern based in the Shetlands and the older ones at Dover. While these ships were 
available to the Admiralissimo, it was stated in the plans that ‘the withdrawal of these latter 
vessels from their stations near the cordons should only take place for very sufficient reasons.’83 
Of note is that the armoured cruisers attached to the Admiralissimo’s command ‘would be 
employed very largely in supporting the destroyer flotillas in the North Sea’ against 
countersweeps by German torpedo craft.
84
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 Plan (B) was very similar to Admiral Wilson’s proposals during the Moroccan Crisis, and 
indeed those plans cannot be ruled out as being the basis for this plan’s development.85 It was not 
viewed with favour by the planners, and was ‘drawn up…more to demonstrate the difficulties as 
compared with Plans (A and A1) than as an approved plan of operations.’86 The Elbe was to be 
blocked by a line of sunken hulks to negate the necessity of splitting the main battle fleet, which 
would remain at six to eight hours out from Kiel to protect the blockading County-class cruisers 
covering the naval base. Detached armoured cruiser squadrons would watch the German ports of 
Pomerania and East Prussia, the German battleship squadron based at Neufahrwasser requiring 
the most powerful ships. The German North Sea ports would be watched by destroyer patrols 
and unarmoured cruisers from Borkum, which would be seized by a Royal Marine brigade 
carried by the older battleships, which would then guard the North Sea against German efforts to 
break out from the Baltic or reopen the Elbe. A detailed plan for landing and capturing Borkum 
was included as an Appendix to the plan.
87
 
 Plan (C)
88
 was much the same as Plan (B) but included the destruction of German port 
facilities, coastal defences, and ‘whatever other damage we could which is sanctioned as 
legitimate by international custom.’89 The main effort of the campaign would fall on the Baltic 
ports, where it was hoped to destroy their ‘entrances, defences, dockyards, and channels’—the 
defences of the North Sea ports being too formidable to undertake ‘unless under very exceptional 
circumstances.’90 The emphasis on Baltic operations in Plan (C) and subsequent aggressive plans 
are strongly in line with traditional nineteenth century British maritime strategy contra Russia. 
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Geographic realities once again eased the burden faced by Admiralty planners—planning and 
intelligence for operations against the Russian Empire in the Baltic could, with suitable 
modification, be employed against the German Empire as well.
91
 
As in other plans, German islands were to be seized for advanced bases if necessary—
Borkum, Sylt, ‘and perhaps also’ Rügen or Femern.92 The fleet’s deployment would be the same 
except that the older battleships would be the force to attack Danzig and the modern armoured 
cruisers would watch the North Sea. Once the bombardment operations were judged as 
accomplished and the German fleet was dealt with,
93
 a raiding force of perhaps 40,000 men—
contingent on War Office cooperation—would carry out large scale raids ‘anywhere from Kiel to 
Memel, which would keep the whole littoral in a perpetual state of unrest and alarm’.94 During 
the bombardment and presumably during the raiding operations, private property was to be off 
limits to destruction except in the case of items of potential use ‘for the production of war 
material.’95 
 Plan (D) was, unlike the other three Plans, dependent on a single contingency: German 
invasion and occupation of Denmark.
96
 This added the further variable of Danish attitudes 
towards such an occupation. If the Danes were to collaborate with Germany, food supplies into 
Sjælland would be cut off by the Royal Navy in the hopes the civil population would choose to 
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support itself over the German garrison.
97
 If the Danes were actively opposed to the invasion a 
strong landing force would be put ashore to wear down the German garrison whose resupply line 
was severed, a campaign which would hopefully end in a German evacuation or surrender. The 
naval side of the campaign would follow the same lines as Plan (C), except which some changes 
in objectives and timetable. 
 As has been observed there is plenty of evidence to show the 1907 War Plans were 
written at least in part to appease the Cabinet by showing the Navy ‘could offer an offensive 
strategy against Germany.’98 However this to a certain extent misses the point. There were, 
indeed, certain difficulties with these plans. One of them was the provision of an assault force 
against the Frisian Islands. Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Lowry explained the difficulties to George 
King-Hall, who duly recorded the remarks in his diary: 
‘Lowry told me that when Head of the War College, Fisher told him to arrange for 
an expeditionary force of 4000 men to seize Borkum or one of the neighbouring 
Islands in case of War and he went down to Aldershot, but found that they would 
take a week to have the men ready, and then turning to the Marines he found only 
about 1000 available, unless the ships were denuded, on account of the reductions 
that have been made.’99 
 
The provision of Marines by stripping the detachments aboard ships was duly incorporated into 
the plans. 
 
Controversies 
If Plans (A) through (D) satisfied the Cabinet, they did not satisfy the senior flag officer 
afloat, Lord Charles Beresford. We have already seen how he found much fault with the Home 
Fleet even before it was officially created, but after discussions with Tweedmouth and Fisher the 
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matter seemed to have been settled for the time being, and the April 1907 tactical manoeuvres 
seemed to indicate that the Home and Channel Fleets could function together in reasonable 
harmony.
100
 However the issuance of the 1907 War Plans caused another spasm of revolt by the 
C.-in-C. Channel Fleet. This particular row seems to have started over Fisher’s reluctance to 
provide Beresford with a copy of Sir Arthur Wilson’s war plans while the latter was ‘pegging 
away at my plan of campaign for war with Germany’,101 and was intensified when Beresford 
received the Admiralty’s 1907 plans in May. In response Beresford submitted his own ‘Sketch 
Plan of Campaign’ on May 13th. Even a generous reading of this plan suggests that Marder had it 
right when he wrote that ‘the whole purpose of this sketch plan, which was based on the War 
Orders of 1905, was to criticize Admiralty policy.’102 This was especially galling since Beresford 
had written just weeks previously to Fisher that: 
‘There is not the slightest chance of any friction between me and you, or between 
me and anyone else. When the friction begins, I am off. If a senior and a junior 
have a row, the junior is wrong under any conceivable condition, or discipline 
could not go on.’103 
 
In light of both Beresford’s previous habits and future events,104 it is astounding that Beresford 
could have written this with any expectation of being taken seriously. Matters were not helped 
since Fisher had already offered Beresford the assistance of Ottley’s N.I.D. staff and given his 
approval of certain early proposals of Beresford’s including a surprise attack—the details of 
which are now obscure—by the Atlantic Fleet.105 
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Beresford started from the (probably reasonable) proposition that any plans needed to 
include the possibility of an enemy attack ‘when our ships are in the worst position to repel or 
reply to it,’ specifically during leaves for Easter and Christmas, weekends, or occasions when 
‘Fleets are combined for manoeuvres not in strategic waters.’106 Beresford’s suggestion was to 
gather the Navy’s principle striking force of battleships and cruisers at Portland, while any ships 
in Northern waters would retreat to Queensferry and the cover of both the coastal guns there and 
an anti-torpedo boat patrol by destroyers. 
Taken in isolation there was nothing particularly uncouth about this, but Beresford’s 
recent actions suggested in the strongest terms that he was, at the very least, not being entirely 
ingenuous. At least this was Fisher’s impression, having had no explanation of Beresford’s 
sudden departure to North America at the start of 1907.
107
 
While the fleet gathered in Portland and Queensferry, measures were to be taken against 
enemy torpedo craft attacks on the East Coast. A fast cruiser/destroyer force would immediately 
race up ‘as far as the latitude of Flamborough Head’ then ‘sweep to the Eastward’ provided 
conditions were satisfactory. Simultaneously a second force of the same character would race ‘up 
the Coast of Holland and the intervening waters and, according to the time of day, should work 
round the North Coast.’ Both these destroyer groups would later form the inshore squadron for 
operations off the German coast.
108
 
In the event of a sudden war with Germany, the commercial blockade would begin by the 
Navy’s cruisers sweeping up any German merchantmen in the Channel and North Sea before 
proceeding to the German Coast.
109
 Subsequent operations were sketched out in a section dealing 
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with war breaking out after a period of strained relations. The Channel Fleet and the Home 
Fleet’s Nore Division and Fifth Cruiser Squadron were to begin from Portland, while the cruiser 
squadrons designated for work off the German coast were to be distributed along the East Coast 
as follows: 
 
Composition Base of Operations 
Skagerrak Squadron Cruisers and destroyers Queensferry 
Elbe Squadron Cruisers, scouts, destroyers 
Cruisers at Dover, scouts and 
destroyers at Harwich, the 
Humber, and the Nore. 
Dover Squadron  Dover 
 
An additional small cruiser force would operate from Plymouth to intercept any German trade 
entering the Channel from the western approaches. 
As described above, there seems to be little in these plans to cause offence, however 
throughout the ‘Sketch Plan’ Beresford made unsubtle complaints about the lack of ships under 
his command and the unsuitability of present peacetime force dispositions. On the possibility of 
a surprise attack by enemy torpedo boats, he complained ‘[o]ur ships are not well disposed to 
meet such an attack.’ Furthermore, in what can only be assumed a deliberate shot across the 
Admiralty’s bows, Beresford and his staff designed the Channel Fleet’s plans around a force 
requiring more cruisers and battleships than were actually available so that he could complain 
‘the Fleets are not nearly up to their proper strength.’110 To hammer that point home, Beresford 
included his own estimates of the Navy’s forces that were immediately available as opposed to 
being ready on paper but (allegedly) not in reality. Using cruisers as his example, Beresford 
wrote that of the fifty-three cruisers he would need for specific duties, only thirty-six at most 
were available.
111
 Elsewhere, Beresford estimated that he would need a total of twenty-seven 
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battleships and sixty cruisers
112
 plus subsidiaries such as destroyers and fleet auxiliaries. This list 
pointedly did not include cruisers needed for other purposes such as patrol of the North Sea 
entrances.
113
 
However the main thrust in Beresford’s attack was contained in a separate critique of the 
Admiralty’s war plans dispatched at the same time as his ‘Sketch Plan’. This letter as well as the 
resulting correspondence became so lengthy it was ultimately bound in its own Case File.
114
 The 
file opens with Beresford’s May 8th comment that ‘on taking over the command of the Channel 
Fleet I have been unable to find any papers relative to a plan of campaign to enable the Channel 
Fleet to take instant action if war had been declared with a foreign Naval Power.’ Beresford 
therefore submitted ‘that I may be supplied with the plans of my predecessors, as I should like 
the benefit of their experiences and ideas on this all important matter.’115 Alongside this request, 
Beresford took aim at the Admiralty’s 1907 War Plans.116 
Beresford noted that Part I of the Plans—which was actually Corbett’s introductory 
essay—was ‘extremely clever’ and contained ‘facts that are A.B.C. to anyone who has ever 
studied war’. Even so he felt that it was useless for planning purposes since it could not be used 
to draw up a ‘practical Plan of Campaign’. 117  The intent of the paper as an intellectual 
justification for the actual plans seems to have never occurred to Beresford. In any case he 
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included a point-by-point commentary which contains the following statement that lays out 
Beresford’s attitude towards planning in general: 
‘“Forming War Plans” are of no use whatever unless the whole of the details as to 
what ships are to carry out the work, are minutely calculated out, detailed by 
name, and corrected each month to date. Re. ships refitting or out of action for 
that month from unforeseen and often non-preventable circumstances. There has 
never been, (with the exception of the Mediterranean Fleet), formulated a proper 
War Plan for the British Navy, i.e., on the same method as the German Army 
Corps system- Every Corps told off, trained, and practiced in its component parts. 
With the exception of a few Manoeuvres, Battle Fleets work together, Cruisers 
work together, T. Craft work together. They are never worked together as one 
whole, continually practising [sic] and training together for the work that they as a 
whole Fleet carry out in time of war.’118 
 
Later, Beresford abused the Home Fleet once again: 
‘The creation of the Home Fleet under present conditions is an invitation for our 
enemies to attack. It is in no wise [sic] a strength; it is apparent and palpable 
weakness; it in no way whatever agrees with the statements made about it, as 
being able at all to meet an enemy when the tension is strongest. It is a fraud upon 
the public and a danger to the Empire.’119 
 
 Before finally moving on to critiquing the War Plans themselves, Beresford fired a shot at 
the concept of a fixed base for the British fleet. While admitting ‘no objection’ to an anchorage 
‘strategically suitable and quite safe from Torpedo Attack’, he felt that ‘the morale of the officers 
and crews will deteriorate very soon and the Fleet will gradually become tied to its base,’ 
gradually losing its ability to act offensively, thus ‘abdicating the command of the sea.’120 As for 
the actual War Plans, Beresford declared Plan (A) ‘radically unsound’ and ‘altogether 
impossible’. The Northern Cordon was too far from the German Coast to be effective. Beresford 
felt that to blockade the German ports effectively a cordon should be ‘close to the German bases 
on the west where German trade is more or less concentrated in the neck of the funnel’. The 
Admiralty’s Plan did not have enough cruisers to make such a cordon effective. 
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Beresford also considered the objective, ‘merely destruction of German Merchant Ships’, 
to be unsatisfactory. Finally, he thought the German fleet could easily sail around through the 
Skaw to attack the British battle fleet from the rear (Beresford assumed the main British fleet 
would be operating the southern North Sea alongside the observational patrols from Borkum. 
Beresford was equally scathing about Plans (B) through (D), all of which necessitated the 
division of the British battle fleet into two parts, which Beresford considered dangerous, and 
although he considered the blocking of the Elbe to be ‘sound’, it could not be entirely trusted to 
succeed.
121
 
The Admiralty’s reaction to these criticisms was consternation. Regarding Beresford’s 
complaints about the Northern Cordon, Captain Ballard would later remark that it was ‘evident 
that he entirely fails to grasp the main idea. These cruisers are not watching cruisers in any sense 
of the word as regards watching for the exit of the enemy’s fleet, but placed solely to intercept 
trade.’122 Even regarding the German battle fleet, Ballard found Beresford in error: 
‘Our object is to force them to proceed to a distance of more than 300 miles from 
their own sheltered bases to defend their trade and then fall upon them when 
outside, or cut off their retreat.’123 
 
Fisher went further, producing a sharply worded memorandum complaining of the insubordinate 
tone of Beresford’s submissions and that his language implied a slur against Sir Arthur Wilson’s 
work.
124
 Tweedmouth tried diplomacy, writing to Fisher that while ‘[n]o one is more alive to the 
objections which can be taken to much of the attitude taken up by Lord Charles Beresford and to 
his methods of action’, his views should not be peremptorily dismissed. 
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‘It is after all only human to grind your own axe and to do what you can to get as 
much power & control over affairs as you can. Of course it is the duty of the 
Admiralty to put a severe limit on such aspirations… I am the last person in the 
world to abrogate one iota of the supremacy of the Board of Admiralty, but I do 
think we sometimes are inclined to consider our own views to be infallible and are 
not ready enough to give consideration to the views of others who may disagree 
with us but who still may give us ideas and information which can be turned to 
great use.’125 
 
From here on the Admiralty’s relationship with Beresford would only get worse. 
 
New Year, New Plans 
A new series of plans was published in the summer of 1908.
126
 Their background is 
clearer than the previous year’s plans. A manuscript draft of one of the six individual plans has 
survived and the handwriting matches that of Lewis Bayly, then serving as President of the War 
College. Bayly was an interesting character, Marder describing him as ‘an able tactician with a 
mania almost for discipline and efficiency’.127 An ardent advocate of aggressive action against 
the German Coast, Bayly’s fire-eating nature can be illustrated by two incidents. The first 
occurred during the Fashoda crisis when he was first lieutenant of the cruiser Talbot. Ordered by 
Admiral Fisher to ‘get hold of’ the telegraph steamer Grappler, Bayly boarded the ship and met 
privately with the ship’s captain. He then ‘called for two sheets of foolscap and wrote out a 
duplicate order for him to remain in British waters, reporting his position by cable daily at noon 
to the Talbot; and began the letters with the words, “I, Lewis Bayly, in the name of the British 
Admiralty, do require you,” etc.’128 
In Bayly’s postwar memoirs, he described the plans he helped work up: 
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‘[Fisher] told me to make out one or two war plans for the operation of our fleets 
against certain enemies. This kept me in frequent communication with him, and 
these war plans were duly put into a drawer by him, and enabled him to say that 
the War College took the place of a specially constituted War Staff.’129 
 
This recollection is not entirely accurate. These plans were, it seems, issued to the fleet 
commanders, or at least to Beresford.
130
 Nevertheless Bayly’s memoirs demonstrate that the W 
Plans were drawn up at the War College, with Captain Henry Oliver assisting.
131
 No doubt the 
D.N.I. also assisted and the whole process took place under Fisher’s supervision. 
While the origin of these plans is reasonably certain, their purpose is less so. Nicholas 
Lambert questions whether they were genuine or simply drawn up by Fisher and his allies to 
pacify the insubordinate Lord Beresford, whose relations with the Admiralty were now very 
strained. Suffice to say that one of the points of dispute between the two was the employment of 
the fleet in a war with Germany, and Nicholas Lambert describes the 1908 War Plans as being 
‘so much in accord with Beresford’s personal views… that there must be doubts that they truly 
represented the Admiralty’s strategic views.’132 This, however, is a mistaken assumption. 
Plan W.1 dealt with a war between England and Germany only.
133
 The introduction 
showed that the plan was rooted in classical Blue Water thinking: ‘The only way in which an 
enemy can hope to impose his will on England is by defeating our Navy.’ 134  Germany’s 
presumed hopes for a temporary supremacy at sea, enough ‘to bring us to our knees by making 
use of their land forces on British soil’ were dismissed as impracticable on any major scale, and 
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did not alter ‘the basic principle that nothing short of overcoming our maritime supremacy can 
be of any permanent use’ to Germany. 
As a result, German naval policy was expected to be ‘offensive in principle’ but, at least 
initially, ‘defensive in fact’. Germany would attempt a campaign of attrition, keeping her main 
fleet safe in port ‘in the hope of being able to reduce British forces by enticing them meanwhile 
to waste their strength in futile operations against her coast,’ except when the possibility of 
‘dealing a blow at some weak detachment’ arose. This prediction was, in fact, more or less what 
actually occurred when war came in 1914.
135
 The authors of W.1 were therefore in concurrence 
‘with Sir Arthur Wilson in advocating that, on the outbreak of war, our battle fleets should, as a 
rule, be kept well away from the German coast, and from possible interference by hostile torpedo 
craft’, excepting situations where circumstances justified their approach to shore. Both a close 
blockade of German harbours by heavy units and operations in the Baltic were deprecated 
generally in W.1. The German Bight was instead to be watched ‘by a few cruisers and 
destroyers’. 136  Any attempt to force the Baltic or carry out major operations within, were 
characterized as ‘a strategical error.’137 The sole exception to this caution was the specific case of 
a German invasion of Denmark, which was dealt with in a separate paper.
138
 The most likely 
German operations against British waters were thought to be mining operations and torpedo craft 
sweeps along the east coast and attempts by commerce raiders (both cruisers and armed 
merchantmen) to break through into the Atlantic.
139
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The mobilization details given in W.1—and especially the discussion regarding the 
Navy’s peacetime disposition—are interesting because they provide the bulk of the material for 
those suggesting the W series plans were written, at least in part, as a sop to Beresford. It will be 
recalled that Beresford was critical of the assumption there would be a sufficient period of 
‘strained relations’ to mobilize the majority of the Navy’s forces in reserve, thus limiting the 
chances of surprise attack similar to the Japanese destroyer raid on Port Arthur. The planners 
wrote ‘In the disposition of our fleets in anticipation of a period of strained relations with 
Germany, we have two conflicting circumstances to consider.’ 140  On one hand, it was ‘an 
undoubted fact that our east coast ports are all within range of torpedo craft attack’, as were the 
Channel naval bases, so ‘it would seem advisable to have no fleet or squadron on our east coast 
while relations with Germany are strained.’ On the other hand, withdrawal of the Navy’s heavy 
units from the east coast during such a crisis ‘may raise an outcry’ and the east coast, guarded 
only by the torpedo flotillas at Harwich and Sheerness, would ‘undoubtedly be a tempting bait 
for German raids and incursions.’  
The nub of the matter lay, said the planners, ‘in the present disposition of our fleets in 
Home waters.’141 For maximum effectiveness the three divisions of the Home Fleet would have 
to concentrate into a single force, and the rendezvous depended on whether the Channel Fleet 
was in home waters. In the worst-case scenario so beloved in Beresford’s arguments, the Nore 
Division would be highly vulnerable to a German surprise attack on the Medway
142
 and neither 
the Channel nor the other two divisions of the Home Fleet could reinforce it. In a concession to 
this argument, the planners submitted ‘in future, whenever the Channel Fleet is cruising in our 
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western waters, the Nore Division of the Home Fleet shall be sent to Portland to carry out 
exercises, the Fifth Cruiser Squadron going to Dover.’143 The choice of Dover for the Fifth 
Cruiser Squadron was to allow it to support the Harwich flotillas when they deployed to their 
observation stations in the Heligoland Bight.
144
 In the most advantageous circumstances, the 
Channel Fleet and other units could proceed to holding areas off the East Coast to await the 
commencement of hostilities.
145
 
When the shooting started the battle fleet would remain divided, but would combine 
when necessary (i.e. before a general fleet action). The Atlantic and Channel Fleets would 
operate from Cromarty or the Firth of Forth with the Second and Fourth Cruiser Squadrons, and 
the Home Fleet would work from the Humber. Why the Channel and Atlantic Fleets were to base 
themselves so far northwards from their peacetime stations is unexplained. The most logical 
reason was that the Home Fleet, manned as it was partially by nucleus crews, would have to be 
filled up by reservists on the outbreak of war, thus leaving it at least initially chained to Chatham 
and Sheerness for ease of distributing the incoming personnel. As in the previous year’s Plan (A), 
the majority of the Navy’s protected cruisers (the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Cruiser 
Squadrons) would form a cordon from the Shetlands to Norway, minus a detachment of the 
Tenth which would operate from Lough Swilly against any German commerce raiders that had 
reached the Atlantic. The observation lines along the German Bight would comprise ten 
‘divisions’ of destroyers supported by the Fifth and Sixth Cruiser Squadrons, as well as the new 
‘C’ class submarines. Another four destroyer divisions were to be attached to the Channel and 
Home Fleets. The Skagerrak was to be covered by the First Cruiser Squadron.
146
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 The plan also envisioned a certain number of coastal operations in the opening days of 
the war. The Channel Fleet was to bombard Heligoland at least once, possibly as a means to 
‘bring German Fleet to action [sic] if opportunity arises’ by the time-honoured Royal Navy 
technique of creating its own opportunity.
147
 Once again Borkum was selected as a target for an 
amphibious assault so as to obtain an advanced base for flotilla craft due to ‘the difficulty we 
should have in maintaining our torpedo craft on the German coast without a base nearer to the 
area of operations’ than the east coast of Britain.148 To that end, Borkum was to be attacked ‘AT 
ONCE’149 by Royal Marines borne on the ships designated as Special Service Vessels.150 Finally, 
Admiral Wilson’s proposal to block the Elbe and Weser with blockships was resurrected in a 
modified form, involving thirty old merchant steamers which would be scuttled near the Elbe 
Middle Light Vessel under cover of the Channel Fleet’s bombardment of Heligoland.151 
War Plan W.2 was in essence a modification of W.1, framed around a different 
organization of the Navy’s strength, and the assumption that the Firth of Forth would be a major 
base for the campaign.
152
 Again the battle fleet would be in two parts—the ‘North Sea Battle 
Fleet’ of the Navy’s sixteen most modern battleships (six Dreadnoughts, two Lord Nelsons, eight 
King Edwards), and the ‘Channel Battle Fleet’ of seventeen battleships (of which nine, all 
Majestics, would have nucleus crews). In addition, the Special Service battleships would be in 
the Medway, ready to sortie and capture Borkum.
153
 As defence against surprise attacks prior to 
an official declaration of war the following rather amusing bit of sea-lawyering was proposed: 
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‘In the Notice to Mariners No. 1, of 1908, we have an admirable instrument for 
preventing surprise attacks without prejudicing diplomatic relations. According to 
the terms of this Notice, we reserve to ourselves the power to forbid all entrance 
to naval ports at night, even in time of peace, on account of periodical exercises, 
manœuvres, or otherwise. 
‘When relations with Germany become strained therefore, “periodic exercises” 
will justify our sending torpedo craft outside these harbours at night to prevent 
any craft from approaching them.’154 
 
The armoured cruisers would be in squadrons, the First and Second comprising the most modern 
vessels and ‘attached to the North Sea and Channel Fleets respectively’, with the Third at Dover 
to support the destroyer forces that would be sent to the German coast.
155
 The other five 
squadrons were ‘constituted primarily with a view to giving us a slight preponderance of power 
over other countries in foreign waters’ with the secondary objective of ensuring homogeneity 
among the squadrons.
156
 The remaining unarmoured cruisers not attached to the flotillas were 
formed into five more squadrons—two for operations relating to the seizure of an advanced 
torpedo craft base, and three for general duties in home waters including the commercial 
blockade cordons described in 1907’s Plan (A).157 Destroyer operations off the German coast 
were given to the Tribals and Rivers, stated reasons being the seaworthiness of the latter and the 
ease of refuelling the former.
158
 Left unstated is the fact that these destroyers had recently been 
selected for fitting out with modern wireless sets, making them ideal for observational 
blockade.
159
 Remaining older destroyers and the Coastals were assigned to either defensive 
duties or reinforcement of the observation flotillas. The newest ‘C’ and ‘D’ class submarines 
were to support the tripwire blockades as well as for patrolling the Kattegat.
160
 
Upon war’s outbreak there were four mission objectives set out: 
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a) Establishment of the tripwire blockade by ‘the despatch of a squadron of blockade’ to 
the Bight and the Skagerrak, to be reinforced later by the Second Cruiser Squadron of 
modern armoured cruisers. 
b) Seizure of Borkum by Royal Marines embarked aboard Special Service Vessels 
simultaneous with a demonstration bombardment of Heligoland.
161
 
c) Strangulation of German overseas trade with cordon patrols at Dover and the northern 
entrances to the North Sea. 
d) Blocking the Elbe and Weser with obstructions supported by a minefield.162 
 
The designation War Plan W.3 was actually used for two separate but related plans, the 
second being named “War Plan W.3 Part II”. The original W.3, first printed in June 1908 and 
later revised twice over the remainder of the summer, assumed a war placing France and Britain 
in alliance against Germany, with no violation of Belgian neutrality expected.
163
 Shawn Grimes 
describes it as an attempt ‘to balance competing options which were all complex, contradictory, 
and hazardous.’164 Since French and British naval forces would be working in concert (despite 
the planners’ note that the French ships might be laid up to provide land forces in a repeat of the 
events of the Franco-Prussian War), there would be ‘a sharp line of demarcation between the 
duties agreed upon by the allies for their respective fleets’.165 The theatre of operations was 
expected to be North Sea, but ‘may possibly have to be extended in certain circumstances to 
include the Western Baltic.’166 W.3’s authors suggested assigning the French responsibility for 
the Dover cordon as their flotilla bases at Calais and Boulogne were ‘admirably suited for the 
work, and can be supported by their own cruisers’, which could use the defended harbour of 
Dover if necessary.’167 The French armoured cruisers, built to ravage British trade in accordance 
with the guerre industrielle, would instead be assigned to protect trade as they were ‘more 
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suitable than the British [armoured cruisers] for the attack and protection of trade’.168 The French 
would have responsibility for the Mediterranean and thus allow the British Mediterranean Fleet 
to be brought home.
169
 
British peace distribution was to be the same as in Plan W.1 with the exception of the 
Fifth Cruiser Squadron, which would be permanently based at Dover.
170
 Upon the outbreak of 
war, the initial observation forces assigned to the German coast would be the Fifth Cruiser 
Squadron, the Harwich destroyer flotilla and its attached scouts reinforced by two destroyer 
divisions from the Forth, as well as the submarine tender Vulcan and a division of submarines. A 
destroyer division would be stationed off each river mouth by night, while by day only ‘a couple 
of destroyers’ would do so. The destroyers’ supporting scouts and gun-boats would be kept thirty 
miles further out. The ships of the Fifth Cruiser Squadron would go in to back the destroyer 
watches in the morning ‘when they are most likely to be attacked by enemy cruisers.’171  The 
Dover cordon would be comprised of French warships, and another French squadron would 
patrol between Stornoway and the Faroes to interdict German trade attempting to enter the North 
Sea, with a ‘special reserve’ of British warships—specifically unarmoured cruisers—to complete 
the line from the Shetlands to Norway.
172
 The First Cruiser Squadron was to watch the Skagerrak. 
The Home Fleet would form the initial battlefleet in the North Sea, to be joined later by the 
Channel and Atlantic Fleets plus their Cruiser Squadrons. The battle fleet would cruise the North 
Sea, ‘always retiring at night beyond the utmost limit which German destroyers could reach if 
sent out at sunset with orders to return next morning.’173 The expedition to capture Borkum was 
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to sail ‘as closely as possible after the Home Battle Fleet.’174 Heligoland would be brought under 
the guns of the battle fleets as well as the Fifth Cruiser Squadron. Once Borkum was taken, the 
newly-mobilized Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Cruiser Squadrons were to join with the Fifth in 
stretching a blockade line between Terschelling and Horn Reef. 
The authors of W.3 noted that ‘the establishment of a closer blockade of the German 
coast is contemplated than in War Plans W. 1 and W. 2.’175 They were not unaware of the 
implications: 
‘The remarks on this project must, however, be prefaced by stating frankly that it 
is fraught with greater possibilities of danger to the blockading squadrons than the 
system of cordons across the Straits of Dover and across the northern entrance to 
the North Sea.’176 
 
A certain extra risk was considered worthwhile, however. 
‘Nevertheless, the cordon system by itself is not a perfect one, and leaves much to 
be desired in many respects. It does not prevent trade to and from German North 
Sea ports being carried on in neutral bottoms, should neutrals consider the risks 
worth accepting, and consequently the offensive value of cordons is confined 
exclusively to the capture of German merchant-ships or neutral merchant-ships 
carrying contraband of war for Germany.’177 
 
The W.3 plan did not presume, however, to stop at commercial pressure only, as is shown by the 
intent to occupy Borkum and attack Heligoland. In this connection, it seems likely that if 
Admiral Lowry and the other planners had examined recent N.I.D. reports indicating that the 
Germans had begun increasing the scale of the Frisian Belt and their northern ports they would 
have been far less enthusiastic in promoting such a combination of amphibious assaults and 
inshore blockade work.
178
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W.3 Part II appeared in August 1908,
179
 ‘predicated on 1904-7 Baltic proposals re-
examined during the Baltic and North Sea status quo arbitrations.’180 Part II specifically dealt 
with ‘cases in which it is considered desirable to send British troops to operate on the German 
coasts, the intention being that the uncertainty as to where our troops may strike will compel the 
Germans to keep large forces in their northern provinces in order to deal with them, thus 
lessening the pressure against our ally on the Franco German frontier.’181 This is a statement that 
could have been taken straight from either Wilson’s or Slade’s strategic principles, and given 
Bayly’s apparent later enthusiasm for amphibious attacks on Heligoland or Borkum, it seems 
likely this section of the plan represents his views.
182
 The British would have to threaten ‘every 
point on the German littoral in the North and Baltic Seas’ to gain the maximum advantage in 
such a conflict.
183
 This meant the destruction of the Hocheseeflotte, or at least a major portion of 
it, were a clear requirement for operational success. The Baltic coast could not be threatened 
until after a decisive action or actions had occurred. The problem was forcing such an action. 
‘There are very few devices open to England by means of which the German Fleet 
might be enticed into the North Sea, and if Germany does the right thing she will 
not touch any such bait.’184 
 
W.3 Part II consisted of three case studies of situations where British troops could be used in 
major amphibious offensives, all of which were dependent on the attitude of Denmark.
185
 In Case 
I, Denmark was allied with Germany. In Case II, Germany had violated Danish neutrality by 
operating in her territorial waters and threatening invasion if the Danes retaliated. Case III had 
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Denmark joining Britain and France ‘in order to enforce her neutrality and prevent Germany 
from occupying her territory which commands the Belts.’ 
Case I was dismissed quickly as being both politically unlikely and a death knell to any 
hopes of British action in the Baltic. British offensive action would thus be limited to the North 
Sea littoral—that is an observation blockade of German North Sea ports, the closure of the North 
Sea to German merchant traffic with a northern blockade line, and the usual operations against 
Borkum. If Borkum was found to be too strongly fortified—evidence Lowry, Brock, and the 
other planners had caught up with the N.I.D.’s intelligence reports—Sylt and the surrounding 
islands of Röm, Föhe, Amrum, Langeness, and Oland would be taken in its stead. There would 
also be a British landing, presumably in force, on the Eiderstedt peninsula “to threaten the Kiel 
Canal, either before or after the dispatch of troops to reinforce the French Army, according to 
which appears most necessary at the time.”186 
Case II, Danish neutrality unhindered by Germany, was “the worst situation we have to 
contemplate”. The authors dismissed the possibility of a Danish land offensive to retake 
Schleswig-Holstein, though they retained the hope that Denmark might join a Franco-British 
coalition once the British had proven their superiority at sea. The possibility of Danish resistance 
to any German occupation attempts, ‘especially if England offers assistance in the form of 
troops’, was considered, as was the possibility that Denmark would allow both sides to operate in 
the Belts so long as her territory remained unimpinged on. Whatever the case, the best course 
was to ‘accept the disabilities, and force our way into the Baltic at all costs.’ Presuming 
‘Denmark’s helplessness’, Case II envisioned ‘the majority of British forces in home waters’ at 
once being sent to the Kattegat and from there forcing their way through the Great Belt. The 
Atlantic Fleet and Mediterranean Fleets upon their arrival from Gibraltar and Malta would join 
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with the Second and Third Cruiser Squadrons to hold the North Sea supported by the destroyers 
of the River and Tribal classes and reinforced by the ‘special service cruisers’ as they mobilized. 
 It was expected the German main force would concentrate to oppose the British thrust 
towards the Baltic, and even if the Germans decided to make their stand in the North Sea, the 
Baltic force would press on until their objectives were achieved. The thrust into the Baltic would 
be led by British submarines, whose immediate task would be to protect British minesweepers 
from the German fleet as they cleared the Belt of any German mines. Transports following the 
British Baltic force would, once the way was cleared, land troops at Fehmarn, Sylt, and Röm. 
Further landings were planned for the Eiderstedt and ‘the peninsula between the Bay of 
Eckernforde and the Scheifiord’, or alternatively Rügen—the latter given a potential base for 
operations further east. The Elbe would be blocked with scuttled hulks, as would Warnemünde, 
Travemünde, and Memel, while Swinemünde and Danzig Bay would be blockaded.
 187
 
Case III’s scenario of active Danish support from the outset of war was quite naturally 
considered ‘the most favourable to the allies, and is therefore the situation which they should 
endeavour to bring about.’188 The planners understood the small Danish Army could not put up a 
prolonged resistance to the estimated German invasion force of 100,000 to 150,000 men, so the 
British first move had to be a rapid attack into the Baltic in the ten-day period it was estimated 
that the Germans would require to mobilize such an invasion force. The forces allocated this task 
were fundamentally identical to those arrangements suggested for Case II, although provision 
was made for the transport of the 40,000 men of the two British Army divisions at Aldershot to 
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Denmark once the Great Belt had been cleared by the Navy.  Danish naval support was expected 
to be of minimal utility.
189
 
 
The First Operation Unthinkable 
Beginning in autumn 1908 and continuing into 1909, a series of plans were written out 
that examined a war between Britain and both Germany and the United States. The idea of a 
British-American naval war had become something of a preoccupation to Fisher during 1908, for 
reasons which have never been adequately explained, although one explanation involves the 
increasingly tortuous matter of the Two Power Standard.
190
 As a German-American combination 
was the strongest permutation of the Two Power Standard at the time, it seems possible, though 
perhaps not likely, that the first of these plans—Plan W.4—was intended to be little more than 
ammunition for the annual battle over the Navy Estimates. Ammunition which, as will be seen in 
the next chapter, was sorely needed. This impression is reinforced by the delay in W.4’s printing, 
which did not occur until the middle of December, several months after W.3 Part II.
191
 
Certainly, Fisher was no enthusiast of a third war with the United States. Even as the ‘W’ 
Plans were being drawn up, Fisher wrote the following covering letter to McKenna for one of 
Slade’s memorandums: 
‘I send you a memorandum by Capt. Slade but I don't agree in the possibility of 
our waging a war with the United States & so deprecate any steps tending to 
encourage that idea.’192 
 
Be that as it may, two more plans on similar lines to W.4 were completed in early 1909: W.5 and 
G.U. (which may be the same plan under two separate names). Neither of these two plans seems 
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to have been officially printed, and both only survive as partially typewritten drafts.
193
 In any 
case there is reason to believe that these plans were not taken very seriously inside the Admiralty. 
In addition to Fisher’s deprecation of a war with the United States, Slade himself complained in 
his diary that one of these plans was ‘the most hopelessly puerile thing possible.’194 Puerile or 
not, they remain of interest, and for more reasons than as an illustration of ‘Fisher’s often 
unrealistic approach to war planning.’195 The essential premise of all these plans was that during 
a war with a German-American combination the U.S. Navy would send its battlefleet or a part of 
it, ‘across the Atlantic to combine with that of Germany.’196 
Plan W.4
197
 was signed by Lewis Bayly, and began with the declaration that as of January 
31
st
, 1909, a German-American alliance would possess thirty-eight battleships to Britain’s forty-
one.
198
 It was expected Germany would, in expectation of the American expeditionary force, 
hold their main fleet in port while conducting ‘incessant attacks on the British Fleet’ with their 
torpedo craft to bleed the Royal Navy’s strength down as far as possible, supplemented by 
minelaying operations off British ports, and sweeps by German heavy units in the Heligoland 
Bight to bait their British counterparts into range of their torpedo craft. The possible climax of 
such operations might be the sacrifice of Germany’s oldest ships ‘with orders to attack the 
British Fleet at whatever distance’. 199  The expected place for the junction of German and 
American fleets was given as the North Sea, following a night dash up the Channel by the 
Americans on the principle that such a course would be ‘the least likely to be expected.’ 
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However, a rendezvous in the Atlantic or after an American arrival through the northern entrance 
of the North Sea were not ruled out. It was assumed the American task force would bring their 
colliers along. 
Two rendezvous locations were worked out for British forces. The Channel and Atlantic 
Fleets would join at 54°N, 1°20ˈE and the Home and Mediterranean Fleets at 57°10ˈN, 2°E. 
Both would be joined by a force of second-class cruisers for supporting duties. The paramount 
duty of these two combined fleets was to prevent the junction of the American and German battle 
fleets. The British flotillas would deploy in Heligoland Bight on observation duties, backed by 
their flotilla cruiser and the First and Second Cruiser Squadrons. Until a ‘strong military 
expedition’ could capture Borkum as an advanced base only a single flotilla’s worth of destroyers 
(twenty-four) could maintain a watch in the Bight. Initially these would be divided into three 
groups: 
Borkum Group Elbe/Jade-Weser Group Lister Deep Group 
Sapphire 
1 Scout Cruiser 
6 Destroyers 
Topaze 
2 Scout Cruisers 
13 Destroyers 
1 Scout Cruiser 
6 Destroyers 
 
When (not if) the Lister Deep and Ems were ‘clear of German torpedo-boat destroyers’ the entire 
force would redeploy off the Elbe and the Jade. The Heligoland Bight force would also include 
the Apollo-class cruiser-minelayer conversions, which would be kept ‘ready to mine the mouths 
of the Elbe and Jahde [sic] if the German Fleet puts to sea.’200 The remaining destroyers, minus 
those required for coastal defence, would operate from Harwich in order to back up the 
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observation flotilla or, if the American task force appeared, to join with Dover’s defence force 
and attack it as it passed through the Straits. 
As noted, D.N.I. Slade was conspicuously critical of these plans, and it may have been 
Slade who scrawled the following note regarding W.4’s assumption the U.S. Navy would try to 
cross the Atlantic: 
‘This is improbable judging by the attitude adopted by the U.S.A. during the 
Spanish American War. Under any circumstances it would be a very risky 
proceeding.’201 
 
Slade had always been doubtful of this prospect, as illustrated by the following diary entry: 
‘Sir J.F. said that in case of war between us & Germany combined with America 
we should base a fleet in Lough Swilly ready to meet the Americans first if it 
comes cover. What was going to bring it over he did not specify.’202 
 
Slade was correct in his suspicion that there would be no American trans-Atlantic sortie in the 
event of a third war with Britain, or any other European power for that matter.
203
 
W.4 was the last of the W Series plans to be formally printed, but it was not the last to be 
drawn up. A subsequent February 1909 plan along the same general lines was written and named 
W.5.
204
 This plan, like W.4, was largely the work of Lewis Bayly of the War College.
205
 Again a 
table was given, listing Britain possessing on March 31
st
, 1909 fifty-four battleships (including 
the Royal Sovereigns, the three second-class battleships, and the turret ships Hood, Nile and 
Trafalgar) against the same thirty-eight American and German ships given in W.4. The same 
assumptions of a German attrition campaign and of an American-German junction as W.4 were 
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given. What was new, however, was a section titled ‘Flying Base for Destroyers’, which laid out 
the need for an advanced flotilla base and specified Borkum as the best of the possibilities. Of 
the other two, Heligoland was too heavily defended and would require reduction by 
bombardment, and Lister Deep was too far from England as well as too easy to be cut off as 
‘communication between it and England lies across the face of Germany.’206 Once Borkum was 
taken, operations against Heligoland would begin with a four-day preliminary bombardment by 
Renown, Centurion, Barfleur, and Hood. 
Once again the British battle fleet would be in two groups. The first would be the 
Northern Battle Fleet and comprise both the Home Fleet’s active and nucleus crew divisions (the 
Channel Fleet having now been absorbed by the Home Fleet) plus the Atlantic Fleet and the First 
Cruiser Squadron and would rendezvous at either 55°20ˈN, 2°20ˈE or 57°N, 4°E. The Southern 
Battle Fleet would be formed of the Home Fleet ships in Material Reserve plus the 
Mediterranean Fleet when the latter arrived home and, in time, the Fifth Cruiser Squadron. The 
Southern Battle Fleet’s patrol area was set at 54°N, 2°E. Nile and Trafalgar would be fitted with 
wireless and come under the command of the senior officer of the Heligoland Bight observation 
force as mother ships for the flotillas, with Nile anchored off Horn Reef and Trafalgar off 
Ameland. Two cruiser lines would be stretched eastwards from the Shetlands and across the 
mouth of the Channel to watch for the American fleet’s approach. Deployment of a cruiser line 
between the Hebrides and the Faroes, though considered preferable, required too many ships and 
risked denuding either the other patrol lines or the cruiser forces supporting the battle fleets. The 
Second, Third, and Sixth Cruiser Squadrons (the latter relieving the Fifth) would support the 
Heligoland observation forces, with three additional cruisers (Eclipse, Vindictive, and Charybdis) 
attached to the Second Cruiser Squadron for patrolling the Skaw. 
                                                 
206
 Ibid., f. 489. 
163 
 
Both proposed battle fleets were considered superior to either of the individual opposing 
fleets. The Southern Fleet would intercept the U.S. battle fleet off Dover if it attempted to dash 
through the Channel, with the Northern Fleet maintaining its station in case the Germans came 
out. If the American forces tried the northerly route, the roles of the two battle fleets would be 
reversed. 
 One last plan in the W Series exists: War Plan W.6. Like W.5 it seems to have not been 
formally printed, and survives as a mix of handwritten and typed pages.
207
 Confusingly, the W.6 
designation seems to incorporate two entirely different plans. One of these refers to a war 
between the Triple Alliance and Britain. The other is a brief series of naval strength tables 
involving another England against the German-American alliance scenario that was written up, 
or at least signed, by Lewis Bayly. The latter is prefaced with a covering letter that includes this 
tantalizing comment: 
‘With reference to War Plan W.6. previously sent in, the following tables are 
enclosed showing the distribution of ships should the U.S.A. Fleet remain on the 
west side of the Atlantic. But before such a powerful British Fleet crosses the 
ocean it must be reasonably certain that the U.S.A. Fleet will not cross it before it 
arrives, and so put the fleets in England at a disadvantage. 
‘The squadron of unarmoured cruisers for North America is to act as an escort the 
transports which will carry about 150,000 men across to Canada, within three to 
four months after the declaration of war.’208 
 
The table referenced in Bayly’s covering letter is reproduced below in full with only minor 
formatting changes: 
 
 
Battleships 
Armoured 
Cruisers 
Unarmoured 
Cruisers 
(First Class) 
Unarmoured 
Cruisers 
(Second Class) 
Unarmoured 
Cruisers 
(Third Class) 
Scouts 
R.N. (Home) 32 21 8 13 4 8 
Germany 22 8 - 17 15 - 
R.N. (Americas) 28 10 9 9 - - 
U.S.A. 24 4 3 5 4 3 
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Where this overseas squadron was to be based is not stated in the surviving documentation. A 
Canadian port such as the ex-Royal Dockyard at Halifax seems most likely, although use of the 
similar facility at Bermuda cannot be dismissed.
209
 
 The remainder of the tables in this version of W.6 are devoted to how Britain’s battleships 
and cruisers could be rated against those of Germany and America. The classification of the 
battleships is of particular interest. These were split into three classes. Class A comprised the 
Dreadnoughts, Lord Nelsons, King Edwards, and—significantly—the Invincibles. Class B 
included the Duncan and Formidable classes as well as Swiftsure and Triumph. Class C was 
made up of the remaining battleships down through the Nile and Trafalgar. Distribution was: 
North Sea North America 
6 Class A 
4 Class B 
22 Class C 
8 Class A 
11 Class B 
7 Class C 
 
The North Sea force would comprise the First, Third, and Fourth Divisions of the Home Fleet, 
while the North American force contained the Second Division of the Home Fleet and the 
Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets as well as the five Canopii. North Sea cruiser units would be 
the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Cruiser Squadrons. The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Cruiser Squadrons would go to North America.
210
 
Considering how the Admiralty had spent much time previously arguing reinforcing 
Canada in such a way would be exceptionally difficult, this provision for an expeditionary force 
comprising most of the British Army is baffling in the extreme. Just as surprising is the proposed 
deployment of almost half of the Royal Navy’s strength overseas during a war involving 
Germany. Perhaps this plan was written in relation to that 1909’s Colonial Conference in order to 
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encourage the Canadian dominions to invest in their own naval defence.
211
 Another possibility 
was that the plans were meant as a ‘nightmare scenario’, or as ammunition regarding the 
maintenance of the Two Power Standard. More likely, it will remain a frustrating puzzle. 
Returning to the more complete version of W.6, a major difference from the plans versus 
an American-German coalition was that it assumed ‘there will be two separate & distinct of War 
viz: the North Sea and the Mediterranean and that there will be no attempt on the part of 
Germany to effect a junction between her own naval forces and those of her Med
n
 Allies.’212 In 
addition, ‘The preponderance of British Naval forces over those of the allies combined, is so 
large as to admit of our being in numerical superiority in both theatres of War, and this has been 
arranged for in the following plan.’213 This being established, the plan’s author wrote that, ‘The 
primary British role is ‘preventative’, i.e. to prevent the Command of the Sea passing to the 
enemy, and to accomplish this, a vigorous offensive must be adopted wherever possible.’214 
In the North Sea, it was admitted by the planners that little could be done offensively 
other than the usual observational blockade as well as ‘the capture of an Advanced Base & the 
complete stoppage of oversea trade in German bottoms[.]’215 Once again, Nile and Trafalgar 
would be equipped with wireless equipment and all-round net defences as the support anchors 
for destroyer flotillas.
216
  In a surprisingly frank confession, the planners remarked that: 
‘The limitations of Naval Warfare will be acutely felt in this theatre of War by the 
British, for, unless other countries become involved, there are no Naval means of 
either forcing or enticing the German fleet out to decisive action, and our Army is 
too small to adventure anything against that of Germany.’ 
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 In the Mediterranean, however, there were more options. Since offensive actions or 
landings in the Adriatic were impractical, the main British objective would be to force Italy to 
accept a separate peace, for which the capture of Sardinia was considered a practical objective.
217
 
Much, however, would depend upon how the naval war played out, and the planners suggested 
that more destroyers would be needed for covering operations in the Adriatic and the dispatch of 
a section of submarines from England. In a parallel of the longstanding North Sea plans for 
Borkum, the island of Pantelleria would be seized by a detachment of Royal Marines from Malta 
as an advanced base for British flotilla craft.
218
 
In the spring on 1909, Fisher and his acolytes were at work on another War Plan, this 
time titled Plan G.U.—almost certainly because, like W.5 and the fragmentary plan for an 
American deployment in W.6, it dealt with fighting a German-American combination.
219
 The 
only surviving portion of this plan that can be positively identified is a document described as the 
orders to be issued to the C.-in-C. Home Fleet, although it also includes orders to be given to 
other British naval forces. The overall strategic assumptions were that the United States ‘either at 
the outset or at some later period’ would enter an Anglo-German war on the side of the Germans. 
The general scheme of G.U. would ‘remain the same if the war is against Germany alone,’ and 
‘the ships and vessels allotted to deal with an attack by the United States being employed after 
war has broken out to reinforce the fleet in the North Sea as required.’ 
During the diplomatic crisis it was assumed would precede hostilities ‘the Southern 
Portion of the North Sea is to be kept clear of Battleships and Armoured Cruisers, the initial 
defence in those waters being entrusted to the smaller Cruisers and Torpedo and Submarine 
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Flotillas.’ This arrangement would continue ‘until war is certain.’ The phrase ‘initial defence’ is a 
significant one, suggesting that the main fleet would not be put into harm’s way until 
preparations were complete. These preparations saw the British heavy units divided into three 
fleets, the Main Fleet, Second Fleet, and Third Fleet: 
Main Fleet Second Fleet Third Fleet 
Atlantic Fleet and Home Fleet 
First and Second Division 
Battleships 
First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, 
and Seventh Cruiser Squadrons 
First and Second Flotillas 
Fifth and Sixth Destroyer 
Divisions 
Submarine Sections VII and II 
Home Fleet Third and Fourth 
Division Battleships 
Ninth Cruiser Squadron 
Mediterranean Fleet 
 
 Once the Main Fleet had assembled at a point designated as Rendezvous A it would either 
anchor there or patrol between Rendezvous A and the Firth of Forth/Scapa Flow, with the cruiser 
squadrons to the eastwards. Once war broke out the Fifth and Sixth Cruiser Squadrons would 
take up a patrol line at the entrance to the Baltic ‘near a line drawn from Hantsholm to 
Ruytingen.’ They would probably be joined by the First and Third Cruiser Squadrons, but the 
surviving document is unclear on this point. The Seventh Cruiser Squadron would patrol from 
Lerwick between the Orkneys, the Shetlands, and Norway against German commerce, supported 
by the Eighth Division of destroyers covering the gap between Pentland and the Orkneys. 
Once again there would be an observation blockade of the German coast, comprised of 
the First and Second Destroyer Flotillas and the Fifth and Sixth Divisions of destroyers—68 
destroyers in total. The First Flotilla would watch the Elbe, Jade, and Weser. The Second Flotilla 
would operate from Sylt to Eider Light. The Ems would be watched by the Fifth Division, while 
the Sixth watched the entrance to the Baltic. The exact strength totals were given as: 
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First Flotilla Second Flotilla Fifth Division Sixth Division 
1 Cruiser 1 Cruiser 1 Cruiser 2 Scouts 
2 Scouts 2 Scouts 1 Scout 16 Destroyers 
1 Depot Ship 1 Depot Ship 12 Destroyers  
25 Destroyers 30 Destroyers   
 
 The distance between the areas to be patrolled and the closest British ports made the 
creation an advanced base very desirable. This was an area where Plan G.U. showed innovation, 
as a significant change proposed was the abandonment of plans for seizing Borkum and/or Sylt 
as advanced bases. Plan G.U.’s authors lamented that ‘attempts to seize and hold any German 
harbour suitable to the purpose’ could not be guaranteed to succeed.  Instead, ‘floating bases at 
sea must be utilized as far as possible.’ The observation flotillas were to shelter in and amongst 
the shallow-water banks just off the coast. The Northern Advanced Base would be in the vicinity 
of Horns Reef, the Southern Advanced Base off Texel. Each base was to be guarded by one of 
the Nile class turret ships and be supported by two depot ships. If these bases were successfully 
established, they would be used to support undersea operations by submarine Sections II and VII. 
The employment of the Second and Third Fleets were not set out in as much detail, as 
their employment depended ‘upon the circumstances which arise after commencement of 
hostilities.’ The Third Fleet would remain in the Channel during ‘the earlier stages of the war’, 
but the Second Fleet would operate either as a southern force in the North Sea, or in the Channel 
if the American fleet appeared there. 
Apparently concurrent with Plan G.U., Fisher produced a long memorandum that 
enunciated the same details contained in the detailed orders written for the C.-in-C. Home 
Fleet.
220
 However, as fascinating as the Admiralty’s plans for opposing a hostile American-
German alliance are, they are also a dead end. After Plan G.U., nothing more is heard of such a 
combination. By the start of 1909, the Navy’s planning against Germany had becoming an 
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intensely personal business involving just Fisher, Wilson, and a few others. ‘I don’t want to 
disclose my plan of campaign to anyone,’ he wrote to Esher. ‘I haven’t even told Ottley and don’t 
mean to.’221 By way of explanation, Fisher insisted that the plan depended on ‘suddenness and 
unexpectedness, and the moment I tell anyone there’s an end to both!!!’222  He did let slip, 
however, that he was working on a scheme that involved transports. ‘I started it about 7 weeks 
ago and got 3 of my best satellites on it’, he wrote.223 
The ‘transports’ Fisher spoke of were not troopships but colliers. In a letter to Winsloe, 
the Fourth Sea Lord, Fisher asked for a revision of planned wartime fleet coaling practices, and 
explained his proposed distribution for the Navy’s wartime ‘offensive flotillas’. These were to be 
based at two ‘advanced positions’ if that was possible. The two forces were comprised of the 1st 
and 2nd Destroyer Flotillas and the 5th and 6th Destroyer Divisions,
224
 and the two forces’ 
strengths, excluding oil burning ships, are given below: 
 Parent Ship Cruisers Scouts Destroyers 
Northern 1 1 4 46 
Southern 1 2 3 31 
 
The exact positions of the two advanced bases are not known, but they are almost certainly off 
the German Bight, given later references to destroyers returning to east coast ports (Harwich, 
Yarmouth, Hull, and the Forth) to refuel prior to the establishment of the advanced bases.
225
 
Concurrent with the devising of Plan G.U., the Admiralty was reworking their plans for 
the defence of the home ports. 
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‘Proposals have been put forward to the Admiralty from time to time that large 
cruisers, and even in some cases battleships, should be allocated to the local 
defence of the Home Ports. 
‘Their Lordships consider that the most efficient defence consists in maintaining 
the seagoing fleets and squadrons at the utmost strength possible, seeking for and 
attacking the enemy on the high seas, and there intercepting any vessels which he 
may detach for the purpose of attacking our coasts. They cannot agree to any 
proposals which would involve the weakening of the fleets at sea, merely for the 
purpose of providing for a more or less sedentary local defence…’226 
 
The Navy’s big ships had better things to do than rust at anchor as Port Guardships. That 
interception of enemy raiders is listed as being, at least in certain instances, as a job for the 
Navy’s capital ships is an indication that Fisher’s strategic vision was not as flotilla-centred as 
some contend. 
It is unknown if any of the 1908-9 plans centred on opposing a German-American 
coalition were officially issued to the fleet. That the plans within them were serious can be seen 
in several ways. First is the amount of work undertaken by the torpedo gunboat Halcyon to 
survey the international waters just off Esbjerg, Denmark, under cover of her usual duties as a 
fisheries guardship.
227
 Another comes from the Home Fleet’s Flag Captain, Herbert Richmond. 
Richmond was caustic about the planned use of destroyers in an observational blockade.
228
 
Whatever the truth of the matter is, the formulation of Plan G.U. brings us to the last great drama 
of Fisher’s prewar tenure as First Sea Lord: the infamous circus known to history as the 
‘Beresford Inquiry’. By this time, war planning was being overshadowed by the poisonous state 
of intra-Navy and intra-Cabinet politics. It is to these therefore that we now must turn. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
Politics, Design, and Enquiry, 1908-1909 
 
The 'Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence appointed to Inquire into 
Certain Questions of Naval Policy raised by Lord Charles Beresford’ was the climax of 
Beresford’s efforts to unseat Fisher as First Sea Lord. Beresford’s constant criticism of the new 
fleet rankled the Admiralty, and Second Sea Lord Sir Charles Drury wrote to Tweedmouth that 
‘Charlie B. would not be himself unless he was firing a shot ‘agin the govt or powers in authority 
over him. It is his nature. He can’t help himself.’1 Others were less kind. Admiral Sir Day 
Bosanquet wrote to Arnold White that ‘I am personally convinced that on certain subjects he is 
not sane.’2 
Etiological or not, Beresford’s complaints could not be ignored, and they were of long 
standing. Recall Beresford’s 1907 fulmination that the Home Fleet was ‘a fraud and a danger to 
the Empire’, and the less hysterical observation that a better organization would be both the 
Channel and Home Fleets being a single combined command. In response to these and his 
continued truculence over the matter of War Plans, First Lord Tweedmouth attempted once again 
to solve things with another face-to-face conference at the Admiralty on July 5
th
 1907. This time, 
however, either Fisher or Tweedmouth decided to call in a stenographer to take a verbatim 
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transcript of the meeting, either for posterity or for future reference in quarrels with Beresford.
3
 
Several copies of the resulting lengthy transcript have survived.
4
 
Tweedmouth had four questions for Beresford. First, was what Lord Charles thought 
‘should be the number and types of vessels to be placed under your permanent command’? 
Secondly, there was the matter of what exactly was the sort of further information Beresford 
wanted beyond that already supplied to the Cs.-in-C. afloat by the Admiralty. Third was 
Beresford’s attitude towards the Admiralty: ‘Why do you not try to cultivate good and cordial 
relations with the Admiralty?’ Finally, Tweedmouth—and doubtless Fisher too—wanted 
Beresford to ‘explain to use your reasons for saying that “the Home Fleet is a fraud and a danger 
to the Empire”?’5 Before Tweedmouth could even ask these questions, however, the meeting 
went off the rails with a long back and forth argument about Beresford’s most recent letters to the 
Admiralty, of which Beresford, remarkably, could recall neither the contents nor even the dates 
they had been sent in.
6
 
When the discussion returned to war plans, Fisher reminded Beresford that he had asked 
for ‘your predecessor’s [Wilson] plan.’ Beresford corrected him, saying he had asked for the 
plans of Wilson’s predecessors as well. Fisher replied that Wilson’s were sufficient since he had 
been in command for six years. Beresford admitted he ‘thought [Wilson] had only been there 
three years.’ Beresford had apparently forgotten Wilson had been in command of the Home Fleet 
before it was renamed the Channel Fleet under the terms of Fisher’s 1904 redistribution scheme. 
Whatever the case, Beresford felt this mistake was ‘only a detail.’ This brought an 
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uncharacteristically icy retort from Tweedmouth: ‘It is a very big detail.’7 In the end, this summit 
meeting accomplished nothing. 
 
‘Fusion’? 
These internecine struggles went on against a background of serious technical discussion 
about the future British battlefleet’s composition and the specifications of the ships that would be 
built for it. The immediate follow-on to both the Dreadnought and the Invincible designs was 
meant, by Fisher at least, to be a merger of both types, thus fulfilling both Fisher’s arguments to 
Selborne during the preparation of the original 1904 Scheme, and Selborne’s qualified admission 
that the battleship and armoured cruiser were merging together.
8
 The result was Design ‘X4’, 
drawn up in November-December 1905. It was intended to be a ship ‘which shall embody the 
offensive and defensive powers of the “Dreadnought” and the speed of the “Invincible”, together 
with improved protection against torpedo explosion and an improved anti-torpedo boat 
armament.’9 ‘X4’ was 623 feet long and displaced 22,500 tons, carried the same main armament 
as Dreadnought and a mixed anti-torpedo boat armament of eight 4-inch guns and eighteen 
twelve pounders, and had a maximum speed of twenty-five knots.
10
 Instead of the somewhat 
clumsy arrangement used for Dreadnought, ‘X4’ would have her ten main guns in four turrets 
similar to the layout used for the Invincibles but with a greater separation of the two echeloned 
amidships turrets. To maintain the ten-gun battery, the two amidships turrets were to be triples 
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rather than twins.
11
 Fisher’s hopes for this ‘Fusion Type’ were short-lived, as ‘X4’ was rejected 
by other members of the ‘Fishpond’, specifically a ‘Committee appointed to consider the 
Questions of a Parent Vessel for Coastal Destroyers, the Utilisation of Mercantile Cruisers, and 
the Fusion Design of Armoured Vessel.’12 
Design ‘X4’ was considered too expensive (only three could be built for the cost of four 
Dreadnoughts) and despite the tactical value of a fast division of ‘Fusions’, the Committee felt 
‘this function is non-existent until we possess a sufficient superiority in modern Armoured 
Vessels over other countries.’13 For much the same reason, the Committee wished to build four 
21-knot battleships instead of more Invincibles, ‘any improvement meanwhile being in the 
direction of increased gun-fire.’14  It seems clear, in fact, that as far as the Committee was 
concerned, Dreadnought’s value lay primarily in her main armament: 
‘The great speed of the “Dreadnought” was essential because her armament is 
effective at a greater range then that of any vessels afloat, and it was of the first 
importance therefore that she should be able to choose and maintain her own 
desired range. But when vessels with the same or an equal class of gun are ranged 
against each other, speed, though desirable, cannot be assessed at so high a value 
as superior number of guns. … 
‘We consider … that it should be our first aim to add gun-fire to our Fleet before 
proceeding in the direction of greatly increased speed, and that the proposed 
“Fusion” ships are, for the moment, premature.’15 
 
 Built instead were the three Bellerophons, near-repeats of Dreadnought with some 
notable improvements such as the addition of a full-sized mainmast and a uniform anti-torpedo 
boat armament of 4-inchers in place of the mixed battery of the ‘Fusion’ design. The increase in 
size was due to the results of gunnery experiments against the old destroyer Skate which had 
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convinced the responsible parties that nothing smaller than the 4-inch quick-firer could be 
reliably counted upon to disable enemy surface torpedo craft.
16
 
The Committee which rejected Design ‘X4’ nonetheless left open the possibility that the 
design ‘might well be reconsidered’ after 1906 since it undoubtedly could ‘form a most useful 
addition to the Battle Fleet.’17 However the Committee thought that a new 13.5-inch gun might 
be ready for adoption by then, which would mean (though this was left unstated) that ‘X4’ would 
have to be completely recast. By late 1906, however, when the Admiralty was considering 
designs for the upcoming year’s programme, ‘X4’ seems to have been forgotten or abandoned, 
and the 13.5-inch gun was replaced by a longer 12-inch weapon.
18
 
Sir Philip Watts was given the preliminary requirements by the Admiralty in late 
November of 1906. He produced two sketch designs, marked ‘E’ and ‘F’. In an illustration of 
Fisher’s continued enthusiasm for the type, Design ‘E’ was an improved Invincible. Design ‘E’ 
was thirty-five feet longer than the Invincible in order to accommodate the new, longer main gun 
and to maintain a twenty-five knot top speed, and had somewhat thicker armour in places 
(notably a maximum side belt of nine inches versus six in the Invincible). Design ‘E’ was 
presented as an alternative to an earlier proposal, Design ‘D’, which was much the same except 
with a ten-inch maximum side belt and a twenty-four knot speed. Design ‘F’ was a battleship. It 
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retained the ‘X4’ turret arrangement of two twins and two triples and had much the same armour 
arrangement as ‘the new “Dreadnought” [i.e. Bellerophon]’.19 
These two designs were considered by the Board on December 11
th
, along with a set of 
seven other battleship proposals, Designs ‘J1’ through ‘J7’, which differed from Design ‘F’ in the 
details of their main armament. Of those ‘J’ variants where specific details are given, Design ‘J4’ 
carried eight 12-inch in four twins, Design ‘J6’ carried nine 12-inch in three centreline triples, 
and Design ‘J7’ carried twelve 12-inch in four centreline triples. Design ‘F’ was considered the 
best all-round design despite several of the ‘J’ variants having their own advantages, particularly 
‘J7’ with its heavier broadside (though no sketches survive it can be assumed ‘J7’ would have 
resembled the Russian Ganguts). Some reservation was expressed regarding the proposed triple 
turrets. During the Board meeting ‘[i]t was pointed out that the three gun-gunhouse could only be 
considered in an experimental stage, and if it should prove unsatisfactory the J6 design would be 
reduced to a six-gun Ship, while the ‘F’ design would be an eight-gun Ship.’20 
As work continued on Design ‘F’ the question of anti-torpedo boat armament resurfaced. 
American adoption of the 5-inch gun in their new dreadnought battleships led D.N.O. Jellicoe to 
ask D.N.C. Watts if such a weapon could be used in the new design in place of the planned 4-
inch battery.
21
 It was considered possible but difficult—there was no such British 5-inch weapon 
available for production, and Jellicoe settled for increasing the number of 4-inch weapons from 
sixteen to twenty.
22
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Very late in the day Design ‘F’ was abandoned. Cold feet at the Admiralty over the new 
triple turret were likely responsible. The D.N.C. was instructed to replace it with a lengthened 
Bellerophon, and the result was the St. Vincent class, which amongst other minor improvements 
had the 4-inch battery increased to eighteen guns.
23
 
 
Flotillas 
The initial hope for the 1906-1907 Programme was four armoured ships, twelve 
submarines, and seventeen destroyers—twelve Coastals and five Tribals.24 By 1907 it was clear 
that the previous ‘high-low mix’ of Tribals and Coastals was no longer practical. During the June 
7
th
 meeting of the Sea Lords and principal department heads to discuss the details of the 1908-09 
Estimates it was decided that a new type of destroyer should be built ‘of a type embodying 
superior endurance and sea-keeping qualities to the most recent German Destroyer.’ 25  The 
meeting suggested ordering twelve such ships, but by November the number had risen to sixteen. 
The Estimates Committee felt that ‘a large number of our older destroyers will become 
obsolescent before long, and that in modern boats, after 1910, we shall scarcely be holding our 
own with Germany.’ 26  They were also careful not to deprecate the value of the previous 
programmes: 
‘It has not been forgotten in making this calculation that the new coastal 
destroyers … are not only equal to a considerable portion of the German 
destroyers … but are even better adapted than the bigger and more powerful ocean-
going destroyers for certain specific services of an offensive nature … chiefly 
owing to their lighter draft of water and greater invisibility.’ 
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Having made that disclaimer, however, the Committee admitted ‘we must be prepared for a large 
destroyer programme twelve months hence.’27 The earliest British destroyers were now close to 
being worn out, and ordering sixteen destroyers in the current year’s programme would avoid a 
much larger order (more than two dozen) in the 1909-10 Estimates. This increase in destroyer 
procurement was obtained with no addition to the shipbuilding estimate by sacrificing one of the 
year’s planned armoured cruisers, with the remaining balance of the savings funding another 
small, fast cruiser intended to support flotilla work.
28
 
The resultant design marked a retreat from the extremes of the Tribal class back to 
something that was in essence an improved River type; an early sketch specification even 
referred to the design as a 30-knot River.
29
 The Home Fleet got a chance to influence the design 
of the new ships when Admiral Bridgeman forwarded a paper by Commodore (T) Lewis Bayly 
to the Admiralty, sections of which were relayed to the D.N.C.
30
 Bayly felt the duty of British 
destroyers were ‘[m]ost emphatically to destroy Enemy’s T.B.D.s. and T.Bs.’ To this end Bayly 
felt British destroyers should devote themselves entirely to this duty, and that attacks by them on 
enemy capital ships ‘would be criminal … because the enemy’s ships are doing exactly what the 
British Admiral wants[.]’31  Simply put, Bayly thought a Mahanian fleet action had a better 
chance of securing the destruction of the enemy battlefleet than a flotilla ambush. Bridgeman 
generally concurred with Bayly’s analysis, but at the Admiralty D.N.O. Bacon condemned the 
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submission as one ‘which if concurred in would, I submit, do much harm in the service.’32 D.N.I. 
Slade thought Bacon too alarmist, though he also thought Bayly went too far in deprecating 
destroyer attacks on enemy heavy units.
33
 
By June of 1908, the new specifications were ready. The resulting Beagle class were the 
last destroyers built by individual yards to a broad Admiralty specification. They were to be of 
roughly 850 tons displacement, to burn coal instead of oil (a step which increased their unit cost 
substantially), and make 27 knots speed.
34
 The Beagles set the basis for Royal Navy destroyer 
designs throughout the rest of the Prewar Era, with a notable and abortive exception in 1914. 
 
Return of the Small(er) Cruiser 
The controversy surrounding Fisher’s creation of the Dreadnought and the Invincibles is 
well known and often cited by historians. However, the interrelated abandonment of cruiser 
construction, which had provoked an equal storm of controversy at the time, is often overlooked. 
In fact the lapse in the Navy’s construction of cruisers—or ships not initially designated as 
cruisers but which would later be designated as such—was shorter than the controversy may 
make it appear. Only the 1905 and 1906 programmes saw no such ships ordered, and if the three 
Invincibles and the Swift are included in the totals, there was no cessation at all. An Admiralty 
report from 1905 shows that more Swifts were to ordered, one in the 1907 programme and two 
more in 1908.
35
 Furthermore, an improved edition of the Sentinel type scouts was under 
preparation for the 1905-6 Estimates before being abandoned.
36
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Neither of these proposals came to be, however there was a resumption of cruiser 
construction beginning in with the 1907-8 Estimates. At the same meetings where battleship 
Design ‘F’ was approved it was decided to build a single fast ‘Parent Ship for Destroyers’ at the 
Pembroke Royal Dockyard. Officially designated as an ‘Unarmoured Cruiser’, it was to be laid 
down in April 1907 for completion in 21 months.
37
 Fisher entrusted D.N.I. Ottley to produce a 
justification for such a ship. Ottley, doubtless under Fisher’s guidance, set out the ship’s raison 
d’être as follows: 
‘Those who would urge Great Britain to forthwith embark on a heavy expenditure 
for unarmoured cruisers of moderate speed appear oblivious of the fact that, even 
to-day, in her numerous flotilla of fast craft (scouts, destroyers, and torpedo-boats) 
this country already possesses the nucleus of a mosquito fleet, which … will at all 
events be able to press home its investigations off enemy’s ports fronting upon the 
Narrow Seas and German Ocean, with a well grounded confidence that, if chased, 
it may show a clean pair of heels to an enemy in superior force. This our existing 
unarmoured cruisers for the most part could not do, and consequently since they 
can neither fight nor run away, they would apparently be fulfilling a better destiny 
on the scrap heap than in the war fleet.’38 
 
The new unarmoured cruiser was to be a further addition to this ‘mosquito fleet’, capable of 
performing as a mother ship for the new Tribals and ‘suitable also for many of the multifarious 
duties’ currently undertaken by the older unarmoured cruisers Fisher had been campaigning 
against since he took office. 
The design chosen for building at Pembroke had been under development since April 
1906.
39
 In November 1907, work began in earnest on a ‘New Boadicea’ design to be built under 
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the forthcoming 1908-9 Estimates.  Early on, it had been decided that the new design should be 
larger than previous scouts owing to the continued German construction of small cruisers 
superior to existing British ships.
40
 Initial sketch specifications were for a 4,000 ton, 25 knot ship 
with a protective deck, armed with twelve 4-inch guns and carrying ‘50% more total of oil & 
coal than in Boadicea’.41 The growth in size, and especially the large provision of fuel, suggests 
that from the start the Admiralty wanted ships closer to the classic long-range cruiser type which 
had gone into abeyance in favour of cruisers designed for flotilla support duties. By January 
1908 additional suggestions from the Board had resulted in four designs named ‘A’ through 
‘D’.42 None satisfied the Board so a fifth design was drawn up, intermediate between Designs ‘B’ 
and ‘C’. The new Design ‘E’ displaced 4650 tons and carried two six-inch guns and ten four-inch 
guns plus a Maxim gun.
43
 This design was considered acceptable and became the Bristol class, 
and the increase in size and gunpower resulted in the type being redesignated as second-class 
protected cruisers.
44
 The Bristol design became the template for a long series of cruisers built for 
the Navy throughout the remainder of the Prewar Era.
45
 
 
Battles for the Estimates 
The kaleidoscope’s worth of designs described above were all predicated on the 
Admiralty receiving sufficient funds to actually build them. This rather obvious fact should once 
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again, if Fisher’s maxim that repetition is the key to success,46 underline the importance of 
matters financial. It has already been demonstrated how in 1906, for example, pressure for 
economies in naval expenditure were a major—perhaps the major—motive force behind the 
creation of the Home Fleet. From 1907 through 1909, however, the eternal war between the 
Admiralty and the economists entered a new and vicious stage. 
Having received First Lord Tweedmouth’s proposed Naval Estimates for 1907-1908, 
Chancellor Asquith wrote to the Prime Minister that they left him ‘much disquieted’ because they 
offered a further reduction from the previous Estimates of only £450,000. Asquith groused that 
‘this is a very poor & inadequate fulfilment of our pledge in regard to reduction of expenditure 
on fighting services.’47 Furthermore, 
‘I confess that, after a year's experience, I have very little confidence in the 
present lot of Sea Lords, who chop & change as the whims suit them. 
‘Our naval supremacy is so completely assured—having regard to the sketchy 
paper programmes & inferior shipbuilding resources of the other Powers—that 
there is no possible reason for allowing ourselves to be hastily misled into these 
nebulous & ambitious developments.’ 
 
In reply, and possibly remembering his experience during the 1884 ‘Truth about the Navy’ 
imbroglio,
48
 Campbell-Bannerman assured Asquith that ‘I entirely share your dislike & suspicion 
of the Navy prospects.’ He confessed, however, that there was ‘desperately little sound standing 
ground in all this!’49 David Lloyd George later floridly recalled that he fellow radicals felt 
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dreadnoughts ‘a piece of wanton and profligate ostentation.’ 50  Tweedmouth, however, was 
nonetheless prepared to stand by the Admiralty, and he rebuffed an overture from Campbell-
Bannerman to devise a new and more economical alternative to the Two-Power Standard. Such a 
move would ‘be sadly misunderstood’ since every government ‘for at least twenty-one years 
have accepted and acted up to the Two Power Standard and it is not to be lightly abandoned 
now.’51 
The Admiralty and Fisher especially were prepared to join battle on the issue. Fisher 
recruited Julian Corbett to the cause of defending the Dreadnought and Admiralty policy in 
general.
52
 The resulting works were only partially successful: ‘Corbett’s articles silenced the 
Admiralty’s loudest critics they did not convince their most dangerous foe, Chancellor 
Asquith.’53 
The problem simmered through the spring and summer, but in autumn it boiled over. 
Towards the end of the year a group of 138 backbenchers constituting a ‘Disarmament 
Committee’ presented a demand for heavy reductions in military and naval expenditure to the 
Prime Minister.
54
 Apparently in response to this, Sir George Murray, the Permanent Secretary of 
the Treasury, produced a memorandum for the Cabinet in which he pointed out that ‘unless some 
substantial reduction is made in the combined total of naval and military expenditure the 
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Government may be exposed to a serious attack by a considerable section of their own 
followers.’55 
Murray’s paper appeared just in time to frustrate Tweedmouth, who had been writing his 
own memorandum in response to the news that the German government had adopted a 
modification to their Navy Act which reduced the replacement period of their battleships from 
twenty-five years down to twenty.
56
 ‘I have just read Sir George Murray’s Paper’, Tweedmouth 
wrote testily, ‘I do not quite know what is the intention of the… Naval portion of the Paper.’57 
Although he did not deign to critique Murray’s paper in detail, Tweedmouth objected to Murray’s 
assumption that future construction would be undertaken along the lines of Dreadnought’s rapid 
and costly building time: ‘Except as a feat, it has nothing to recommend it.’58 Furthermore he 
declared that the Admiralty ‘may be relied on not to propose a new construction programme 
larger than is absolutely required to maintain our naval supremacy[.]’ 59 Nevertheless, although 
the destruction of the Russian battle fleet had left the Royal Navy with ‘full possession of a two-
Power standard strength for the next year or two,’ in the longer term the picture was less 
favourable. To maintain the Two Power Standard, defined by Tweedmouth as 10% superiority 
over the French and German fleets in 1920,
60
 would require the ordering and construction of 
forty-seven battleships between 1909 and 1920. If, as Tweedmouth felt was probable, the United 
States possessed the second largest battleship fleet in 1920 after Britain, even more than forty-
seven new battleships would be required.
61
 Although the Admiralty was content to include only a 
single new dreadnought in the upcoming 1908-9 Estimates, Tweedmouth’s calculations for the 
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needs of 1920 were a warning to his colleagues of ‘a need for a much increased programme of 
new construction in future years.’62 
The Admiralty, meanwhile, had been hard at work drawing up their programme for the 
1908-9 Estimates. Aside from the single battleship, the initial plans drawn up in June 1907 
comprised two small armoured cruisers carrying eight 9.2-inch guns, five improved Boadiceas, 
twelve destroyers and a half-million sterling worth of submarines.
63
 Shortly afterwards the 
programme was rearranged, sacrificing one of the armoured cruisers for a sixth Boadicea and 
four additional destroyers.
64
 As Nicholas Lambert notes, neither the Chancellor nor the rest of the 
Cabinet could honestly ‘accuse the Admiralty of profligacy.’65 In fact, had the cost of naval 
works (see Chapter 3) not been included in the Estimates, the Admiralty would have been able to 
claim reduction on the previous year.
66
 In addition, several important men at the Admiralty were 
unhappy with the new programme to say the least. Edmond Slade, the D.N.I., was horrified, 
moaning to Julian Corbett that ‘They say that we ought to lay down only one battleship this next 
year, not four as I was told.’67 
It is unlikely Slade’s feelings would have mattered for very much had he expressed them 
outside his letter. The other members of the Cabinet, and especially Asquith, were not in a 
magnanimous mood. The Chancellor was scrambling to find sufficient money for the upcoming 
Old Age Pensions Bill.
68
 Inevitably, Asquith looked to an assumed peace dividend to provide a 
solution. When Tweedmouth indicated the 1908-9 Estimates might include a more than £2 
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million increase over the previous year’s Estimates, Asquith declared that as Chancellor ‘I cannot 
and will not be responsible for submitting such estimates to the House of Commons.’69 
Soon thereafter the Cabinet dropped a bombshell on the Admiralty. On November 26
th
, 
Tweedmouth was informed that the estimates ‘must be completely revised with the view of 
securing that the estimated expenditure on the Navy for 1908-9 shall not exceed the figures of 
the last year.’70 Furthermore, the Cabinet had decided that ‘no Estimate for a new Dreadnought 
need be included in the Estimates for 1908-9.’ Tweedmouth seems to have panicked at this, 
which forced Fisher to draw up a compromise proposal that would reduce the increase on the 
1907-8 Estimates (via some creative accounting and deferred payments) to £560,000.
71
 However 
these would only be temporary reductions and eventually ‘the Treasury would still have to cough 
up an extra half million.’72 
Fisher may have been initially willing to compromise, but the other Sea Lords were not 
so obliging, and quickly brought Fisher around to their views. Collectively they produced a blunt 
memorandum for Tweedmouth announcing that ‘we have got to face largely increased Naval 
Estimates in order to preserve our Naval supremacy, and it seems a necessity that we should 
adhere to what really may be characterised as a very modest shipbuilding programme for next 
year’.73 Furthermore 
‘Although it is quite true that our preponderance in Battleships at the present 
might justify the omission of the solitary Battleship proposed, yet with the full 
knowledge and absolute certainty (now afforded by the German programme just 
issued) of having to commence a large Battleship programme in 1909-10, it 
would be most unbusinesslike, and indeed disastrous, to close down the armour 
plate industry of this country by the entire cessation of Battleship building. It 
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would similarly disastrous to abruptly stop the manufacture of heavy gun 
mountings, which the omission the Battleship would also involve.’74 
 
The ‘right course’, in fact, would be to authorize two Dreadnoughts in 1908 instead of just one. 
In summary, ‘it is inadmissible to have a less programme than that carefully discussed and 
decided upon by the Board of Admiralty, and the Estimates as a whole do not admit of any 
further reduction consistent with the fighting efficiency of the Fleet and its readiness for war.’75 
As additional fortification the Sea Lords told Tweedmouth they were prepared to resign en bloc 
over the issue, so it was not without reason that Slade told Corbett that ‘the Govt & the Admiralty 
are at daggers drawn.’76 
There now came Tweedmouth’s finest hour. Buoyed by his service advisors’ adamancy, 
Tweedmouth fought back in Cabinet as ferociously as he ever had. Just a few days after the Sea 
Lords presented their memorandum, Esher told the King ‘Tweedmouth was on the point of 
resigning the Admiralty.’77 Campbell-Bannerman sent in Sir Edward Grey—regarded by both 
sides as independent—to look for reductions with a small committee. Unfortunately for the 
economists, Grey found nothing,
78
 and Tweedmouth privately informed Grey that ‘I cannot hold 
out any hope that the minimum can be cut down any lower by the Board of Admiralty as at 
present constituted.’ 79  Campbell-Bannerman gave way and endorsed the original proposed 
estimates.
80
 Before the Admiralty could celebrate, the Prime Minister suffered a massive and 
ultimately fatal heart attack and Asquith became deputy leader.
81
 Spurred on by the Radicals, 
Asquith counterattacked. 
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Fisher was called to the House of Commons by Louis Harcourt—and furthermore told to 
enter through the Ladies’ entrance—where the latter ordered the Admiralty to reduce the 
Estimates by £1,340,000.
82
 When Fisher protested that the Estimates had ‘already been approved 
by the Cabinet and signed’, Harcourt ‘then adopted a tone which was arrogant and almost uncivil, 
intimating plainly that either five Members of the Cabinet, or the Board of Admiralty, would 
have to resign.’83 Fisher declared the Sea Lords would go and leave the Government with the 
difficult task of rebuilding the Board, Harcourt implied that Lord Charles Beresford would ‘at 
once’ agree to be Fisher’s replacement, at which Fisher stormed out. Lloyd George and Churchill 
at a subsequent meeting told Fisher much the same ‘only in a more conciliatory style.’ At the 
mention of Beresford becoming First Sea Lord, Fisher remarked that Lord Charles would ‘sell’ 
them within three months’ time. Fisher also dangled an offer of compromise that the 1908-9 
Estimates could be cut provided the deficit was covered by the adoption of one or more 
Supplementary Estimates later on. 
Tweedmouth found the supplementary estimate proposal appealing, and subsequently 
wrote to Asquith after an evening Cabinet meeting on February 10
th
 that, 
‘I cannot go to bed without frankly telling you that the only condition on which I 
can consent to a further reduction of the naval estimates of 1908-9 is that a written 
engagement should be given me that I shall be allowed a supplementary estimate 
of £400,000 or such smaller sums as may be necessary to complete the sum 
required efficiently to carry out the Service for the year 1908-9.’84 
 
Immediately after this, Asquith and the Cabinet ‘called the Admiralty’s bluff’, and Tweedmouth 
was told that only a £900,000 increase would be accepted.
85
 Tweedmouth grumbled that he was 
                                                 
82
 Esher journal entry, 7 February 1908, ESHR 2/11, Esher MSS. 
83
 The five Cabinet members, Fisher later determined, were Lloyd George, Harcourt, McKenna, Burns, and possibly 
Crewe. 
84
 Tweedmouth to Asquith, 10 February 1908, f. 180, Add MS 41231, Campbell-Bannerman MSS. 
85
 Nicholas Lambert, op. cit. p. 141. 
189 
 
‘sorry I was not told … sooner nor … consulted’.86 The First Lord had little choice but to accept, 
but defiantly insisted that ‘I ought to receive the frank assurance of my colleagues that if 
supplementary estimates are made necessary by the requirements of the Service of the Navy to 
the amount of £400,000 or less, I should have their support without consideration[.]’87 The First 
Lord further complained of ‘a very cavalier manner of treating a colleague and the whole Board 
of Admiralty except the financial secy not to consult them before so grand a matter was 
decided.’88 
Neither Campbell-Bannerman nor Tweedmouth saw the affair through to its conclusion. 
Like his political superior, Tweedmouth was a sick man. The illness was it seems quite literally 
in his mind—possibly a brain tumour.89 Whatever the cause, the First Lord became increasingly 
erratic in behaviour. Asquith later recounted to Venetia Stanley that Tweedmouth’s decay was ‘a 
tragic case, for he was one of the sanest & most high-spirited of mankind. I shall never forget my 
bewilderment when, in the course of a longish tête-à-tête in the Cabinet room, it gradually 
dawned upon me that he was off his head.’90 He used stronger language at the time, calling 
Tweedmouth ‘a “raving lunatic”’ in conversation with the Chief Whip.91 Tweedmouth was duly 
‘kicked upstairs’ to the position of Lord President of the Council. It was a political death 
sentence, and Tweedmouth himself would succumb to illness a few months later. 
The fact that successive Liberal First Lords, and especially those known as ‘economists’, 
would continually side with their own department over Cabinet desires for budgetary 
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concessions is an interesting phenomenon, especially so considering how junior most of the First 
Lords were in terms of standing within the party. To a certain extent Fisher and his fellow 
members of the Admiralty deserve credit for supplying ammunition for the Ministerial guns, but 
that cannot be the sole reason for the Admiralty’s relative success at fending off many of the 
more drastic actions demanded by the Treasury. Nor can the skills of the First Lords provide the 
answer, since the Treasury was represented by equally skilled politicians such as Asquith and 
David Lloyd George. 
 The real reason for the Admiralty’s success in budget battles was a combination of public 
willingness to pay the Admirals’ Bill and the strong position this gave to First Lords even in the 
face of great pressure from within the cabinet. In retrospect, the building programme described in 
the Cawdor Memorandum had never truly been departed from. The proscribed four per year 
minimum was held to by both Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith, as can be shown by the 
following table: 
1906-7 1907-8 1908-9 1909-10 
Bellerophon St. Vincent Neptune Hercules 
Temeraire Collingwood Indefatigable Colossus 
Superb Vanguard  Lion 
   Princess Royal 
   Orion 
   Conqueror 
   Monarch 
   Thunderer 
 
Simple arithmetic shows the resolution: 3 + 3 + 2 + 8 ÷ 4 = 4. Temporary cuts to capital ship 
construction in sympathy to the political necessities the Liberals faced ultimately this had little 
effect on actual construction in the long term. In fairness, however, to those who criticized the 
reductions in construction, it had been a great struggle simply to maintain this minimum building 
tempo. 
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Four? Six? Eight? 
Writing on the announcement in Parliament of the 1908-9 Estimates, The Times declared, 
‘[t]he most favourable verdict which the country can be expected to pronounce on such a 
programme is “Not guilty, but don’t do it again,” with especial stress laid on the latter clause of 
the sentence and many reserves in regard to the former.’92 Others were less restrained, with the 
Daily Mail living up to reputation by asking whether Britain’s maritime supremacy would be 
sacrificed to provide old-age pensions.
93
 During the debate in the Commons, Balfour raised the 
question of ‘whether in the latter months of 1911 there will not be thirteen ships of the 
“Dreadnought” and “Invincible” types belonging to Germany and only twelve belonging to Great 
Britain’ due to possible increases in the German building programme. Asquith, by now de facto 
Prime Minister owing to Campbell-Bannerman’s terminal condition, replied that while he 
doubted this would be the case, but that ‘without the faintest hesitation’ if there was ‘a 
probability or a reasonable probability of the German programme being carried out’ as Balfour’s 
figures suggested, ‘we should deem it our duty to provide not only for a sufficient number of 
ships, but for such a date for laying down those ships that at the end of 1911 the superiority of 
Germany which the right hon. Gentleman foreshadows would not be an actual fact.’94 
A few weeks after this exchange, which Marder called ‘the high point of the navy 
debates’,95 Campbell-Bannerman finally resigned and the now-Prime Minister Asquith put his 
hopes for economies with the young barrister and relatively junior Cabinet member Reginald 
McKenna. Asquith and McKenna had worked together in the Treasury until the latter replaced 
Augustine Birrell as President of the Board of Education in February 1907. The choice of 
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McKenna was an indication that Asquith had no intention of letting up on his push for defence 
economies, for McKenna was regarded by the Prime Minister as a fellow ‘economist’ and was 
expected to succeed where Tweedmouth had failed. Towards this end even Fisher was considered 
expendable, as the Admiral later recalled to John Leyland that McKenna was ‘the man who on 
succeeding Tweedmouth was expected to kick me out!’96 It must therefore have been a great 
shock to Asquith when McKenna ‘went native’ as so many previous First Lords had done.97 
Any mutual suspicion between Fisher and McKenna died quickly and Fisher soon wrote 
to McKenna ‘You & I cannot have secrets from each other about the Navy’.98 The two men 
formed a formidable administrative partnership that grew into genuine friendship. Even after 
Fisher’s departure and McKenna’s sacking after Agadir the two remained in touch. 
If he ever seriously had a mandate to remove Fisher, McKenna would likely have come 
to the realization that Fisher, however unpopular in certain circles, was the only man who had 
any notion of preserving some sense of fiscal discipline, and the alternatives were politically 
worse. Beresford was nominally a Conservative Unionist, but was a political wild card at best. In 
any case there were no credible grounds in early 1908 for dismissing Fisher apart from a tenuous 
case that he had already served two-and-a-half years as First Sea Lord and thus was nearing the 
end of his traditional term. This was a non-starter, and Fisher would later explain that there was 
no traditional term limit for First Sea Lords anyway. Fisher added—sans any subtlety 
whatsoever—that ‘the real limit is the period of cordial harmony between the First Lord & First 
Sea Lord. There is no other condition.’99 
                                                 
96
 Fisher to John Leyland, 1 February 1911, in Marder, FGDN, ii, p. 356. 
97
 Professor Grove uses this term to describe George Ward Hunt, First Lord 1874-1877. Grove, Royal Navy from 
1815, p. 57. 
98
 Fisher to McKenna, 16 May 1908, f. 7, MCKN 3/4, McKenna MSS. 
99
 Fisher to McKenna, 28 October 1908, f. 2, MCKN 6/1, McKenna MSS. 
193 
 
The change in First Lord brought about a new and even more hostile between Beresford 
and the Admiralty. Beresford’s correspondence with Lord Tweedmouth, even during his most 
violent disagreements with the Admiralty, had always been respectful and in places even 
genuinely friendly—Beresford’s letter of condolence to Tweedmouth after his mother’s death 
was written with genuine sympathy.
100
 Perhaps this was on account of their both being titled 
aristocrats. Whatever the case, Beresford’s treatment of McKenna can only be described as 
exceptionally hostile, with the disclaimer that much of it occurred during or after the most bitter 
moments of the feud. For instance, McKenna is singled out for practically all the blame in 
Beresford’s 1912 screed The Betrayal.101 
In May 1908 Fisher offered McKenna a solution that would dispose of Beresford and the 
related criticisms of the Home Fleet. In two proposed notices (one for Beresford and the other for 
the press) Fisher stated—only partially disingenuously—that the goal was the further 
development of the Home Fleet. To this end the Channel Fleet and the First Cruiser Squadron 
would be absorbed into the Home Fleet, with four of the Channel Fleet battleships being 
transferred to the Nore Division of the Home Fleet. In addition the Home Fleet would become 
the senior command, with the Channel Fleet reverting to the older name Channel Squadron, with 
its commanding officer being termed a Vice-Admiral Commanding instead of a Commander-in-
Chief. This change was set to take place after the summer manoeuvres concluded in July.
102
 
Fisher’s proposal, whatever its genuine intentions regarding the Home Fleet’s 
development, demonstrate that by mid-1908 the fighting between Beresford and Fisher had 
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become general within the service. Admiral Sir Edmund Poë told George King-Hall that ‘Sir 
John had destroyed the camaraderie of the Service and … Officers were all partisans of Sir John 
or Lord Charles Beresford and would not speak to each other.’103 
For Fisher’s part, he was determined to stay in control to the bitter end. His secretary 
wrote to Captain Ernest Troubridge of the First Sea Lord that: 
‘His view is that he is not going to be blackmailed or driven out by Armstrong & 
company. At one time he fully intended to have gone this October, until the 
Armstrong campaign & the Beresford inquiry started. Now he says that nothing 
will induce him to move until the day he is compelled to do so, viz 25 January 
1911. His is prepared to be kicked out, if necessary, but not to cave in to the 
campaign to make him leave voluntarily.’104 
 
Meanwhile Fisher and McKenna had finally planned to merge the Channel and Home Fleets.  
The plan was that Beresford would go ashore, May would take command of the Home Fleet, and 
the Channel Fleet would disappear.
105
 As Nicholas Lambert wrote, the end of the Channel Fleet 
was ‘an ignominious end to his distinguished albeit checkered [sic] career’. Worse, it was ‘also 
the death of his life-long ambition to become First Sea Lord.’106 To no one’s surprise, Beresford 
was not prepared to go down without a fight. 
 
Inquiry 
The Admiralty enjoyed only a brief respite after Beresford went ashore. Soon, despite 
writing to Troubridge that as an active naval officer it would be ‘impossible’ to discuss his future 
plans openly, Beresford resumed plotting the downfall of Fisher and his works.
107
 He began by 
writing to his party chief Balfour.
108
 Balfour was torn; he was still loyal to Fisher, yet he could 
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not afford to antagonize Beresford at a critical moment for the Conservative Party. 
Unsurprisingly, Balfour made no promises to the Admiral but did however suggest writing to 
Asquith.
109
 After a March 30
th
 tête-à-tête with Asquith failed to achieve the desired results,
110
 
Beresford submitted a lengthy j’accuse to him in April.111 Predictably, the Home Fleet came in 
for censure, Beresford claiming that during his time as C.-in-C. Channel Fleet ‘the Fleets in 
Home Waters have not been organized in readiness for war, and they are not organized in 
readiness for war, now, to-day.’112 Beresford continued on to explain how the fleet should be 
arranged: 
‘One large homogeneous fleet, complete in all units—battleships, armoured 
cruisers, protected cruisers, scouts, destroyers, mine-ships, mine-clearers, and 
auxiliaries, trained under the orders of one Commander-in-chief, maintained at 
sea, and in full commission; the administration of the various divisions being 
intrusted [sic] to the Admirals in command of them.’113 
 
Asquith had, as a result of a previous meeting with Beresford, been so put off that he wanted to 
‘cashier’ him, according to a confession he made to his wife.114 Beresford, naturally, had thought 
that particular meeting a success.
115
 This time, however, Beresford indulged in a degree of 
blackmail, essentially threatening to go public with his allegations if the government did not 
announce an enquiry by April 14
th
.
116
 Asquith went to McKenna, suggesting that the matter could 
be handled by a Committee of Imperial Defence sub-committee which would provide both 
cachet and, more importantly, discretion.
117
 Asquith took this advice, but ignored a further 
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suggestion that the sub-committee included ‘two distinguished admirals – say, Sir Arthur Wilson 
and Admiral [Sir George] Neville.’118 
 When he learned of the details, Fisher let loose his frustration in a letter to Ponsonby, 
moaning ‘it is almost past belief how Beresford has been pandered to.’ Especially galling was 
how Asquith had, in Fisher’s view, hemmed and hawed on the members of the inquiry and its 
scope: 
‘The Prime Minister without consulting the Admiralty decides on Sir A. Wilson 
being a Member of the Committee of Enquiry – a very good decision – but 
Beresford objects to him and he is taken off the Committee. Esher is especially 
invited to serve on the Committee at a personal interview by the Prime Minister 
and is appointed – Beresford objects and Esher’s appointment is cancelled. 
Beresford summons as witnesses my own personal staff at Admiralty to cross-
examine them as to the way I conduct business, and this is to be allowed. Other 
officers in the Admiralty are called by him for a similar purpose. What has this 
got to do with the fighting efficiency of the Fleet and its readiness for war? 
Nothing whatever! But the object is to discredit me – he won’t – but that has 
nothing to do with the licence given him.’119 
 
Fisher had reason to worry, but perhaps not as much as he feared. Beresford wrote to numerous 
officers asking them to appear as witnesses, and the response from the majority were at the very 
least unenthusiastic. Sir A. Berkeley Milne, Beresford’s successor in command of what was now 
the Second Division of the Home Fleet, wrote back that ‘Considering my present position, I 
think it would be inadvisable to name me as a witness before the Court.’120 A list in one of the 
Cabinet Office files relating the Enquiry shows that, aside from Milne, Beresford proposed to 
call numerous Captains and several prominent Admiralty civil servants.
121
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A more helpful response came from one of Beresford’s former battleship captains, John 
de Robeck, to which Beresford wrote a long reply while the enquiry was underway.
122
 De 
Robeck’s letter concerned three of Beresford’s questions: 
‘Whether during the period 15th Apl 09, to 24th Mch 09 the Fleets in Home waters 
have been organized in readiness for war and are so organized today. 
‘Whether during the same period there was such a deficiency in Home waters in 
small craft and destroyers as to constitute a grave weakness. 
‘Whether the types of British Torpedo Craft were unsuitable for the purposes 
required.’123 
 
 De Robeck submitted that as far as destroyers were concerned, they had not been 
properly trained to work with the cruisers that would support them off the German coast and that 
there were too few of them in any case. Furthermore the fleet’s Reserve Divisions were too 
undermanned to be ‘properly trained and organized for war’. This analysis, however, was based 
on de Robeck’s assumption that ‘the British Naval Policy in the event of War with Germany will 
be the same as in the wars of the Past. That is for the Naval Forces of this country to be off the 
Enemy’s coast and to endeavour to fight and destroy their opponents whenever opportunity 
offers.’ 
 Whatever the truth of the Home Fleet’s condition, it is inarguable that this was never the 
real issue at stake.
124
 Beresford let slip his real objective to Sir Charles Ottley: 
‘So far as he himself [Beresford] was concerned the main object was to drive the 
present Board of the Admiralty out of office.’125 
 
The first meeting quickly went off the rails when Beresford tried to imply Fisher and his 
supporters were threatening Beresford’s witnesses, a charge which just as quickly proved the 
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result of a misunderstanding between said witness, Assistant D.N.I. Captain Arthur Hulbert, and 
his immediate superior, Rear-Admiral Bethell.
126
 Then when the committee returned to its actual 
subject Asquith had to coax Beresford along: 
‘22. MR. ASQUITH: You are prepared to deal with each head seriatim, are you? 
LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: Yes. 
23. And to substantiate what you say here under each head? 
LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: Yes. 
24. MR. ASQUITH: I suppose that would be the most convenient way of taking 
it?’127 
 
This exchange—during which it is easy to imagine the Prime Minister sighing inwardly—was an 
ill omen, and recalls a comment of Esher’s on Asquith’s manner of overseeing meetings. In 
Esher’s estimation, Asquith was ‘‘a timid man’, ‘not imposing as a Chairman’, and lacked ‘some 
element of character; perhaps decision.’128 In fairness to Asquith, Beresford was so discursive a 
speaker it is hard to imagine another chairman doing better under the circumstances. 
In any case, Beresford soon showed he was staggeringly unprepared. On the subject of 
the 1907 War Plans he repeated his old accusation that they were useless and ‘absolutely 
theoretical’ and ‘had nothing to do with fighting or with war.’129 He then complained of plans 
listing forces by squadrons instead of individual ships! 
‘I went to the First Sea Lord, and I remember throwing the plan on the table and 
saying to him at the time, “… I throwing the “I want to know where you want me 
to go, and what you want me to do; and it is no use saying ‘the sixth cruiser 
squadron’, for I have got to put down on Sunday morning what are the ships in 
the sixth cruiser squadron, so that if one is away I can fill up her place.’130 
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Shortly after this, Beresford failed to remember Julian Corbett’s name, referring to him as ‘a Mr. 
Corbett or Corlett, or a gentleman with a name something like that’.131 When Minister of War 
Haldane tried to elucidate Beresford’s criticisms of the war plans, he was rewarded with a long 
rambling reply complaining about everything from poor strategy to Fisher’s scrapping policy to 
an attempt—probably for Haldane’s benefit—at drawing an analogy between battleships, 
cruisers, and torpedo craft with cavalry, infantry, and artillery.
132
 Eventually, and after varied 
abuse was levelled against the Home Fleet, Asquith asked what Beresford would have preferred. 
Beresford replied: 
‘I want three divisions of battleships, and there should be 8 ships in each division. 
I want the component parts of cruisers and catchers [destroyers] with those 
divisions. I would have two divisions, which will give me my 60 ships always 
together, with the 60 ships perfectly ready to meet whatever any neighbouring 
country can send over. The idea of [placing the fleet’s wartime base on] the east 
coast is very good if you had an east coast port, but you have got no port there. 
Portland is the very best port in the world. … There is no other place where you 
can keep your men ready like Portland. If Portland was in Wales it would not very 
much matter, if you had that fleet ready; because you are never going to have such 
a very sudden attack, and there is a fleet in being of 60 ships. The third division, 
or one of the divisions, could be away with the Admiral, together with the cruisers 
and some of the catchers, the Admiral drilling them and reporting to his 
Commander-in-Chief what he has done. Then he comes back and you send away 
another division.’133 
 
Further questioning elicited that each of the three divisions would have its own Admiral, and the 
nucleus crew ships would be a reserve force and source of replacement ships as the fully-
commissioned ships went in for overhauls and refits. Each of the three divisions would also have 
its own attached cruiser squadron and destroyers.
134
 This was more or less where the first 
meeting ended except for a revisiting of the matter of Captain Hulbert by Admiral Bethell. 
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The next few meetings covered largely the same ground, and the various members of the 
committee began showing signs of irritation: ‘Doubtless Grey and Morley, with major 
departments of state to run, were wondering just how long all this was going to take.’135 During 
the fourth meeting a running argument over Beresford’s time served at sea erupted and continued 
off and on over several meetings.
136
 Of more relevant concern was Beresford’s charge at the third 
meeting that current British destroyers were no good for work in the North Sea, Beresford 
considering them all bad sea boats except for the River class.
137
 The 27-knotters were totally 
unsuitable and the 30-knotters, which still formed much of the Navy’s destroyer force, would be 
all worn out after a week of scouting work on the German coasts.
138
 What Beresford would have 
made of the Admiralty’s reversion to building destroyers which were greatly improved 
descendants of the Rivers can only be guessed at. 
Beresford’s own statement ended, mercifully, during the eighth session, and McKenna 
was finally able to counterattack. Asquith, by now as sick of the whole affair as anyone, 
imploringly asked ‘Will you proceed, Mr. McKenna?’139 The First Lord began with an obvious 
dig at Beresford’s wandering testimony by proposing ‘to confine myself strictly to the terms of 
reference.’140  Despite this it took some time to broach the Home Fleet in detail. The most 
interesting example occurred during the fifteenth and final meeting. Beresford claimed that if 
either Bridgeman or May were present: 
‘I am satisfied that if I had asked them the question, “Is it the fact that the Home 
Fleet was ready as a striking force for instant action without an hour’s delay, as 
every minute may be of vital value?” they would have said, “No,” because it was 
not fact.’141 
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Shortly afterwards Sir Francis Bridgeman give his evidence, which more or less directly refuted 
Beresford’s claims. Preferring to testify in person ‘instead of writing’, the former C.-in-C. Home 
Fleet was there to respond to Beresford’s claim that he thought his command unready for instant 
action.
142
 Bridgeman told the enquiry members: 
‘I do not think that justified. I never made such a statement, that it was not ready. It 
was ready. Of course, no fleet can be ready like an electric car on the line; but 
under modern conditions the Nore Division of the Home Fleet was certainly the 
most ready fleet I have ever known.’143 
 
Asquith enquired further whether ‘if the question Lord Charles suggests were sent to you, you 
would say it was ready?’144 Bridgeman replied 
‘I should say that the Nore Division, which consisted of 12 modern armoured 
ships and 24 destroyers, with their attendant craft and submarines, which was the 
striking force, was as immediately ready as it is possible for a fleet to be under 
modern conditions.’145 
 
Bridgeman also confirmed to Haldane that mobilization of the Home Fleet’s nucleus crew ships 
at five hours’ notice was possible, and had indeed been done under his command. In his 
estimation, Bridgeman thought ‘the nucleus crew ships could have been mobilized, even as a 
surprise mobilization, in, say, eight hours.’146 When asked by Asquith if he thought nucleus crew 
ships would require six months to work up for active duty, Bridgeman’s response was ‘Good 
gracious, No! The nucleus-crew ships with their three-fifths crews were splendid. Look at their 
firing. You have only got to look at the way they hit the target.’147 
 Other of Beresford’s claims fell apart just as quickly. When Beresford claimed there were 
just six battleships out of the Channel Fleet’s fourteen ready for battle on September 23th, 1908, 
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this was short of the truth, since two of Beresford’s battleships were detached on gun calibration 
work on Beresford’s own orders (and which ‘could have rejoined his flag at any time on receipt 
of a telegram’) and three more were in dockyard hands—two on one hour’s notice, another on 
one day’s notice—thus ‘making a total of 11 battleships of the Channel Fleet available if an 
ultimatum had been directed to this country to reply within 24 hours.’148 Even in gunpower this 
force was considered, possessing sixty-eight heavy guns versus the sixty-four possessed on paper 
by the Hochseeflotte.
149
 
 
‘We Want Eight!’ 
 Beresford's case was not made, although the open controversy laid the foundations of 
Fisher's eventual departure the following year.
150
 The Service was just too divided. Nonetheless 
Fisher had one last victory. A political furore had resulted from the 1908-9 Estimates both inside 
and outside the Cabinet; the drama surrounding the 1909-10 Estimates surpassed it in every 
important respect. 
On arrival McKenna had evidently tried to carry out a thorough investigation of current 
policies, and Fisher quickly apologized for the resultant blizzard of documents: ‘I have 
bombarded you with papers but you told me too!’ 151  Amongst these was a report by the 
Controller on the ability of Britain to construct ‘large armoured vessels’ which set the assumed 
maximum sustainable production capability of the British shipbuilders at ‘six large vessels … in 
two years from giving the order’.152 Between this and other discussions, Fisher and the rest of the 
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Sea Lords were able to secure McKenna’s consent to include ‘FOUR Dreadnoughts, AND IF 
NECESSARY SIX’ in the 1909-10 Estimates.153 
Outside the Admiralty there was already suspicion—and in some cases, hope—that the 
next year’s programme would be greatly increased. McKenna had barely consented to the Sea 
Lords’ proposal for a quartet when an article in J.A. Spender’s Westminster Gazette on the 
German and British naval programmes ventured ‘to throw out the assumption that we shall lay 
down at least six “Dreadnoughts” next year.’154 The responsible correspondent was, as Fisher 
emphasized to McKenna,
155
 no death-or-glory militarist—he was in fact the pro-German J.L. 
Bashford, who had rarely missed an opportunity to declare for Germany’s generally pacific 
intentions.
156
 Meanwhile Archibald Hurd wrote concernedly that the situation vis-à-vis the Two 
Power Standard ‘may become critical unless foresight is shown’.157 
Under these circumstances it was unsurprising that the Admiralty would depend on their 
received intelligence during the subsequent process of hashing out the new building programme. 
The intelligence obtained by the Admiralty regarding German intentions was not encouraging. 
Furthermore, this intelligence was more detailed and of better quality than has been sometimes 
claimed.
158
 Early in 1908 the British naval attaché in Berlin, Captain Philip Dumas, wrote in his 
annual report summarizing the Kaiserliche Marine’s development during 1907 that there was 
popular agitation for continuing the current four battleship tempo past its planned termination in 
1911, though he noted that these efforts had been received with ill will by Tirpitz and the German 
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Navy League. Nevertheless, Dumas ‘[thought] it likely that some such programme will shortly 
be brought forward as the ideal to be arrived at instead of the present one of 38 battleships and 
20 armoured cruisers.’159 
Of particular interest to the Admiralty was German’s shipbuilding capacity. As one of the 
underpinnings of British naval supremacy was the efficiency of its shipbuilding industry, the 
growth of Germany’s industry was naturally looked upon with alarm. Dumas’ predecessor, 
Captain Reginald Allenby, had estimated in 1905 that German could build a maximum of nine 
battleships, three armoured cruisers, thirty-four small cruisers and ninety-nine destroyers with a 
building time of two years and nine months. The next year Dumas reported a similar figure: 
Germany could build six Dreadnoughts in two years.
160
 While actual German warship 
construction proceeded at a rather more sedate pace, the attachés’ estimates suggested that 
Germany had the ability to greatly accelerate their rate of naval expansion. Britain had put 
Dreadnought into water in a year, was it unreasonable to believe Germany might accomplish a 
similar feat? D.N.I. Slade thought so, writing in mid-1908 that when the expansion of the Krupp 
heavy gun factory was complete Germany could possibly double their shipbuilding output 
without outpacing demand for heavy guns and mountings, thus enabling a maximum German 
building tempo of eight or nine heavy ships every two and a half to three years. This compared 
worryingly with an estimated British maximum tempo of six heavy ships every two years, even 
after Britain’s lead in capital ship construction was taken into account.161 
Of course, these were paper figures, drawn up without account of all the things which can 
hobble industrial production. As long as there were no signs or evidence of German 
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acceleration—either actual or implied—there was no trouble. Unfortunately, such evidence 
began appearing in late 1908. Dumas heard whispers of this just prior to his departure from 
Berlin at the end of July, probably from the same sources as the U.S. Navy’s attaché, Reginald 
Belknap.
162
 Fisher reported to McKenna in mid-August, likely on the basis of Dumas’s report 
that the German navy was ‘going to lay down an extra Dreadnought to take advantage of 
slackness of work in German Dockyards.’ Fisher made no mention of acceleration, or of 
certainty regarding the report, instead merely commenting that ‘By November we ought to know 
the truth of this.’163 Worrying information continued to trickle in, and on October 21st the new 
naval attaché, Captain Herbert Heath, reported that while the next year’s estimates had not been 
published, ‘there seems no doubt that the contracts for two of the battleships for that year’s 
programme have already been placed.’164  Admiralty suspicions were further aroused by the 
persistent stonewalling Heath encountered in gaining admission to German shipyards such as the 
Schichau works at Danzig where one of the suspected acceleration battleships was build built. 
With evident frustration, Heath observed in May 1909 that it ‘would have been interesting to see 
how far she had advanced’.165 
The Admiralty was inclined to take these reports seriously. Slade fretted in his diary that 
‘Germany intends to lay down 8 ships between now and next Christmas year’.166 The Fourth Sea 
Lord, Sir Alfred Winsloe, wrote privately to Sir Henry Jackson, now commanding the Third 
Cruiser Squadron, that: 
‘There has lately been enormous activity in Germany. The Govt have been 
lending money to contractors to advance the ships before the contract time and 
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they also gave the orders in Nov for the ships which should be laid down in 
March next, thereby advancing them by 4 months. … They have also made 
enormous purchases of Nickel for armour[.] 
‘We now calculate that by April 1912 she will have 17 Dreadnoughts completed 
and if she were to go on again next year as this, it would be possible for her to 
have 21.’167 
 
By this time the Admiralty were in the midst of deciding their own building programme 
for the coming year. At the start of November, Fisher told Esher that the Admiralty was 
considering laying down ‘4, perhaps 5, ships.’ Esher thought that if the Admiralty consented to 
less than six, ‘you will be condemned on all sides ! No quarter !’168 Subsequent events show the 
Admiralty took this advice seriously. 
While the Admiralty was convinced of the danger, they would face an uphill fight to 
convince the Cabinet. Asquith reminded McKenna in July 1908 that ‘I have for a long time been 
growing vy skeptical [sic] (in the matter of shipbuilding) as to the whole “Dreadnought” policy.’ 
The Prime Minister wished to hear McKenna’s views on future shipbuilding ‘for the next few 
years’ now that the new First Lord had ‘surveyed the whole situation from inside’, and so as to 
leave McKenna in no doubt as to gravity of the issue, Asquith ended his letter thusly: ‘There is 
much money in it, & more than money.’169 In addition to pressure from inside the Cabinet, the 
Radicals were still determined to avoid increased defence expenditure: a repeat of the 1907 
petition for armaments reduction gained even more signatures in 1908.
170
 Harcourt denounced 
concerns over Britain’s naval position as the ‘diseased imagination of inferior minds.’171 The 
stage was thus set from the beginning for a contentious fight in December 1908. 
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The Cabinet had already discussed the Two Power Standard at their meeting on 
November 25
th
, about which Asquith informed the King that requirements ‘are practically 
satisfied under existing conditions by the provisions which the Admiralty is making.’172 Existing 
conditions meant a four ship programme, and Asquith had recently defined the Two Power 
Standard as a ten per cent superiority over the next two navies.
173
 Then McKenna presented his 
initial Estimates, including six Dreadnoughts, six protected cruisers, twenty destroyers, and the 
usual half million in submarines. The total increase over the 1908-9 Estimates was 
£2,923,200.
174
 An indication of the Cabinet’s reaction can be seen by Asquith’s admission to the 
King that McKenna’s Estimates required the entire Cabinet sitting on December 18th to approve, 
and then ‘in substance’ only and with two of the six Dreadnoughts being held for consideration 
until January.
175
 
The issue festered over the holidays, with Churchill telling Esher the shipbuilding 
programme has caused ‘discords – very grave ones – in the Cabinet’. The Radicals were 
naturally opposed, while Haldane and Grey backed McKenna. ‘The question is,’ Esher wrote, 
‘which way will the P.M. incline.’176  Churchill was well placed to know, being one of the 
economists; Lloyd George had written to him expressing his ‘deep obligation for the assistance 
you rendered me in smashing McKenna’s fatuous estimates & my warm admiration for the 
splendid way in which you torn them up.’177 Of interest at this juncture is a remark by Edward 
Hobhouse, that Lloyd George ‘has an extraordinary power of picking up the essential details of a 
question by conversation. He refuses to read any office files or papers, but likes people to come 
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and talk.’178 McKenna, meanwhile was providing detailed information to Grey and Asquith.179 
Grey had in November declared ‘There is no half-way house between complete security and utter 
ruin.’, so very likely he appreciated McKenna’s memoranda.180 
Matters were not made easier by the Sea Lords’ conviction that the German acceleration 
was real, presenting McKenna with a memorandum on January 15
th
 urging an increase in the 
shipbuilding programme from six heavy ships to eight.
181
 Lloyd George was aware of this via 
Whitehall whispers, and was furious: ‘I feared all along this would happen. Fisher is a very 
clever person & when he found his programme was in danger he wired to [Sir Arthur] Davidson 
for something more panicky--& of course he got it.’182 Why Lloyd George saw fit to implicate 
Sir Arthur Davidson, an Assistant Private Secretary to the King, in a Fisherite conspiracy is 
unclear. What is clear, however, is Lloyd George’s own estimation of the suspected German 
acceleration: ‘Frankly I believe the Admirals are procuring false information to frighten us.’ The 
First Lord’s actions, however, were less mercenary and in the Chancellor’s estimation, ‘McK 
feels his personal position & prestige is at stake.’183  
By the time the Cabinet resumed discussion of the Estimates on February 1
st
,
184
 the issue 
was at or near the boiling point. The following day Lloyd George warned Asquith of dire 
consequences: 
‘I will not dwell upon the emphatic pledges given by all of us … to reduce the 
gigantic expenditure on armaments built up by the recklessness of our 
predecessors. Scores of your most loyal supporters in the House of Commons take 
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these pledges seriously and even a £3[,]000[,]000 increase will chill their zeal for 
the gov
t
 & an assured increase of £5 to £6,000,000 for next year will stagger 
them. … When the £38,000,000 navy estimates are announced the disaffection of 
these good Liberals will break into open sedition & the influences of this 
Parliament will be at an end.’185 
 
Asquith, meanwhile, bought time by asking McKenna to provide the Cabinet ‘an anticipatory 
estimate of German & English naval expenditures from now to 1912’.186 Churchill, meanwhile, 
had written up a paper of his own on the subject—with help from Dreadnought opponents 
Admiral Custance and Sir William White—which concluded the British margin in existing ships 
through 1912 plus new construction left no argument to be made for building six ships.
187
 
McKenna wrote a detailed critique of Churchill’s calculations before passing both along to 
Fisher.
188
 The First Sea Lord was unimpressed by Churchill’s reasoning and concurred with 
McKenna’s judgment, noting that, ‘It seems to me upon reflection that Winston Churchill is 
doing the red-herring trick and leading off the controversy into comparatively minor issues, as to 
the relative value of non-Dreadnought types on both sides, whereas the main issue – THE ONLY 
ISSUE – is the number of Dreadnoughts!’ 189  Churchill returned fire with a critique of 
McKenna’s critique that ended with the observation that the Admiralty were ‘prepared to prove 
that this superiority [contra Germany] is so great that it will meet the whole Two-Power standard 
formula with 10 per cent. To spare -- if 2 more battleships are added.’190 
By late February, as Asquith wrote to his wife, the economist faction was ‘in a state of 
wild alarm, and Winston and Ll.G. by their combined machinations have got the bulk of the 
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Liberal press into the same camp.’191 Fisher, for his part, thought Asquith ‘weak as water!’192 
Matters were not eased by any of the principals’ behaviour. During one discussion in late January, 
Lloyd George exploded over an intelligence report on German heavy gun manufacturing: 
‘I think it shows extraordinary neglect on the part of the Admiralty that all this 
should not have been found out before. Don’t think much of any of you admirals, 
and I should like to see Lord Charles Beresford at the Admiralty, and the sooner 
the better.’ 
 
McKenna snapped back: 
‘You know perfectly well that these facts were communicated to the Cabinet at 
the time we knew of them, and your remark was, ‘It’s all contractors’ gossip’—or 
words to that effect.’193 
 
What Asquith would have made of the Chancellor’s Beresford proposal can only be guessed at. 
Churchill hinted to Lord Morley that he would quit the Government instead of accepting six 
ships, ‘that there was no bluff about this, and that the Government would break up.’194 
Surprisingly, it was Asquith who seems to have made the next move. During a Cabinet 
meeting on February 15
th
 he decided to create a committee on the issue made up of himself, 
Morley, Grey, and Lloyd George, who would interview the Board of Admiralty.
195
 This 
committee, minus Morley, met in conference in Asquith’s room at the House of Commons on 
February 23
rd
.
196
 Attending were Asquith, Lloyd George, Grey, McKenna, Fisher, Jellicoe, and a 
stenographer. It should be noted that a compromise proposal—whereby four Dreadnoughts 
would be ordered immediately with the possibility of another four to be added later based on 
circumstances—was already on the table during the February 15th Cabinet meeting. 
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The discussions carried on at the February 23
rd
 conference were, if one judges by the 
surviving minutes, wide-ranging indeed. At one point when the matter of the French Navy 
advocating dreadnought construction over the objections of their finance minister Joseph 
Caillaux, Asquith quipped that, ‘Like a good Chancellor of the Exchequer, he is putting the brake 
on.’197 Apart from this, and a possibly half-hearted suggestion by Lloyd George that if German 
acceleration proved true an Act of Parliament could be arranged (possibly contingent on the 
Admiralty declaring their future building programmes for the next few years in advance in a 
manner akin to the German Navy Laws), little seems to have been achieved at this conference; 
the discussion in the surviving minutes is quite divagatory in places. 
How much influence the conference had on later events is unclear, but the next day 
Asquith secured the four now-four later programme.
198
 Outwardly Fisher appeared satisfied by 
this, and he jocularly observed to Churchill that ‘it would be quite lovely’ to name the four 
supplemental ships Winston, Churchill, Lloyd, and George.
199
 Privately however he had serious 
concerns. He besieged Sir Edward Grey, waving ‘definite information’ on the German 
programme at the Foreign Secretary and imploring that all eight ships be ordered immediately. 
Grey shared the First Sea Lord’s anxieties, but McKenna took a more relaxed attitude, arguing 
nothing much would be gained by ordering all eight ships immediately.
200
 
The matter now passed to the House of Commons,
201
 where it immediately became 
political theatre best summed up by Conservative M.P. George Wyndham’s famous declaration 
‘We want eight, and we won’t wait.’ Another Conservative, Arthur Lee, brought a censure 
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motion against the Government reading: ‘That in the opinion of this House the declared policy of 
His Majesty's Government respecting the immediate provision of battleships of the newest type 
does not sufficiently secure the safety of the Empire.’202 It was defeated 353-135. As spring 
turned to summer the issue of the four contingency ships continued to fester, with Sir Edward 
Grey at one point hinting at resignation should they not be ordered.
203
 Finally, the new Austro-
Hungarian construction programme forced the Cabinet’s hand.204 When the Cabinet reconvened 
on July 21
st
 it was decided to order the four contingent ships.
205
 McKenna subsequently 
announced this to the Commons on July 26
th
.
206
 
The Germans were being honest. In March, Metternich admitted two battleships had been 
ordered ahead of schedule, but only due to reasons which would have been familiar to the 
Admiralty: ‘the German Government had found that the shipbuilders were forming a Trust to put 
up the prices… and in order to prevent the formation of this Trust contracts for these two ships 
were promised in advance… on the understanding that the Reichstag would be willing to vote 
the money subsequently.’207 It mattered not a jot. No matter what late in the day assurances the 
German government gave, the British—especially Fisher—were not inclined to believe them. 
They probably would not have been any less suspicious had the Germans been upfront from the 
beginning. ‘The fact is we must have a large margin against lying!’ were Fisher’s words to Sir 
Arthur Davidson.
208
 Of interest in this matter are the extraordinary lengths the British went 
through to obtain the barest scraps of information on German building progress, an extreme 
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example being a dead of winter trek by an agent across the frozen Bay of Danzig to reconnoitre 
the ships under construction at the Schichau works.
209
 This ramshackle piece of espionage is 
perhaps reminiscent of those carried out in John Le Carré’s bleak novel The Looking Glass War 
by the moribund and ineffectual Department. 
In any case, by the end of 1909 Fisher had got his margin, beaten off Beresford and his 
co-conspirators, and been ennobled as Baron Fisher of Kilverstone. This was perhaps a sign that 
he was on the way out. The Palace, formerly a source of strength, was unhappy at the deep 
partisan divisions in the Fleet. Furthermore, the First Sea Lord was by now not entirely reluctant 
to retire from the service. But who could replace him, and would they maintain his policies 
against all comers? 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Sir Arthur Wilson as First Sea Lord, 1910-1911 
 
In a certain sense, Sir Arthur Wilson’s tenure as First Sea Lord is something of an 
interregnum. Falling as it does between two great turbulences at the Admiralty—Fisher’s 
departure and Churchill’s arrival—it is tempting to write this period off completely. Partially this 
has to do with the fact that, with the exception of the Agadir Crisis, there are no great historical 
landmarks to describe, although Agadir’s importance counterbalances this somewhat. Historians 
have thus proven ambivalent in their judgments of Wilson as First Sea Lord. Marder describes 
him as ‘not a successful First Sea Lord.’1 Nicholas Lambert uses Wilson’s arrival to launch into a 
discussion of the ‘Grand Fleet of Battle’ concept, which he declares in his chapter title to be an 
‘Aberration’ from Fisher’s doctrine of flotilla defence.2 Sumida writes that Wilson’s obstruction 
‘played an important role in the disruption of the development of the Pollen system, new model 
armour-piercing projectiles and probably director firing as well.’3  Another writer states ‘the 
process of finding a worthy successor to Fisher went disastrously awry.’4 
To an extent, the general tenor of these comments is merited. Compared to his 
predecessor, and indeed his two successors, Wilson’s term of office was not a particularly 
productive one, and in some cases it proved damaging to the Navy as a whole. Specific examples 
include Wilson’s poor showing at the C.I.D. meeting on strategy during the Agadir Crisis, his 
aloof and undynamic actions during that same crisis, and his bitter opposition to both delegation 
of authority and responsibility and, relatedly, to the establishment of any sort of Admiralty Staff. 
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 In connection with the latter, evidence on war planning during Wilson’s time as First Sea 
Lord is more fragmentary than any other period included in this study—no single example of a 
complete War Plan remains from the Wilson administration. This situation is due—even more 
than from historically pernicious weeding of the files—to Wilson’s methods of operation. 
Reserved ‘to the point of secretiveness’,5 Wilson trusted no one with his own schemes. Whereas 
Fisher had, for all his oft-cited refusal to disclose Admiralty plans, used committees of men he 
felt sound in order to hammer out the fine details of many of his schemes—including the Navy’s 
war plans—Wilson seems to have eschewed even this form of delegation. Nevertheless, several 
significant fragments regarding Wilson’s intended doctrine have survived; enough, at any rate, to 
reconstruct the general tenor of his strategic thinking, if not the exact intended movements. 
Unsurprisingly, this situation has much to do with Wilson’s character, which Marder 
described as ‘obstinate and full of idées fixes.’6 Although he tended towards martinetcy he was 
almost universally respected within the Navy, and although the lower deck called him ‘Old ‘Ard 
‘Art’, they recognized he worked himself as hard as he worked them—a fact of which his 
Victoria Cross won at El Teb was the most obvious reminder. Although aware that ‘his natural 
talents … were for executive command rather than for administrative duties’,7 this did not stop 
him from being generally unable to delegate responsibility—either to his juniors at sea or his 
colleagues on the Board, who ‘resented his obstinacy, high-handedness, and secretiveness.’8 
Several weeks before taking office on January 25
th
, Wilson publicly told Sir Francis Bridgeman, 
now Second Sea Lord, that he was ‘only his second’ and treated Bridgeman ‘as if he were a 
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second lieutenant on board a ship.’9 This was hardly unexpected within the fleet, Prince Louis 
Battenberg wrote to Frederick Hamilton that Wilson would make the other Board positions into 
very humble ones.
10
 This was a longtime tendency of Wilson’s, Bridgeman having written to 
Fisher that: 
‘I know from experience with him that there is no joy to be found in serving either 
with him or under him! Deadly dull and uncompromising as you know! He will 
never consult with anyone and is impatient in argument, even to being 
impossible!’11 
 
Fisher himself had forwarded a letter written to him by Captain Christopher Cradock to Lord 
Tweedmouth in late 1906 ‘so that you may see it is not ‘all jam’ about Wilson!’ Fisher then 
continued that ‘It’s a great failing in him that he never can evoke enthusiasm and is well named 
‘’ard’ ’eart’ by the men!’12 
Battenberg had also pointed out Wilson’s weaknesses. When in June 1904 the question 
had arisen of who should be appointed as Commanders-in-Chief of the Home and Mediterranean 
Fleets, Battenberg wrote a private report for Lord Selborne noting that ‘Beresford and Wilson are, 
I take it, our two Naval leaders—practically the only ones until men like Lambton, May, etc, 
come on. Beresford trains the Flag-Officers and Captains under him, but Wilson does not.’ Worse, 
Wilson knew ‘quite well what an enormous fleet he will have under him in a war, as I supply him 
with the Order of Battle every month, and I know that he is making elaborate plans, but it is all 
done by himself alone and personally.’13 This combination of solitariness and obstinacy were 
hardly an ideal combination for a First Sea Lord at the best of times, and especially after such a 
gregarious one as Sir John Fisher. 
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Nonetheless it is still unfair to dismiss Wilson’s time as First Sea Lord too hastily. 
Unbending and obstinate as he was, Wilson was not the Admiralty or the Navy in toto any more 
than Fisher had been, and important work was certainly done during his time in office. This is 
especially true in terms of the Home Fleet, where the Cs-in-C. set the stage for the changes and 
reforms that occurred after Wilson passed from the scene. Even Wilson himself was not above 
advocating change if he felt it appropriate. As Channel Fleet C.-in-C. Wilson had argued for the 
abolition of pistols. In the wake of a tragic death aboard one of his ships during shooting practice, 
Wilson argued the case to D.N.O. Jellicoe, ultimately unsuccessfully.
14
 Furthermore, Nicholas 
Lambert suggests a connection between Wilson’s strategic planning—apparently at variance with 
remarks made during the Admiral’s testimony at the Beresford Enquiry—that suggests 
Germany’s belated development of the submarine as an element of the Kaiserliche Marine 
affected his views on the blockade of the German coast.
15
 
 
The Reluctant Candidate 
The choice of Sir Arthur Wilson was made, as Nicholas Lambert noted, ‘more out of 
desperation than inspiration’. 16  Of other possible candidates, the former Second Sea Lord 
Admiral Sir Charles Drury was seen as being a Fisher acolyte and therefore unsuitable. 
17
 
Another possible candidate, Sir William May was unpopular with some in the service. Jack 
Sandars was under the impression ‘that May is wholly unfit for this great command of the Home 
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Fleet.’18 Lewis Bayly is known to have disliked him.19 Bridgeman ‘had a contempt’ for him,20 
and probably told his friend Sandars of an incident where, in answering ‘his second [in] 
command as to what the C in C. had been doing, the answer was “nothing”!’21 Whatever the 
truth, once Bridgeman threatened to resign from his post as Second Sea Lord rather than serve 
under May or Wilmot Fawkes, the matter was effectively settled. Neither Fisher nor McKenna 
wished to part with Bridgeman’s services at the Admiralty.22 
At the same time Bridgeman refused to serve under May or Fawkes, he told Fisher ‘he 
would gladly remain as First Sea Lord’ with his erstwhile cruiser commander Sir George 
Callaghan as the new Second Sea Lord.
23
 Despite this apparently sudden fit of ambition on 
Bridgeman’s part,24 Fisher and McKenna took the offer seriously, but on reflection became less 
favourable to it, as Fisher informed Arnold White that November: 
‘Originally it had been intend[ed] th[at] Ad[miral] Bridgeman sh[oul]d be 1st Sea 
L[or]d but he had not develop[e]d [the] particular qualities require[ed] in the 
office – especially hold[in]g his own in [the] Defence Com[mittee] against 
practice[e]d debaters & militant soldiers[.]’25 
 
By the time White learned this, the decision had been taken to offer the position to Wilson. The 
fact that Wilson ‘to use his own words, had completely given up all idea of ever serving again’ 
was of little consequence.
26
 Wilson was duly invited to Fisher’s estate at Kilverstone on October 
27
th
 where he found both Fisher and the King awaiting him. Having evidently not received a 
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satisfactory response the first time, the King commanded Wilson’s attendance at Sandringham on 
November 6
th
, where the Admiral once again expressed his reluctance.
27
 
Subsequently, McKenna wrote to Wilson on November 19
th
, noting that his words would 
doubtless be ‘no surprise’ to the Admiral. McKenna continued that ‘The King has already told 
you how necessary it is in the interests of the Service that you should become First Sea Lord in 
succession to Sir John Fisher, and I am only now repeating what you have already heard from 
His Majesty in saying that your acceptance of this great office is of the highest national 
consequence.’28 This letter may not have be necessary, for whatever passed between Wilson and 
King Edward during their interviews, it profoundly influenced the old Admiral’s thinking, as his 
response to McKenna shows: 
‘After my interview with the King I cannot refuse to accept your offer of the post 
of First Sea Lord, and though as I told H. M. it is very much against my own 
judgment I must now do my best’.29 
 
In this connection, it is sad to note that one of the first major matters that Wilson had to face as 
First Sea Lord were the preparations required for King Edward’s funeral. 
The news of Wilson’s appointment was not greeted by any great shock by interested 
parties. After all, Wilson had been marked as a ‘high flyer’ even by outside observers. In early 
1904, the U.S. Naval Attaché had reported that ‘Vice Admiral Wilson, in the estimation of many 
of his fellow officers, stands second to none as a possible Commander-in-Chief of a British force 
in time of war.’30 
 Even if Wilson was not appointed to smooth over the rift in the service, many of the 
disaffected officers regarded his return with approval. Gerard Noel—no longer employed but still 
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in contact with many officers who were—likely shared similar sentiments, having written at the 
time of Wilson’s promotion to Admiral of the Fleet that he was ‘delighted’ that Wilson ‘will now 
be available in case of trouble.’31 From a comfortable retirement, the much-respected Admiral 
Sir Michael Culme-Seymour wrote: 
‘If it is true, as I see in the Times, that Sir Arthur Wilson is to succeed Fisher, I 
sincerely congratulate you on your choice. He will have the confidence of the 
Service, and I very much hope that Bridgeman will remain on as 2
nd
 Sea Lord, 
which I rather fancy he wd not have done had some other officer been app
d
. He & 
Wilson will make an excellent combination’.32 
 
Both Sir Charles Drury and Sir George King-Hall shared this opinion, the latter writing in his 
diary ‘We both agreed that it would be a good thing if Wilson should succeed Fisher’, at least 
until Sir William May could take over.
33
 
 Even before Wilson took office, McKenna had concerns. In January 1910 Esher wrote to 
his son that ‘McKenna finds Wilson “very difficult”.’34 Nevertheless, if the primary reason for 
Wilson’s appointment was a desire to maintain continuity of policy, Wilson proved a success—
several months after Wilson became First Sea Lord, Ottley told A.J. Balfour that ‘there has been 
no material change of naval policy since Sir Arthur Wilson succeeded Lord Fisher at the 
Admiralty.’35 
 
Planning for War 
One of the most recent assessments of the Wilson regime states that he ‘contributed little 
to the Admiralty’s strategic policy compared to earlier administrations.’36 While strictly true, this 
is not really a fair assessment. First of all, the previous two Admiralty administrations, Fisher’s 
                                                 
31
 Noel to Tweedmouth, 4 March 1907, MSS 254/607, Tweedmouth MSS. 
32
 Culme-Seymour to McKenna, 18 November 1909, MCKN 3/14, f. 33, McKenna MSS. 
33
 George King-Hall diary, 23 September 1909, King-Hall MSS. 
34
 Esher to M.V. Brett, 4 January 1910, in Brett (ed.), op. cit., p. 433. 
35
 Ottley to Balfour, 17 October 1910, f. 209, MS.Eng.hist.c.761, Sandars MSS. 
36
 Grimes, op. cit., p. 159. 
221 
 
and Lord Walter Kerr’s, had seen the adoption of the submarine, the affirmation of commercial 
blockade as a principal strategic objective, the redirection of war preparations away from the 
Dual Alliance to Germany, and several major reorganizations of the Royal Navy’s active strength. 
With such great shifts in the immediate past, any policies spawned under Wilson would naturally 
seem quite minor no matter their importance. Secondly, since Wilson had been involved in the 
creation and implementation of many of those earlier policy changes, especially in terms of war 
planning, his time as First Sea Lord should probably be described as being concerned with the 
continuation of those policies instead of a break with the past. Finally, and this is phrased 
probably more cruelly than is strictly justified, Wilson’s approach to the problem of planning for 
a North Sea campaign left subsequent administrations and planners with a very clear example of 
what not to do. 
From a historian’s perspective this is illustrated by the fact that a full edition of Wilson’s 
war plans simply do not exist. Even more so than Fisher, Wilson believed in keeping his cards as 
close as possible. This was true to the extent that he revealed in August 1911 that the details of 
the Admiralty’s war plans were not even known to Admiral Bridgeman, the Home Fleet’s C.-in-
C.!
37
 This in comparison to Fisher, who it will be recalled provided copies of his plans to, among 
others, Channel Fleet C.-in-C. Lord Charles Beresford. 
Nonetheless, the principles of Wilson’s thinking can still be outlined, and the resulting 
plan is consistent with both Wilson’s earlier proposals during the Moroccan Crisis and with the 
plans drawn up under Fisher’s supervision in 1907-1909. This is not surprising, since the latter 
plans, of course, were partially influenced by Wilson, who had been one of the many informal 
advisors employed by Fisher in their formulation process. The differences, however, are 
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important, and one major difference between Fisher’s plans and Wilson’s was the use of the 
heavy ships of the fleet. 
A surviving set of ‘preliminary orders’ drawn up for the Commodore (T) and signed by 
Admiral May (and likely under instruction from Wilson), emphasizes that the British forces to be 
deployed immediately off the German coast would not lack for teeth.
38
 The Commodore (T) 
would command ‘for the purposes of watching the German coast’ two destroyer flotillas backed 
by four armoured cruisers ‘(“HOGUE”, “CRESSY”, “SUTLEJ”, and “EURYALUS”, or similar 
ships)’ with a third flotilla for reinforcements and relief purposes. Three Apollo class cruiser-
minelayers plus two submarine sections would also operate on the German coast ‘and may be 
employed under the Commodore T.’39 
The principle behind this deployment is a familiar one: 
‘It is essential that the mouths of the Elbe and Weser should be closely watched 
during the period immediately following mobilization by a strong Inshore 
Squadron, which will be well supported by armoured cruiser squadrons in order, 
if possible, to prevent the enemy breaking out without being reported and brought 
into action.’ 
 
The cruising ground of this inshore force was to stretch on a line roughly from Horns Reef to 
Borkum.
40
 Reflecting the importance of commercial blockade, in addition to watching the 
German fleet: 
‘Measures should also be taken to prevent the passage into the North Sea of the 
enemy’s cruisers, armed merchant steamers, or transports, and to capture the 
merchant shipping of the enemy, and neutral vessels carrying contraband of any 
nature and liable to capture under international law.’ 
 
Despite this proscription to attack trade where possible,
41
 Wilson intended the Commodore’s 
force as being principally a reconnaissance line rather than a tight blockade of the sort usually 
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pictured when the term ‘close blockade’ is used. The difference between this plan and the 
previous forward destroyer deployments was the presence of a strong force of armoured cruisers 
in the immediate vicinity. The Commodore’s force would be ‘supported by the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd 
Cruiser Squadrons, which will be to seaward of the flotillas’.42  
 This large inshore force does not equate to a return to the traditional close blockade, as 
the orders themselves make clear. The vulnerability of the heavy ships was recognized, and they 
were to form the inshore watch during daylight hours only. In addition, the initial deployment 
was not meant to be permanent. The intent was to ‘enable the destroyers and inshore ships to 
gain experience of the local conditions off the enemy’s ports at the earliest possible date, which 
will be very useful in arranging for their most economical distribution afterwards.’ 43  These 
orders were not meant as irrevocable holy writ. Furthermore, once mobilization had been 
completed ‘so close a watch of the Heligoland Bight will not be essential, and it may even be 
advisable to remove the inshore watch at times to tempt the enemy out.’  
 The message here is unmistakable: even a valuable forward reconnaissance could be done 
without if the conditions for a decisive battle could be gained in exchange. How exactly the 
British would learn of a German sortie in the absence of their advanced scouts is never made 
clear. The occupation forces landed among the Frisian Islands or on Heligoland (assuming the 
assault on that island had been successful) may have been intended as bait—a garrison with 
wireless communications would at the very least give a hint of trouble if routine traffic was 
blacked out by the kind of jamming that an enemy bombardment force would likely use. As 
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tempting as this hypothesis is, it remains entirely supposition. There is no direct evidence for or 
against it; the relevant surviving papers are too scanty. 
 
Handsome Willie May’s Revolution 
While Wilson and his few confidants within the Admiralty were continuing work on a 
maritime strategy based on close observational blockade by cruisers and flotillas, the Home Fleet 
was in the process of establishing the system that would ultimately eclipse this strategy. This was 
the ‘grand fleet of battle’, which involved the union of scouting forces, torpedo craft flotillas, and 
battle squadrons into a single integrated package rather than as separate loosely connected forces 
as had been previous practice. The man who led this revolution was Home Fleet C.-in-C. 
Admiral Sir William May. May has already been briefly discussed in connection with his 
proposed appointment as First Sea Lord, but he deserves more consideration. 
Like both Fisher and Jellicoe, he was from relatively humble circumstances by the 
standards of the Royal Navy’s executive branch. Born in 1849, May’s father was a Royal Navy 
officer, his grandfather a Dutch Admiral. According to his own account, he was only granted a 
nomination to the Navy with difficulty and had to attend a ‘crammer’ school before taking the 
entrance exam, which he passed twenty-second out of fifty-three entrants.
44
 As a Lieutenant, he 
joined a Polar expedition (losing several toes in its course) and then served alongside Percy Scott 
and Prince Louis of Battenberg aboard the frigate Inconstant. Although he had ambitions to be 
gunnery specialist, May soon became involved in the early development of the Whitehead 
torpedo, ultimately becoming not only the first commander of the torpedo ram Polyphemus, but 
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also Director of Torpedoes.
45
 From there he joined the Mediterranean Fleet under Admiral Sir 
Michael Culme-Seymour, under whose command were a galaxy of future flag officers such as 
Jellicoe, Hugh Evan-Thomas, William Goodenough, Arthur Leveson, and Osmond Brock.
46
 
When he succeeded Bridgeman, May faced a difficult situation. This was not at all 
surprising considering the events of the previous two years. Long afterward, he recalled, ‘There 
had been a great deal of jealousy between Beresford’s Fleet and Bridgeman’s Fleet, and when 
they came together under my command, this jealousy persisted, chiefly with the Senior officers 
in Beresford’s old Fleet’.47 Nevertheless, he seems to have made a decent job of integrating the 
former Channel Fleet into the Home Fleet whatever the attitudes of the pro-Beresford camp. 
Nicholas Lambert claims that prior to 1910 ‘nearly every senior British admiral’ 
including Fisher thought that naval battles would be fought almost entirely between battleship 
squadrons with a few cruisers for scouting and signalling purposes.
48
 This is at the very least an 
overstatement, for there was a school of thought in the Royal Navy that advocated the use of 
destroyers in fleet actions. The roots of this can be traced back to the early days of the self-
propelled torpedo, when the Royal Navy tried several times to create a torpedo-carrying vessel 
capable of fleet work, including defence against enemy torpedo craft.
49
 As the head of the 
Mediterranean Fleet, Fisher had encouraged the development of such tactics, partially to offset 
the inability of the Fleet’s destroyer force to carry out the sorts of covering operations against 
French torpedo boat stations that were the basis of destroyer operations in Home Waters.
50
 
Possibly as a result Fisher became interested in the use of destroyers to screen the fleet against 
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enemy flotilla attacks, and from there it was a short step to consider their possible offensive use 
in a fleet action.
51
 
Ironically, Fisher’s ascension as First Sea Lord resulted in these developments falling out 
of favour. Instead, as seen in Chapter 3, the British destroyers would be used for observation 
work off the Waddenzee while the battle fleet was held back awaiting a suitable opportunity to 
engage the Hocheseeflotte on its own. Thus Fisher abandoned the doctrine he had built up in the 
Mediterranean in favour of an adapted version of the Channel doctrine that had—formerly in 
Fisher’s eyes at least—kept the Admiralty from providing sufficient destroyers to the 
Mediterranean.
52
 This apparent volte face was, as Norman Friedman observers, a frustrating 
surprise to Lord Charles Beresford, who had been building upon the notion of integrating 
destroyers into the battle fleet.
53
 
For his part, Admiral May eventually came to regard the attachment of destroyers to the 
battle fleet as a fait accompli: 
‘The main question as to whether a Fleet operating in Home waters should be 
accompanied during the daytime by a flotilla of destroyers is practically solved 
for us by the fact that at least one foreign nation is known to carry out tactical 
exercises with destroyers taking part. Consequently it may be assumed as 
probable that an enemy putting to sea in force with the object of bringing on a 
general action may bring his destroyers out with him, and it therefore appears 
essential for us to be in a position not only to meet any possible attack from them 
during any particular stage of an engagement by day, but also to known how to 
use our own destroyers to the greatest advantage.’54 
 
Even so, as late as 1910 May wrote officially that although ‘it may become occasionally 
necessary to have Destroyers with a fleet’ and that their primary duty was to destroy enemy 
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flotilla craft, they were not to be a permanent component of the battle fleet and under ‘no account 
whatsoever’ were to travel with the battle fleet at night.55 The longstanding knowledge that a 
‘foreign nation’ (i.e. Germany) was working destroyers with their seagoing fleet meant combined 
destroyer/battle fleet exercises continued, with a notable example being the April-May 1910 
strategic and tactical manoeuvres carried out by the Atlantic and Home Fleets during a combined 
cruise.
56
 Soon afterwards, a general survey of the principal fleet officers was undertaken on the 
subject of working destroyers together with a battle fleet. The results showed division within the 
fleet, with some officers such as May, Battenberg, and the flotilla commanders themselves 
supporting such a marriage, while others, notably Milne and Sturdee, were against.
57
 D.N.I. 
Bethell thought the increasing range of the torpedo would make a fleet turning away from 
attacking destroyers more effective than adding flotillas to the battle fleet.
58
 The matter was still 
undecided when in 1911 May had published an immense volume on the tactical exercises 
conducted by the Home Fleet since 1909.
59
 
By then May’s appointment had run its course. His successor was none other than Sir 
Francis Bridgeman. When Bridgeman had been offered a second bite at the apple of command 
by McKenna, he replied from his home at Copgrove Hall, Yorkshire that he was ‘delighted to 
accept the responsibilities of the Home Fleet, & I sincerely hope I may prove a success & do 
justice to your confidence in me!’60 No doubt part of Bridgeman’s delight was the relief at 
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escaping from under Sir Arthur Wilson’s thumb, but his love of sea duty and fleet work was 
almost certainly the principal reason. 
As C.-in-C., Bridgeman dutifully continued May’s work, and one result was ‘an 
interesting paper’ written by Captain Walter Cowan of the Gloucester on destroyer operations. 
Later, as First Sea Lord, Bridgeman later passed the paper on to the First Lord, noting that 
‘Cowan has had large experience, & is a good authority on these subjects’. 61  Cowan was 
‘strongly of the opinion that a Battle Fleet at sea and likely to fight should always have its 
attendant Flotilla’ in company, operating ahead and on its flanks ready to ether counter enemy 
flotillas or dash at the enemy main force according to the circumstances of the action. Cowan 
allowed that: 
‘Some Flag Officers and Captains who have only served in armoured ships will 
perhaps disagree with this, and have said … that Destroyers acting as I have 
described would be annihilated by gun-fire before ever getting within striking 
distance; but I cannot think it, as no system of [fire] control in the Navy is quick 
enough to cope with vessels closing each other at perhaps nearly 50 knots’ speed, 
and very few brains cool enough, especially after the ships have taken a certain 
amount of punishment and are heavily engaged elsewhere as well.’62 
 
As for watching duties, Cowan felt scouts or even armoured ships were preferable until the 
enemy emerged, at which time destroyers could be vectored in via wireless, with a consequent 
reduction in fatigue to both crews and ships. 
Bridgeman’s second tenure as C.-in-C. Home Fleet would last just a few months before 
events elsewhere intervened. 
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Agadir 
In the spring of 1911, France had begun working to remove the last vestiges of 
independent Morocco by sending a military column to Fez. Germany, alarmed by this disruption 
of the status quo began diplomatic counter-manoeuvres but overplayed their hand by 
demanding excessive compensation for the loss of their (largely theoretical) commercial claims 
in Morocco in the form of French Congolese holdings and by impetuously sending the gunboat 
Panther to Agadir in defence of their position.
63
 It is worth noting that in both cases the impetus 
came from the German Foreign Ministry, as Tirpitz for all his faults knew better than to make 
such an obvious challenge to British maritime pride. Sir Edward Grey and the rest of the Foreign 
Office understood the German grievances but nonetheless regarded them with the suspicion of a 
conspiracy theorist. Helping them to this conclusion were the usual diplomatic rumours of the 
time, especially one of French provenance that the Germans were desirous of a great African 
territory that would ultimately threaten South Africa and Rhodesia.
64
 
The Admiralty, who were not privy to such rumours and in any case understood the 
reliance on seapower that such a move would entail, took a much more relaxed view of the entire 
crisis. Much ‘to the consternation of Crowe and Nicolson’, the Admiralty’s initial reply to the 
Panthersprung was to note the fact that the crisis posed little threat to Britain’s maritime 
interests.
65
 This response was, in retrospect, a very good example for those who wish to paint the 
Navy as a retrograde institution. It was entirely correct but politically naïve—the diplomats and 
cabinet politicians wanted something more than a blithe assurance of safety, and the Admiralty 
would not stoop to give it. 
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Frustration was not limited to the Cabinet. From his flagship, Admiral Bridgeman 
complained to Battenberg in an unusually forceful manner at the end of September about recent 
events. Hearing garbled (and, in fact, inaccurate) reports of German warships operating in the 
Orkneys and Shetlands, Bridgeman sent first ‘a Scout & some Destroyers’ to the islands and then 
took his own flagship, the dreadnought Neptune, to Lerwick in response to rumours of German 
cruisers being seen in nearby waters. ‘It’s difficult to say what particular cruiser she was,’ 
Bridgeman stated ‘but I am led to believe she was one of those in charge of the Submarines & 
most possibly she was accompanied by them!’ These reports convinced Bridgeman that 
‘Germany has laid her plans for attacking our fleet in these Northern ports with His Submarines, 
Destroyers and Mines—the instant they declare war!’ Germany, he thought, would go to war 
using their flotillas as the tip of the spear. Their rumoured infiltration of the northern islands was 
disturbing enough, but ‘what is so disconcerting to all of us Sailors in the Home Fleet’ was that 
the Cabinet ‘will permit no precautions being taken to prevent a surprise.’ Bridgeman 
complained further that he ‘was forbidden to take the Fleet to Sea, or take the necessary 
precautions while laying in Harbour, exception having been taken to getting nets out at night!’ 
What were the point of War Orders providing precautionary measures for ‘Strained Relations’ 
when those Orders ‘were disregarded just as much as if they had not existed!’ The experience 
had even soured him on the use of Scapa and Cromarty and the Firth as bases. ‘Are we never to 
take precautions for fear of the press? If so, then I am no longer in favour of using these Northern 
Harbours for our Battleships! For if we are not to go to sea, and not defend ourselves, the fleet 
will be gone before we can fight an action!’66 
On August 23
rd
, 1911, in the context of the crisis a famous meeting occurred in London 
Despite recent efforts to downplay its importance, there is still the impression of a bureaucratic 
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coup d’état to the proceedings.67 The Army could hardly have prayed for better circumstances. 
The Navy’s best advocates were either absent or hors d’combat.68  Also absent were Lewis 
Harcourt and Lords Morley and Crewe, who if not sympathetic to the Navy’s cause, were 
unlikely to favour the Army’s ‘continental commitment’; 69  in any case they were furious 
regarding their enforced absence.
70
 The Navy’s case was thus left to McKenna, Wilson, and 
Bethell. It is not an understatement that ‘the meeting constituted a gathering of the entente 
faction’.71 The stage was set for what amounted to the Navy’s Ides of March. 
 The subject of the meeting was officially described as ‘Action to be Taken in the Event of 
Intervention in a European War’.72 Zara Steiner observed that this would be the only time that 
the Committee ‘actually reviewed the over-all pattern of British strategy before 1914.’73 Wilson 
and McKenna began the meeting by denying that the Admiralty could provide men or ships to 
transport a major expedition across the Channel: 
‘The whole force at the disposal of the Admiralty would be absorbed in keeping 
the enemy within the North Sea. Ordinarily the Navy would furnish transport 
officers and protecting ships. These could not be furnished in these 
circumstances.’74 
 
Unfortunately, this argument was diluted when General Wilson observed that in any case the 
Channel would likely ‘be covered by the main operations’ in the North Sea, and resultantly the 
risk to the troop transports would be ‘very slight’, especially since in the first few days of 
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mobilization many of the Navy’s warships activated from reserve would be ‘traversing the 
Channel on the way to their stations.’75 When pressed for details on the opinion of Admiral 
Groome, the Admiralty Director of Transports, McKenna said the Admiralty had not sufficient 
men to mobilize the fleet and ferry the expeditionary force to France simultaneously.
76
 Bethell 
added that a previous report on transport availability had ‘assumed the Fleet had already been 
mobilized.’77 Asquith grew increasingly impatient over the whole issue and finally ended the 
discussion, instructing McKenna to look into the matter of transportation because the Army’s 
plan required simultaneous mobilization of the British forces alongside the French Army, making 
‘the question of time… all important.’78 
General Wilson was then able to commence his ‘masterful, well-planned exposition’.79 
Seven British divisions (six infantry, one cavalry) plus Army-level assets totalling some 160,000 
men would cross the Channel and marshal at Maubeuge, where they would be available to assist 
the French forces defending against the main German thrust, which Wilson said would happen in 
‘the 90-mile gap between Verdun and Maubeuge.’ Limitations of the local road network meant 
the Germans could employ at most forty divisions against a French defensive force of thirty-
seven to thirty-nine. In these circumstances, General Wilson said it ‘was quite likely that our six 
divisions might prove to be the deciding factor.’80 Doubts over whether Germany would violate 
Belgian neutrality only south of the Liege fortress were dismissed by Wilson when they were 
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raised by Churchill and, later, General French.
81
 When the question of a French defeat along the 
Meuse was raised, Wilson simply said the British forces would remain alongside the French left 
flank. This did not satisfy Churchill, who ‘did not like the idea of the British Army retiring into 
France away from its home country.’82 After a discussion of potential Russian contributions to a 
European war, and a suggestion by Churchill that Russia could be supported by a forcing of the 
Dardanelles which Grey felt would be ‘an insuperable difficulty’,83 the meeting adjourned for 
lunch. 
The Admiralty spoke their case that afternoon. The First Sea Lord began by offering three 
related objections: 
1. The effect on public morale if the entire regular Army went abroad. 
2. The effect of such a deployment on the Navy’s defence of the British Isles. 
3. The consequential loss of the ability for the Navy to carry out combined operations. 
 
On the second point, Admiral Wilson emphasized that his statements were in no way a 
capitulation on the unending invasion argument. It was not ‘a question of invasion by 70,000 
men,’ he said. ‘The guarantee of the Navy against any number like that was absolute, but small 
raids might cause serious damage unless very promptly met.’84  The third objection allowed 
Admiral Wilson to segue into the Admiralty’s own plans of war against Germany. 
 Wilson’s strategy was consistent with his proposals during the previous Moroccan Crisis. 
Landing operations would be undertaken to seize Heligoland ‘as soon as possible after the 
outbreak of war’ using the Royal Marines for the assault, and afterwards other islands and points 
on the coasts on the German Bight would be taken by Army forces covered by the fleet. 
Wangeroog, Schillighorn, and Büsüm are named explicitly in the Minutes, the first to prevent its 
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use as an inconvenience for the British destroyer flotillas on observation duties or as a German 
signal station, the second for its potential as an advanced base, and the last because of the threat 
it would pose to the Kiel Canal if in British hands. No mention is made of Borkum, presumably 
because Heligoland was designated as an essential target, making the former’s capture redundant. 
Admiral Wilson’s estimate was that these operations would ‘probably require one division, 
perhaps more’, especially if at a later phase of the war the British felt ‘obliged to try and destroy 
or drive out the German Fleet at Wilhelmshaven’, presumably if they had not previously sortied 
to attack the earlier British landing forces en masse. Anticipating arguments on the vulnerability 
of the transports to attack or the landing forces to counterattacks from the German shore, the 
First Sea Lord claimed that by ‘having its transports close at hand’ the British amphibious assets 
‘would be highly mobile, and could be landed and embarked again before superior forces could 
assembled to destroy [them].’85 
 Summarizing the plan’s objectives, Admiral Wilson launched into a barbed attack on his 
Army counterpart: 
‘If in this way we could retain the 10 German divisions of which General Wilson 
had spoken on the North Sea coast, we should make a material contribution to the 
Allied cause by keeping these men not only from the theatre of war elsewhere, but 
from normal productive labour, possibly in dockyards or kindred industries. That 
meant that we should intensify the economic strain upon Germany.’ 
 
This excerpt should remove any doubt that Admiral Wilson was supportive of economic warfare 
or that he was blind to the possibility of these landings being faced by German reserve units or 
even the Landstrumm, instead of first-line regiments pulled back from the Western Front. After 
all, why would a redeployment of active duty troops pose a danger to the availability of shipyard 
labour? 
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How McKenna took all this in is not recorded, although Nicholas Lambert suggests he 
‘listened in horror’,86 which may be true as Battenberg would later write that neither McKenna 
nor Haldane knew of this plan before Wilson presented it.
87
 In any case, the counterattack came 
quickly. When Churchill observed that the taking of Wilhelmshaven would involve ‘regular siege 
operations’, the First Sea Lord ‘assented’, and further observed he did not anticipate any 
difficulty in the Heligoland operation—despite previous N.I.D. studies of such an operation 
suggesting otherwise
88—since the Admiralty ‘knew what guns were there, and those we could 
easily fight.’ The only intelligence that the First Sea Lord was concerned with involved mortar 
batteries on Heligoland, presumably due to the danger of plunging fire.
89
 As for the other 
operations ‘we could not foresee how much we could do; but the nature of the enemy coast, with 
its numerous creeks and islands providing shelter for the enemy’s torpedo craft, would make its 
blockade very arduous’ without ‘regular troops to assist [the Navy] in their operations.’90 Field 
Marshal Sir William Nicholson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, noted that Admiral 
Wilson’s comment on keeping transports close to hand was a departure from a statement he had 
previously written for a book on the invasion/conscription issue. The First Sea Lord retorted that 
‘the difference was that we should have command of the sea.’ Furthermore, the guns of the fleet 
could protect the landing forces. This provoked Nicholson to sum up the Army’s position on the 
matter: 
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‘The truth was that this class of operation possibly had some value a century ago, 
when land communications were indifferent, but now, when they were excellent, 
they were doomed to failure. Wherever we threatened to land the Germans could 
concentrate superior force.’91 
 
 Things only got worse for the Navy after this. Churchill’s comment that landing 
operations would tie the fleet to the coast was met by Wilson observing that those ships ‘would 
be tied to the coast by the necessity for blockading it.’92 Nicholson thought siege operations 
against Wilhelmshaven were out of the question given the Japanese experience at Port Arthur. 
When Wilson said a successful fleet battle in the North Sea might open the Prussian and 
Pomeranian coasts to attack by the Royal Navy, Haldane scoffed it would ‘not cause the 
Germans a moment’s anxiety, for they had always ridiculed the idea of fortifying Berlin despite 
its comparative proximity to the sea.’93 Churchill, meanwhile, thought entering the Baltic would 
‘incur great risks’ to the fleet.94 
 Churchill would later remark to Asquith that he had lost all confidence in Wilson and 
‘[n]o man of real power cd have answered so foolishly.’ 95  The War Minister now had his 
opportunity and went on the offensive, informing the Prime Minister that ‘the Admirals live in a 
world of their own. The Fisher Method, which Wilson seems to follow, that war plans should be 
locked up in the brain of the First Sea Lord, is out of date and impractical. Our problems of 
defence are far too numerous and complex to be treated in that way.’ Furthermore, ‘I have after 
mature consideration come to the conclusion that this is… the gravest problem which confronts 
the Government to-day and that unless it is tackled resolutely I cannot remain in office.’96 
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In addition, Haldane took the opportunity to embarrass the Admiralty further on August 
25
th
. He submitted the details of the latest revision of the Army’s transport requirements with a 
demand for immediate comment, despite knowing he was on leave. After three weeks Haldane 
complained to the Prime Minister about the (predictable) lack of response, and Asquith 
swallowed the bait whole, writing to McKenna telling the First Lord to ‘Please see to this, for 
though there is every reason to home that we are well out of the wood, all possible contingencies 
ought to be studied.’97 There seems little doubt Haldane had by now fixed his eyes on the First 
Lordship. He claimed the Board of Admiralty could not be counted upon to move with the times, 
complaining ‘the doors of the Admiralty are closed to all new ideas and new developments.’98 
In the end, it seems unlikely that the Admiralty could have carried the day, even if Wilson 
had put forward what Sir William May might have described as a significantly more au fait 
presentation of his schemes of campaign against the German coast. At this distance, with the 
horrors of the Somme and Ypres and Passchendaele defining—for better or worse—public 
conceptions of the Great War,
99
 and the many successful amphibious operations seen during the 
Second World War and subsequent conflicts, it is tempting to see Wilson’s proposals as a great 
‘what if’. This is, however, to put too much stock in hindsight. Whatever their chances of success, 
they were politically naïve in the face of the Army delegates’ emphasis on cooperation in an 
assumed Anglo-French coalition. An expeditionary force deployed to the Continent, even a body 
of only two corps, was a direct show of material assistance that a naval blockade could not be, no 
matter how many German divisions were kept pinned to the Waddenzee by British landings. 
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Enter Winston Churchill 
Even sympathetic navalists felt Wilson had done them a wrong. Lord Fisher wrote that 
Wilson ‘was magnificent at sea but he has wrecked McKenna ashore.100 Asquith felt, according 
to Esher, that ‘McKenna has done fairly well as a defender of Admiralty Policy in Parliament, 
but that he has been entirely dominated (a) by Jackie, (b) by Wilson, and that he would never be 
inclined or able to reorganize the internal naval policy of the Department.’101 The Prime Minister 
subsequently made noises to McKenna on October 10
th
 on the pretext that ‘As we are on the eve 
of completing our sixth year of office, I am contemplating a certain amount of reconstruction 
both inside & outside the Cabinet.’102 Now came the choosing of McKenna’s successor. 
The most obvious candidate at the time, thanks mostly to his self-promotion, was 
Haldane. His letter to Asquith that threatened resignation illustrates this, for Haldane wrote ‘Five 
years[’] experience of the War Office has taught me how to handle the generals and get the best 
out of them and I believe that the experience makes me the person best qualified to go to the 
Admiralty and carry through a reorganization’.103 However, ‘Haldane had been a very vocal 
critic of the Admiralty and would not have been well received there.’104 This is something of an 
understatement, in fact. Originally a supporter, Fisher had by this time developed a violent 
loathing for Haldane, going so far as to call him ‘Napoleon B’.105 Haldane was also now in the 
House of Lords, which went against Asquith’s desire that the new First Lord ‘ought to be in the 
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H of Commons’. Asquith additionally worried about Haldane’s potential reform schemes, fearing 
‘the Navy would not take kindly… to new organization imported direct from the War Office.’106 
Fortunately there was another candidate in the offing. Winston Churchill at the end of 
September indicated he would very much like to leave the Home Office, where he had grown 
especially tired of dealing with the Women’s Suffrage issue—as indeed had the Suffragettes in 
dealing with him.
107
 Having previously been one of the leading economists during the 1909 fight 
over shipbuilding, he would have credibility with the Radicals—he certainly had the backing of 
his good friend Lloyd George.
108
 He had also shown some extracurricular interest in naval affairs 
quite unrelated to matters of economy. In 1904 he had been involved in a long talk with Sir 
Michael Hicks Beech and Sir George King-Hall about naval policy, which left King-Hall to note 
that Churchill had ‘a very good opinion of himself.’ 109  Much later—in March 1911—he 
circulated a memorandum to the Cabinet titled ‘The Mediterranean Fleet’ that began with the 
statement ‘I AM anxious that the Mediterranean position should be examined de novo.’ The rest 
of the memorandum laid out, in general but informed terms, the arguments against maintaining 
the Mediterranean Fleet at its present strength. Churchill concluded that it was ‘a matter for 
consideration whether the Mediterranean establishments should not be reduced to that of a 
cruiser squadron, capable of discharging all minor measures of police,’ and whether the 
occasional visit by ‘the periodical visits at convenient junctures of a preponderant battle fleet.’110 
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In other words, Churchill felt that the same principles Fisher and Selborne had applied to the 
armoured cruiser squadrons in 1905 could be expanded to include battle fleets as well. 
It was not without reason, therefore, that Asquith wrote that ‘On the whole, I am satisfied 
that Churchill is the right man’.111 Churchill was also under the influence of Lord Fisher. The 
two men had met in Biarritz during April 1907 and become fast friends, with Fisher regaling the 
young M.P. into the late hours with ‘wonderful stories of the Navy and of his plans—all about 
Dreadnoughts, all about submarines, all about the new education scheme, all about big guns, and 
splendid Admirals and foolish miserable ones, and Nelson and the Bible, and finally the island of 
Borkum.’112 
Haldane learned of this at a visit to Archerfield in late September. His autobiography 
certainly shows his disappointment. Although he claimed to have ‘no desire to be First Lord’, 
Haldane felt ‘if a real Naval War Staff were to be created and the Admiralty to be convinced of 
its necessity, that must be done by someone equipped with the knowledge and experience that 
were essential for fashioning a highly complicated organization.’113 It was thus fairly distressing 
to find that Churchill ‘had been pressing Asquith hard.’114 Subsequently matters came to a head: 
‘I took the initiative. I told [Churchill] that his imaginative power and vitality 
were greater than mine, and that physically he was better suited to be a War 
Minister. But at this critical moment it was not merely a question of such qualities. 
The Navy and public had to be convinced, and they would be most easily 
convinced of the necessity of scientific preparation for naval war by someone who 
already had carried out similar preparations in the only Service in which they had 
been made or even thought of. I was satisfied that in all probability I could 
accomplish what was wanted within twelve months, and if he would look after the 
Army till the end of that time I would return to it and he could then take over the 
Admiralty.’115 
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This rather strange proposal left both Asquith and Churchill unmoved. Churchill got the job. 
There remained McKenna to be disposed of. In the same letter that Asquith had informed 
the soon-to-be ex-First Lord of the ‘certain amount of reconstruction’, Asquith referenced a 
rumour that McKenna had ‘been willing in the Summer to take Sir G. Murray’s post [as Master 
of Elibank].’116 Noting that he was thankful this had not come to pass, lest he lose McKenna’s 
‘legal training & … large & tried administration experience and capacity’ altogether, Asquith 
went on to offer him ‘one of the most difficult and responsible places in the Government – the 
Home Office.’ McKenna was under no illusions about the reality of the situation, nevertheless he 
knew his position was untenable, and wrote to the Prime Minister that ‘It is repugnant to me not 
to acquiesce in any proposal made by you.’ 117  However McKenna had no wish to leave 
immediately and he wished to remain until December, which raised the Prime Minister’s ire.118 
Asquith had hoped McKenna ‘would have recognized the cogency of the reasons’ he had 
given.
119
  Furthermore, Asquith said that he ‘cannot at all assent to what you say about the 
Estimates … To bring in a new First Lord in December for the first time, does not appear to me 
to be giving him a fair chance.’ McKenna hastily replied that he had been misinterpreted.120 
McKenna ultimately left the Admiralty in October. He would not forgive Churchill for his 
transfer.
121
 
Churchill arrived at the Admiralty with a dual brief. Besides the now-familiar mission of 
reigning in the Navy Estimates,
122
 he was to create a Naval War Staff.
123
 The new First Lord was 
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a young man in a hurry, and resultantly some of his ideas bore ‘traces of great haste and little 
thought.’124 As one of his Naval Secretaries wrote, Churchill was ‘clever and hard-working, but 
he was also impulsive, headstrong, and even at times obstinate.’125 Esher wrote, ‘I fear Winston 
as a First Lord of the Admiralty. Will he play up? He has one eye undoubtedly on the Navy and 
to be a popular First Lord. But the other is not unnaturally on the radical tail.’126 
 
The Need for a Staff 
The issue of the creation of a staff organization at the Admiralty had been a long-festering 
one. The supreme and decisive success enjoyed by the Prussian Army during the Franco-Prussian 
War was seen as being primarily due to the work of the Prussian General Staff. It was natural, 
then, that agitation for a similar such organization at the Admiralty would follow. The first steps, 
in the minds of many, had already been taken when a Foreign Intelligence Committee had been 
established in 1882, partly through the enterprise of the Naval Secretary, Captain George Tryon. 
In 1886 this body was expanded into the Naval Intelligence Department partly, but not entirely, 
due to the public harangues of Lord Charles Beresford, who Lord Salisbury had made Junior 
Naval Lord.
127
 The N.I.D. was for the next decade led by some of the most capable and 
intelligent men in the Navy, beginning with Captain William Hall.
128
 Though not a true general 
staff, it performed many of the functions of one, especially concerning war planning.
129
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Fisher himself flirted briefly with the idea of a staff prior to becoming First Sea Lord.
130
 
In February 1902, Prince Louis of Battenberg wrote a memorandum, described by his biographer 
as ‘an example of a clear-sighted improvement for the Admiralty Staff’.131 This memorandum 
proposed ‘enlarging and strengthening’ the existing Naval Intelligence Department and placing 
the First Sea Lord in direct charge of this new body, freeing him of ‘the heavy burden of his 
general work, especially routine matters,’ which Battenberg felt ‘prevents him from devoting as 
much attention to “Preparation for War” as he should and probably would wish.’  Further relief 
would come from, preferably, the redistribution of business among the other Sea Lords. This 
proposal, minus the creation of a staff body from the Naval Intelligence Department, was 
otherwise similar to the reforms of the Board of Admiralty that Sir John Fisher undertook as part 
of his 1904 Scheme.
132
 
While there were numerous officers who felt a Naval Staff would be a good idea, there 
were others in the Navy, however, that deprecated the idea that the Navy needed a staff. Fisher 
had after his appointment as First Sea Lord embraced the latter position, preferring to work with 
committees—both formal and informal—made up of trustworthy men. Fisher felt a permanent 
Staff was ‘an exceedingly useful body to be kicked and to deal with d——d rot! And to make out 
schemes for the German Emperor to have next morning at breakfast!’133 Black notes that ‘in 
place of a reference to Kaiser Wilhelm II, the reader should more properly substitute the name of 
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Lord Charles Beresford.’ 134  This is especially true remembering N.I.D. Captain Henry 
Campbell’s pro-Beresford testimony at the Beresford Enquiry. 
Another officer who was publically in opposition to a Staff was Sir Cyprian Bridge. 
Bridge felt that ‘a navy is so constituted that it contains its General Staff in itself, and 
consequently does not need an excrescent body to co-ordinate its elements and their efforts.’135 
As an explanation, Bridge cited the self-sufficiency of each warship. ‘From the St. Vincent to the 
Cadmus, every man-of-war—no matter to what class she belongs—is self-contained, and 
therefore no General Staff is needed to evoke her full belligerent efficiency.’136 Sir Arthur Wilson 
was also in the anti-Staff school. Like Fisher, Wilson felt ‘that the First Sea Lord, and he alone, 
was responsible for the preparation and conduct of the war at sea’.137 This might not have been a 
problem had Wilson been willing to make use of the informal system Fisher had used. Instead he 
kept his own council to an extreme degree, and even Fisher’s insurance that the talented Sir 
Alexander Bethell would remain D.N.I. during Wilson’s tenure did nothing to help matters.138 
Fisher had made one concession in the wake of the Beresford Enquiry by creating a 
‘Navy War Council’ with the First Sea Lord as President that would consider issues relating to 
strategy and war plans. The records of its few meetings make sombre reading.
139
 Most of the 
discussions involved manning and mobilization questions, although some specific strategic 
issues were brought up as well. The Navy War Council has largely been dismissed as a con job 
by Fisher. Herbert Richmond hyperventilated that it was ‘the most absurd bit of humbug that has 
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been perpetrated for a long time’.140 The Navy War Council deserves more consideration, and 
Marder’s disapproving comment that the Council was a ‘modest reform’ and ‘not a true naval 
staff’, while true, misses the point. 141  The Council was, in effect, a linear evolutionary 
development of Fisher’s method of forming committees to tackle policy questions; the Navy War 
Council was a permanent version of those committees.
142
 While it would never ‘hush the 
agitation of those who were urging a “thinking department”… corresponding in function to the 
General Staff of the Army’,143 it was probably never expected to. 
By the autumn of 1911, however, the Navy War Council appeared very much inadequate. 
In large portion, this was due to Wilson. Sir Herbert King-Hall, who as Director of Naval 
Mobilization had been a regular attendee at Council meetings from the start, sadly recalled that 
‘for whereas Sir John suckled the infant on skim-milk, Sir Arthur denied it even that nourishment, 
and starved it to death.’144 While the Council met four times during Fisher’s last months in office, 
only seven meetings occurred in Wilson’s tenure as First Sea Lord.145 
Churchill at first seems to have made a good faith effort to bring around Sir Arthur 
Wilson to the creation of a Naval Staff. C.I.D. Assistant Secretary Adrian Grant Duff considered 
it ‘vain to try and change the views of a man of 69 – more especially when acknowledgement of 
the need virtually implies blame to himself.’146 
In reply, Wilson wrote several memoranda that restated his opposition to a Naval War 
Staff. In passing one of these to Asquith, Churchill remarked that it was ‘decisive in its 
opposition, not only to any particular scheme, but against the whole principle of a War Staff for 
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the Navy.’147 The core of the First Sea Lord’s argument was a familiar one—it was very close to 
what Cyprian Bridge had written for the Naval Annual: an Army-style General Staff could not 
work for the Navy because ‘the conditions and problems to be solved are so entirely different 
that no analogy can be drawn between them.’148 An army on the march demanded the services of 
‘a very large staff of highly trained officers’ to tackle problems of topography, transport, defence 
of lines of communication, and other issues.
149
 Naval squadrons, however, ‘contain[ed] in 
themselves all they require for war’ and ‘have no lines of communication to defend.’150 His next 
paragraph expounded at length on this matter, noting that while the movement of an Army 
Division from Aldershot to the Norfolk Coast in battle readiness ‘would require the consideration 
of many more details than anyone not conversant with the difficulties of moving large bodies of 
troops can think of’, the orders for a Division of the Home Fleet to proceed into the North Sea 
‘could be carried within the limits of a single short telegram and without any preliminary plans.’ 
This was not to deny a great deal of detailed work was required by the Navy. In fact, ‘[i]n 
the aggregate probably more thinking has to be done to produce an efficient Navy than an 
efficient Army’. However this thinking was ‘entirely on different lines.’151 The Navy’s thinking 
was predominantly ‘occupied with producing the most perfect ships, guns, and machinery, with 
crews trained to make the most perfect use of them, and constantly practiced under conditions 
approaching as nearly as possible to those of war.’152 Furthermore, the Navy’s requirements for 
thinking out the various important matters a staff would tackle already existed: 
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‘It is composed of the principal members of every department at the Admiralty, 
supplemented by the Admirals, Captains, Executive Officers, and heads of the 
different departments in every ship afloat, all organized for one end.’153 
 
Like Bridge, Wilson claimed the Navy was its own general staff. While Battenberg’s 1902 
memorandum had suggested that a staff could only work if it was advisory to the Admiralty 
Board, he had not made any claim this broad. In support of this position, Wilson claimed that: 
‘The Navy has learned by long experience thoroughly to distrust all paper 
schemes and theories that have not been submitted to the supreme test of trial 
under practical conditions by the Fleet at sea, and the whole Admiralty has been 
gradually developed to make the most of the experience so gained.’154 
 
Correctly sensing that compromise was impossible, and with the annual argument over 
the Estimates fast approaching, Churchill concluded that Wilson had to go. He may have been 
encouraged by the Prime Minister. Asquith was ‘strenuously in favour’ of a Naval Staff 
according to Esher, and saw that ‘while Wilson is First Sea Lord such a Reform is hopeless and 
that it must wait until next April.’155 It would not be surprising if Churchill felt to a certain extent 
pressured by Asquith’s views. 
Prompting from on high or no, the First Lord acted decisively. Captain Dudley de Chair 
would write in his diary that ‘Wilson said he was dismissed like a butler’,156 and one of the 
Admiral’s few surviving letters to his sister Katharine suggests this was a fair comment: 
‘When you return from your visit to Aunt Ellen you will find me no longer a Lord 
of the Admiralty. They have let me off the last three months of my hard labour. 
One Wednesday last, when I got home after dinner with the Markhams, I found a 
letter from Mr. Churchill to say he had decided to have a new Board, and Admiral 
Madden, Sir George Egerton and myself, were to go.’157 
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The change of command was set for December 5
th
, when Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman 
would take over as First Sea Lord. Wilson admitted he was ‘very glad to get away, as if I stayed I 
should have a very anxious time in the next three months.’158 The Second Sea Lord, Sir George 
Egerton, was less acquiescent, and Sir George King-Hall wrote that he ‘boiled over with rage, at 
this summary dismissal’.159 Now the Churchill regime began in earnest. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Churchill-Bridgeman Regime, 1911-1912 
 
If Wilson’s tenure as First Sea Lord is remembered harshly, and Nicholas Lambert writes, 
with reason, that ‘Wilson left office in 1911 with his professional reputation severely damaged 
among naval and political leaders’,1 then Sir Francis Bridgeman’s is at best seen as a placeholder 
appointment. Bridgeman’s biographer, Stewart Ross, wrote that ‘If his near contemporary Bonar 
Law is the forgotten Prime Minister, then Bridgeman is the forgotten First Sea Lord.’ 2 
Bridgeman, who prior to his appointment as First Sea Lord had been the first C.-in-C. of the 
Home Fleet and a rock of stability and good sense during Beresford’s assaults, and who would 
later return to that post in time to lead it during the Agadir Crisis, deserves better. Bridgeman’s 
term of office, though little over a year long, nevertheless saw a great many changes in the Royal 
Navy, many of which were the result of the drive and energy of irascible First Lord Winston 
Churchill. Though Bridgeman and Churchill, in Marder’s words, ‘simply did not get along’, the 
‘root trouble’ of this being, in Marder’s judgment, ‘Bridgeman’s resentment of the First Lord’s 
interference in everything’,3 the twelve months that their professional relationship lasted saw 
much of importance happen in which Bridgeman’s role has often been overlooked. 
 
The Appointment 
Like Sir Arthur Wilson, Bridgeman’s appointment as First Sea Lord was by no means a 
straightforward choice. Churchill, as already noticed, originally hoped he could retain Wilson’s 
services, until the First Sea Lord’s total opposition to the creation of any form of a Naval Staff 
became clear. At that point Churchill, with more alacrity than manners, decided Wilson had to be 
                                                 
1
 Nicholas A. Lambert, ‘Admiral Sir Arthur Knyvett Wilson, V.C. (1910-1911)’ in Murfett (ed.), op. cit., p. 49. 
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3
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replaced. With Asquith in full accord, Churchill began looking for a successor to Old ‘Ard ‘Art.4 
Churchill was convinced that the change would have to be made by ‘January at the latest’, but as 
of the beginning of November he had no definitive suggestions beyond replacing Second Sea 
Lord Egerton with Prince Louis of Battenberg, although he could ‘if it were imperative, propose 
to you a new Board for submission to the King at once.’5 The problem was that, as in 1909 and 
even 1904, the available choices for First Sea Lord were ‘narrow’,6 and unlike in 1904 there was 
no obvious Fisher among the top echelon of the flag list. Churchill’s initial inclination to bring 
back Fisher had only been abandoned ‘with extreme reluctance’ on the First Lord’s part. 7 
Fisher’s own suggestion was either Admiral Edmund Poë, a sea dog with little Admiralty 
experience who Fisher felt would be an amenable First Sea Lord,
8
 or Prince Louis of Battenberg, 
who possessed ‘to perfection the German faculty of organizing a great Naval Staff’, and with the 
right choice of subordinates would be ‘incomparable’ in C.I.D. debates.9 The King also had 
suggestions; initially he favoured his friend Sir Hedworth Lambton Meux—who had changed his 
surname on the request of society widow Valerie, Lady Meux—despite his prominent 
membership in the Syndicate of Discontent and hatred of Prince Louis.
10
 However he 
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 Marder, op. cit., p. 257. 
5
 Churchill to Asquith, 5 November 1911, f. 58A-59, MS.Asquith 13, Asquith MSS. 
6
 Ibid., f. 59. 
7
 Marder, loc. cit. In one letter, Fisher wrote ‘I would offer to be your ‘Chief of the Navy General Staff’ – there is 
room for an immense ‘coup’ there but I don’t want to embarrass you.’ Fisher to Churchill, 26 October 1911, f. 5, 
CHAR 13/2, Chartwell MSS. This letter is reproduced, with several transcription errors, in Randolph Churchill, YS 
Companion 2, pp. 1298-1300. 
8
 Fisher to McKenna, 20 August 1911, f. 47, MCKN 6/4, McKenna MSS; Fisher to Churchill, 4 November 1911, in 
Randolph Churchill, YS Companion 2, p. 1320; Fisher to Churchill, 9 November 1911, in ibid., p. 1326. 
9
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 In 1906 Prince Louis had vented to Fisher that while on a visit to Germany: 
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‘urbe et orbe’ against my going Second Lord—or any other Lord and fleet command 
presumably—viz: that I was a d—d German who had no business in the British Navy & that the 
service for that reason would not trust me. I know the latter to be a foul lie … the mere fact of my 
flag flying is a public proof that I still enjoy T.L.’s confidence. But I feel that I can never forget 
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means of keeping the coveted billet open for one of themselves—the confederate also was to let 
251 
 
subsequently advocated Admiral Sir John Durnford, President of the Greenwich Royal Naval 
College whose Admiralty experience proper had been limited to a term as Junior Naval Lord 
under Lord Walter Kerr.
11
 Durnford apparently came within an ace of securing the job, should 
the following anecdote from Fisher be believed: 
‘When the Medina left England it was considered sure that Durnford would be 
First Sea Lord and a private telegram to that effect was actually despatched to the 
Mediterranean!’12 
 
Durnford’s undoing seems to have been his opposition to the various education reforms 
undertaken by Fisher during Selborne and Cawdor’s First Lordships.13 Finally, Sir William May 
was apparently under consideration but was considered unsuitable for reasons unknown.
14
 
Even as Fisher was writing what he described as his ‘Machiavellian idea’ of using Poë as 
a figurehead, Churchill had apparently discovered that Battenberg as First Sea Lord was 
politically untenable, and therefore cast his eyes elsewhere. Elsewhere happened to be the 
Admiral’s cabin of the Home Fleet flagship Neptune. Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman, though 
only recently reappointed as C.-in-C. Home Fleet, had better qualifications than any of the other 
candidates. While as Marder observed wisely, Bridgeman was not a natural administrator,
15
 
Bridgeman’s work as the Home Fleet’s original commander-in-chief left him possessed of better 
understanding of North Sea operations than anyone else in the Navy. In addition, he had recently 
served at the Admiralty as Second Sea Lord to both Fisher and Wilson, and thus had (as has 
                                                                                                                                                             
the burglars into the house they meant to rob [the Admiralty]—but it is none-the-less a drop of 
poison in my cup of happiness of a life-time devoted truly & wholly to our great service. 
‘It was a my great ambition to be Second Lord sometime or other merely as a stepping stone to 
First Sea Lord. Now, I doubt this will ever come about.’ 
Battenberg to Fisher, 24 July 1906, F.P. 203, f. 13, FISR 1/5, Fisher MSS. 
11
 Marder, FDSF, i, p. 257. 
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 Fisher to Bridgeman, 8 December 1911, Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman MSS, IWM. 
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 Fisher to Churchill, 9 November 1911, in Randolph Churchill, YS Companion 2, p. 1326. 
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already been described) been a leading candidate to replace Fisher. Fisher, whose respect for 
Bridgeman has already been noted, was generally pleased with Churchill’s suggestion: 
‘I love Bridgeman! He is what you say – a splendid sailor and a gentleman – but 
he has no genius for administration. However he would command immense 
confidence so it would pay you to have him as First Sea Lord.’16 
 
Fisher took pains to emphasize Bridgeman’s credibility, claiming he ‘would cast a ‘halo’ of 
integrity and firmness round the Board of Admiralty.’17 
Even without this glowing recommendation, Churchill seems to have been confident in 
his choice, writing to Asquith that: 
‘I pronounce decidedly in favour of Sir Francis Bridgeman as First Sea Lord. He is a fine 
sailor, with the full confidence of the Service afloat, and with the aptitude for working 
with and through a staff well developed.’18 
 
Churchill wasted no time in making his offer to Bridgeman. The next day he wrote to the 
Admiral that ‘I have come to the conclusion that the public interest will be served by the 
appointment of a new Board of Admiralty, & that the change should take place without any 
delay.’ Believing that he and Bridgeman were ‘in general agreement upon the broad principles of 
naval strategy’, especially the creation of a Naval Staff, and that the ‘opinion of the Sea Service 
shall be effectively represented at the Admiralty & that their confidence shall be sustained by the 
appointment of a First Sea Lord fresh from the handling of great fleets & in the closest touch 
with actual operations’, Churchill offered him the First Sea Lordship.19 Though his biographer 
describes the letter as being rather brusque for an invitation to the top position in the Royal Navy, 
Bridgeman nonetheless accepted dutifully.
20
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Dutifully, but not immediately. After his dismissal in December 1912, Bridgeman’s friend 
Jack Sandars wrote to A.J. Balfour that ‘Bridgeman begged & begged to be excused’ from taking 
up the post, ‘but Winston was insistent and so Bridgeman yielded, sorely against his own 
wishes.’ 21  Marder writes that Lady Bridgeman wept at the news he would return to the 
Admiralty.
22
 This reluctance can be confirmed by another letter from Sandars to Balfour: 
‘I asked Bridgeman how he came to leave command of the Home Fleet. He said 
that Winston had sent for him, never mentioning what he wanted him for, and to 
his great surprise he was pressed to accept the post of First Sea Lord, although he 
had been Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet less than a year. He did his best 
to decline, but Winston was insistent. Winston told him he should never be able to 
work with Wilson, and that he had satisfied himself that he could work with him 
(Bridgeman). In the result much against the grain Bridgeman had to consent.’23 
 
Bridgeman, for his part, gave Lord Fisher his own reasons for ultimately accepting the offer: 
‘Two reasons forced me to do it— 
‘1st  Within the Admiralty, there were designs for wrecking the whole Scheme of 
Education, that had to be stopped, & I saw no means of doing so other than 
coming here myself! 
‘2d  I do feel that I was perhaps needlessly standing in the way of younger men, 
who its very desirable sh
d
 go ahead! So long as I remained, there could be no real 
advancement for, say, Jellicoe, directly I go, up he comes automatically to 
Command of the 2
d
 Div, & a splendid opportunity for him!’24 
 
Regardless of Bridgeman’s reluctance, there was genuine enthusiasm regarding Bridgeman’s 
appointment. Fisher wrote to him that ‘it is a splendid act your coming as First Sea Lord and I 
don’t wonder that Lady Bridgeman weeps!’25 Fisher meanwhile wrote Churchill that ‘I’ve heard 
from two Fleets of heartfelt joy universal at Bridgeman, Battenberg, & Jellicoe’.26 
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To Build a Staff 
The most pressing issue that Bridgeman faced upon arrival, and indeed the very reason he 
had been summoned back to the Admiralty from the Neptune, was the creation of a Naval War 
Staff. Work progressed well, which was not surprising since much had already been done semi-
unofficially in spite of Wilson’s opposition. By New Year’s Day of 1912, Churchill could provide 
Haldane with a draft memorandum laying out the organization of the new staff.
27
 Of its contents, 
Haldane wrote back ‘there is not a word I should have wished to change had I wanted to.’28 
Grant Duff of the C.I.D. was also complementary: ‘Nearly all the points which we have pressed 
for are included and it is a very good half-loaf.’ 29 The Admiralty War Staff ‘was finally born’ a 
week later on January 8
th
, with Rear-Admiral Ernest Troubridge as the Admiralty’s first Chief of 
the War Staff.
30
 The organization seems, in fact, to have been partially operating rather earlier 
than that: Troubridge saved the first minute he received as Chief of War Staff. It was from 
Churchill and dated December 10
th
, 1911.
31
 
If he was pleased by the contents of Churchill’s announcement, Grant Duff was far less 
charitable the new Chief of Staff. He described Troubridge as ‘an idle and self indulgent 
fellow’.32 Historians have largely followed this lead. Probably not coincidentally, Troubridge is 
largely remembered for his decision not to engage the German battlecruiser Goeben with his four 
armoured cruisers in the opening days of World War One, one for which he was court-martialled 
but acquitted, in large part because of the garbled orders he had received previously.
33
 That one 
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of the nicer evaluations claims that while ‘he had many friends in the service, he was never 
admired for his intellect’, says a great deal.34 Sometimes serving as an accompaniment to these 
criticisms is another comment by Grant Duff that another naval officer with whom he worked 
with had ‘more brains in his little finger than Troubridge has in his great woolly head.’35 His 
proposals of operating a picket line patrol of ships in the North Sea, a so-called ‘intermediate 
blockade’, have also been criticized.36 However, a memorandum produced by Troubridge on the 
possibilities of naval aviation in early 1912 shows that he possessed a clearer and more 
imaginative mind than is often allowed.
37
 
The War Staff’s structure owed much to the influence of amongst others, George Ballard, 
Prince Louis of Battenberg, and Herbert Richmond.
38
 It was organized ‘from existing elements’39 
into three divisions: Intelligence, Operations, and Mobilisation. In Churchill’s official 
pronouncement, these groups ‘may be shortly described as dealing with War Information, War 
Plans, and War Arrangements respectively.’40 As originally constituted, the War Staff existed ‘to 
gather and analyse information, so that the Board of Admiralty, particularly the First Sea Lord, 
was in a position to control the movements of British warships in wartime.’41 Central to this 
work was the maintenance of the Admiralty’s ‘War Room plot’, and assisting the First Sea Lord 
in developing war plans and fleet manoeuvres. 
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As with any new organization, there were inevitable teething troubles. The Chief of the 
War Staff had no executive authority of his own and his relationship to the Board of Admiralty 
was murky, especially when Churchill began using him as a cutout to circumvent Bridgeman 
when their relationship deteriorated.
42
 Troubridge was chosen without the First Sea Lord’s 
consultation, and Churchill described him as ‘my man’ to Battenberg.43 
 Nevertheless, as Nicholas Black has recently shown, much of opprobrium levelled at the 
earliest incarnation of the War Staff is undeserved.
44
 The Admiralty, with Churchill’s direction, 
had made a good start, but it would take time. ‘And’, as Churchill lamented, ‘we were only to 
have thirty months!’45 
 
The 1912 Estimates 
Aside from the formation of a Naval Staff, the most important brief given Churchill upon 
his appointment as First Lord was the now time-honoured quest to rein in the Naval Estimates. 
His later claims to the contrary were short of the truth to say the least.
46
 As already described, 
Churchill had a strong reputation as one of the Cabinet’s ‘economists’. His initial behaviour 
would have reassured any doubters. At the Guildhall Banquet on November 9
th—little more than 
a fortnight after his arrival at the Admiralty—he told the assembled guests that ‘the estimates for 
the forthcoming year should show some reduction from the abnormal level at which they now 
stand … the high-water mark, at any rate, has been reached.’47 A month or so later Sir Francis 
Bridgeman wrote to Lord Fisher that ‘Churchill is strongly on the economy line. I trust he will 
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not go too far’.48 Many of Churchill’s proposals regarding economy were, to Bridgeman’s mind, 
‘almost too bold to be believed.’49 As Lambert points out, Bridgeman was probably unaware than 
many of these ideas were the result of several profoundly secret conversations between Churchill 
and Fisher!
50
 Surviving correspondence between Churchill and Fisher from late 1911 suggests 
these schemes were an extension of the traditional Fisher strategy of saturating the southern end 
of the North Sea with flotilla craft to counter the German Navy’s own flotillas and the closure of 
the North Sea’s exits: 
‘If you hold the Straits of Dover & Scapa Flow with an abundance of Submarines 
& Destroyers such as we possess and have a good Admiral in perpetual charge of 
the East Coast with his own ear-marked flotillas of Submarines & Destroyers and 
attendant Cruisers then you can sleep quiet in your bed as regards any raid of the 
German Fleet. Any bolt out of the blue I mean! And our Battle Squadrons never 
ought to be within Destroyer range of the German Coast. What is Destroyer range? 
(The German Submarines can be ignored[,] those they have are only coastal 
vessels) Well! A German destroyer can only be mischievous at such a distance as 
enables her to get back to her Port before daylight for the English “Swifts” (we 
want more of that type) waiting off the rabbit holes upon their return. On the wide 
ocean one Indomitable owing to her immense superiority of speed in a sea-way… 
would overtake and lick up one after another any number of destroyers!’51 
 
Furthermore, Fisher described secret proposals he had prepared for Baltic operations by British 
submarines in defence of Denmark and even the Russian capital (‘defenceless against German 
Fleet’), combined with an eventual landing by Russian forces ‘90 miles from Berlin.’52 Apart 
from Fisher’s plans for Russian amphibious operations along the Pomeranian coast, nothing in 
these proposals differ from 1907’s Plan (A) when the improvement in the capabilities of 
Germany’s torpedo craft since 1907 are considered.53 The lack of emphasis regarding the British 
heavy units (battlecruisers excluded) is not necessarily evidence Fisher had no use for them, only 
                                                 
48
 Bridgeman to Fisher, 4 December 1911, F.P. 547, f. 7-8, FISR 1/11, Fisher MSS. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Nicholas Lambert, JFNR, pp. 244-245. 
51
 Fisher to Churchill, 6 November 1911, f. 16-18, CHAR 13/2, Chartwell MSS. 
52
 Fisher to Churchill, n.d. [c. December 1911], f. 5-8, CHAR 13/43, ibid. See also Fisher to Churchill, n.d. [c. 
January 1912], f. 1-5, CHAR 13/14. Dating taken from Nicholas Lambert, op. cit., p. 378n100. 
53
 See Gray (ed.), Conway’s 1906-1921, pp. 164-168. 
258 
 
that he envisioned the great majority of operations being conducted by light forces. Nowhere was 
an eventual general engagement between fleets ruled out, nor was it mutually exclusive to 
Fisher’s proposals. 
Armed with Fisher’s advice and his own hopes for economy, Churchill set to work on the 
Estimates for the 1912-13 financial year. The McKenna-Wilson administration had already 
worked out a proposed construction programme of four dreadnoughts, five light cruisers, twenty 
destroyers and six submarines. The resultant increase in financial liabilities would be £11.3 
million from which £8.4 million resulted from the four planned dreadnoughts.
54
 In terms of 
reductions, an obvious place to start was the disposal of whatever old warships were deemed 
expendable by the Board. As Churchill explained to the prospective Second Sea Lord, Prince 
Louis of Battenberg, ‘The very first thing that we must tackle is the number of old ships to be 
kept in commission. Upon that manning, stores, and repairs mainly depend.’55 Doing so would 
‘reduce expense on the upkeep of an obsolescent fleet’, thereby ensuring a concomitantly greater 
amount ‘for the development of new teeth and claws.’56 There were qualifications, however: ‘I 
deprecate the sale of any of the battleships at the present time. The old destroyers too should be 
considered in connection with coast defence.’57 
 Insofar as the new construction programme was concerned, ‘my present view is that the 
marked feature should be a multiplication of torpedo craft.’58 Another change would be the 
replacement of the four planned battleships by a super-Lion type battlecruiser of Fisher’s own 
design costing an estimated £1,995,000, of which more will be said later.
59
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Battenberg warned the First Lord some of his schemes were overambitious: ‘The 
difficulty that I foresee’, he warned: 
‘is a cry being raised of your ‘cutting down’ the moment Sir A. Wilson’s back is 
turned. Forgive my mentioning this. I feel sure that you are fully aware of this, 
and that you feel yourself able to refute it in the House—or rather, to prove that it 
is a case of ‘reculer pour mieux sauter.’60 
 
Battenberg’s own suggestions were for a reduction in the Navy’s Mediterranean commitments, 
the details of which will be discussed later. Fisher, as usual, had a much more decisive proposal: 
‘I think in view of the immense increase of gun power in your new ships that you might only 
have 3 & take the money of the 4
th
 for submarines chiefly & a few more destroyers.’61 Nicholas 
Lambert views this substitution as a radical departure from previous practice.
62
 However this is 
not necessarily an accurate descriptor, since as shown in Chapter 4, many previous construction 
programmes had seen ships of one kind substituted for another as part of the usual budgetary 
horse-trading that the yearly estimates went through. The major difference now, of course, lay in 
the particular classes of ships under consideration for substitution. 
Churchill’s solution was the abandonment of plans to station the Indomitable in the 
Pacific as per the 1909 naval agreement with the Dominions to build up a new force of capital 
ships in the Pacific. Responding to a memorandum from Bridgeman on the requirements needed 
to maintain 60% superiority over the High Seas Fleet in Home Waters, Churchill noted a 
requirement to order four dreadnoughts ‘is on the assumption that the Indomitable should be sent 
to China in January 1912, and that the New Zealand should follow when completed.’ If 
Indomitable remained in Britain only three new dreadnoughts were needed. Furthermore, this 
proposal ‘would open two very important … possibilities, first a largely increased construction 
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of torpedo craft… and secondly, if the Germans increase their Navy Law by laying down an 
extra Cruiser, we could immediately reply by adding 2 battle-cruisers to our programme which 
would then be 5.’ Churchill therefore proposed ‘as an alternative to the programme submitted 
that we should build 3 new capital ships and retain the Indomitable’, saving £2,100,000.63 The 
money thus saved would go to ten submarines and ten destroyers, thus providing a total of forty-
six new flotilla craft when added to the twenty-six already planned. British strength in torpedo 
craft would be thus almost doubled. Total new construction expenditure would be £11,350,000.
64
 
Churchill quickly found that his proposal was unfavourable to the rest of the Board. The 
principal objection was to replacing the new battleships with battlecruisers, especially since the 
decision was made to develop a new 25-knot battleship carrying 15-inch guns, a design which 
Bridgeman and Battenberg were very much in favour.
65
 
 
The Novelle 
In Britain one isotope to be detected in the fallout from the Agadir Crisis was the firming 
up of the rift in the Asquith Cabinet regarding relations with Germany. Esher observed in 
November 1911 that, notably, ‘Morley believes in capturing German sentiment. Winston thinks 
Germany L’ennemi, and uncapturable.’ 66  In Germany, the reaction was much the same. As 
Professor Marder wrote, ‘[t]he effect of the Agadir Crisis in Germany had been to exasperate 
feeling against England and convince the press that Germany must have more ships.’67 Admiral 
Tirpitz, a seasoned political animal, saw this as an opportunity for further expansion of his own 
bureaucratic preserve. Thus in the autumn of 1911 he proposed a modification of Germany’s 
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naval aims. Instead of merely building to complete the fleet required by the extant Navy Laws, 
the new objective would be a 2:3 ratio of capital ships versus Britain. Such a ratio was easily 
understandable ‘from the King down to the beggar.’68 
In his first public speech as First Lord, at Guildhall on November 9
th
, Winston Churchill 
attempted to dissuade the Germans. In a piece of rhetoric aimed at both Germany and the 
economists in his own party, Churchill suggested there was hope for substantial reductions in 
future Naval Estimates, foreign situation permitting. This was not mere talk; Churchill had 
already been in correspondence with McKenna on the matter and hoped that a rumoured 
reduction of £1,700,000 could be achieved.
69
 Churchill retrospectively justified himself by 
claiming that he ‘felt I should be all the stronger in asking the Cabinet and the House of 
Commons for the necessary monies, if I could go hand in hand with the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and testify that we had tried out best to secure a mitigation of the naval rivalry and 
failed.’70 
Failure was fast in coming. A draft of the new German Novelle caused great alarm when 
shown to the Cabinet. In a hurried letter to Sir Edward Grey, Churchill wrote that Germany’s 
naval increases ‘are serious & will require new & vigorous measures on our part.’71 Especially 
troubling was the effect on future naval construction: 
‘I had been thinking that if the old German programme had been adhered to we 
shd have built 4,3,4,3,4,3 against their 6 years programme of 2,2,2,2,2,2. If their 
new programme stands, as I fear it must, & they build 3,2,3,2,3,2, we cannot build 
less than 5,4,5,4,5. This maintains 60% superiority over Germany only in 
Dreadnoughts & Dreadnt Cruisers. It will also be 2 keels to 1 on their additional 3 
ships.’ 
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This was not the only problem. The new Novelle would also create a third permanently-manned 
German battleship squadron of the Hocheseeflotte, leaving the Admiralty forced to make their 
North Sea force calculations against a German force of twenty-five battleships
72
 instead of the 
previous seventeen. 
This increase in German strength in the North Sea meant a further reorganization of the 
Home Fleet was inevitable. In fact, a new reorganization of the fleet was already in the works, 
but the Novelle announcement gave it new urgency. At the same time as the Naval Staff was 
being drawn up, Churchill had sought out advice on a rearrangement of the fleet with an eye 
towards both greater economy and increased effectiveness. On December 7
th
, Prince Louis had 
submitted a minute enumerating ‘the broad lines on which floating material of the Navy 
(excluding foreign Stations) could be best divided up’ during peacetime. Battenberg suggested 
three categories: 
‘1. The bulk of all classes of ships and vessels of the latest types in full 
commission. (Present 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Divisions, Home Fleet). 
2. A certain proportion (earlier types) of ships in commission with Nucleus 
Crews- the balance of Active Service personnel actually available at their 
manning ports. (Present 3
rd
 Division, Home Fleet). 
3. The remainder of the Fleet fit to fight – the oldest types – in Reserve, ready to 
be mobilized as soon as their proportion of Reserve Crews have arrived, on being 
called out. (Present 4
th
 Division, Home Fleet).’73 
 
Churchill took these suggestions to heart, writing back on Boxing Day that ‘I have spent a lot of 
time on the organisation of the Fleet in 1912-13.’74 Amongst the options was the withdrawal of 
the Navy’s Mediterranean battleships, which on arrival in Britain would go into ‘the new A.1. 
reserve’, meaning the current 3rd Division of the Home Fleet.75 Amongst other changes would be 
a complete redesignation of the Home Fleet’s component parts, for in Churchill’s opinion the 
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extant nomenclature ‘was misleading and confused.’ Especially vexing to the First Lord was that 
‘[t]he word ‘Division’ was used in three different senses, sometimes tactical and sometimes 
administrative.’76 In part-place, the system of numbered Squadrons used for cruisers would be 
extended to capital ships. Early on, Churchill seemed to hope they could be more than this, as he 
wrote to Battenberg that, ‘The 4th Battle Squadron must be a complete fleet: 9 battleships[,] 5 
armoured cruisers, 3 protected cruisers and the et ceteras.’ 77  The Fourth Battle Squadron, 
however, was meant to be the Gibraltar-based replacement for the Mediterranean battle fleet, so 
it may have been a special case. 
The matter of fleet reorganization was further discussed between Admiral Bridgeman and 
Churchill in January. Among the points discussed was the nature of the C.-in-C. Home Fleet’s 
command responsibilities. Battenberg wrote that ‘I rejoice to hear you have been discussing with 
the First Sea Lord the question of putting an end to the present unsound organization in Home 
Fleet, whereby the C. in C. is charged, over and above his legitimate work, with the direct 
command of one of the Divisions of the Fleet.’78 The Second Sea Lord, recalling Churchill’s 
military background, likened it to the commanding general of an army division being also in 
simultaneous permanent command of one of his division’s brigades. 
The heavy units of the Home Fleet were not the only ones to be reformed. Churchill 
intended any new organization to extend all the way down. ‘I do’, he informed Battenberg, ‘now 
feel able to carry it further than large armoured ships.’79 In this connection, the Home Fleet’s 
destroyer flotillas came under scrutiny. Admiral Bridgeman, doubtless drawing on his extensive 
experience as C.-in-C., Home Fleet, led the way. On January 27
th
 the First Sea Lord minuted to 
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Chief of Staff Troubridge that in his opinion ‘[t]he size of Destroyer Flotillas appears to require 
modifications.’80 The current twenty-four ship flotillas left both the Commodore (T) and the 
Captains (D) an ‘unreasonably heavy’ load of clerical work, and Bridgeman felt a reduction to 
twenty per flotilla would be a great improvement. Troubridge dutifully passed the matter on to 
Captain George Ballard, now the director of the War Staff’s Operations Department. Ballard’s 
response proposed creating a fourth fully-manned flotilla from ships drawn from the other three. 
Each flotilla would be given two cruisers, one as flagship and the second as a supporting scout. 
 
Flagship Scout Depot Ship Destroyers Base 
First Flotilla Blonde Pathfinder Venus 20 Acherons Rosyth 
Second Flotilla Bellona Attentive Blake 16 Acorns Rosyth 
Seventh Flotilla Boadicea Patrol Blenheim 16 Beagles Harwich 
New (Fifth) 
Flotilla 
Blanche Adventure Hecla 
4 Acorns & 
12 Tribals 
Portland 
 
Other changes planned included a total reorganization of the existing Sixth Flotilla, which as 
then organized was in Ballard’s opinion ‘not a flotilla in any proper sense.’81 The destroyers of 
that flotilla would be broken up amongst the local Torpedo Boat Flotillas at Devonport, Chatham, 
and Portsmouth. Both Battenberg and Controller Charles Briggs
82
 were amenable to the proposal, 
though the Second Sea Lord regretted it would not ‘give me any relief in men’.83 Battenberg’s 
solution was to distribute twenty-four ‘Coastals’ eight apiece amongst three nucleus crew 
flotillas. Briggs also noted that the second-class cruiser Venus could be replaced by a new depot 
ship provided for in the latest Estimates. Troubridge added little to Ballard’s proposal, but noted 
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that a further division of the destroyers into five flotillas instead of four would needlessly 
overcomplicate arrangements.
84
 
 Subsequent discussions changed little of the original Ballard proposal, although when 
questioned on the need for economy in personnel arrangements by Bridgeman, which were 
considered ‘evidently undesirable from the “War Plans” point of view’ Battenberg insisted they 
were essential, but suggested sending several old second class cruisers into 4
th
 Division reserve 
instead of any change to the flotillas.
85
 Troubridge found this acceptable.
86
 Also accepted was a 
reduction of twenty-three ‘30-knotters’ to care and maintenance crews only. 
The First Lord announced the new Admiralty policies to the Commons on March 18
th
. In 
Churchill’s words he proposed ‘to lay bare to them this afternoon, with perfect openness, the 
naval situation.’87 The new organization was based largely on Battenberg’s original December 7th 
proposal. The details were issued to the fleets in an Admiralty minute on March 29
th
 and were set 
to take effect on May 1
st
.
88
 In place of the old divisional structure, the Home Fleet would be 
comprised of three separate fleets: the First, Second, and Third. Each of these was manned to a 
different scale based on mobilization considerations, or as the official language ran, ‘These 
Fleets are therefore administrative and not tactical classifications.’ The First Fleet contained all 
ships in full commission, the Second Fleet comprised the ships in commission but manned by 
nucleus crews, and the Third Fleet ships were those in reserve either with nucleus crews or 
simply care and maintenance parties. 
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Thus constituted, the Home Fleet would be arranged into eight Squadrons, each 
comprised of a Battle Squadron and a Cruiser Squadron plus supporting vessels. The 1
st
 and 2
nd
 
Divisions of the Home Fleet became the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Squadrons while the Atlantic Fleet became 
the 3
rd
 Squadron, and it was planned to constitute a 4
th
 Squadron subsequently. The old 3
rd
 and 
4
th
 Divisions of the Home Fleet would be split into the 5
th
 and 6
th
 Squadrons and 7
th
 and 8
th
 
Squadrons respectively. The C.-in-C., Home Fleet would now ‘have place under his direct 
command such fleets and squadrons as Their Lordships consider proper.’ What this meant in the 
normal course of events was that his command included ‘the whole of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd 
Fleets.’ The overall arrangement would be: 
First Fleet Second Fleet Third Fleet 
1
st
 Squadron 
2
nd
 Squadron 
3
rd
 Squadron 
4
th
 Squadron 
5
th
 Squadron 
6
th
 Squadron 
7
th
 Squadron 
8
th
 Squadron 
9
th
 Cruiser Squadron 
10
th
 Cruiser Squadron 
11
th
 Cruiser Squadron 
 
In the event, the combined cruiser-battleship squadrons never became official and are seldom if 
ever referred to after this announcement. 
Aside from hurrying on the reorganization of the Home Fleet, ‘Germany’s intransigence 
helped solve Churchill’s domestic political problem of rallying Liberals to the Admiralty’s 
shipbuilding program.’ However, ‘Berlin’s blunt refusal to consider the holiday plan still left 
Britain with the strategic problem of facing simultaneous naval build-ups by great powers other 
than Germany.’89 Though the Estimates issue had been somewhat eased by the Novelle, no First 
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Lord and especially not Churchill could expect to count on the German government to put 
forward a major naval reform every time the Admiralty’s financial situation was threatened.90 
 
The Queen Elizabeths 
For the 1912-13 Estimates, Churchill had from almost from the beginning been 
considering another leap forward in battleship design. He was not alone in this desire, as 
witnessed by the broad support given to it by most of the naval members of the Board. His 
claimed inspiration was Fisher and McKenna’s decision in 1909 to replace the 12-inch gun with 
the 13.5-incher.
91
 Churchill claimed that he ‘immediately sought to go one size better’, giving the 
new battleships an armament of 15-inch guns.
92
 Such a gun was already in train, preliminary 
considerations having begun in February 1911 when D.N.O. Moore asked the Ordnance Board to 
consider both a 15-inch and a 14.5-inch design.
93
 
In addition to this upgrade in firepower, an increase in speed to 25 knots was planned. 
Fisher approved of the new gun, but practically nothing else, referring to the new design as a 
‘d—d hybrid’.94 This might at first seem unusual, since Churchill’s proposed specifications were 
not far distant from Fisher’s 1906 fusion design. However by 1911, with the Lion-class 
battlecruisers—from which trial speeds of 30 knots were hoped for—under construction, 
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anything slower than that in Fisher’s mind was a retrograde step. Just as unwanted in the old 
Admiral’s opinion was the 6-inch anti-torpedo boat battery. 
Secrecy was considered essential, as the following note in the Ships Cover indicates: 
‘This design is to be regarded as secret, and neither the design as a whole nor any 
features of it should be mentioned, either inside or outside of this office, to 
anyone whatever except people actually engaged on the design.’95 
 
This secrecy extended to descriptions of the armament in the D. N. C.’s paperwork—the new gun 
was referred to as the ‘14 inch experimental gun.’96 
While the earliest design documents in the Queen Elizabeth class’s Ships Cover are 
from May and June of 1912, preliminary specifications for armament and speed were clearly 
ready by October of 1911, when Churchill discussed the proposed design with Fisher at Reigate 
Priory.
97
 These facts, combined with the commencement of work on a 15-inch gun by the 
Ordnance Board in early 1911, suggest that the Wilson-McKenna regime may have been 
considering the possibility of such a vessel before their ouster. If so—and the evidence either for 
or against this is scanty—then the inception of the Queen Elizabeth class, which are ton for ton 
probably the finest capital ships ever built by the Royal Navy, is another example of Churchill 
being able to achieve something great thanks to the unrecognized preparations of his 
predecessors. 
Over the next seven months occurred the ‘vast process of juggling and haggling’ needed 
to produce a satisfactory design.
98
 One proposal, which must have been amongst the very first 
and may date from the last months of McKenna’s First Lordship, was for a slightly enlarged Iron 
Duke with ten 15-inchers. This design would have the usual 21-knot speed and ‘carry armour 
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which on the armoured belt, the turrets and the conning tower would reach the thickness 
unprecedented in the British Service of 13 inches.’99 Very quickly this design gave way to a more 
radical design, sacrificing one turret to gain a higher speed of 25 knots, thus granting the ability 
of the ships to work as a semi-autonomous ‘fast division’ of the battlefleet. In The World Crisis, 
Churchill suggests this speed was worked out ‘on the tactical board’ by the War College on the 
basis of the ‘speed required in a Fast Division in order to ensure this Division being able to 
manœuvre around the German Fleet as it would be in the years 1914 and 1915.’100 While such a 
request was doubtless made to the War College, it seems likely that 25 knots speed was already 
in the specifications by October 1911, if Lord Fisher’s ‘d—d hybrid’ of November 9th comment 
is any indication. 
Attaining 25 knots without a massive increase in size became the key consideration. The 
battlecruiser Lion and her successors were all much larger than their battleship counterparts 
owing to their massive engineering spaces.
101
 The solution was the total replacement of coal by 
oil fuel, which had a much higher caloric efficiency. The Navy had by 1911 accepted oil fuel for 
destroyers, despite an initial reversion to coal after the endurance of Fisher’s Tribals proved 
disappointingly low. Utilizing it in battleships, though, would bring about new logistical issues, 
and by all accounts, the decision for oil-only fuel for the Queen Elizabeths was not decisively 
made until after the final design was selected in June 1912.
102
 This design was known internally 
as ‘RˈIII’, and was selected in preference to two other designs: ‘RIII’ and ‘RIV’. Considering 
dreadnought design names for this period ran more or less sequentially, and that the finalized 
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design for the Iron Duke class was ‘MIV’,
103
 it seems likely that designs ‘N’ to ‘RII’, if they ever 
existed, were either preliminary proposals for the Queen Elizabeths or alternative designs. 
Whatever the case, ‘RˈIII’ was preferred because she included additional torpedo protection 
lacking in the original ‘RIII’ design, and had a better turret arrangement than ‘RIV’, which used 
the same layout as the Lions and the Queen Mary, thus sacrificing the ability of ‘Q’ turret to fire 
astern.
104
 The belt armour was still the same thirteen inches as the original proposal for the 
enlarged Iron Duke, but for the conning tower and turrets it was reduced to twelve inches in the 
interests of higher speed. 
Churchill defended himself from Fisher’s deprecations of the use of armour in general by 
pointing out that armour ‘forces the use of armour-punching as against high-explosive shells with 
consequent tremendous diminution in destructive power: with high explosive shells even, the 
bulk of the explosion remains outside.’ 105  Fisher, however, did not consider this a strong 
argument.
106
 
The resulting five ships (originally four until the Federated States of Malaya gifted the 
funds for a fifth vessel to the Admiralty
107
) can safely be said to have satisfied, and indeed 
exceeded, the Admiralty’s hopes for them.108 Sir Francis Bridgeman, who as First Sea Lord had 
signed off on the design along with Churchill, was especially proud of them. During the war he 
wrote to Jack Sandars of the Queen Elizabeth herself that ‘I regard her & her sister ships as my 
special children.’ 109  Despite this enthusiasm, the Queen Elizabeths had some important 
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detractors from the very start. Lord Fisher, as has been noted, felt them to be a ‘d—d hybrid’ type. 
Sir George King-Hall recorded that Sir Henry Jackson felt ‘that Battleships were getting too big 
and he had set his face against the 15” guns most determinedly.’110 Civil Lord George Lambert 
was another dissenter—when the final design for the Queen Elizabeths was approved by the 
Board of Admiralty at their July 17
th
 meeting, Lambert insisted that a note be added enumerating 
his objections. Lambert felt there was no need to make the leap to 15-inch guns in the 1912-13 
Programme and that in any case, all British battleships should carry at minimum ten guns instead 
of the eight planned for the Queen Elizabeths.
111
 
Having established the new design and committed to its construction, the matter of 
securing a sufficient supply of fuel oil became paramount. Churchill knew just the man for the 
job: Lord Fisher, and the remainder of the ex-First Sea Lord’s principle activities were related to 
matters arising for his work as Chairman of the Royal Commission on Fuel and Engines, which 
ultimately led to the Anglo-Persian Oil agreement. 
 
Groping For a Strategy 
As Churchill and the Admiralty were occupied with the Mediterranean and the Pacific, 
the new War Staff was given the job of revising the Navy’s strategic plans for war with Germany. 
The traditional close observational blockade and amphibious operations against the German 
coast had been one of the major reasons for the dismissal of McKenna and Wilson. Furthermore 
the new Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, Sir George Callaghan, was distinctly unhappy 
with those same plans. On January 9
th
, 1912 Callaghan submitted a lengthy complaint to the 
Admiralty which had obviously been a long time in coming.
112
 There was little about the plans 
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from their schedule of officers to be supplied with copies to peace distribution to actual wartime 
objectives that Callaghan found appealing. Nicholas Lambert goes so far as to describe 
Callaghan finding the plans incomprehensible, ‘confused in detail and riddled with 
inconsistencies.’113 
Of specific complaints, Callaghan observed that one of the destroyer flotillas destined for 
observation duties in the Heligoland Bight was expected to take up patrol duties in the Thames 
during the period of strained relations in lieu of preparation for its wartime duties. ‘Since the 
watching operations on the Enemy’s Coast are to be under the control of the Commodore T,’ 
Callaghan pointedly observed, ‘it is considered essential that the whole of his Flotilla should be 
fresh and ready to accompany him at a moment[’]s notice to the Enemy’s Coast.’114 The plans 
listed the old Cressy-class armoured cruisers as being part of the support force for the initial 
observation line, to which Callaghan replied that as those ships were being passed into care and 
maintenance reserve they were ‘unlikely to be available on the outbreak of hostilities’. Callaghan 
was no less sanguine when it came to the observational blockade strategy as a whole: 
‘It is submitted that the whole question of the Heligoland Bight Blockade, which 
depends largely on the policy with regard to Heligoland, be reviewed and also the 
duties of the 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, and 7
th
 Flotillas.’ 
 
By way of explanation, Callaghan observed that ‘our present margin of superiority in destroyers 
seems insufficient to establish a watch in the mouths of the Rivers in the manner suggested.’ 
As for the matter of conducting a campaign of coastal assaults using the heavy ships of 
Home Fleet, Callaghan was something more than incredulous. ‘The employment of a portion of 
the Main Fleet in operation against land defences, as recommended in these notes, appears to me 
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to be open to grave objection’, he wrote.115 Not helping were ‘other points in the Notes which I 
do not understand, e.g. the duties proposed for the “Hearty”, the use of our minelayers at the 
mouths of the German Rivers and the value of Cruisers of the “Edgar” class in bombarding land 
defences.’ 
Callaghan was not the only senior Home Fleet officer to be troubled by the state of the 
existing plans. Another was Sir Robert Arbuthnot, the Commodore (T). The eccentric Arbuthnot, 
now historically infamous for his suicidal handling of the First Cruiser Squadron at Jutland, is, to 
quote Andrew Gordon’s description of the similarly-inclined Sir Algernon ‘Pompo’ Heneage, ‘a 
historical tourist attraction’ of the Prewar Era.116 Though not a formal member of the ‘Fishpond’, 
Fisher was nonetheless fond of him, memorializing him after Jutland as ‘a favourite Midshipman 
of mine.’117 
In late December 1911, Arbuthnot complained to Callaghan that the planned stationing of 
the First Destroyer Flotilla in Yarmouth Roads was not at all suitable. ‘A year’s experience with 
the Flotilla, and a year’s consideration of these questions, have convinced me that a Flotilla, 
returning from 4 days’ work on an enemy’s coast, requires a properly protected Base, in which it 
can coal, oil, repair and rest, in any weather, under the protection of the Base’s Military defences.’ 
These requirements, Arbuthnot wrote, ‘cannot be in any way met by Yarmouth Roads.’118 For a 
man so famous for driving his men and himself as hard as possible to make this claim gives it 
substantial weight. 
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These complaints by prominent seagoing officers were taken seriously at the Admiralty. 
Churchill had quickly grown to admire the Home Fleet C.-in-C., writing in March after a visit to 
the fleet at Portland that ‘They are vy simple these sailors; but this one — Callaghan — is 
sensible.’ 119  In the meantime, Chief of the War Staff Troubridge had assured Sir Francis 
Bridgeman that most of Callaghan’s complaints were to be ‘dealt with in the new War Plans 
which will very shortly be ready to issue.’120 Accordingly the Admiralty informed Callaghan in 
early April that ‘the Blockade by the British Fleet of the whole German Coast on the North Sea is 
to be considered as cancelled.’121 In the meantime, Callaghan had informed the Admiralty he had 
no intention of drawing up fresh war orders for his fleet until his complaints had been 
considered.
122
 
The results of the War Staff’s efforts in early 1912 have been almost universally 
condemned, with Grimes calling them ‘as flawed as the strategy it was meant to supersede.’123 
Only Nicholas Black has anything approaching a kind word for the scheme.
124
 Usually referred 
to as ‘Intermediate Blockade’, the plan was a break, albeit a somewhat half-hearted one, from the 
previous observational blockade paradigm. Nevertheless, it shared much with earlier plans, 
although considering the limited number of realistic strategic choices available for operations in 
the North Sea this was probably inevitable. Nevertheless it does not seem entirely fair to imply 
Troubridge and his assistants culled most of the plan straight from the 1908 ‘W’ series.125 
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The outbreak of war with Germany would see the First Fleet’s four Battle Squadrons 
‘together with such cruisers and flotillas as their Lordships may determine’ into the North Sea 
‘northabout’ to proceed ‘to Scapa Flow, to Cromarty, or to Rosyth, or to remain at sea, according 
to circumstances.’126 These units would become the Northern Fleet, and their main wartime base 
was to be Rosyth. Meanwhile the major share of the Second and Third Fleets would remain in 
the south, forming the Southern Fleet; the Fifth and Sixth Battle Squadrons assembling at either 
Spithead or Portland, and the Seventh and Eighth Battle Squadrons at Portland. This at least was 
the plan if an Anglo-German war broke out after a period of strained relations. If war came 
suddenly, the ‘first essential’ would be to maintain a unified battle fleet ‘of sufficient strength to 
enable it to seek a battle with the whole German Navy; and until this condition has been 
established no division of the fleets into a North and Southern Fleet can take place.’ Subsidiary 
operations included the distant commercial blockade, enforced by the Ninth and Tenth Cruiser 
Squadrons on patrol between the Shetlands and the Stadlandet Peninsula. 
Provided there was time for the fleet to assemble before war commenced, it was intended 
to string a cruiser-flotilla line across the North Sea: 
‘Five Cruiser Squadrons and four Flotillas will be stationed from Stavanger to the 
Hook of Holland, to each of which squadron and flotilla an area will be assigned 
over which they will patrol. This patrolling movement will be uniform both as to 
course and speed throughout the area to be patrolled. Forty miles to the westward 
there will be stationed a line of “look-outs.” This line will consist of steam 
trawlers or other small vessels fitted with wireless telegraphy. 
‘Each Cruiser Admiral will have a group of these craft under his orders, and their 
positions relative to the patrolling cruisers will be fixed. 
‘The 1st Cruiser Squadron will be stationed at a distance of about 90 miles to the 
westward of the patrolling cruisers in readiness to support them if required or to 
fall back on the Battle Fleets if necessary. 
‘All the flotillas that are under the orders of the Admiral of the Patrols will also be 
available to reinforce any of these outlying forces if considered desirable. 
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‘Thus the watch will be maintained by a triple line working throughout in concert, 
of which the first will be patrolling squadrons and flotillas strong enough to deal 
with any but the most serious movements of the enemy; the second, of fixed lines 
of observation only; and the third, of a fast and powerful supporting squadron 
certainly capable of reaching and engaging or keeping in touch with anything 
which passes the others.’127 
 
These deployments were to be made ‘[a]s soon as possible after the warning telegram or the 
outbreak of hostilities.’ Once they were in place, the battle fleets could await a German sortie. No 
efforts would be taken to obstruct such a sortie, until the Hochseeflotte reached a point ‘that will 
render his return to his own ports without fighting a battle an impossibility’, hopefully a location 
‘in proximity to our own coasts and harbours and as far distant as possible from his own.’128 
Most desirable would be a general engagement where the Germans would be caught between the 
Northern and Southern Fleets with one cutting across their line of retreat. 
The ‘Intermediate Blockade’ scheme can be seen as an attempt to combine two 
competing strategies: observational blockade and distant patrols. Unfortunately, the results 
obtained during trials showed the concept had the flaws of both and the merits of neither. The 
line selected was too great for the available forces to cover, leaving the patrolling cruisers too far 
apart and the blockade as a whole open to evasion or piecemeal destruction by enemy forces. 
Other aspects of the concept were problematic too. The Navy possessed too few cruisers and 
destroyers for such an undertaking, and the establishment and maintenance of the nearly 350 
mile cordon has been quite fairly described by Grimes as a ‘logistical and communications 
nightmare’.129 In fairness to Troubridge and the planners, however, they had been given a major 
task to accomplish and little time with which to accomplish it. Furthermore, apart from the long 
patrol line, many features of this proposal survived into later War Plans. 
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Churchill seems to have been sceptical (at the very least) about the prospects of 
intermediate blockade from the beginning. To his wife he wrote in March that ‘the war plans put 
forward by the staff have several stupid features about them wh have caused me some worry. I 
am gradually purging them of foolishness … it is extraordinary how little some of these officers 
have really thought upon war on the largest scale.’ 130  Before the plan could be officially 
approved, Churchill sent what in Bridgeman’s words was a ‘truly Winstonian telegram’ setting 
aside the adoption of any new war orders before Troubridge’s proposed cordon could be tested in 
the annual manoeuvres.
131
 More evidence of Churchill's displeasure with these initial plans was 
recorded by Grant Duff, who claimed in his diary ‘upon good authority’ that when the plans were 
submitted to Churchill, after having been initialled by Bridgeman and Battenberg, the First Lord 
‘read them & tore them in half – saying that he would lay down the plans for war!’132 There 
matters ground to a halt until the cruiser cordons could be tested. 
 
The 1912 Manoeuvres 
As in previous years, the 1912 Summer Manoeuvres provided the Royal Navy an 
opportunity to carry out trials of new tactics and strategies on the largest scale practicable in 
peacetime. In a briefing written for Prime Minister Asquith in October, Churchill described the 
‘special purpose’ of the 1912 Summer Manoeuvres as being ‘to test certain situations and 
dispositions possible in the initial phase of a potential war between Great Britain and 
Germany.’ 133  As already indicated, one such disposition was Troubridge’s proposal for an 
‘intermediate blockade’ of cruisers and light craft strung across the North Sea. There was also the 
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matter of the defence of the British coast against raiding expeditions in the absence of the British 
Army’s expeditionary forces.134 An economic blockade was implicit in the Manoeuvres’ scheme: 
one condition of the manoeuvres was a prohibition against the movement either side’s forces 
across longitude 61° north. When Callaghan expressed his incredulity and warned such a 
restriction ‘might lead to fallacious conclusions’,135 it was explained to Callaghan privately (for 
reasons of secrecy) as representing a cruiser line that the forces available for the manoeuvres 
could not provide.
136
 
With these factors in mind the General Scheme for the manoeuvres makes interesting 
reading. The majority of the action was naturally expected to occur in the North Sea. The Blue 
Fleet represented the British with coastal territory being the entirety of the British Isles except a 
sector from Flamborough Head to Dungeness. The opposing Red territory extended from 
Yarmouth and its associated Roads to Dungeness.
137
 Red’s objectives were ‘any and all of the 
following’: Covering a landing on the Blue coast, and the disruption of Atlantic mercantile trade 
either by a show of strength requiring the intervention of the Blue Fleet’s main force or through 
cruiser activity while the Blue Fleet was occupied. Blue’s objective was to prevent Red fulfilling 
any of these conditions.
138
 In lieu of actual troop transports it was decided that Red battleships 
could be declared as transports carrying 3,000 men each. Blue would be commanded by the 
Second Sea Lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg; Red by Admiral Callaghan. Admiral Sir William 
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May was chosen to be Umpire-in-Chief with his flag aboard the armoured cruiser Euryalus. The 
order of battle for both sides was as follows: 
Blue Fleet Red Fleet 
2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 5
th
 Battle Squadrons 1
st
, 7
th
 Battle Squadrons 
Lion, Indefatigable Inflexible, Invincible 
2
nd
, 3
rd
, 5
th
, 6
th
 Cruiser Squadrons 
Minelaying Cruisers 
4
th
 and Mediterranean Cruiser Squadrons 
1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 Destroyer Flotillas 4
th
, 6
th
, 7
th
 Destroyer Flotillas 
III, IV, VI, VII Submarine Flotillas VIII Submarine Flotilla 
Minesweepers 2 Aircraft 
 
Of interest are the maximum ranges allowed for effective fire. These were 9,000 yards by day, 
3,000 yards after dark. The Manoeuvres would commence on the night of July 11
th
. 
Once the Manoeuvres commenced, Callaghan planned to send his faster battle squadron 
plus cruisers and a destroyer flotilla into the Atlantic via Fair Island. Meanwhile his older 
battleships plus two cruisers and the balance of his destroyers would sail to land troops at 
Filey.
139
 Red’s first approach to Filey was spoilt by dense fog, which was fortunate as Blue’s 
ships were not in position for a timely intervention. After a brief withdrawal, Callaghan turned 
around and succeeded in getting his two battlecruisers into the Atlantic accompanied by the 
armoured cruisers Hampshire and Suffolk. Then, after regrouping his forces, Callaghan made 
another attempt to land at Filey. This time he was successful, claiming to have landed more than 
28,000 troops before Blue arrived to intervene. Callaghan pulled out from Filey, sacrificing the 
Majestics of his Seventh Battle Squadron to escape. Soon afterwards the Admiralty pulled the 
plug on the Manoeuvres. 
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Troubridge’s patrol lines had failed to provide an adequate observation force, and 
although George Ballard, now Director of the Operations Division of the War Staff, still 
considered the principle sound, Churchill felt ‘vindicated’ and ordered a new start be made.140 
 
Six via Four 
Alongside all the other milestones and crises, 1912 saw the start of construction of the 
four Iron Duke-class super-dreadnoughts, and indeed the launching of the Iron Duke herself.
141
 
As mentioned previously, the Iron Dukes reintroduced the 6-inch gun to the British battleship, 
though for a completely different purpose than the 6-inch batteries mounted aboard the pre-
dreadnoughts. This fact is reflected in a memorandum from the D.N.O. to the Controller from 
August 1911: ‘It is assumed that these guns are to be considered as anti-torpedo boat guns both 
for day and night and not as part of the main armament.’142 So it seems certain the reversion to 6-
inch guns was entirely motivated by concerns over defence against torpedo attacks by enemy 
flotillas. This decision was not without controversy, even within the Admiralty. Aside from 
Fisher’s venomous objections, both Bridgeman and Jellicoe had previously objected to an 
armament of guns larger than 4-inchers, although there is little evidence either of them opposed 
the change when it came with the Iron Dukes.
143
 
Even Churchill seems to have developed certain doubts. In October 1912, the Third Sea 
Lord asked the D.N.C. if 12-pounder guns could be fitted to the Queen Elizabeths—and 
presumably the Iron Dukes as well. Constructor H.R. Champness duly produced tracings 
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showing that twelve could be mounted with accommodation for 200 rounds per gun.
144
 D.N.O. 
Tudor pointed out that several of the proposed positions were totally unsuitable owing to blast 
effects from the main armament, graphically noting that in one case ‘the gun and mounting 
would be blown to pieces by the blast from ‘B’ turret guns if they are not actually fouled by the 
guns themselves.’145 The First Sea Lord was very much against the entire idea of adding more 
guns to the new ships: 
 ‘I am averse to three types of guns being mounted in one ship- it is apt to create 
confusion, & there is nothing a 12 P
r.
 can do that a 6” cant [sic] do - also all our 
experiments in “Skate” show that nothing less than a 4" gun will effectively stop a 
Destroyer! A 6” gun can be brought into action just as quickly as a 12 Pr..’146 
 
The Third Sea Lord was no more supportive: 
‘I am not in favour of adding the 12 prs. The 6 inch guns being loaded can be 
discharged as quickly as the 12 prs, and at night the attacking destroyers will 
certainly get so close before being discovered that unless put out of action by the 
first discharge, their torpedoes will certainly be launched effectively, and it is 
hardly likely that a 12 pr. salvo will prevent this, whereas a 6 inch salvo very 
possibly might.’147 
 
Churchill, characteristically, was not inclined to give up the idea, even faced with this 
unambiguous opposition from the responsible experts. In response to Moore and Bridgeman he 
wrote that ‘Before we come to a final decision upon this, it wd be well to have the subject 
investigated by a cte. There is much to be said on both sides.’148 
Bridgeman’s response can be interpreted in several ways. By this time his relationship 
with Churchill had more or less collapsed completely, and this means that the First Sea Lord may 
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have been intending to be as defiant as possible in his answer. This does not, however, seem very 
likely considering Bridgeman’s capacity for stone-faced professionalism demonstrated during 
Beresford’s assault on the Home Fleet. Sadly for historians looking for vicious interdepartmental 
quarrels, Bridgeman seems to have opposed Churchill’s proposal on purely professional grounds.  
Whatever emotions Bridgeman felt while drawing up his reply, the result was typical of 
the man. His memorandum was a clear and lucid statement of facts. In reference to Churchill’s 
committee proposal, Bridgeman suggested going even farther: ‘I suggest that the whole subject 
of anti-torpedo boat defence requires investigation.’ Reminding the First Lord of the ‘enormous 
amount of money’ devoted to ‘providing men and materiel as a defence against torpedo craft’, it 
was nonetheless ‘open to question whether we are likely to get an adequate return for it and it 
may even be that our efforts are futile and that we are dealing with the problem in an altogether 
out-of-date manner which has not been sufficiently criticised.’ 
Bridgeman began from first principles, describing the manners in which ships could be 
attacked by torpedoes (either by other capital ships, by submarines, or by flotilla craft), and 
noting that the modern torpedo had a range and accuracy ‘which I think is insufficiently realised’, 
a situation which was only increased by the newly-invented ‘Angle Gyroscope’. Torpedo attack 
by enemy heavy ships could only be defended against than remaining outside the enemy’s 
torpedo range, a difficult proposition even with the efforts devoted to long range fire control. 
Against enemy submarines, the battleship’s armament was ‘quite impotent unless the submarine 
is above water or in the unlikely event of the periscope being hit.’ Bridgeman was under no 
illusion, however, as to the unlikelihood of these circumstances. In both cases the most important 
defence for the targeted ship was the strength and internal subdivision of her hull and  anti-
torpedo boat armament was of little relevance to the problem. 
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Turning to the question of defending against enemy torpedo craft, Bridgeman noted that 
by day the anti-torpedo boat battery ‘depend for their usefulness on the present elaborate control  
being intact.’ Beyond that, much would depend on how the enemy flotillas behaved: 
‘If the torpedo boat destroyers come close they will probably be hit, but why 
should they come close by day when there is such a huge target to hit and when 
they can possibly manoeuvre for position… 
‘It is probable that the torpedo boat destroyers will go on closing until they are 
being hit in which case they will fire their torpedoes and a definite percentage will 
hit, and some of the torpedo boat destroyers will be sunk, but after firing their 
torpedoes.’ 
 
In a night attack, British capital ships would be unable to open fire on attacking torpedo craft 
outside the effective range of their searchlights (3000 yards), and Bridgeman believed the 
emphasis placed on strict searchlight discipline (to avoid accidentally showing a light) plus the 
time needed to target the attacking craft meant that in practice the range would be considerably 
less by the time the anti-torpedo boat guns opened fire. Once again, the enemy flotilla would 
probably be able to fire their torpedoes before they suffered losses. There was also the question 
of whether searchlights should even be used, as a squadron proceeding in total darkness would 
be a more difficult target than one using searchlights. It should be noted that in neither of these 
cases did Bridgeman consider counterattacks by British destroyers, since in that case he felt that 
the battleships’ anti-torpedo armament would be irrelevant. 
In summary, Bridgeman asked the following questions: whether searchlights were of use 
or a hazard; whether the present anti-torpedo armament and control systems were worth 
maintaining in future designs; and whether they might be abolished altogether and the weight 
saved used to improve internal protection.
149
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Churchill’s response to Bridgeman’s memorandum was enthusiastic. Forwarding the 
document to Battenberg, the First Lord noted he agreed with Bridgeman’s opinions and ‘the 
conclusions carry us a long way.’ 150  This would have been of little comfort to Bridgeman 
however, as by this time he was being forced out of the Admiralty. In the ruckus that followed, 
Churchill dropped the issue completely, but the matter did not stay dead. 
Nine months later Churchill minuted Moore and Tudor that ‘I must revert to the point I 
raised last year about the anti-torpedo armament of the latest battleships.’151 When asked for 
comment, the new D.N.C., Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt, replied they could be added, but in 
locations where ‘they do not apparently meet the conditions for defence against T.B. attack.’152 
When the question was submitted to the fleet flag officers for their views (possibly a stalling 
tactic by Battenberg), Callaghan replied that additional light guns would be useless except in 
night or thick weather.
153
 
As for the 6-inch battery’s utility in a fleet action, Callaghan had already shown himself a 
disbeliever. In his report on the gunnery exercise carried out against the old battleship Empress of 
India, part of which included the light cruiser Liverpool pounding away with her 6-inch 
armament, Callaghan remarked: 
‘The six-inch gun in battleships can be considered of very little use at ranges over 
8,000 yards, or probably 7,000 yards may be nearer the mark, when engaged with 
the main armament at the same target. 
‘In this connection the question may arise as to whether the 6-inch guns of “IRON 
DUKE” class should fire at battle practice at the same target as the main (13.5”) 
armament; I would take this opportunity of recommending they should not do so.’ 
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Once again, a senior officer had declared against using a battleship’s 6-inch guns against the 
enemy’s battleships. However, the 6-inch guns were not to be considered worthless: 
‘One other hand, the firing of “LIVERPOOL” clearly showed the importance of 
armoured ships carrying an armament of hand-worked rapid-fire guns, which can 
be kept ready, and can develop a high rate of fire at the shortest notice, for use at 
night, in weather of limited visibility by day, or in action against light-cruisers or 
torpedo craft.’154 
 
This result should not be considered surprising. That the 6-inch gun could do great damage had 
never been in doubt. While captaining Dreadnought, the arch-pessimist Herbert Richmond had 
fretted that in thick weather ‘a Bulwark class could have lain half a mile of us & pounded us at 
practically point-blank range…& put 60 6”-shot a minute into us.’155 It was clear that apart from 
a few circumstances the advantage would always lie with the heavy gun in a fleet engagement, 
and the increasing emphasis on increasing battle ranges left the 6-inch gun being suitable only to 
use against flotilla craft. A decision in 1911 that armoured ships with 6-inch batteries should 
carry a loadout of 75% lyddite explosive shells and 25% capped common pointed armour-
piercing shells should be seen in this context. This was a contingency loadout—a recognition 
that circumstances where capital ships would fight each other using their 6-inch guns would be 
unusual, although not impossible.
156
 
Finally, it might be asked why, considering the extent of the debate over the question of 
4-inch quick-firers versus 6-inch, was there apparently a lack of consideration towards splitting 
the difference and adopting a 5-inch piece, or even a reversion to the old 4.7-inch calibre. In fact 
there is scattered evidence that such a weapon was considered, in the form of a 5-inch 60-
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pounder gun. During the early work on the Iron Duke class one design, Design LIII, was proposed 
which carried sixteen ‘5” B.L.’. 157  There being no such weapon immediately available the 
proposal was quickly abandoned. Subsequently in July 1914 the D.N.O. wrote that the question 
‘of a 5-inch 60-pdr gun is being dealt with … in connection with the possibility of arming 
cruisers with guns of this calibre.’ The process got as far as requesting designs from heavy gun 
builders but nothing further was done, almost certainly due to the outbreak of war.
158
 Fisher’s 
insistence to go back to the 4-inch, albeit on a triple mounting, and the simultaneous introduction 
of the 5.5-inch gun only confused matters more.
159
 
 
The Bridgeman Affair 
Despite being First Sea Lord at a crucial time, Sir Francis Bridgeman is not an oft-
recalled figure of the Prewar Era. In fact if Bridgeman is remembered at all, it is either as a 
peripheral character in the Fisher-Beresford ‘feud’, or for his enforced departure from the 
Admiralty, which with some justification is referred to, again by his biographer, as the only time 
he ‘hit the headlines’. 160  While the basic facts of Bridgeman’s exeunt from the First Sea 
Lordship are known, like so many events in the Prewar Era it is quite possible that new 
approaches can be taken to them. 
Professor Marder’s observation that Bridgeman and his First Lord, Winston Churchill, 
‘simply did not get along’ remains valid.161 By November 1912, relations between the two men 
had deteriorated to such an extent that ‘neither man was making much of an effort to get on with 
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the other and the tension at the Admiralty was embarrassing.’162 When the Treasury opposed a 
£470,000 per annum increase to sailors’ pay, Bridgeman put his foot down and threatened 
resignation when Churchill tried to compromise. In this case, Bridgeman had the support of the 
other Sea Lords, who declared that ‘they cannot be held to accept it as a final settlement’.163 It 
should be noted that Churchill was as desirous as the rest of the Board to see a pay rise for the 
lower deck approved, and a compromise was eventually reached.
164
 
This cannot be said of two more incidents, both squabbles over senior appointments 
(Churchill’s offering command of the First Cruiser Squadron to Troubridge instead of the 
already-promised Rosslyn Wemyss, and Admiral Arthur Farquhar’s retention on full pay as 
Admiral Commanding the Reserves and Coast Guard) during which Bridgeman threatened 
resignation in order to cow the First Lord.
165
 Little wonder that on November 14
th
, Churchill 
confidentially informed Prince Louis of Battenberg that he would succeed Bridgeman when the 
latter departed.
166
 
Churchill was not the only one manoeuvring for position, however. At the end of October 
Bridgeman had written to Sir Henry Jackson offering him the post of Chief of the War Staff in 
place of the outgoing Troubridge. Before offering Jackson the job, Bridgeman wrote that ‘I 
should value your opinion … as I naturally am much interested in the appointment, the C.O.S. 
working immediately under me.’167 He continued that ‘The work is very close & indeed trying, 
for the First Lord also takes up much of the time with him, and at present the office is 
understaffed!’ This may have been friendly advice, or it may have been an effort to ensure the 
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new Chief of the War Staff would be less of a tool of the First Lord than Troubridge had 
sometimes been. This being said, Bridgeman seems not to have held any lasting personal grudge 
against Troubridge. In the wake of the latter’s court-martial over the escape of the Goeben, 
Bridgeman wrote to Jack Sandars that he was glad Troubridge had been acquitted.
168
 
Bridgeman was also being encouraged from afar by Lord Fisher. In mid-November 
Bridgeman apparently wrote to his former superior suggesting that he was considering a 
departure from the Admiralty at Churchill’s request, or was at least feeling considerably 
burdened by both the job and his sparring with the First Lord.
169
 Having already sent several 
letters over the spring and summer urging him ‘on my bended knees to stick to your post to the 
bitter end!’170 and to ‘stick like a limpet to your very last hour… as First Sea Lord regardless of 
every personal consideration’,171 Fisher now again attempted to rally the spirits of ‘My beloved 
Bridgeman’. 
‘I am astounded! Not even a faint hint was given me by W.C. when talking to him 
only a few days ago. The only thing he said was … it might be a good thing for 
Jellicoe to be Second Sea Lord & I of course assumed that meant Battenberg 
succeeding Callaghan [as C-in-C Home Fleet] because long ago that had been 
mentioned but I never thought of it as Jellicoe told me[.] Callaghan has no idea 
now of leaving & was very fit and as I once told you W.C. had said to me in 
confidence that he looked on you as his sheet anchor & if necessary would 
arrange for you to be an Admiral of the Fleet &ct.’172 
 
Perhaps Bridgeman’s spirits were not the problem, since Battenberg’s wife wrote to a friend 
around the same time that the First Sea Lord ‘has again been ill’ and that his resignation was 
‘more than likely … before long’.173 Bridgeman himself wrote to Battenberg that ‘two attacks of 
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bronchitis within a few months, and coming on top of appendicitis, seems to have weakened my 
constitution, and I sometimes feel inclined to give up my post.’174 Battenberg replied that: 
‘You told me before that the Doctor had wished you to have a spell abroad soon. 
Let me beg you not to neglect his advice. … I had no intention whatsoever of 
leaving London this winter & with the assistance of your excellent staff I can 
perfectly attend to your papers whilst you are abroad.’175 
 
Whatever the ill feelings between Bridgeman and Battenberg, it is difficult to view this letter as 
anything but one colleague telling another to take a needed rest. 
During this exchange Bridgeman was at Copgrove Hall on a short leave from the 
Admiralty. Bridgeman’s biographer suggests that the First Sea Lord missed some nefarious 
subtext in this letter, something that ‘would have aroused immediate suspicion in the wary mind 
of a Fisher or a Churchill – or even the most humble backbencher.’176 Whether this is the case 
seems to be a matter of the historian’s personal preference, and an orchestrated conspiracy may 
be an overdramatic reading of events. Whatever the case, another letter from Battenberg 
informed Bridgeman that ‘[s]hould a change become inevitable I thought you might like to know 
that I have, provisionally and whenever it should become necessary, accepted the First Lord’s 
offer to fill, to the best of my ability, your place.’ 177  Churchill, meanwhile, wrote on 28 
November that he was ‘very glad to hear from various sources that you have somewhat 
recovered from the chill which so unkindly spoiled your holiday’. 178  Then Churchill, with 
uncharacteristic delicateness, suggested resignation might be on the table: 
‘I have been meaning for some time to write to you about your health which 
causes me concern both as a colleague & a friend. During the year … I have seen 
how heavily the strain of your great office has told upon you & I know that only 
your high sense of duty & your consideration for me have enabled you 
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successfully to overcome your strong inclination to retire. That strain will not I 
fear diminish in the future; & if … we were to be involved in war, I feel that the 
burden might be more than you could sustain. 
‘If therefore you should feel disposed … to retire, I could not whatever my 
personal regrets oppose your wish…’179 
 
Bridgeman was likely startled by this suggestion, and wrote to both Battenberg and Churchill 
that he was, in fact, well and truly on the mend. On December 2
nd
, he informed Battenberg that 
he intended to return to the Admiralty ‘for a week or two days’, and after the holidays would 
‘return to Admiralty [sic] for good.’180 Furthermore: 
‘Today the Dr. gave his considered opinion, that as there was nothing organically 
wrong, & that as he had now diagnosed the malady there was nothing to prevent 
my getting quite well under treatment. He said I had been run down & that if I had 
taken more leave I sh
d
 not have been so bad.’ 
 
Bridgeman’s December 2nd letter to Battenberg suggests that his previous letters contemplating 
resignation was meant merely as a dutiful warning that, until given a firm diagnosis by his doctor, 
it would be well if the First Lord had a ready contingency plan in case his health was seriously 
threatened. Unfortunately for all concerned, Churchill was now it seems resolved once and for all 
to rid himself of this turbulent Admiral, and leapt at the pretext Bridgeman had unintentionally 
provided. He had already written to the King on November 29
th
 expressing ‘anxiety about the 
state of Sir Francis Bridgeman’s health’ and proposed to promote Battenberg to First Sea Lord 
and bring in Jellicoe as Second Sea Lord.
181
 
Thus Churchill must have been startled when a letter from Bridgeman arrived shortly 
afterwards in which the Admiral said that he was both feeling better and was ‘in receipt of your 
kindly-meant letter,’ which he planned to give ‘careful consideration.’182 Churchill, flummoxed, 
wrote back from aboard the Admiralty yacht Enchantress that having consulted the Prime 
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Minister and reported to the King, Churchill’s conclusion ‘must necessarily be final; and I am 
confident that it will command your assent.’ Bridgeman was to be replaced as First Sea Lord. 
Bridgeman was hardly pleased at this, and his reply accepting his ouster was measured, 
concluding ‘I now understand that you expect me to resign, and I am happy to be able to meet 
your wishes.’ 183  Several days later however, Bridgeman, doubtless encouraged by officers 
unhappy over another abrupt dismissal of a First Sea Lord, wrote to Churchill asking if their 
disagreements ‘may have had something to do’ with the resignation request.184 Meanwhile Jack 
Sandars told Bridgeman that he could ‘hardly refrain from proclaiming the iniquity of Churchill 
from the house tops’.185 
Others however were perfectly happy to shout from amongst the chimneysweeps, 
especially Lord Charles Beresford, who grilled the First Lord in the Commons on the matter.
186
 
Bridgeman’s initial reaction to Beresford’s unasked-for offensive on his behalf was bemusement: 
‘I wonder what C.B has heard. He is not supposed to be a friend of mine.’187 
Worse followed soon; The Standard reported that a Special Correspondent had ‘just seen 
the healthiest invalid in England – Sir Francis Bridgeman. Whatever may have been the 
mysterious cause of the First Sea Lord’s resignation, certainly it was not ill-health.’188 The 
Times picked up the story subsequently.
189
 An angry exchange of letters and telegrams between 
Bridgeman and Churchill only aggravated matters, and the Commons was still raging over the 
issue when it adjourned on December 20
th
. By this time Bridgeman was fully aware he had 
become a tool for the Opposition, as well as for members of the Syndicate of Discontent looking 
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to attack Fisher by proxy through Churchill.
190
 Despite being Tory in his politics, Bridgeman had 
no desire to be used as a hammer to strike at the Admiralty no matter his own feelings towards 
Churchill. On December 23
rd
 the Admiral wrote the the Leader of the Opposition, Andrew Bonar 
Law: 
‘As you know, I was very anxious that there shd have been no debate, but 
unfortunately the matter had gone too far to be stopped! 
‘I now desire to say I am that I am still more anxious that the case shd not be re-
opened: no good from my point of view could result and these unhappy 
differences do much harm to the great Service I have the honour to belong.’191 
 
Bridgeman’s straightforward character means there is no need to search for a hidden meaning in 
this letter, but even so any doubts about his sincerity are quashed by the following extract of a 
letter written on Christmas Day by Lord Stamfordham: 
‘His Majesty wishes me to say that he is very glad you have abandoned the idea 
of a further publication of correspondence and that he thinks your letter to 
Churchill was a very dignified one. 
‘If I may be allowed to say so, your decision to let the matter drop is the best 
thing you could have done for the sake of the service; and you have subordinated 
your own feelings in the interests of the Navy. I only hope that Churchill will 
realize this and appreciate your action.’192 
 
Whether Churchill appreciated Bridgeman’s disengagement is unknown. Soon, however, the 
issue had become immaterial. Bridgeman accepted his forced retirement and his successor, 
Battenberg, was already entrenched at the Admiralty. Overall, Bridgeman was correct in his 
observation to Sir Francis Hopwood that ‘I was fired out WITHOUT warning, but it was not 
because I was too weak, but because I was too strong!’193  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Serene Sea Lord and the Outbreak of War 1912-1914 
 
Marder writes that Battenberg was ‘by 1914 generally considered to be the outstanding 
flag officer on the active list’ and that it was said that ‘he was born a Serene Highness, but had 
lived it down.’1 Ottley wrote that ‘There are literally hundreds of naval officers who would be 
quite ready to believe black was white if he issued a memo. to that effect.’2 Standing over six 
feet tall, Battenberg cut a memorable figure. Sir Henry Oliver recalled that 
‘Prince Louis was a big man and had a big appetite. At breakfast he began on 
porridge, then fish, then eggs and bacon or a meat dish, then a large plate of cold 
ham, then hot muffins or crumpets; and then a lot of toast and butter and jam, and 
finished on fruit. His meal would have fed an officers’ mess.’3 
 
 Churchill found him a gracious and ideal First Sea Lord. Their harmonious record 
together is such, especially when compared to the other men who occupied the position while 
Churchill was First Lord, that Battenberg is accused of being either a pawn of Churchill’s with 
few opinions of his own or being unwilling to stand up against him even when the best interests 
of the Navy were on the line.
4
 This impression is, unsurprisingly, not the whole and entire truth. 
It seems likely that Battenberg, far from regularly knuckling under to his young colleague, 
tended to be very much in agreement with the First Lord on many issues. When disagreements 
arose, Battenberg was able to smooth Churchill’s ruffled feathers in a way Bridgeman and Fisher 
never could. One suspects from reading correspondence between the two on matters where they 
disagreed that Battenberg knew how to manoeuvre the First Lord until he either forgot the issue 
or relented sufficiently to meet Battenberg’s desires. This political ability would not, of course, 
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be obvious to the First Sea Lord’s frustrated subordinates, and who would thus have felt 
aggravated by what they saw as Churchill’s interference, but were at the same time were left 
unaware of the Admiralty’s remedy.5 Even if it had, there were likely many in the service of 
Admiral Drax’s ‘old sea-dog type’ who would have found such methods distasteful. 
 Upon learning of Battenberg’s appointment as Second Sea Lord, Lord Selborne, who had 
worked closely with Battenberg a decade prior, told Churchill that ‘[h]e is the ablest officer the 
Navy possesses and, if his name had been Smith, he would ‘ere now have filled various high 
offices to the great advantage of the country, from which he has been excluded owing to what I 
must characterize as a stupid timidity.’6 An anecdote from Churchill himself seems appropriate to 
relate here: 
‘It was recounted of him that on one occasion, when he visited Kiel with King 
Edward, a German Admiral in high command had reproached him with serving in 
the British Fleet, whereat Prince Louis, stiffening, had replied, “Sir, when I joined 
the Royal Navy in the year 1868, the German Empire did not exist.”’7 
 
Such were the times that Prince Louis lived in, however, that no amount of ostentatious displays 
of patriotism would dissuade the suspicious, the envious, or the malicious. 
One of the timid had been David Lloyd George. Esher recalls that upon Wilson’s ouster, 
Asquith had suggested Battenberg as his replacement, but when he ‘tried it on’ with the 
Chancellor, Lloyd George ‘was horrified at the idea of a German holding the supreme place.’ 
Asquith appreciated the point but was evidentially unimpressed by Lloyd George’s reasoning, 
wryly noting to Esher that ‘L.G. is an excellent foolometer and that the public would take the 
same view.’8 
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Perhaps one of the most important attributes possessed by Battenberg was the ability to 
dissuade, or at least distract, his eager-beaver First Lord from some of his more problematic 
schemes. This was due in part to the fact that Churchill and Battenberg possessed many similar 
opinions. This has been viewed by both Battenberg’s contemporaries (including, notably, Sir 
Francis Bridgeman) and historians as a sign of Battenberg lacking a certain amount of steel in his 
personality. Overall, however, Battenberg seems to have genuinely trusted his subordinates and 
commanders such as Jellicoe, Moore, and Callaghan, as well as the still-embryonic War Staff, to 
provide new ideas and proposals where such were required. This was not out of idleness or 
spinelessness. It was a signal of his trust in the other flag officers in the Admiralty and the Home 
Fleet. 
 
Strategy I: Deploying the Fleet 
Just before Bridgeman was dismissed, Callaghan was sent new war plans, albeit ones 
described as being temporary measures.
9
 The Admiralty's disclaimer was extensive, declaring the 
plans ‘provisional in the sense that they are subject to revision, that they have been issued to you 
only and that they and the War Orders based upon them have not yet been issued to other officers 
concerned.’ However the Sea Lords thought it 'of importance’ that Callaghan be placed 'in 
possession of their latest intentions without delay’.10 The distant commercial blockade strategy 
was now accepted, with the general intent being 'to use our geographical advantage of position to 
cut off all German shipping from oceanic trade and to secure the British coasts from any serious 
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military enterprise and incidentally but effectually to cover the transport across the Channel of an 
Expeditionary Force to France should the government decide upon such an operation.’11 
To carry out this goal the Grand Fleet would be based in Scottish waters while the 
Channel Fleet would operate in the Channel. Callaghan was to use his cruiser squadrons not 
involved in the northern cordon operations 'as an observation force to sweep and patrol the North 
Sea', however they were to keep their distance from the German coast, with 4°E ‘marking the 
more dangerous radius of German activity.’12 The four First Fleet destroyer flotillas would be 
divided up, one remaining with the battle fleet, two with the cruiser patrols, with the remaining 
flotilla operating from Harwich in conjunction with the 5th Cruiser Squadron ‘for operations 
south of the 55th parallel.’ 13  The details of the cruiser and destroyer patrols were left for 
Callaghan and his staff to draw up. With very slight amendments, this plan was adopted as on a 
permanent basis in December,
14
 and was substantially the one the Home Fleet went to war 
with.
15
 
Churchill was unhappy with these plans; the newly adopted distant blockade scheme was 
too passive for the First Lord’s temperament. ‘It is impossible’, he wrote to the First Sea Lord, 
‘to guard against all the dangers wh may be threatened by an enterprising enemy. When one 
menace has been provided against another appears.’16 Churchill fretted the entire length of the 
British coast from Dover to the Shetlands would be left vulnerable to German attack. The First 
Lord’s solution was characteristic: 
                                                 
11
 Admiralty, ‘Proposed War Plans’, 25 November 1912, M.0020/1912, f. 10, ADM 116/3412. 
12
 Ibid., f. 11. 
13
 Ibid., f. 12. 
14
 Admiralty, ‘War Plans’, 16 December 1912, M.0020/12, f. 26-45, ADM 116/3412. 
15
 For later revisions, see Admiralty, ‘War Plans and War Orders. Home Fleets and Detached Squadrons. October 
1913 to July 1914.’, H.S. 818, ADM 137/818. 
16
 Churchill to Battenberg, 17 February 1913, in ‘War Plans. Note by 1st Lord.’, 17 February 1913, f. 192, ADM 
116/3412. 
297 
 
‘Whatever may be said in favour of distant blockade as the guiding policy of a 
long war, & I agree with what is said, such a policy can only be effectively 
maintained on a basis of morale superiority. Unless & until our enemy has felt & 
learned to fear our teeth it is impracticable. We must conduct ourselves that the 
sea is full of nameless terrors for him—instead of for us.’17 
 
This meant a short, sharp offensive at the start of an Anglo-German war to teach the Germans to 
fear the Royal Navy’s teeth before settling in to the dull business of economic warfare. ‘Nothing 
can give us the security we require during the first 10 days of the war except a strong 
offensive.’18 Churchill also felt it might be better to cover the passage of British troops to France 
by blocking the Elbe instead of patrolling the North Sea, an idea of long pedigree indeed.
19
 
 Aside from the work of the War Staff, Battenberg asked his erstwhile Flag Captain, Mark 
Kerr, to draw up his own proposal. As Kerr recalled in his later biography of Prince Louis, the 
First Sea Lord told him ‘that the War Plan against Germany I had made when under his orders 
some years before, and which had been accepted by the then First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, Sir 
John Fisher, had been superseded by one that was plain suicide.’20 This plan, which was probably 
Wilson’s now-lost plan of 1910-11, though this cannot be confirmed with certainty, ‘paraded our 
battle fleets in two separate squadrons up and down the North Sea of the German ports and exits, 
regardless of the fact that submarines, destroyers, mines, and aircraft had come into being as 
offensive weapons.’ As for the reason for Kerr’s selection as a planner, he later wrote that 
Battenberg was faced with a backlog of work owing to Bridgeman’s illness, and thus ‘had no 
time for the formation of a new plan’. 21  Kerr was in sympathy with Battenberg’s general 
conception of naval strategy, and ‘knew his ideas on the subject.’22 
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The resulting plan, which will be referred to as the Kerr Plan for lack of any other name, 
is one of the most intriguing of the Prewar Era. It has also generally been neglected by historians. 
Eschewing almost completely the use of heavy ships in the North Sea, defensive and offensive 
operations were to be left to the flotillas, and in fact it is a purer example of Nicholas Lambert’s 
‘flotilla defence’ strategy than any of Fisher’s war plans or proposals.23 The general thrust of the 
plan was ‘to make the North Sea into a British flotillas’ lake.’ The Navy’s capital ships were to 
be removed ‘as far as possible from the German submarine bases.’ Rosyth, Cromarty, and Scapa 
Flow were not distant enough. Instead, the battlecruisers would be kept in the Minch
24
 while the 
main fleet would rust upon its anchors in Bantry Bay. The heaviest ships available on the east 
coast would be the six old Cressys operating from Scapa, possibly supplemented by other 
armoured cruisers (the wording is somewhat vague), as well as eight destroyers, two submarines 
and the tender Aquarius. Eight more submarines, plus eight destroyers and some additional 
auxiliaries would be at Lerwick with a detachment at Battu Sound at the extreme north of the 
Shetlands. Twenty light cruisers were to operate from Cromarty. Nineteen light cruisers, twenty-
seven destroyers, and three submarines would be at Rosyth and the Firth along with their parent 
vessels. Small groups of submarines, torpedo boats, and destroyers were to protect Newcastle, 
Sunderland, Grimsby, and Yarmouth. Harwich would be home to a force of forty destroyers, 
thirteen submarines, six torpedo boats, and ‘twelve light cruisers and parent ships’. 25  The 
Thames was to be covered by six light cruisers, twenty torpedo boats, and three submarines. At 
Dover would be twelve torpedo boats and six submarines. Long-range submarines would be 
deployed to watch the Skagerrak exit alongside a seaplane carrier and would be ‘based where 
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most convenient.’ An identical force would work off the Elbe backed by three cruisers ‘with a 
varying base as necessary.’26 
The various cruiser-destroyer-submarine forces based along the east coast were each to 
patrol a set area. The cruisers at Cromarty would ‘patrol at speed on a N.E.—S.W. line as far as 
the coast of Norway.’ The Aberdeen force would deploy between the Cromarty patrol line and 
the south of Norway. The Firth destroyers would operate ‘in groups, at speed’ between their base 
and the north of Denmark ‘but not to go farther east than the fifth degree of longitude without 
special orders’. The Harwich ships would ‘be disposed between there and the mouth of the Elbe.’ 
While on station the destroyers were to work in flotillas, spending ‘four days and nights at sea 
and two days and nights in harbour’. However, they would be relieved ‘in singles, each one 
doing a curve of search when going to and from the base.’ 
Aside from turning the North Sea into a pond for British flotilla craft Kerr expected these 
deployments would be ideal against Germany’s small but growing submarine force: 
‘It is known that the Germans have only small under-sea boats, as they consider 
that they are only useful for coast defences. If the above plan is carried out, we 
should destroy about twenty under-sea boats in the first two months of the war, 
and they will not have a target worth shooting at. The submarine warfare will 
cease, large under-sea boats will not be built, and the greatest menace to our 
communications will be stopped before it starts.’27 
 
Exactly how Kerr worked out that the British flotillas would destroy ‘about twenty submarines in 
the first two months’ is never specified. Ironically, he may have unwittingly followed Wilson’s 
line of reasoning that the best place to fight German submarines would be the Waddenzee coast. 
Apart from the description left by its author in his biography of Battenberg, little remains 
to show the Kerr Plan ever existed. In any case, Kerr’s bitterness aside, the rejection of this plan 
should not come as a shock. The extensive patrols by flotilla craft and cruisers recommended call 
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to mind Troubridge’s intermediate blockade proposal, which had been proven ineffective during 
the 1912 Manoeuvres. When presented with a more extreme version of the same idea that also 
involved the main fleet being stationed as far as possible from the North Sea, the resultant of the 
examining Admirals for the Kerr Plan was logical and justified. 
Even had Troubridge’s patrol lines functioned properly in the 1912 Manoeuvres there was 
a major flaw in the Kerr Plan that calls to mind the rambling criticisms of Beresford in 1907-8. 
Much like the proposals Beresford had made, the Kerr Plan needed far more ships of various 
types than the Royal Navy possessed, Overall the Kerr Plan was a bridge too far for the prewar 
Admiralty, and a very rickety bridge at that. 
 
Fleet Tactics and ‘The Great Gunnery Scandal’ 
In addition to the Bridgeman affair, the fall of 1912 saw the end of anything resembling 
cordial relations between the Royal Navy and Arthur Hungerford Pollen, a career businessman 
who had spent the previous twelve years working on the problem of naval fire control. The story 
of this relationship and its fractious ending is an excellent framing device for discussion of 
British prewar naval tactics, and especially the ways in which the Home Fleet would fight a 
general engagement. The deeply rooted notion encapsulated in Professor Marder’s statement that 
the prewar Royal Navy was without ‘a generally accepted, comprehensive, authoritative tactical 
doctrine in 1914’ is, while possibly technically correct, nonetheless incomplete.28 Furthermore, 
accusations that the later Grand Fleet Battle Orders were a straitjacket are based on something of 
a misunderstanding of their true purpose. 
Returning to Pollen, he became interested in the problem of naval fire control after his 
cousin—William Goodenough, later to win fame at Jutland leading the Second Light Cruiser 
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Squadron—invited him to view gunnery practice aboard the cruiser Dido in February 1900. 
Having asked why shooting practice was conducted at a distance that was considerably less than 
naval gun crews were achieving in action on land in the on-going Boer War, Pollen was told the 
major limitation was ‘the lack of an efficient range-finder.’ 29  This matter had been under 
consideration since at least 1880.
30
 By 1906 the Admiralty had finally found a suitable 
instrument, the 9-foot Barr & Stroud FA2.
31
 
After some early unsuccessful proposals, Pollen finally succeeded in obtaining a trial of a 
rangefinding system and plotter—the only parts of a proposed full system ready for testing—
aboard the battleship Jupiter in the fall of 1905, which proved quite unsuccessful.
32
 Undeterred 
after this failure and in part prompted by the introduction of the 9-foot rangefinders into naval 
service, Pollen and his engineer Harold Isherwood redesigned their ‘A.C. System’, resubmitting 
the proposal to the Admiralty in early 1906.
33
 
Fisher was at first enthusiastic; declaring in September 1906 that ‘Pollen’s invention is 
simply priceless, and I do hope we may hesitate at nothing to get ITS SOLE USE. We shall 
NEVER be forgiven hereafter if we do not!’34 However by 1909 Fisher had performed a volte-
face and wrote to Arnold White that ‘I have consistently refused to have anything to do with him 
or see him.’35  The proximate cause of this reversal was a combination of Pollen’s Roman 
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Catholicism—Fisher was a staunch anti-Catholic36—and his cordial connections to leading anti-
Fisher partisans such as Lord Charles Beresford and Sir Reginald Custance.
37
 Fisher also seems 
to have believed Pollen to be behind certain newspaper attacks on him.
38
 Nevertheless 
negotiations between Argo and the Admiralty continued throughout, leading Brooks to conclude 
that ‘Fisher’s personal hostility to Pollen does not seem to have influenced subsequent events’ in 
any significant way while Captain Bacon was D.N.O.
39
 
Indeed in late 1906 was given £6,500 for a set of revised instruments with the promise of 
a £100,000 payment for monopoly rights should two months’ trials at sea prove them 
satisfactory.
40
 This was despite Pollen’s aggressive manner during negotiations which won him 
no favour amongst the responsible Admiralty officials. 
These trials took place aboard the protected cruiser Ariadne under the supervision of Sir 
Arthur Wilson with the assistance of Ordinance Department officer Lieutenant Frederic Dreyer. 
They have been a source of contention ever since.
41
 
Dreyer was already working on his own fire control instruments by this time, and had 
also informed Pollen that he intended to test Pollen’s gear for all it was worth, claiming in a letter 
he intended to ‘crab’ it. At the time Pollen was understanding, and he replied that, ‘I am strongly 
convinced that, unless the system is crab proof … the Service ought not to any exceptional 
expense to acquire it.’42 Wilson was also anxious conduct as thorough a trial as possible, and Sir 
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Henry Jackson apparently wrote to warn Pollen that ‘If your gear can be broken down, Wilson 
will break it’.43 Matters were not helped by the fact that the A.C. apparatus installed aboard 
Ariadne was incomplete. Although the Admiralty apparently had accepted this as a necessary 
part of their contract with Pollen, Wilson was unhappy, and wrote to demand ‘a written statement 
showing exactly what are the advantages you claim for your system as fitted in the Ariadne and 
for which the Admiralty are asked to pay £100,000.’44 
Wilson ultimately rubbished the A.C. system in his report of the Ariadne trials in favour 
of his own manual virtual-course plotting system, and the Admiralty saw fit to reject Pollen 
under the terms of their contract in the spring of 1908. This was despite the fact that the A.C. 
system had passed the requirements set out in the trial; the Admiralty had scrupulously 
maintained their right of refusal no matter the outcome of the Ariadne trials. Until the end, Pollen 
had reason to think the Admiralty might still decide in his favour, so the rejection was doubtless 
a shock.
45
 The Admiralty’s motives likely had more to do with the roaring fight over every 
farthing of the 1908-9 Estimates in Cabinet than any bias against Pollen. Nevertheless, Pollen 
could rightly accuse the Admiralty of less-than-fair dealing.
46
 Further progress stalled after 
Tweedmouth’s sacking in April 1908, but even so the Admiralty gave Pollen £11,500 to cover his 
expenses in June.
47
 
One of the problems was Pollen’s conduct towards the Admiralty. ‘I may say’, wrote 
Captain Henry Barry in May 1904, ‘I know the Pollen family personally and they are all pushing 
and persistent.’48 Barry was the D.N.O., and had been in contact with Pollen regarding an early 
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proposal for a fire-control system consisting of a ‘rangefinder, calculating machine and plotter’.49 
Barry had also told Pollen the proposal was ‘not the instrument that the Admiralty wanted.’ 
Pollen’s response was that ‘he wanted – “the Admiralty to take what they didn’t want”.’50 Pollen 
undeniably had a habit of courting controversy—much later he earned the ire of naval aviation 
pioneer cum Member of Parliament Murray Sueter by providing an introduction for a book that 
to Sueter’s mind deprecated the aircraft as a weapon of war.51 He also had something of a 
deliberately loose tongue; in July 1908—at the height of Beresford’s feud with the Admiralty—
Pollen complained to Custance that ‘I do not think [D.N.O.] Bacon had a vestige of an idea what 
it [the A.C. equipment] was for, and consequently could not instruct Sir Arthur in this sense.’52 
Worse followed in the coming months, and culminated in ‘a piece of blatant political arm-
twisting’ by Pollen in March 1909 at the height of the naval panic. 53  Sans any subtlety 
whatsoever, he wrote to McKenna regarding his ‘Battle System’: 
‘for the last three days, I have been doing my utmost to prevent this matter being 
brought up in the Unionist Press and in the House of Commons. There is a wish to 
bring it up because (I hear the Front Bench Unionists, who were formerly 
members of the Board, are perfectly familiar with the tremendous importance that 
was attached to my inventions when they were brought forward under the late 
Government. The gentlemen who have approached me are in touch with a great 
many men in the Service; and in the Service the view taken of the way in which 
the thing has been treated, is of such a forcible character, that it is believed a very 
strong polemical value would attach to brining the matter out in the forthcoming 
vote of censure.’ 
 
Pollen’s following paragraph did little if anything to reassure McKenna to his good intentions: 
‘To supply powder and shot for a Unionist attack on the Liberal Government can 
never be part of my programme; and in this matter the efficiency of the Fleet and 
national safety are more important than anything else. I have accordingly told 
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these gentlemen, who, I hope, are as good patriots as they are partisans, that if 
their object is the efficiency of the Fleet, they will be defeating their object by 
drawing the attention of foreign powers to a secret system of enormous fighting 
value, nor would their doing so accelerate the introduction of this system into the 
English Navy. I hope, therefore, that I have prevented this matter being publically 
discussed.’54 
 
This was apparently not enough for Pollen, as soon after these letters to McKenna he 
produced a splenetic account of the Ariadne trials ‘accusing Bacon, Wilson, and Dreyer or 
ignorance, stupidity and dishonesty.’55 The major accomplishment of this print seems to have 
been alienating a crucial ally of Pollen’s, Rear-Admiral Jellicoe. The now-Third Sea Lord’s 
blistering response to the attacks on his gunnery advisors left Pollen grovelling.
56
 
Despite this difficult and frequently abusive relationship, the Admiralty continued their 
support of Pollen. Bacon had refused to rise to Pollen’s bait, and subsequently Captain Robert 
Falcon Scott—then a member of the Ordnance Department—wrote that Bacon ‘went arm and 
arm with Pollen to Manchester and came back much impressed.’57 The Admiralty’s secrecy 
arrangements with Pollen were continued and a new round of equipment trials took place aboard 
the armoured cruiser Natal in October 1909. Although the Admiralty felt the results of the trials 
were not sufficient to consider adoption of Pollen’s entire fire control system (which was still 
incomplete at the time of installation aboard Natal) he was rewarded with funding, a 
continuation of secrecy, and a large order for Pollen’s rangefinder mounting.58 
By 1912, Pollen and his Argo Company were ready to try selling a full fire control 
system to the Admiralty again. 1912 was a busy year for the Navy’s already-overworked 
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ordinance experts,
59
 for not only but Pollen but Percy Scott as well had new developments ready 
for trial.
60
 This time the Admiralty was far less enthusiastic, as by now Frederic Dreyer had 
designed a competitive—and far less expensive—plotting instrument. Perhaps inevitably, Dreyer 
was accused of plagiarising from Pollen’s machine,61 which Dreyer just as inevitably denied 
forcefully.
62
 
Once again Pollen made sure the Admiralty heard his case loudly. Inspector of Target 
Practice and long-time Pollen supporter Admiral Sir Richard Peirse wrote to Bridgeman and 
Battenberg in September full of concern over ‘a rumour that the Admiralty were about to 
abandon the testing of Mr. Pollen’s Fire Control System’.63 Doubtless having heard only Pollen’s 
side of the story, Peirse opined that ‘[t]o throw over Mr. Pollen and allow him to give the fruits 
of his ten years [sic] experience (all gained at our expense) to some Foreign Power would in my 
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opinion be nothing short of a National disaster.’64 
Peirse’s letter included a memorandum on Pollen’s equipment with closed with Sir Percy 
Scott’s declaration that ‘I agree with every word of this[.]’.65 
Moore fired back later that month. Offended at Pollen’s accusations that Moore was 
maliciously obstructing the adoption of Argo fire control equipment, Moore stated flatly that if 
Pollen ‘can produce [a fire control table] there would be no objection to trying it in conjunction 
with the Clock & Rangefinder and Mr. Pollen is quite mistaken in thinking I oppose this.’66 This 
being established, Moore noted that Pollen knew that ‘I do not think he has yet, or is even likely 
to produce equal results with True Course & Speed plotting, to those obtained by Rate plotting 
under seagoing fleet conditions.’67 
On a more fundamental level, Moore had fiscal objections to Pollen’s special treatment, 
especially now Dreyer had produced what was apparently a tangible alternative that would 
‘produce about equal results’ to Pollen’s. As far as a comparison of the two went, Moore felt that 
‘Dreyer’s is the more developed at present, but Pollen’s workmanship is probably better & less 
liable to get out of order.’ This being the case, it was a question of economics. ‘If Pollen’s table 
proves better at rate plotting,’ Moore stated bluntly, ‘then it is a question of how much better 
compared to price[.]’ Pollen’s hardball business methods, meanwhile, left Moore cold. 
Everything to do with Pollen ‘hangs up, because of the demand for Monopoly money (it might 
almost be called Hush money).’68 
Equally as troubling was Pollen’s insistence on large orders. When on April 10th the 
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Admiralty through Moore offered an order for five clocks to equip the new King George V class 
battleships, Pollen was hesitant. His official explanation was that it would be ‘impossible to 
make so small a number at commercial prices, and I would not like to have the first impression 
of price be one that would not be defensible in clocks were supplied in quantities.’69 This was a 
fair enough reservation on Pollen’s part, but his follow-up was an all-or-nothing recommendation 
for the Admiralty to either ‘acquire the monopoly of our system’, place an order for a large 
number of range clocks, or to abandon secrecy and allow the Argo Company to try its luck on the 
open market.
70
 Pollen stuck to this line throughout the summer, and in at least one instance 
Pollen’s comments had the tone of a protection racket: 
‘Assuming the Dreyer gear is to be identical to mine, it is admitted that both are 
infinitely superior to anything hitherto seen. The question before you… can only 
be whether economy justifies putting (possibly) enemy navies on an equality with 
ours in a vital point of efficient preparation for war.’71 
 
For all his proclamations of being motivated by patriotism, Pollen was here admitting to a senior 
Admiralty officer that he had no compunctions about selling his apparatus to a hostile power. As 
Moore had bitterly noted this in his September 19
th
 letter to Battenberg: 
‘Mr. Pollen made a great parade of his patriotic feelings preventing him from 
seeking out other markets, but if we propose to accept that kind offer of patriotism 
without paying him for it, he threatens to go aboard and trade upon the 
Confidential knowledge he has acquired by reason of his specially favoured 
treatment.’72 
 
Pollen further did himself no favours by his venomous denunciations of Moore. In one letter to 
Peirse, Pollen went so far to accuse the erstwhile D.N.O. of incompetence and dirty tricks: 
‘I gather that opposition both to adopting my system and to monopolising it 
begins and ends with Admiral Moore. It is no disrespect to him to say that he has 
never been practically engaged in Fire Control, has never seen any of my system 
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at work, knows nothing first hand of the first experiments, is ignorant of why we 
first embarked upon this quest, or why from the first we have been so strongly 
supported by the Admiralty, the same weight does not attach in the region of pure 
expertise to his opinion as to that of many others. It is inevitable too, that his 
opposition began when he was D.N.O., for the Admiralty to support me now 
would be … a reflection on his previous policy and recommendations.’73 
 
This, combined with the veiled accusations of plagiarism he levelled against Dreyer, sank 
Pollen’s relationship with the Admiralty. Moore, for his part, was surprisingly diplomatic: ‘Mr. 
Pollen's being a “personal” letter to Peirse I do not comment on it, although it contains a strong 
attack upon me.’74 Furthermore 
‘After the Natal trials all that was successful of the Pollen gear was accepted i.e. 
The gyro-controlled Range Finder, & a very handsome monopoly price paid for 
45 sets. The Clock was not then completed. The plotting table aiming at finding 
direct “Time Course & Speed of Enemy” failed, & until recently Mr. Pollen has 
not produced a better table. 
‘If [Pollen] can produce one there would be no objection to trying it in 
conjunction with the Clock & Rangefinder and Mr. Pollen is quite mistaken in 
thinking I oppose this. He knows I do not think he has yet, or is ever likely to 
produce equal results with True Course & Speed plotting, to those obtained by 
Rate plotting under seagoing fleet conditions. What I am opposed to is paying him 
monopoly prices when we have practically the same principles at work in 
Dreyer’s system. I am so far from being opposed to Pollens Clock that I have 
begged him for his own sake to push on with it, & perfect it, as I know Dreyer 
was going ahead, & I believed Argo Company's work would be more accurately 
carried out.’75 
 
These were hardly the words of a man out to cause unscrupulous delays. Thus it is hardly 
surprising that eventually even Pollen’s supporter Peirse wrote that he was ‘sorry that Pollen 
proved himself impossible but I was always afraid he might prove himself to be his own enemy. 
It is a great pity as it is my firm conviction that he alone has solved the problem in a scientific & 
at the same time practical manner.’76 
The Admiralty let the secrecy agreement expire with the New Year, but even afterwards 
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they were unable to shed themselves of Pollen entirely. As had been the case throughout their 
association with Pollen, the Admiralty found themselves forced to remind serving officers of the 
need for secrecy, and specifically forbade them from corresponding with Pollen.
77
 
As far as the Pollen-Dreyer controversy goes, the possibly unanswerable question of 
which system was technically superior may not matter, since materiel superiority alone cannot 
win battles.
78
 This being the case, it seems best to leave the last words on the subject to Pollen’s 
cousin, William Goodenough: ‘As regards the statistics of hits the human element enters so 
enormously that one wonders whether they show any conclusion as to materiel.’79 
But what of the tactics that the fleet would employ in wartime, especially in the fleet-to-
fleet encounter(s) with the Hochseeflotte that were increasingly the central object what the Home 
Fleet was organised on an operational level?
80
 To discuss this matter it is necessary to return to 
the nineteenth century, when the introduction of steam had necessitated some major changes in 
how fleets operated at sea. With steam power came the possibility of mathematically precise 
station-keeping.
81
 From this the manoeuvring of fleets seemed to become a matter of precise 
manoeuvring
82
 in a manner quickly stereotyped as mindless quadrilles executed via signal flag.
83
 
In fact, the most astute flag officers realized that the true purpose of practicing such ‘equal speed 
manoeuvres’ was to prepare their ships for the chaos of battle so that the integrity of the line of 
battle could be maintained—the vogue for melee and ramming engagements that resulted in 
                                                 
77
 Admiralty to Fleet, 29 July 1913, G.0721/1913, in D.N.O., ‘Important Questions dealt with by D.N.O. Copies, 
precis, etc. Vol. II 1913’, f. 135, NHB. 
78
 Professor Rodger makes this point with his usual elegance using the Hazemeyer anti-aircraft mounting as an 
example. See Rodger, ‘Royal Navy in the Era of the World Wars’, p. 275. 
79
 William Goodenough to Custance, 13 September 1909, PLLN 6/14, Pollen MSS. 
80
 For as one interested party declared postwar: ‘The tactical encounter is the culminating act in war, and is therefore 
of supreme importance… for, as Clausewitz has said, “In war nothing is gained except by fighting.”’ Captain Henry 
Thursfield, ‘History of Tactics I.’, 12 December 1921, THU /107, Captain Henry Thursfield MSS, NMM. 
81
 Gordon, Rules of the Game, p. 183. 
82
 One such effort was Foxhall A. Parker, Squadron Tactics Under Steam (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1864). 
83
 Marder, FGDN, i, p. 148. 
311 
 
much spirited argument through the 1860s and 1870s notwithstanding. Still, in the hands of less 
attentive commanders there could be justice in the following complaint: 
‘Tactical exercises consisted merely of changing the columns of Divisions or 
Subdivisions by equal speed, from lines ahead to abeam or quarterly and vice 
versa. It taught captains to turn their ships accurately in the wake of their guide 
and at all times to keep exact station. Admiral Hornby's rules still governed the 
whole procedure, but these were not “war exercises”.’84 
 
The tactical situation recrystallized in the years after the Naval Defence Act when the 
Royal Navy once again possessed homogenous squadrons of warships of similar design and 
capability, and the venerable line of battle once again asserted its supremacy. Unfortunately most 
of this ‘tactical revolution’—if indeed it is worthy of the name—escaped formal description, and 
in some cases it seems never to have been written down in the first place. Of Fisher’s tactical 
reforms in the Mediterranean, Prince Louis of Battenberg (now Marquess of Milford Haven) 
could only recall that ‘Lord Fisher never told us captains how he proposed to fight his fleet; in 
his lectures he merely pointed out the tactical advantage of superior speed as enabling you to 
choose the range.’85 
Despite this (now-familiar) paucity of direct evidence, there are still indications of how 
the Royal Navy might have fought a fin de siècle fleet engagement. One of the more obscure is a 
1905 novel of the genre that is now called ‘alternate history’ depicting Lord Nelson’s Trafalgar 
campaign and the eponymous battle as it might be fought with modern ships—Victory becoming 
a King Edward VII and so forth.
86
 Though clearly intended as a boy’s adventure story, the two 
listed authors—naval writers Alan Burgoyne and Sir William Laird Clowes—make it of serious 
interest. The climactic battle sees Nelson’s battle fleet—a mixed force of battleships and 
armoured cruisers operating together—operating as three separate divisions, comprehensively 
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outmanoeuvring the Franco-Spanish fleet in a series of semi-isolated actions. On the issue of 
weaponry, the torpedo proves a disappointment and the author (writing as Nelson’s Flag 
Lieutenant) comments ‘it remains more than ever evident that it is upon the gun, and the man 
behind it, that depends the result of a naval battle to-day—given, of course, a leader who has the 
respect, admiration, and whole-hearted confidence of his subordinates.’87 
Of course the finest tactical mind is worthless without the ability to communicate, and 
this was a critical matter in the years preceding the First World War. Quite simply, the size of the 
fleet that a wartime British C.-in-C. would command had grown massively, even without the 
development of the ‘grand fleet of battle’ concept. In 1907 Admiral Beresford expected to fight 
with fourteen battleships of generally homogenous capabilities under his direct command. By 
1914, Admiral Callaghan possessed twenty-nine battleships, eight of which were three knots’ 
slower than the rest and carried less than half the main armament.
88
 Many officers were of the 
opinion that fleet commanders simply could not command this many vessels.
89
 The one certainly 
was the ultimate object of tactics: ‘All guns possible pointing at the enemy.’90 
It was into this situation that Admiral May stepped when he took command of the Home 
Fleet in 1909. The ‘Notes of Tactical Exercises’ produced at the end of Admiral May’s term in 
1911 have been mentioned already in the context of destroyers, but they also provide important 
information on the tactical thought going on in the Home Fleet. It is, however, important to bear 
in mind that the ‘Notes’ were never intended to be used as a tactical manual.91 
The ‘Notes’ emphasized that much depended on how the commander would choose to 
fight with his fleet. The available choices were the classic single line ahead that had dominated 
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tactics since the age of sail, or the division of the fleet into squadrons that would fight semi-
autonomously.
92
 The latter concept was essentially that described in Trafalgar Refought and had 
been recently under test in the Home Fleet, despite some initial reticence on the part of Admiral 
May.
93
 All else being equal, the fleet commander’s major decision would be how to deploy his 
ships to ‘mass the heaviest fire possible on the van of the enemy’.94 Since the fleet’s battle line 
would be composed of both dreadnoughts and earlier ships, it was important to put the most 
powerful ships where they could attack the enemy van. If the fleet cruised in line ahead it was 
simply a matter of putting the largest ships at the head of the line, but because the fleet would 
likely cruise in columns abreast, the matter was more complicated and also related to the 
commander’s decision to deploy either to port or starboard of the fleet’s course.95 The most 
flexible option was keeping the heaviest ships in the wing divisions, meaning whichever way the 
fleet deployed, their leading ships would have the best chance of gunfire supremacy. 
The other option, decentralized attack by divisions, in theory offered advantages in terms 
of response time, and being amore offensively-oriented formation: ‘The single line is a defensive 
formation; success in war may depend on a strong offensive. Detachment of command lends 
itself directly to offense.’96 In addition, the introduction of the long-range ‘heater’ torpedo made 
long lines of ships vulnerable to the point where one estimate predicted 35% hits on a line of 
battle by torpedoes fired indiscriminately.
97
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Nevertheless divisional attack had several disadvantages as well.
98
 Though it encouraged 
initiative I subordinate commanders and reduced the danger from torpedoes, it also demanded 
more skill and practice, and carried with it the danger of the divisions being isolated and 
destroyed piecemeal. Such an incident happened in the 1909 Manoeuvres when Captain Hugh 
Evan-Thomas, in command of the dreadnought Bellerophon had been acting as a single-ship 
‘fast division’. Although in one engagement Bellerophon bagged four ‘enemy’ cruisers, the next 
day Bellerophon ran into an enemy battleship squadron and was overwhelmed.
99
 This danger was 
especially acute if the individual divisions were of differing composition and speed. In any case 
the lack of a universal tactical doctrine made it worrying difficult, if not practically impossible, 
for a fleet commander to predict with any reliably how their subordinates would behave on their 
own. Furthermore, it was quickly discovered that the fleet’s communications infrastructure ‘was 
simply not up to the task.’100 This last problem, the ‘Notes’ observed, would be exacerbated as 
the number of ships in a division increased.
101
 It is significant that the first appendix in the 
‘Notes’ begins 
‘The necessity for having some simple signals for forming the Order of Battle on 
any bearing when the Fleet is cruising in columns has been frequently shown 
throughout the series of tactical exercises carried out between 1909 and 1911, and 
more especially … in misty weather.’102 
 
All in all, the ‘Notes on Tactical Exercises’ provided a base for future tactical 
development, though Richmond inevitably thought much of it as poor quality, possibly because 
much of his own contribution had been trimmed from the finished product.
103
 Certainly the 
remark on the need to have a simple signal to deploy the fleet from cruising formation can be 
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taken as one root of Jellicoe’s famous ‘Equal Speed Charlie London’ signal at Jutland. What 
Admiral May’s successor, Bridgeman made of them, is uncertain, as is his contribution to tactical 
development during his brief second tenure as C.-in-C. of the Home Fleet. It is entirely possible 
that between Agadir and his sudden appointment as First Sea Lord Bridgeman found little time 
for such considerations. 
Bridgeman’s successor was the practical and open-minded Sir George Callaghan,104 who 
was active in efforts to develop fleet operational tactics.
105
 In 1913 this drive resulted in a 
campaign to update the Navy's venerable Fighting Instructions, which ‘had by that time 
dwindled down to a few pages in the Signal Book’. Comprising thirteen articles, most were 
‘almost unchanged’ from their seventeenth century forebears.106 As efforts to revise the Signal 
Book were underway at the same time, Callaghan and his staff submitted their own proposed 
revision, said to be a very complete revision. When the results were submitted to the Admiralty it 
was ‘severely criticised by the Admiralty Naval Staff, principally on the ground that it was much 
too detailed to be issued as general instructions from the Admiralty, and a large part of it was cut 
out.’107 
What was eventually released by the Admiralty was entitled ‘Instructions for the Conduct 
of a Fleet in Action’, and consisted of ten headings on subjects such as manoeuvring in action 
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and fire discipline.
108
 Callaghan subsequently issued a supplemental memorandum that 
according to one source was largely comprised of material the Admiralty had vetoed.
109
 This 
memorandum is one of the main sources for the contention that Callaghan intended to employ a 
more decentralized command style in action than Jellicoe, entrusting greater responsibility and 
initiative to his subordinate commanders.
110
 
Callaghan acknowledged that ‘[s]ize of the fleet must influence tactics’.111 Although he 
recognized the need to decentralize authority in a large fleet,
112
 Callaghan still intended 
(visibility permitting) to ‘exercise control over the whole fleet during the approach, disposing it 
as may be best for subsequent deployment, and ordering the deployment when the time arrives.’ 
After battle was joined, Callaghan intended to maintain control of the battle line, but detached 
squadrons and ‘other portions’ were to be ‘delegated to their commanders, subject to the general 
instructions given below or to others which I issue.’113 
Of course, intent and thruppence would get Callaghan a loaf of bread if he was unable to 
pass his orders to the rest of the fleet, and that was where the greatest problem lay. Of the three 
chief methods of transmitting signals, only two could really be relied upon—signal pennants and 
Aldis lamps. Despite the importance attached to wireless telegraphy, Callaghan was under no 
illusions about its capabilities in action: ‘The chief W/T difficulty to be faced in war will be the 
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congestion of the various lines of communication.’114 Wireless signals were to be brief, clearly 
written, and only sent if no ‘other method of communication’ was possible. At least the increased 
speed of the latest destroyers meant the Boadiceas could be repurposed as repeating ships, 
increasing the speed that visual signals could be transmitted throughout the battle fleet. 
An additional handicap to Callaghan’s communications was that neither flags nor Aldis 
nor telegraphy functioned in what is now termed ‘real time’. There was considerable delay 
between a squadron commander issuing an order, the actual transmission of that order by his 
flagship’s signalmen, 115  the order’s reception by the rest of the squadron’s ships, and their 
subsequent execution of those orders. This delay between issuance and execution was at the best 
of times measured in minutes. 
The brevity of Callaghan’s instruction116 and his comment that his delegation of authority 
would be subject to other instructions issued later (which never were), both suggest that the 
Admiral may have been more of a ‘centralizer’ than hitherto claimed. Perhaps Callaghan was 
setting up some fleet-wide general principles for his successor, Sir John Jellicoe,
117
 to build upon. 
If this was indeed what Callaghan was attempting, it would largely explain the great difference 
between his ‘Instructions’ and Jellicoe’s wartime Grand Fleet Battle Orders, which were of much 
greater detail and complexity. But if Callaghan never intended to fight a fleet engagement using 
the ‘Instructions’, and instead meant them to be a tool for developing a standard fleet doctrine, 
where the does that leave the infamous Grand Fleet Battle Orders? Those Orders that have been 
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accused of proclaiming ‘the message that any proactive exercise of initiative would be 
tantamount to disloyalty’118 and thus being responsible for the indecisive outcome at Jutland? 
Recall Marder’s comment about ‘the lack of a generally accepted, comprehensive, 
authoritative tactical doctrine in 1914.’119 If Callaghan meant his ‘Instructions’ as a foundation to 
build from, that construction was overtaken by events. From the earliest moments, Jellicoe had to 
create a fleet doctrine to answer ‘[t]he supremely important question of how best to handle in 
action the large and increasing Fleet in his charge.
120
 Callaghan had the luxury of writing his 
Instructions in peace and possessed time to experiment. What form his wartime Fleet Orders 
would have taken is unknown. It is known, however, that prior to the war no ‘instructions 
respecting cruising formations or deployments existed.’121 These had to be created essentially ex 
novo by Jellicoe. 
After war’s end, Jellicoe wrote ‘The tactics to be pursued by the different units of the 
Fleet in action under all conceivable conditions were provided for as far as possible.’ He also 
declared his initial Grand Fleet Battle Orders were based on a ‘Battle Memorandum’ he had 
written while in command of the Atlantic Fleet.
122
 These orders were looser than the Grand Fleet 
Battle Orders, but they were written for a much smaller force. In all cases the emphasis was on 
forcing a favourable position to win the resulting gunnery duel.
123
 Due to the disappointing 
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results obtained in experiments with divisional attack, the single line ahead remained the best 
tactical formation. Jellicoe was certainly aware of its faults, especially with a force as large as the 
Grand Fleet, writing to the commander of the Third Battle Squadron, which was comprised of a 
mixture of pre-Dreadnought battleships: 
‘Undoubtedly the line of 31 ships is very unwieldy, but if the Germans do it we 
must do the same. They may detach divisions in which case ours will naturally be 
taken to meet them under the VA's. But above all don't get drawn away by a fast 
division which might then leave you isolated by their superior speed. 
‘The German TBD's ... are the more difficult problem. If they deploy in the 
opposite to us, we must bite their tails as if they bite ours & we don't bite theirs 
we are all in a very bad position.’124 
 
The line ahead, then, seemed the best of a number of less-than-ideal options. 
A tradition has grown up that regards the Grand Fleet Battle Orders as a straitjacket, and 
that Jellicoe’s over-centralization killed off the initiative of his subordinates.125 There is, however, 
another way to look at the prescriptiveness of these Battle Orders. Setting out a large number of 
potential scenarios in advance deceased the reaction time and signals traffic needed during battle, 
a very important matter in an organization without real-time communications. By providing his 
officers with specified procedures ahead of time, the chance of a serious collapse of fleet 
command and control was greatly reduced. Jellicoe emphasized this: 
‘Stress was laid from the beginning on the fact that the Commander-in-Chief of a 
large fleet could not after deployment control the movements of all the squadrons 
comprising that fleet under the conditions of modern action when funnel and 
cordite smoke, and the great length of the line, would hamper his knowledge of 
events, and increase the difficulty of communication. The necessity for wide 
decentralisation of command, after the deployment of the fleet for action, was 
emphasised.’126 
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The first addendum to Jellicoe’s initial set of Orders demonstrates that Jellicoe did not 
always have ‘little faith in his followers’ and prefer ‘to do everything himself.’127 Regarding the 
reportage of sightings of the enemy fleet: 
‘It is of the greatest importance to the Commander-in-Chief that he should receive 
the earliest information from any cruiser or other vessel sighting the enemy’s 
main body as to the composition and disposition of their battlefleet.’128 
 
Although perhaps phrased awkwardly, this instruction demonstrates that Jellicoe did in fact put 
much trust in his subordinates. It can be argued that if the Grand Fleet lacked initiative with 
Jellicoe as its C.-in-C., then it was not Jellicoe or his orders that were the cause. 
Aside from questions of manoeuvre or initiative, a crucial part of tactics involved the 
range at which to engage the enemy. While there has been a recent tendency to discount British 
commitment to long-range gunnery in the years immediately previous to the war,
129
 Callaghan 
certainly left no doubt of his preference, informing his subordinates that ‘deliberate fire may well 
be opened at about 15,000 yards’, although effective fire was expected to be at ranges between 
8,000 and 10,000 yards. Closer ranges would, Callaghan hoped, be avoided until the end of an 
engagement when the enemy’s firepower was beaten.130 This seems to have been in accordance 
with previous intentions—Jellicoe’s prewar ‘Orders & Dispositions’ proposed opening fire at 
15,000 yards (weather permitting), and establishing the maximum rate of fire between 13,000 
and 12,000 yards, while ranges closer than 7,000 yards were to be avoided in ‘ordinary 
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circumstances’ due to ‘the Torpedo menace’.131 Callaghan was also convinced that his views 
were echoed by at least the majority of the First Fleet’s responsible officers. The principal 
problem was lack of practice in long-range firings, ‘although everyone is agreed as to the great 
desirability of hitting first we have little to guide us as to the range at which we can open fire 
with good prospect of hitting.’132 There was a general failure to carry out long-range firings in 
the last few years of peace.
133
 One intriguing exception, however, was a firing done by the 
Colossus in 1912 at between 14,000 and 15,000 yards,
134
 and with the start of the war gunnery 
practice switched to longer ranges very quickly—within weeks a ship of the Second Battle 
Squadron ‘put 3 of her first salvo into a small towed target at 13000 yds.’135 Although perhaps 
verging on caricature, Captain Henry Thursfield was reasonably accurate when he claimed that 
the firm prewar conviction that the Hochseeflotte wished a close-range slugging match with their 
heavy secondary and torpedo armament ‘that our whole tactics were based upon it’, and the 
British decided, in effect: 
‘“Since the Germans want to fight a close action, to do so must be advantageous 
to them; therefore we should endeavour to avoid it: we must develop and practise 
the game of long bowls”.’136 
 
In fact, this ‘Quest for Reach’ as Jon Sumida termed it, had been going on since the fleets of the 
Dual Alliance were still the Navy’s main concern. The emergence of the German threat gave the 
Navy no reason to desist—and every reason to continue—working on their ‘long bowls’.137 
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Strategy II: Bases 
As the work on the new war plans continued, a parallel discussion was taking place 
regarding the basing of the war fleet. By the end of 1912 it had been more or less decided that 
Scottish waters were preferable. It was expected that any fleet actions would occur in that 
vicinity owing to the expected impregnability of the Dover Straits thanks to advances in mines 
and torpedo craft.
138
 This cut both ways, however, and the Admiralty recognized that a sheltering 
fleet would be vulnerable to attack. Thus the northern realignment brought back into the 
limelight one of many issues left over from the early 1900s: the question of a northern Home 
Port for the Royal Navy. Though this matter had never quite died away, the adoption of a distant 
blockade strategy gave it renewed importance. 
The Admiralty had been greatly concerned of overcrowding in the three existing Home 
Ports, and a Berthing Committee reported at the beginning of 1902 that the Firth of Forth was a 
strategically desirable location for a fourth Home Port: 
‘Its position, 300 miles nearer than is Chatham to the Pentland Firth and the other 
routes to the north of Scotland, renders it a valuable strategic position in case of 
war with the Northern Powers.’139 
 
Land was subsequently purchased from Lord Linlithgow in 1903 and schemes were 
drawn up for the construction of a modern naval base at Rosyth. Then came Fisher, who 
implored Lord Selborne ‘Don’t spend another penny on Rosyth!’140 Battenberg's view in 1904 
had been similar to Fisher's. Building a new base to ease overcrowding was nonsensical when 
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the existing facilities could be relieved by scrapping old ships.
141
 Selborne, however, noted that 
this argument overlooked other considerations, including Germany.
142
 Despite Selborne’s 
admonition, work on Rosyth proceeded at a snail’s pace throughout the remainder of the Fisher 
administration, and in 1910 Fisher bragged of getting Rosyth delayed four years.
143
 This despite 
the entreaties of Jellicoe, who as Controller felt the matter of East Coast docking facilities was of 
‘the utmost gravity and open to much criticism.’144 
Fisher’s motives for blocking Rosyth were not all based on securing economies, however. 
He wrote in 1912 that ‘I have always been “dead-on” for Cromarty and hated Rosyth, which is 
an unsafe anchorage…and there’s that beastly bridge which, if blown up, makes the egress risky 
without examination’.145 
Work proceeded on Rosyth nonetheless, albeit slowly. Progress was such that when the 
first harbourmaster was appointed in July 1911, his first ‘very hasty’ visit convinced him ‘that for 
war purposes the Firth of Forth was a hopeless position.’146 Work was carried on at such a pace 
that Churchill offhandedly admitted in the Commons in March 1912 that Rosyth would not be 
ready until 1916.
147
 By August 1914, Rosyth could manage a few minor repair duties, but 
nothing more.
148
 Meanwhile, other locations had begun to attract attention. 
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Cromarty Firth, noted earlier as Fisher’s preference, came into the spotlight during 1912. 
Churchill sided with Fisher, and at the same time as he told the Commons of the delays at Rosyth 
he announced a ‘floating second-class naval base and war anchorage’ would be established at 
Cromarty.
149
 The matter went on to the C.I.D. and subsequently the War Staff agreed that the 
creation of ‘a temporary secondary base’ there was an important matter, ‘especially before 
Rosyth is completed.’ 150  In December 1912, during discussions of the 1913-14 Estimates, 
Churchill felt that work on Cromarty (including fortification) required ‘the immediate provision 
of another floating dock, and also a floating factory.’ 151  The emphasis given to floating 
infrastructure was probably inspired in part by the work of the aforementioned Rosyth 
harbourmaster, Commander D.J. Munro. Munro was a great advocate of floating dry docks, and 
had discussed them with Jellicoe and Churchill. He had also drawn up plans for an entirely 
mobile naval base at Cromarty.
152
 Oil tankage was also authorized for construction in the area, 
leading Churchill to worry that they could become a target for a tip-and-run landing operation.
153
 
There was also the remote roadstead of Scapa Flow in the Orkneys, which had been noted 
by naval surveyor Graeme Spence in 1812 and was featured as a wartime anchorage in numerous 
Admiralty War Plans from 1907 onward.
154
 Already a regular destination of Home Fleet cruises, 
Scapa found a great advocate in Commander Arthur Vyvyan, the Assistant to the Chief of War 
Staff. In Vyvyan’s words to the Cabinet, Scapa was ‘ample for all requirements’ and its 
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remoteness would make maintaining operational security much easier.
155
 A major disadvantage, 
however, was the prohibitive cost of maintaining defences in the Orkneys.
156
 
Faced with these three choices, opinion amongst the responsible parties was divided. In 
October 1913, Admiral Callaghan admitted Scapa’s advantages, declaring it ‘the best natural 
harbour’, but its remoteness meant that in the immediate future Cromarty and the Firth were 
preferred as fleet bases.
157
 For its part, the Board of Admiralty ‘wavered between Scapa Flow 
and Cromarty’.158 Meanwhile, having considered all the various facts, the War Staff came to 
prefer Scapa.
159
 Having seen statements to the same effect in a paper on providing Scapa with 
temporary defences in wartime, Churchill implored Battenberg to have the War Staff recast their 
argument ‘without reflecting upon the Admiralty policy in regard to Cromarty.’160 
 The debate over the basing of the fleet would continue throughout the war, and Scapa 
Flow’s ultimate wartime role as the Grand Fleet’s primary base was nowhere as clear-cut as 
Jellicoe would later claim.
161
 Despite this absence of certitude, the northward reorientation of the 
fleets still had effects on matters besides the purely strategic. In October 1912 Commodore (T) 
Lambert received a complaint from the owner of the island of Hoy regarding ‘the injurious 
effects on the sporting rights’ caused by regular visits by men of the Home Fleet, leading 
Admiral Callaghan to severely restrict the activities of libertymen visiting Hoy.
162
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Another Cruiser Revolution 
 In 1912 Churchill instructed the Admiralty to simply the designation system for cruisers, 
and the result was the consolidation of the myriad types under three headings: battlecruiser, 
cruiser, and light cruiser.
163
 This sweeping redesignation did not alter the Navy’s lack of a cruiser 
capable of equalling the speed of the latest destroyers. This requirement resulted in a choice 
between two designs, a ‘Super-Active’164 carrying a belt of side armour, and a ‘Super-Swift’.165 
Fisher inevitably favoured the Super-Swift because the Super-Active lacked speed and thus 
‘cannot possibly escape from an Armoured Cruiser … Armour is vision. D—d rot to put 
armour into small vessels! Sheer waste of speed!’166 The Admiralty, however, tended towards the 
Super-Active, and this design, which had originated as a ‘New Fearless’,167 was chosen. After a 
hectic design process, the eight ships of the Arethusa class emerged.
168
 They were the first of a 
series of light cruiser classes optimized for North Sea fleet operations that can be collectively 
termed ‘North Sea Scouts’.169 
The ‘North Sea Scouts’ were intended ‘to protect the Battle Fleet from torpedo attack, to 
screen it and within certain limits to scout for it’, or so Churchill later claimed.170 In fact, there 
was a difference of opinion over exactly which of those duties would be most prominent. 
Churchill favoured their use in scouting, writing in April 1913 Churchill that ‘tactical 
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combinations of battle cruisers and light cruisers require special study and practice.’ 171 The 
battlecruisers were ideal for reinforcing the fleet’s scouting cruisers operating ahead of the main 
body in search of the enemy fleet: 
‘It is suggested that the light cruiser squadrons (‘Arethusas’) should work with the 
battle cruiser squadron, and that in observation or scouting the battle cruiser 
should be in the front line with the light cruisers of his or perhaps 5 or 6 miles in 
rear or it.’172 
 
The responsible officers afloat had other opinions. Admiral Callaghan and the commander of the 
1
st
 Battle Cruiser Squadron, Rear-Admiral David Beatty, though not denying the importance of 
scouting, felt that the light cruisers would be ‘the only proper means of defence against torpedo 
craft in a Fleet action’.173 
This also touched on the matter of how to employ the battlecruisers. A month after taking 
command of the First Battle Cruiser Squadron in March 1913, Beatty and his War Staff Officer 
Commander Reginald Plunkett produced ‘Functions of a Battle-Cruiser Squadron’.174 In their 
view the duties of the battlecruisers were: 
A) Supporting fast light cruiser sweeps of the enemy coast so that the enemy would need 
battleships to drive them off. 
B) Supporting an armoured cruiser blockade patrol. 
C) Supporting armoured cruiser squadrons during a cruise by the fleet. 
D) Supporting for cruisers shadowing an enemy fleet. 
E) Acting as a fast division in a fleet action. 
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To carry out these duties, Beatty and Plunkett argued that their force must be numerically 
superior to the enemy’s battlecruiser force.175 That September Beatty reiterated this point, as well 
as accepting ‘that one of the principal functions of the Battle Cruiser Squadron is to provide 
supports for the Cruiser Squadrons.’176 Beatty went so far as to declare that the battlecruisers 
‘should be the keystone of the Cruiser Dispositions’. 
In his April 1913 letter to Chief of the War Staff Jackson, Churchill had suggested that 
Arethusas and battlecruisers could operate together in mixed groups of ‘1 battle cruiser to every 
4 light cruisers.’ Such a force, with the battlecruiser at the centre, could ‘watch with ease in clear 
weather a front of 90 miles… 30 to 40 miles even in misty weather.’177 Churchill maintained this 
notion, which seems as much like a cavalry deployment as a cruiser formation; in mid-1914 he 
noted that Beatty, in a submission on battlecruisers, had not included ‘what is to my mind the 
most formidable and disconcerting of all’ battlecruiser functions: ‘rupturing an enemy’s cruiser 
line and attacking his cruisers of all kinds wherever found.’178 
By this time Churchill had gone a step beyond what he had described in 1913. Then he 
had proposed merely that the battlecruiser and light cruiser squadrons cooperate and train 
together. Now he had decided that the entire structure of the First Fleet’s cruiser force would be 
altered. Instead of distinct battlecruiser and light cruiser squadrons, there would be six-ship 
mixed squadrons comprising two battlecruisers and four ‘North Sea Scouts’.179 In this proposal 
Churchill may have been prompted by the C.-in-C. Home Fleets. A draft précis of a question to 
be discussed at a planned conference at Spithead in July 1914 mentions Callaghan 
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recommending ‘the association of light cruisers with the battle cruisers’, although whether the 
C.-in-C. proposed breaking up the Battle Cruiser Squadrons is unknown.
180
 Unsurprisingly, the 
question was submitted by Admiral Beatty, who had a proprietary interest in the matter.
181
 There 
is no mention in any of these papers of the employment of mixed battlecruiser-light cruiser 
forces outside the Home Fleet. 
 
The 1913 Manoeuvres 
The 1913 Manoeuvres were along the same general lines as the previous year’s, and 
deliberately so. Chief of Staff Sir Henry Jackson hoped they would ‘possibly afford either a 
valuable confirmation of the results obtained by the Red Fleet last Summer, or show the 
apparently successful raid on the East Coast was illusory’.182 The use of battleships as ersatz 
troopships in the 1912 Manoeuvres had been a point of controversy, so this time Jackson hoped 
that chartered merchantmen carrying Royal Marines would provide superior verisimilitude.
183
 
Subsequently the Admiralty chartered four suitable vessels as transports, supplemented by the 
repair ships Cyclops and Assistance.
184
 
The Red Fleet was once again the attacking force, and represented a German-Austrian 
combination, a curious feature of which being a successful sortie by a strong detachment of the 
Austro-Hungarian Navy to seize a coaling anchorage on the western Irish coast.
185
 Red was 
given two objectives, both of which were similar to those from 1912. The first objective was to 
cover the transports carrying raiding forces, and the second was the interruption of Atlantic trade 
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‘by operating on the routes in sufficient strength to ensure that only Battleships can successfully 
engage him and drive him off.’186 The principal Atlantic raiders would be the ‘Austrian’ force in 
Hibernian waters. Red’s Commander-in-Chief was Vice-Admiral Jellicoe, now the Second Sea 
Lord. Not including the six transports, the total Red Fleet was: 
Red Fleet 
Thunderer (flagship) 
2
nd
, 4
th
, 6
th
 Battle Squadrons 
Indomitable, Invincible 
1
st
 Cruiser Squadron 
Cornwall, Cumberland, Warrior 
2
nd
 Light Cruiser Squadron 
2
nd
, 3
rd
, 6
th
 Destroyer Flotillas 
6
th
 and 8
th
 Submarine Flotillas 
Transports 
 
The defending Blue Fleet was left in the charge of Admiral Callaghan. Callaghan maintained 
command of Blue’s main fleet, leaving the patrol flotillas in the charge of the Admiral of Patrols, 
John de Robeck.
187
 Callaghan and de Robeck’s forces included the following: 
Blue Fleet 
Neptune (flagship) 
1
st
, 3
rd
, 5
th
 Battle Squadrons 
Lion, Princess Royal, Indefatigable 
2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 5
th
, 6
th
, 7
th
, 9
th
, 10
th
 Cruiser Squadrons 
1
st
, 3
rd
 Light Cruiser Squadrons 
1
st
, 4
th
, 5
th
, 7
th
, 8
th
, 9
th
 Destroyer Flotillas 
3
rd
, 4
th
, 7
th
 Submarine Flotillas 
Minelayers 
 
‘War’ was declared in the afternoon of July 23rd. Callaghan’s forces were, at the outbreak, based 
around eastern Scotland and Scapa Flow, with de Robeck’s forces farther south backed by 
several cruiser squadrons in the Humber. Jellicoe’s main force was at the Nore, minus the 4th 
Battle Squadron, which represented the Austrian force in the Atlantic. Jellicoe’s plan was, 
initially, to bring his fleet as close to Blue’s territory as possible before hostilities commenced, 
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then raid the Humber in force while a detachment simultaneously attacked Cromer. As the Red 
main fleet approached the Humber Cyclops and Assistance attempted a landing at Haisborough 
and drove off a Blue destroyer stationed nearby.
188
 
Meanwhile Jellicoe’s force had arrived off the Humber, and the defending submarines 
were declared—not without controversy189—to have been all knocked out of action. Red landed 
Marines ashore at Immingham before Callaghan’s fleet could intervene, though a Blue cruiser-
destroyer force managed to engage Red’s battlecruisers sporadically in fog off Flamborough. His 
landing successful, Jellicoe withdrew from the Humber and escaped, while Callaghan detached a 
strong naval force to retake Grimsby from Red, while otherwise remaining on patrol off the 
Yorkshire coast.
190
 
After refuelling, Jellicoe on the 25
th
 planned to land troops at Blyth and Sunderland, 
again covered by his fleet, with the Cyclops and Assistance carrying out a separate raid south 
of the Humber at Mablethrope. Callaghan, meanwhile, had re-established his patrols and was 
cruising in the latitude of the Farne Islands while his Third Battle Squadron was off 
Flamborough Head. 
During the evening of the 25
th
 Jellicoe’s plans almost came to grief when his transports 
made contact with Blue’s Second Cruiser Squadron, although Red’s escorting cruisers were able 
to drive away Blue before the transports were discovered. Blue submarines attacked both 
landings but only the Blyth landing was disrupted. Callaghan, meanwhile, gathered his ships and 
set off to attack the Red forces. This time Jellicoe did not manage to get away unscathed as 
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Callaghan’s force overwhelmed the Sixth Battle Squadron which had been operating farther to 
sea as a diversion. Callaghan’s pursuit of Jellicoe was disrupted by attacks by Red submarines. 
Again Jellicoe returned to the Nore to regroup, arriving early on July 27
th
. From there he 
intended to make another raid on the Humber but subsequently the two Red transports involved 
were diverted to Blyth. When the transports and their escorts reached Blyth, they were brought 
under attack by Blue submarines and destroyers led by the cruiser Juno. Supported by fire from 
shore batteries at Tynemouth Castle, the Juno and three destroyers forced their way past the Red 
escorts ‘and then had the Transports at their mercy.’191 While this was taking place, Jellicoe had 
once again taken his main fleet to sea to cover the remainder of the Red transports, but the 
Admiralty signalled for operations to cease in the evening of July 27
th
. Jellicoe’s Flag Captain, 
Henry Oliver, recalled that Jellicoe’s raiding had ‘scared the Government and the papers made a 
great fuss and the Manoeuvres were suspended and Jellicoe sent for to the Admiralty, he flew 
there in a seaplane.’192 
Preparations for the second phase of the Manoeuvres began, with the Admiralty altering 
the rules ‘strictly against us [Red] so that it was impossible for us to scare anyone again, or to do 
anything else.’193 When war resumed on July 31st the two opposite sides comprised: 
Blue Fleet Red Fleet 
Neptune 
1
st
, 3
rd
, 5
th
 Battle Squadrons 
Three battlecruisers 
2
nd
, 3
rd
, 6
th
, 7
th
, 10
th
 Cruiser Squadrons 
3
rd
 Light Cruiser Squadron 
1
st
 and 4
th
 Destroyer Flotillas 
Minesweepers 
Thunderer 
2
nd
 and 6
th
 Battle Squadrons 
Two battlecruisers 
1
st
 Cruiser Squadron 
2
nd
 Light Cruiser Squadron 
2
nd
, 3
rd
, 6
th
 Destroyer Flotillas 
Six transports 
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Callaghan had been ordered confidentially by the Admiralty to pursue a much more ‘generally 
offensive policy’ as compared to the previous phase: 
‘You should endeavour to bring the Red Fleet to decisive action at the earliest 
possible moment, or, failing that, drive him into his ports, and blockade him 
therein, to prevent a continuance of the raids on Blue territory and the egress of 
Red vessels into the Atlantic.’194 
 
In addition the First Lord had written to Callaghan in a rather chiding tone on July 29
th
.
195
 In it, 
Churchill, aware that Callaghan felt his provided resources inadequate, insisted that they were 
not, and in fact ‘[t]he task now entrusted to you cannot be called disproportionate to the forces at 
yr disposal’. Furthermore, the First Lord felt that it seemed ‘that very favourable chances are 
offered to a general offensive’.196 What Callaghan thought of this can only be imagined. 
After the Admiralty declared hostilities open on the morning of the 31
st
, Jellicoe gathered 
his fleet together near the Haaks Lightship, with the intent to take his transports to attack one of a 
choice of objectives that included Newcastle, Glasgow, and the Shetlands. As a cover to these 
operations, Jellicoe planned to carry out a night destroyer attack on the Humber while two 
transports attacked Winterton. He further planned to use a minefield to secure a line of retreat. 
Callaghan, meanwhile, had disposed his Cruiser Squadrons along a line from 
Flamborough to Lister, with the First and Third Battle Squadrons plus the First Destroyer Flotilla 
and half the Fourth Destroyer Flotilla cruising to north about sixty miles from Peterhead. The 
Fifth Battle Squadron supported by the Fourth Cruiser Squadron and the remainder of the Fourth 
Destroyer Flotilla were to counter attack Red’s bases. 
Despite heavy seas, the diversionary attack on Winterton went off successfully. Blue 
submarines arrived too late to disrupt operations. The night destroyer attack on the 31
st
 resulted 
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in a running fight which saw considerable damage done to the Blue ships present. The real action, 
however, was happening elsewhere. Red’s main fleet passed the Dogger Bank during the night 
and ran headlong into the Blue cruiser line just before 0400 on August 1
st
. At 0530 Jellicoe 
detached two transports plus the Sixth Battle Squadron to raid Blyth but fifty minutes later 
recalled them, judging the Blue forces too strong for a successful landing. Throughout the rest of 
the morning Jellicoe’s ships fought to drive off Blue’s shadowing cruisers. 
Callaghan had no shortage of intelligence but was still unsure of Jellicoe’s objective. At 
1240 Jellicoe tried again to send his transports to attack Blyth, but they were subsequently caught 
by Blue’s Third Cruiser Squadron and sunk along with most of their escorts. Callaghan and 
Jellicoe finally came to blows at 1715, the results of which were heavy losses to Jellicoe’s fleet. 
The detached Fifth Battle Squadron had captured Yarmouth, leaving Jellicoe in a dangerous 
position. At this point the Manoeuvres ended. 
In the reckoning afterwards Jellicoe was generally hailed as the winner, having achieved 
his objective of carrying out several successful raids on British territory and escaping with 
minimal casualties. To be sure, there were dissenters, especially regarding the first landing where 
the Blue submarine forces were ruled out of action. Callaghan, meanwhile, defended himself by 
pointing to his eventual success in forcing a fleet action during the second phase of the 
Manoeuvres. While his cruisers had been brushed aside, ‘at an early hour on Friday the Blue Batl. 
Fleet were able after 12 hours chase to bring [Jellicoe] to action.’ Callaghan considered this 
‘preferable to establishing Blue in strength between [Red] & his base & the annihilation of both 
Fleets left Blue with the 5
th
 Batt. Sq
n
 intact & in command of the sea.’197 By the end of August, 
Callaghan had compiled his thoughts into a long memorandum dealing with ‘North Sea Strategy’ 
as a whole. The principal question, as the Commander-in-Chief saw it, was whether ‘the fleet [is] 
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to be primarily used for the defence of our coast, and stationed with this main object in view?’ 
Callaghan objected strenuously to this notion. ‘Such an idea,’ he warned, ‘if allowed to grow, 
cannot but be most prejudicial to that spirit of initiative which is so essential.’ Callaghan declared 
‘the only proper defence of the country against Invasion and Raid is by Military forces, and to 
make the Navy responsible for this work is a grave strategic error, which hands the initiative 
wholly to the enemy.’198 What were needed instead were more coastal batteries. As for cruiser 
patrols, Callaghan felt strongly that the Manoeuvres showed this was useless. 
Jellicoe was equally sanguine about the existing coastal defence flotillas, writing that ‘I 
do not think these vessels will be a sufficient deterrent to an enterprising foe although they are of 
great value.’199 The enemy cruiser-destroyer forces expected to be escorting raiding troopships 
could sweep aside the destroyers and harass the defending submarines, ‘especially if the moment 
selected for the appearance of the hostile force is propitious.’ Clearly, thought Jellicoe, ‘some 
other means of protection’ was needed against enemy raids. 
 
Destroyers and the Fleet: Integration 
Callaghan’s post-Manoeuvres commentary on the uselessness of chaining destroyers and 
cruisers to coastal defence work was a symptom of a greater doctrinal argument within the Navy 
on the role of the destroyer. By 1913 the arguments over whether or not destroyer flotillas would 
be a permanent element of the Royal Navy’s main fleet in wartime had ended. The ‘grand fleet’ 
school favouring such an attachment had triumphed, aided in no small part by the abandonment 
of both the observational blockade strategic paradigm and the poor results obtained in the 1912 
                                                 
198
 Callaghan, ‘Naval Manoeuvres, 1913. Remarks on North Sea Strategy’, 28 August 1913, enclosure in Callaghan 
to Admiralty, ‘Naval Manoeuvres, 1913. North Sea Strategy.’, 28 August 1913, No. 1266/H.F.7.S., ADM 116/3130. 
The stricken-through words are from the original. 
199
 Jellicoe ,‘Naval Manœuvres, 1913. Report by Vice-Admiral Sir J. R. Jellicoe, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commander-in-
Chief, Red Fleet.’, 6 August 1913, p. 1, ADM 116/3381. 
336 
 
and 1913 Manoeuvres when search patrols were put into practice. In his appraisal of the 1913 
Manoeuvres, Red Fleet C.-in-C. Jellicoe noted that ‘[t]he presence of even a few torpedo-boat 
destroyers … makes it possible to drive off watching cruisers of any nature most effectively at 
night and gives a great sense of security.’200 All that remained was to actually integrate the 
flotillas into the battle fleet, thus converting the ‘grand fleet of battle’ from theory to practice. 
One of the most immediate necessities for the union of flotilla and battle fleet was the 
need for adequate communications between the battlefleet C.-in-C. and his flotillas. Jellicoe had 
discovered to his frustration that the existing destroyer flotillas lacked this capability, and to 
bridge the gap he had been forced to attach his own signalling cruisers to the flotillas as an 
extemporised substitute. 
‘Without the flotilla cruiser the senior officer of the flotilla cannot signal with any 
facility or rapidity to his vessels. Their movements are therefore much hampered, 
they have no rallying point, navigation becomes very difficult; but perhaps the 
most important point of all is that communication between the flotilla and the 
Commander-in-Chief is very quickly lost.’201 
 
If this total collapse in communications was not prevented, attaching flotillas to the battle fleet 
would be worse than useless. Jellicoe therefore looked upon ‘the immediate reintroduction of the 
flotilla cruiser as an entire necessity.’202 
Jellicoe submitted this report on August 6
th, and even before the month’s end the 
Admiralty was hard and work on a response. Instead of reintroducing a Boadicea or Sentinel-
type cruiser, the Admiralty had a less drastic step in mind. Initial efforts were led by Commodore 
Cecil Lambert and focused on converting one or more of the Tribal class ships and the Swift to a 
‘Flotilla Leader’ configuration, in which guise they would embark the Captain (D) of the flotilla, 
a wireless installation capable of 150 miles’ range, and the necessary signalmen and 
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telegraphists.
203
 Trials of such an arrangement had already been carried out during the summer of 
1913.
204
 Within a fortnight, likely due to the Tribals’ wretched endurance, it was decided to 
forego such conversions and in their place an entirely new design emerged. The new ‘Destroyer 
Flotilla Leader’ was to be not larger than 1800 tons with a 33 or 34 knot top speed, a ‘Light 
Cruiser [wireless] installation’ and signalling arrangements ‘[i]f possible equal to the latest Light 
Cruisers’, and superior endurance at 15 knots to the latest ordinary Royal Navy destroyers.205 
This was the basis for the Lightfoot class flotilla leaders, and the urgency with which their 
development proceeded can be seen by the decision to order three before the official design was 
finalised, although this was later changed to just two with the Swift being converted in lieu of a 
third. The two new leaders, Lightfoot and Marksman, replaced three ‘M’ class destroyers already 
on order under the 1913-14 Estimates, with another two (Kempenfelt and Nimrod) being added to 
the forthcoming 1914-15 Estimates.
206
 
Besides the matter of improving the flotillas’ signalling and wireless capabilities, there 
was the issue of how the flotillas would be used in a fleet-to-fleet engagement. What was 
ultimately decided upon by Callaghan and his staff is embodied in a memorandum he issued to 
the Home Fleet in March 1914.
207
 The C.-in-C. decisively cut through the issue of whether his 
flotillas would concentrate on attacking the enemy heavy ships with torpedoes or defending their 
own battle line against hostile torpedo craft: they would do both. The large size and gun battery 
possessed by the First Fleet’s newest destroyers allowed them to operate suitably in either role, 
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no matter how much this dual-purpose irritated some at the Admiralty.
208
 The British flotillas 
would immediately at the onset of an engagement close to launch their torpedoes, preferably 
with browning shots against the enemy battle line(s) at favourable angles of attack.
209
 Once their 
torpedoes were launched, the flotillas would turn their attention to disrupting their enemy 
counterparts. Callaghan refused to give one mission priority, noting that there would likely be 
occasions where both these objectives would be undertaken simultaneously. Responsibility for 
ordering the destroyers into action would initially rest with the fleet or squadron commander, but 
Callaghan cautioned that in the latter stages of an engagement the ‘decision must rest with the 
flotilla commanders’ owing to anticipated signalling difficulties in the chaotic atmosphere of 
battle. Flotilla commanders were to work out their method of attack beforehand to avoid long, 
easily misinterpreted signals during an action. 
 
The Last Year of Peace 
On November 4
th
, 1913 the old Royal Sovereign-class battleship Empress of India was 
sunk by gunfire from Callaghan’s Home Fleet off Portland. Despite the Empress’s allocation as 
a target for a not-inconsiderable portion of the Navy’s battle line firepower, her loss was not 
greeted with favour by the Admiralty. Their reaction to the sinking should be considered as 
significant. Third Sea Lord Rear-Admiral Moore described her loss as being ‘unfortunate, not so 
much by reason of any deductions that could have been formed from a survey of her condition 
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[after the firings were complete]… but because of the financial loss of her sale value.’210 Admiral 
Callaghan too regarded her loss as a lost opportunity, but for a different reason. The Home Fleet 
C.-in-C. had hoped that ‘long-range runs’ by Neptune and Hercules, a ‘local control’ run by 
King George V, and a full speed run by Lion could have been carried out. However, Callaghan 
also believed Empress’s loss had ‘a satisfactory feature in that officers and men are now better 
able to appreciate the object of the gunnery training they receive.’211 
The difference in opinions regarding the results of Empress’s loss—the Admiralty 
regretting the monetary loss versus the Fleet’s unease at the loss of valuable combat practice—
illustrate vividly the quandary that the Royal Navy found itself in after the 1912 Novelle. 
Furthermore, it illustrates the central debate that ran through the entire prewar period: economy 
set against the need for adequate preparations for a war at sea. The sale of ships after their use in 
experimental trials as well as fleet gunnery practice was not in itself unusual, as the ultimate 
fates of the ironclad Belleisle and the turret ship Edinburgh illustrate.
212
 However Admiral 
Moore’s statement, combined with an earlier argument used by Churchill to justify the expense 
of the trial to Asquith,
213
 show that there was more to Empress of India’s potential sale than 
ordinary penny-wisdom by the Admiralty. The other Royal Sovereigns sold for scrappage 
prewar brought an average of around £38,000,
214
 while the Navy Estimates in preparation for the 
1914-15 financial year were initially estimated by the Admiralty Finance Committee as over 
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£50,000,000.
215
 The concern over such a small amount of potential income illustrates the depths 
of the financial exigencies that burdened the Admiralty as 1914 began. Throughout the year the 
Navy’s fiscal requirements were increasingly contrary to the political desires of the Cabinet, to 
the point that some argue the situation would be intractable without a major shift or concession 
by one side or the other. Implied—but always left unsaid—is a notion that could have come 
straight from Dangerfield’s Strange Death of Liberal England: that only war prevented a 
major crisis for the country regarding expenditure on the Royal Navy. 
Nicholas Lambert argues that the Navy was prepared to make that shift through the 
revival of Winston Churchill’s earlier proposal to substitute torpedo craft for the capital ships 
authorized in the Estimates for the 1914-15 financial year. In fact he goes considerably further 
than this. His writings, in particular the final chapter of John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, are 
devoted to presenting what is described as incontrovertible evidence suggesting that substitution 
policy had been accepted by the principal figures at the Admiralty, and was ready in all ways for 
adoption bar having been actually and officially put into writing when the First World War broke 
out.
216
 This claim, as has already been mentioned, is an overstatement of the evidence. Closer 
examination of both Lambert’s own cited evidence and other surviving material suggests that 
matters were far from being as clear-cut as the substitution policy narrative implies. 
 
The Estimates Crisis 
The spectre of the budget had already arisen even before the Empress of India began her 
final voyage. While Churchill had already warned the Cabinet that the 1914-15 Estimates would 
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likely exceed ‘perhaps to the extent of £2,000,000’ the 1913-14 Estimates, the reaction to this 
was muted.
217
 Churchill was as eager as anyone to avoid such expenditures, and hoped, as in 
1912, that the Germans might come to his rescue. To that end he made a final offer for an Anglo-
German naval holiday during a speech in Manchester on October 18
th
, perhaps hoping the 
German government would reject the offer and strengthen his position when discussion of the 
next estimates began, although the First Lord probably retained a genuine desire to reach such an 
accord with Germany.
218
 In any case, his motivations were rendered moot; the German 
government never responded officially.
219
 
Six days after the Empress of India sank Churchill managed to alienate the Radicals 
further during a speech at Guildhall. Instead of again offering the olive branch of a building 
holiday or any sort of cushion to soften the blow of higher naval estimates, Churchill seemed to 
contradict himself (in the eyes of some) when he both talked up the British naval position but 
insisted that ‘expenditures and exertions greater than we have ever made in times of peace’ 
would be necessary, and that as First Lord he was duty-bound ‘to present to Parliament Estimates 
substantially greater than the enormous sums originally voted in the present year.’ 220  It is 
tempting to agree with F.W. Wiemann that ‘[o]ne can hardly understand why Churchill, who in 
1909 had himself been leading the fight for ‘economy’, could not have foreseen’ the furore this 
statement would provoke from his economist colleagues.
221
 It seems likely that Churchill 
honestly felt his case was obvious and unarguable on its merits alone, a failing of his that would 
recur throughout his career. He may also have felt the most important question that would be 
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discussed by the Cabinet would be the expansion of the Royal Navy’s construction 
programme.
222
 In either case, the speech was a miscalculation; that Churchill’s statement was 
injudicious at best was widely recognized. Margot Asquith wrote that if the Cabinet ‘let Winston 
have too much money’ the result would be a Liberal party in ‘local war’, both within itself and 
with Labour. ‘If one can’t be a little economical when all foreign countries are peaceful then I 
don’t know when we can.’223 
Churchill’s initial memorandum to the Cabinet of December 5th asked for close to £53 
million, of which £50.7 million would be contained in the regular estimates and the rest in a 
special Supplementary Estimate.
224
 The combination of this figure plus a poorly-timed dinner 
with members of the shadow cabinet set a faction of the Cabinet to work on either reducing the 
Naval Estimates or ousting the First Lord.
225
 Amongst their ranks was, unsurprisingly, the 
vengeful McKenna. Others included Charles Hobhouse, Walter Runciman, Pease, and Lord 
Samuel.
226
 Lloyd George, while not interested in removing his friend from power, nevertheless 
wanted the Estimates cut, as he felt they would be ‘distinctly provocative’ since Anglo-German 
relations seemed to be thawing.
227
 At a Cabinet meeting on December 15
th
, Churchill suggested 
that £700,000 in reductions could be found, and a tentative agreement was reached for an 
Estimate totalling £49.7 million.
228
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The issue did not end there. The anti-Churchill group pressed for more cuts, including the 
elimination of two battleships.
229
 Even Churchill’s aunt, Lady Cornelia Wimborne, wrote to him, 
scolding that he was ‘breaking with the traditions of Liberalism in your Naval expenditure; you 
are in danger of becoming purely a ‘Navy Man’ and losing sight of the far greater job of a great 
leader of the Liberal party. Peace, retrenchment and reform must ever be its policy and you are 
being carried away by the attraction of perfecting your machine for war expenditure.’230 The 
holidays did little to slow the gathering storm. On Boxing Day Churchill warned the First Sea 
Lord of a new memorandum issued a few days previously by Lloyd George which ‘must be 
regarded as a most serious challenge to the whole of our policy’, and asked the Sea Lords to 
study it and produce a ‘restatement of the case for the programmes and standards the Admiralty 
are pursuing.’231 
Then an interview with Lloyd George appeared on New Year’s Day in the Daily 
Chronicle. Beyond calling for ‘a bold and independent step towards disarmament’, 232  the 
Chancellor blamed the increase in military expenditure for increased taxation, claiming that if 
said expenditure had remained at the level of 1887, a savings of 4s on the pound on local rates 
would have occurred. Furthermore, Lloyd George reminded readers that Lord Randolph 
Churchill had considered the 1887 estimates excessive.
233
 Considering Churchill’s complicated 
relationship to his father and his political activities, this can only be considered a direct personal 
attack. Though some of Churchill’s opponents—including Samuel—found the interview too far a 
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step, the possibility that a backbench revolt could occur must have worried Asquith.
234
 Sir 
Francis Hopwood believed that ‘the Cabinet is sick of Churchill’s perpetually undermining & 
exploiting its policy and are picking a quarrel with him’, although ‘their battleground is very ill 
chosen as in consequence of their indolence he has probably got chapter and verse for every item 
of the Naval Programme.’235 For his part, Churchill observed ‘a dignified and moody silence.’236 
Matters could not have been improved when the Admiralty Finance Committee returned a Sketch 
Estimate totalling £51,986,948 gross. Of this, the Estimate proper was £49,966,700; the 
remaining £2,020,248 was ‘Appropriations in Aid’.237 
The problem, wrote Financial Secretary MacNamara, was that ‘the great bulk of the 
expenditure necessary in 1914-15 is the result of commitments already approved by Parliament.’ 
Even a total elimination of new construction would only save £2,030,000 from the proposed sum. 
‘This obvious fact is sometimes overlooked when critics comment on the size of Navy Estimates.’ 
MacNamara added acidly.
238
 When the suggestion of cutting two battleships was proposed in 
Cabinet, Churchill retorted that it would jeopardize the agreed-upon standard of naval superiority 
since even four battleships would ‘only just [maintain] the 60 per cent standard’.239 On January 
19
th
 Churchill wrote a minute to the Third Sea Lord asking for sketch estimates for 1915-16 and 
1916-17 assuming an identical construction programme each year. ‘The object of these figures’, 
the First Lord explained, ‘is to show how heavily we are burdened by arrears and accelerations in 
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these years, and how greatly the Estimates would be relieved if these exceptional charges were 
removed.’240 
Lloyd George, meanwhile, informed Manchester Guardian editor C.P. Scott on January 
18
th
 that he, McKenna, and Samuel were agreed that Churchill should be forced out.
241
 King 
George wrote Churchill encouragingly that same day, agreeing that ‘if the Government are to 
carry out the Naval policy which they have already sanctioned, this year’s programme of 4 
Battleships must be adhered to.’242 
Two days later Asquith and Grey—the latter one of Churchill’s supporters within the 
Cabinet—were of the opinion that rather than risk ‘smash-up and resignation’ it might be better 
to ‘dissolve parliament and run the risk of the election’.243 The next day one more attempt was 
made by Asquith to settle matters between Lloyd George and Churchill. Faced with the Prime 
Minister’s backing of the First Lord, the Chancellor threatened resignation. Asquith replied that 
this would lead to a general election. The Chancellor, who had not started the row and may, as 
Hopwood suspected, have been ‘trying it on’ after all,244 seems to have blinked, and the next day 
suggested that he would concur with all four planned dreadnoughts in 1914-15 as well as other 
‘present obligations’ provided that the 1915-16 Estimates would contain strenuous reductions.245 
Almost immediately the Financial Secretary responded unfavourably. ‘I do not at all 
agree with the policy of 53 or 54 millions for 1914-15 in order that 1915-16 may be relieved.’ 
MacNamara raised the spectre of a Parliamentary Enquiry by the ‘Little Navy people’, although 
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he admitted ‘whatever provision is made, you must contemplate a demand for Enquiry.’ He 
added that ‘we want 51½ millions’ for the 1914-15 Estimates, which ‘might get us through 
without Supplementary’. For the next two years he speculated either £50 million or £51 
million.
246
 This letter was presumably preceded by other similar discussions, because on January 
26
th
 the First Lord wrote Lloyd George that he could not hold up his end of the arrangement. 
Churchill insisted that 
‘There is no act of Admiralty administration for which I am responsible wh 
cannot be vindicated to the House of Commons. I cannot buy a year of office by a 
bargain under duress about the estimates of 1915-16. No forecasts beyond the 
year have ever been made by my predecessors. I have no power—even if I were 
willing—to bind the Board of Admiralty of 1915 to any exact decision.’247 
 
The Chancellor reacted aggressively—at first. He wrote back warning Churchill that 
‘This intimation completely alters the situation. I now fully appreciate your idea 
of a bargain: it is an argument which binds the Treasury not even to attempt any 
further economies in the interest of the taxpayer, whilst it does not in the least 
impose any obligation on the Admiralty no to incur fresh liabilities.’248 
 
Subsequently, McKenna received an invitation to a council of war from Lloyd George that 
Winston had ‘[put] to an end all my efforts for peace.’249 However at Cabinet on January 28th 
Lloyd George seems to have backed down once more, leaving Churchill to carry the day.
250
 A 
strongly worded letter signed by five of the anti-Churchill hardliners reached Asquith soon 
afterwards,
251
 but with their ranks thinned by defectors such as Sir John Simon,
252
 the 
Admiralty’s success was no longer in serious doubt. Even so, the First Lord would offer cuts 
totalling £920,000 in a memorandum on February 6
th
.
253
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The thinness of the Admiralty’s financial margin can be seen in one of the casualties of 
Churchill’s efforts at economies, the nascent Royal Naval Air Service. During the height of the 
crisis, Battenberg offered this advice: ‘I prefer a reduction in “Air” to that in Cruisers. The latter 
are the weapon, the actual means to an end; the Hydroplane or Airship may turn out to be good 
aids of the former, but can never be a substitute.’ 254 Aircraft, an as-yet unproven weapon—or at 
the very least an underproven one—were considered a lower priority than building new light 
cruisers. It was unsurprising, then, that the proposed rigid airships for that year came under 
scrutiny, resulting in a cut in procurement from four to two.
255
 In addition a Forlanini-type semi-
rigid airship would be deferred until 1915-1916.
256
 Despite these setbacks, Captain Murray 
Sueter, the head of the R.N.A.S., still hoped to that in the 1916-17 Estimates £60,000 (reduced 
from £100,000) could be spent on the construction of a ‘special high speed aeroplane ship’.257 
The ultimate form this ship would have taken is unknown, but given that designs for a full-
decked aircraft carrier had already been submitted to the Admiralty by one firm,
258
 the 
possibilities are intriguing, to say the least. 
 
The Manpower Crisis 
Even as the Cabinet chose sides over the 1914-15 Estimates, Churchill and the Admiralty 
were already coming to grips with a related issue that was also reaching a moment of acute crisis: 
the Navy’s manpower situation. Nicholas Lambert commented correctly that the Royal Navy saw 
                                                 
254
 Battenberg to Churchill, 16 January 1914, MB1/T29/271, Battenberg MSS. 
255
 Recent German successes with Zeppelins had encouraged the Admiralty, led by the air-minded Churchill, to 
reconsider their abandonment of rigid airship development after the ill-fated Mayfly project. 
256
 Typescript memorandum, n.d., ‘Estimates 1914-15’, AIR 1/2439, , AIR 1/652/17/122/480, Air Ministry MSS, 
TNA. 
257
 ‘Air Service Estimates’, 23 January 1914, AIR 1/2440. 
258
 William Beardmore & Co., Ltd. To Admiralty, n.d. [December 1912], “Outline Specification for a Proposed 
Parent Ship for Naval Aeroplanes”, AIR 1/2454. See also D.K. Brown, Grand Fleet, pp. 75-76; R.D. Layman, To 
Ascend from a Floating Base: Shipboard Aeronautics and Aviation, 1783-1914 (London: Associated University 
Presses, Inc., 1979), pp. 186-187. An earlier proposal for a similar ship came from Admiral Mark Kerr. See Admiral 
Mark Kerr, The Navy in My Time (London: Rich & Cowan, 1933), p. 222. 
348 
 
this issue ‘as its worst long-term problem.’259 The issue was not confined to enlisted personnel; 
the officer corps suffered too,
260
 and by the time the 1914-15 Estimates were being drawn up the 
issue was urgent. On January 21
st
 the Mobilisation Department of the War Staff submitted a 
memorandum to the Board which showed that even with some generous omissions and changes 
the Navy would fall short of its estimated personnel requirements substantially from October 
1915 through to April 1917.
261
 
There was also a severe shortage of young officers, especially Lieutenants. In March 
Churchill proposed some drastic expedients to Second Sea Lord Jellicoe. These included the 
immediate promotion of one hundred Sub-Lieutenants (to be replaced by an equal number of 
promoted Midshipmen), abolition of cadet training ships Cornwall and Cumberland in favour 
of ‘appoint[ing] the two next batches of Midshipmen direct from Dartmouth’, and cutting 
Osborne classes from six to five ‘and fill up by new entries’.262 Retaining existing trained ratings 
was also crucial owing to the ever-increasing complexities of warships. Soon after this proposal 
Churchill raised the issue of ‘how to encourage men to serve after twelve years,’ and requested 
proposals on the principle ‘that after completing his first engagement the sailor who had not 
become a petty officer should nevertheless receive distinctive treatment’.263 In the same minute 
Churchill encouraged a reconsideration of marriage allowances and widow’s pensions. 264 
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Methods to increase enlistment, such reducing the physical standard for Boys and Stokers, were 
also approved.
265
 
Despite these measures, as late as the end of May 1914 the First Lord was still very 
concerned about the shortages of both junior officers and men ‘consistently complained of’.266 
 
Borkum Once More 
In January 1913, Rear-Admiral Lewis Bayly had been given the task of examining the 
possibilities of seizing Borkum as an advanced base, in other words a reversion to the old 
observational blockade strategy, albeit with the odd new wrinkle of the operation being 
suggested as an early-warning system against a German attempt at landing troops on British 
shores.
267
 This proposal was not well received, to say the least.
268
 In spite of this, June 1914 saw 
Churchill mount a final effort to develop a Borkum alternative to the distant blockade paradigm. 
On June 11
th
, the First Lord instructed Battenberg to request that both Callaghan and Jellicoe 
prepare plans ‘subsidiary & incidental to the main plans’ for a series of opening gambits against 
Germany. These were: 
Plan M: ‘A general drive at the outset of the war’ perhaps on the third day following the 
assumption of war stations. 
Plan L: ‘A close blockade of the Heligoland Bight by strongly supported flotillas 
maintained for 4 or 5 days at the least – closing the Elbe absolutely during that period.’ 
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This plan had two sub-variants: Plan L.a assumed the Navy would not have an ‘oversea 
base’ (Borkum) to work from, while L.b assumed possession of such a base. 
Plan T: ‘The establishment of a cruiser & flotilla base in the neighbourhood of Stavanger 
to control the debouches of the Skaw.’269  
Callaghan’s reaction to this request can be guessed from his reply. Although Grimes describes 
the C.-in-C.’s response as ‘neither complementary nor supportive’,270 it was rather more than that: 
Callaghan made no mention of the plans at all, confining his comments to the main War Plan.
271
 
Jellicoe was equally nonplussed by the proposals. Regarding a close blockade of Heligoland he 
wrote that ‘we should be as likely to achieve the safety of the Expeditionary Force on the one 
hand, and the prevention of reinforcements being sent on the other hand…with much less loss to 
ourselves, if we keep our forces nearer home instead of sending them off the German coast.’ He 
continued by flatly declaring that he could ‘see no advantage beyond that of an apparent 
offensive in maintaining the T.B.D.’s in the Heligoland Bight.’ He was equally scathing about an 
assault on Borkum or Sylt, not only considering them not worth the losses in ships or men, but 
also doubting that the Army would provide a force to carry out the landings. If landing 
operations had to be undertaken against the German coast, ‘I think it would be far better to strike 
at one of the enemy’s naval bases direct.’272 Jellicoe obviously felt that the risks were such that 
an attack on a German base was no less dangerous than against one of the outlying islands. 
This strong reaction by the two principle fleet commanders abruptly ended the discussion, 
and the Royal Navy would go to war committed to a policy of distant blockade. 
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New Year, New Designs, New Policy? 
For a long time, the following was accepted concerning the battleships cancelled at the 
outbreak of war: The 1914-15 Estimates included funds to build four new dreadnoughts, of 
which two were to be built in the Dockyards and two by private contract. Three would be repeats 
of the previous year’s Revenge class and the fourth a Queen Elizabeth, their respective names 
being Renown, Repulse, Resistance, and Agincourt. However this can be challenged thanks to the 
availability of D.N.C. Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt’s design notebook273 which resurfaced in 
time for D.K. Brown and Keith McBride to make use of it.
274
 Other material from d’Eyncourt’s 
personal papers given to the National Maritime Museum put flesh on the bones of the bare 
design outlines given in the notebook, especially early wartime correspondence between 
d’Eyncourt and the former Third Sea Lord, Sir Archibald Gordon Moore.275  
Furthermore, these and other documents show that the dreadnoughts were not the only 
ships for which radically different proposals were being considered. An entire crop of new 
designs died either at the outbreak of war or soon thereafter as the existing classes under 
construction were chosen for the emergency programmes implemented in the fall of 1914. 
Besides the modified Royal Sovereign and Queen Elizabeth battleships, there were several ‘E’ 
class submarines incorporating new engine types,
276
 the controversial 1914-15 destroyer design, 
and an extraordinary ‘Torpedo Cruiser’. 
The initial Royal Sovereign design had been known as T1, and throughout 1913 several 
studies were made to improve upon it. February 1913 saw T2 and T3, which would have 
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increased the main armament to ten guns, T2 using a combined twin and triple turret arrangement 
like that of the U. S. Navy’s Nevadas and T3 reverting to the Iron Duke layout of five twins. In 
both cases this increase added ten feet to the hull and brought displacement past 27,000 tons.
277
 
T4, essentially T1 with a single triple turret on ‘Y’ barbette, thus giving a nine-gun broadside, 
followed on June 9
th
.
278
 None was considered acceptable alternatives to T1. Another proposal, V1, 
is known to exist from the records of the Admiralty Experiment Works, Haslar, where it was 
tested as model VF in November 1913. Apart from a draught of 28 feet, 6 inches and a ‘naked 
displ[acement]’ of 25,100 tons (suggesting it was another Royal Sovereign variant), nothing 
further is known about V1.
279
 Much better attested is W1, the first design completed specifically 
for the 1914-15 dreadnoughts.
280
 
W1’s major difference from the original Royal Sovereign is the concentration of the anti-
torpedo boat armament amidships in a two-deck battery, apart from two pairs of guns directly 
under ‘A’ and ‘X’ turrets. This design, submitted in February 1914, was dropped according to the 
design notebook, but it or a similar design was resurrected later in the year owing to reports from 
the fleet that the Iron Dukes’ 6-inchers, which had been placed well forward, were hopelessly 
flooded out in a seaway.
281
 The double-decker arrangement was revived towards the end of 
summer for the new ships, and even after the outbreak of war thought was even given to 
converting the five Royal Sovereigns already under construction to the new design.
282
 In any case, 
a new variant of the basic T1 design was submitted in May 1914 for the two contract-built 
battleships. This design contained only a few changes from the original, including an increase in 
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wing bulkhead protection, enlargement of both the conning and torpedo control towers, and 
increase of the forward turrets ammunition storage from 80 to 100 shells.
283
 Simultaneously a 
new version of W1 was submitted for the dockyard-built Revenge but was again rejected.
284
 
The single Queen Elizabeth planned for 1914-15, Agincourt, had a similar panoply of 
designs considered during the early months of 1914. The first was February’s U3 (U1 and U2 
being used for the proposed Canadian Queen Elizabeths
285
) which had only one funnel but was 
otherwise little different. U4 and U5 were based on U3 but saw their armament radically 
redistributed: superfiring turrets were abandoned and the armoured conning tower was moved 
forward to a position between ‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets. In U4 the turrets remained on the centreline, but 
in U5 the forward pair would be placed en echelon. In all three designs the 6-inch battery would 
be arranged as in W1.
286
 The purpose of such radical changes is obscure. Keith McBride 
supposed that U4 and U5 possibly ‘were ‘Aunt Sallies’, put forward to show how much better 
was the design which the DNC (and/or the Third Sea Lord?) preferred,’ which McBride 
speculated was either U1 or U3.
287
 D.K. Brown thought the turret rearrangement was likely meant 
to lower the centre of gravity, since ‘if the superfiring guns could not fire over the lower turret, 
what was the point in raising them?’288 None of the U series proved acceptable and as a result, 
the D.N.C. went back to work. The results were two closely related designs, X1 and X2. X1 was a 
Queen Elizabeth with a 13-inch belt and a sloped two-inch deck inherited from the Royal 
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Sovereigns. To meet the increase in displacement (28,500 tons) the beam was increased to 94 feet.  
X2 was more radical, being twenty feet longer than X1 in order to reduce the necessary 
horsepower required for 25 knots and with further modifications in armour layout. X2 also used 
the double-decker arrangement for the 6-inch armament. The increased beam left both designs 
unable to dock for maintenance anywhere besides Portsmouth or Rosyth when the latter finally 
completed. Given these limitations, it is unsurprising both were rejected by Moore. 
One more battleship design exists, and is perhaps the most intriguing of all, with Nicholas 
Lambert apparently misconstruing it as a battlecruiser variant of the Queen Elizabeth class.
289
 
Known as Design Y, it was a proposal for a 31,350 ton 30 knot battleship carrying the same 
armament as the Queen Elizabeths with an 11½-inch belt.
290
 The origins of this design are 
sketchy, and the following is as a result very much speculation. 
It is well-known that Fisher had written on several occasions to Churchill advocating a 
new ‘super Lion’ design carrying ten 15 inch guns, but sacrificing armour in order to obtain both 
a speed of over 30 knots and a cost of £1,995,000.
291
 Even after the Queen Elizabeths were 
ordered, much to Fisher’s consternation as seen in Chapter 6, the old Admiral continued to press 
Churchill to build his preferred design or something similar.
292
 Finally, in May 1914, Churchill 
asked the Third Sea Lord: 
‘The third battleship of this year’s programme to be laid down at Portsmouth is a 
“Queen Elizabeth.” Please report what increase of cost or diminution of armour 
would be necessary to raise her speed to that of the “Tiger.” I do not see much 
harm in coming down to 11-inch armour over a large portion of the belt, 
especially if the fact is concealed. But she must carry full battleship armament. I 
think it is essential that this ship should be as fast as anything now projected. 
‘Please make me the best proposition you can.’293 
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This was most likely the impetus for Design Y. Unfortunately D.N.C. d’Eyncourt had been 
stricken by typhoid; so much of the work fell to the junior constructors, possibly with the 
assistance of Sir Philip Watts.
294
 Completed in time for submission on July 8
th
, the sketch design 
bears a remarkable resemblance to the later Hood, and may be a remote ancestor, although most 
trace that famous ship’s origins to a wartime specification.295 Whatever the influence Design Y 
had on later designs, it was rejected due to inadequate torpedo protection. 
One feature of the 1914 battleships designs is the provision of a fire control position right 
forward in the bow. This feature is another result of the Empress of India trials. Callaghan’s 
report included the following commentary which survived into the officially issued report: 
‘The probable advantages of a spotting position on the forecastle have been 
brought forward at various times during the year, and I consider this opinion has 
been borne out by these firings; the forecastle is not only less likely to be hit than 
the centre of the ship, but also clears [of smoke] first. The further forward the 
position is placed the better; it should certainly be protected to a sufficient extent 
to keep out fragments of shell.’296 
 
Callaghan thought of the proposed bow station as a spotting position only, and it was ‘not 
proposed that such a position should be used for control of fire, or that it should be of a size to 
hold more than two persons; it is considered better that it should be regarded solely as a position 
for observation of fire.’297 The outbreak of war seems to have killed this idea and it was not 
included in any of the wartime dreadnought designs. 
While the battleship proposals were the results of linear evolution, the 1914-15 Destroyer 
was a complete break with the previous River-derived designs. Nor was the new design related 
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to either of the components of Fisher’s initial ‘high-low mix’. The financial situation being what 
it was, the unit cost was to be £80,000.
298
 To achieve this both size and speed had to be 
reduced—32 knots and 700 tons were specified in the D.N.C. instructions of 12 February. 
Gunpower was also cut back by a return to 12 pounders and reducing their number from three to 
two. The only armament increase was in torpedoes, possibly in deference to Admiral Callaghan’s 
desire to include torpedo attack by his flotillas in the Home Fleet’s tactical repertoire.299 The 
resulting design was not without detractors, notable of which was Captain Superintendent of 
Torpedo Boat Destroyers Douglas Dent, who in an annoyed minute to the Director of Naval 
Equipment stated 
‘To call these craft Torpedo Boat Destroyers would appear to be wholly 
misleading, as there are no modern foreign torpedo craft afloat, or as far as known, 
projected, which are not superior in gun armament. It is therefore strongly 
recommended that they should be described as torpedo boats.’300 
 
In fact, a design for genuine torpedo boats—intended to replace the elderly Victorian examples 
still in service in 1914—was drawn up in late 1913 for inclusion in the 1914-15 estimates. It was 
ultimately abandoned due to the need for economy and a high estimated unit cost.
301
 
The same fate overtook a pair of proposals for new armoured cruisers. These, designated 
E2 and E3, were drawn up in October 1913. In appearance the ‘E’ series was ‘a beautiful, mini-
Queen Elizabeth’.302 E2 was 560 feet long, displaced 15,500 tons, and was capable of 28 knots 
with an armament of eight 9.2-inch and eight 6-inch. E3 was 580 feet long and displaced 17,850 
tons, the length and weight going to heavier armour. Presumably intended to replace older 
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armoured cruisers in fleet duties, they were too expensive to justify and the design was dropped 
without any attempt to fit them into the 1914-15 Estimates.
303
 
Two further classes of cruiser were proposed for inclusion. The first was a further ‘C’ 
class variation, but the other is one of the most remarkable designs of the Prewar Era. This was 
the ‘Torpedo Cruiser’, often referred to as the ‘Polyphemus’ after the Victorian torpedo ram. 
Except perhaps for the two armoured cruiser proposals of late 1913, the ‘Polyphemus’ is the most 
obscure of the designs that died on the outbreak of war; no complete plans have survived and it 
went unmentioned in all postwar design histories including D.K. Brown’s The Grand Fleet. 
Nicholas Lambert referred in passing and inaccurately as a ‘semi-submersible’.304  The first 
detailed description appeared only in late 2009, written by the ubiquitous Norman Friedman.
305
 
Surviving documentation of the Torpedo Cruiser is sparse and so much of her history is 
necessarily conjectural, but she may have arisen from discussions related to the development of 
the infamous fleet submarine project. In December 1913, during discussion of a 24 knot steam 
submarine proposal, d’Eyncourt offered his opinion that if the design ‘failed as a submarine, it 
would still be a very formidable surface torpedo craft. [Later] the design was discussed in its 
relation to the late Polyphemus.’306 The idea of a large torpedo vessel seems to have stuck with 
Churchill, apparently reinforced by Lewis Bayly’s support for the type.307 Whatever the case, 
work began on the design in earnest on February 24
th
. 
                                                 
303
 d’Eyncourt Notebook, pp. 15-16. 
304
 Nicholas Lambert, op. cit., p. 300. 
305
 Friedman, British Destroyers, pp. 277-278. 
306
 ‘Minutes of Admiralty Conference on Submarine Policy’, in Nicholas Lambert (ed.), Submarine Service, p. 235. 
However this may not be the true origin of the design. Nicholas Lambert, JFNR, cites a ‘diary entry’ by d’Eyncourt 
from November 1913 located in DEY/31, d’Eyncourt MSS. Unfortunately, this document now seems to be missing 
from DEY/31, although it may refer to the d’Eyncourt Notebook. Possibly the published footnote contains a typo. 
307
 At least, this was Rear-Admiral Frederick Tudor’s impression in late 1914 when as Third Sea Lord he wrote a 
very unfavourable report on the proposed vessel. See Tudor, ‘Remarks on design of Torpedo Cruiser got out by 
DNC in accordance with verbal instructions from First Lord and originated by Admiral Bayly’, 4 December 1914, in 
Admiralty, ‘Memorandum on New Construction’, 12 October 1914, S.0796/1914, ADM1/8397/365. Note the 
358 
 
Constructor Stanley Goodall drafted the initial design submitted to d’Eyncourt on March 
11
th
.
308
 The preliminary design was 380 feet long between perpendiculars and displaced 3,400 
tons. Carrying an armament of eight submerged 21-inch torpedo tubes and twenty torpedoes, the 
design’s maximum speed was 28 knots with sufficient fuel for 5000 nautical miles range. While 
the design’s hull form was generally along light cruiser lines, it was intended to reduce freeboard 
to the ‘minimum possible’, and surviving sketches show only a small conning tower, two very 
short funnels, and two light masts for signalling and wireless.
309
  Significantly, the only guns 
included were two 3-inch anti-aircraft guns. Armour was limited almost entirely to the conning 
tower and a 3-inch protective deck of ‘Vanadium steel’, presumably a reference to steel alloyed 
with vanadium for additional strength.
310
 Testing of this novel armour type was underway when 
war broke out.
311
 
Unsurprisingly, problems soon arose, principally that Goodall’s design could only fire her 
submerged tubes at a maximum of 10 knots speed, which was not at all what was desired. Thus 
in June the D.N.C. were instructed to have another go since ‘it is now understood to be necessary 
to fight the tubes up to the full speed of the ship’.312 Recasting was completed in June, the new 
design having grown to 420’ between perpendiculars, 4400 tons displacement, and thirty-two 
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torpedoes.
313
 This was duly submitted to Moore on July 1
st
, but little else was done prior to 
hostilities, though work continued until the beginning of 1915, by which time there was almost 
no chance of the design being ordered. 
The First Lord’s enthusiasm for the Torpedo Cruiser is in stark contrast to senior officers, 
who found it objectionable. The incoming Chief of the War Staff, Rear-Admiral Sir Doveton 
Sturdee, considered the type, like the original Polyphemus, of no peacetime value and of no 
strategic value as she was unable to perform any of the combat functions of a normal cruiser, 
such as reconnaissance. Even as a torpedo vessel her utility was marginal: compared with 
destroyers, the Torpedo Cruiser was a larger, slower target with no anti-flotilla capability, and 
unlike the most modern submarines, the Torpedo Cruiser could not carry out blockade duties.
314
 
In Sturdee’s opinion, ‘It does not appear that the Polyphemus is the true reply to the torpedo 
menace or any real substitute for Battleships, Destroyers, or Submarines.’315 Rear-Admiral Sir 
Frederick Tudor, promoted to Third Sea Lord after the outbreak of war, held much the same 
views.
316
 
Like the original Polyphemus, the Torpedo Cruiser proved a dead end design of limited 
use in war outside a fleet to fleet encounter and of almost zero peacetime utility, but in fairness to 
Churchill and Bayly, others thought that surface ships armed with heavy torpedo batteries were 
worthy of study. The U.S. Navy spent a not inconsiderable effort developing the concept of a 
torpedo dreadnought, ultimately producing design studies for a 36,000 ton vessel capable of 31 
                                                 
313
 Unsigned, ‘Design for a Torpedo Cruiser. Statement of Dimensions, Estimate of Weights, &c.’, June 1914, f. 4, 
ibid. A variation was also proposed that carried a set of twin above-water torpedo tubes and four extra torpedoes, but 
this was rejected. 
314
 Sturdee, ‘What is the Raison d’être of a Polyphemus at the Present Time’, 24 July 1914, MB1/T37/361, 
Battenberg MSS. 
315
 Sturdee, ‘What is the Strategic and Tactical Value of a Polyphemus?’, 24 July 1914, MB1/T37/362, Battenberg 
MSS. 
316
 Tudor, ‘Remarks on design of Torpedo Cruiser got out by DNC in accordance with verbal instructions from First 
Lord and originated by Admiral Bayly’, 4 December 1914, in D.N.C., ‘Memorandum on New Construction’, 12 
October 1914, S.0796/1914, ADM1/8397/365. 
360 
 
knots in 1911. The General Board reached the same conclusions as their Admiralty counterparts 
would three years later, and the project was abandoned.
317
 The Japanese alone thought the 
integration of heavy torpedo batteries into large surface vessels worth undertaking, in large part 
owing to their development of the excellent ‘Long Lance’ torpedo. 
Having described the various designs prepared for construction under the 1914-15 
Estimates, the Navy’s construction plans for those estimates must be examined. In December 
1913 the planned programme for 1914-15 was: 
4 Dreadnoughts 
4 Town class Light Cruisers 
20 Destroyers 
10 Torpedo Boats
318
 
8 Submarines 
 
As the fight over the Estimates raged this programme inevitably took casualties. In December 
1913 Churchill instructed Battenberg and Moore to make major alterations. The four ‘Towns’ 
became eight ‘C’ class ships, while the destroyers were reduced to ten plus two flotilla leaders.319 
Then in January the first-class torpedo boats were apparently dropped entirely.
320
 As of February 
1914 the planned programme
321
 was: 
4 Dreadnoughts 
4 Light Cruisers 
2 Flotilla Leaders 
10 Destroyers 
8 Submarines 
 
In his quest to strip every excess penny from the Estimates the First Lord suggested several even 
more radical alterations. Beginning in December he corresponded with Battenberg, Jellicoe, and 
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Moore in utmost secrecy on various schemes ‘for an extraordinary substitution programme[.]’322  
On January 16
th
 he asked Moore to drop the surface flotilla craft entirely and built four 
dreadnoughts, ten Arethusas, and £1,650,000 in ‘submarines and miscellaneous small craft.’323 
Six days later Churchill suggested substituting fourteen submarines for the Resistance and 
arranging that ‘the whole batch might be ready by June 1917, i.e., the date when [Resistance] is 
required?’324 He had already enquired how many submarines could be built for the price of the 
Resistance, cautioning Moore that ‘Extreme secrecy must be observed in handling this paper.’325 
Almost as soon as Churchill had proposed these substitutions, he seems to have backed 
down. The reasons are unknown, since none of the Sea Lords’ replies to Churchill’s minutes 
survive, if they ever existed on paper. By May however, he was once again actively seeking to 
modify the coming construction programme, writing in a minute that ‘I cannot help feeling 
misgivings about the torpedo-boat policy on which we have provisionally decided.’326 According 
to Fisher, the First Lord had recruited Battenberg to the cause of substitution.
327
 To this end he 
suggested replacing the ten destroyers with four more light cruisers as well as replacing the 
fourth dreadnought with submarines.
328
 A glimpse into Churchill’s motives can be seen in a 
related minute to Third Sea Lord Moore; if the fourth dreadnought was replaced with submarines, 
wrote Churchill, ‘I imagine there should be a considerable relief in 1915-16.’329 Further, it is 
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surely not coincidental that Lloyd George’s budget for 1914-15 was running into serious 
difficulties at precisely this time.
330
 
 
Substitution Policy? 
On the basis of the above minutes and other evidence it is unarguable that considerable 
modifications to the Navy’s 1914-15 construction programme were under consideration in the 
summer of 1914. However the question of how likely any of the various substitution proposals—
and there were several under consideration in June-July 1914—were likely to become decided 
Admiralty policy is much less clear. Nicholas Lambert believes they were certain to become 
official and that only the outbreak of war meant that there ‘was no time for the revolution in 
British naval policy to become apparent to all.’ 331  While most have accepted Lambert’s 
position,
332
 Christopher Bell has expressed his doubts on the likelihood of a revolutionary 
‘substitution policy’ taking effect in the absence of war.333 What follows is an attempt to establish 
exactly in which way forward the Admiralty was preparing to go in the last weeks of peace. 
June 1914 saw Admiral Jellicoe depart the post of Second Sea Lord for a rest cure prior 
to his succeeding Admiral Callaghan as C.-in-C. Home Fleets in December.
334
 His replacement 
was cruiser expert and friend of the King Admiral Sir Frederick Hamilton.
335
 Sometime in June 
the new Second Sea Lord composed a memorandum outlining the various substitution proposals 
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being discussed as well as his own thoughts on them.
336
 Furthermore he sent the memorandum to 
both Jellicoe and Third Sea Lord Moore for their input. Any analysis of the Royal Navy’s 
planning for the future in 1914 must take this invaluable document into account. To judge by the 
memorandum, the Torpedo Cruiser was now being seriously considered as an alternative to one 
of the 1914-15 battleships, probably the Resistance.
337
 Hamilton’s memorandum describes the 
substitution of six of the new type for the aforementioned dreadnought.
338
 However there were 
two other possibilities considered: replacing a second dreadnought with sixteen submarines ‘of 
the latest pattern’, and replacing the entire destroyer order (minus the flotilla leaders) with four 
Calliope class light cruisers or a mix of four leaders and four submarines.
339
 
Furthermore, the Hamilton Memorandum shows that, however great Churchill’s 
enthusiasm for the various substitution proposals was, the remaining members of the Admiralty 
seem to have been more sanguine. Hamilton stated at the outset that it was ‘assumed that it is 
admitted that the time has come when the proportion of Torpedo craft (especially submarines) to 
Battleships should be increased’ [emphasis added] and he later added the further qualification 
that consideration demanded that any change in policy ‘should be gradual’ to avoid giving ‘an 
excuse for the chauvinists of other countries to press for increased estimates’ and, significantly, 
Hamilton believed that ‘it is more than doubtful if we have the means to provide the necessary 
personnel or Torpedoes’. Furthermore, while Hamilton felt that ‘we have now an approved 
standard to work on [the 60% standard] … and it should not be lightly be departed from’ since 
there could be problems with public acceptance of a new standard of naval power, although he 
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felt this could be overcome if the public were given the facts of the case. He also raised concerns 
about the effect of the proposal on the Admiralty’s efforts towards the Canadian battleships, 
which seemed at the time to be gaining traction.
340
 Hamilton’s own opinion was that the best 
option for substitution was to replace one battleship and the year’s destroyers in favour of six 
torpedo cruisers and either the four Calliopes or the mix of flotilla leaders and submarines.
341
 
Both Moore and Jellicoe replied with comments for Hamilton. Moore noted that whether 
a departure from the existing standard was needed at all was ‘the most dominating question’,342 
and that ‘it would savour of insincerity or stupidity to make a sudden departure’ [emphasis 
original], and agreed that any change from the existing standard should be a gradual one. Jellicoe 
appears to have been even less enthusiastic, and wrote ‘the only substitution that I favour is that 
of Polyphemus class for the TBD’s of the current programme except flotilla leaders.’343 This may 
have been due to his selection as Callaghan’s successor as C.-in-C. Home Fleet; the newest 
destroyer design may have appeared incapable of operating with the battle fleet at sea, a trait the 
torpedo cruisers did not share. 
 
The Fleet That Never Was 
The Royal Navy’s final prewar deployment programme survives in the National 
Archives.
344
 Like an insect caught in amber, it shows the state of British maritime strategy at 
almost the moment the lights of Europe went out. As such it can well be termed the final piece of 
the substitution policy puzzle. Furthermore, it throws suspicion on Nicholas Lambert’s 
contention that Fisher’s theorized flotilla defence revolution had been rekindled. 
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The Director of Naval Mobilisation, Rear-Admiral Leveson, submitted the scheme to the 
Board on 8 July and a minute of recommended changes in First Lord Winston Churchill’s hand is 
dated 15 July—the same day substitution policy was agreed upon at a Board of Admiralty 
meeting according to Lambert. Further suggestions from First Sea Lord Prince Louis of 
Battenberg and Churchill are dated to July 16
th
 and 17
th
. The final scheme was completed by 
Leveson’s team on July 20th and showed the planned deployment of British capital ships through 
April 1917. At that time, the First Fleet would comprise four all-dreadnought battle squadrons 
and four mixed cruiser squadrons of two battlecruisers and four modern light cruisers (the 
current Battle Cruiser Squadrons would be broken up after Admiral Beatty hauled down his flag 
in the spring of 1915). Both battleships Lambert claims were to be replaced by light craft 
according to a revived substitution policy, Agincourt and Resistance, are shown as being in 
service in April 1917, Agincourt assigned to the 3
rd
 Battle Squadron with her sister Queen 
Elizabeths, and Resistance in the 4
th
 Battle Squadron alongside the other seven Royal 
Sovereigns. Furthermore, a reborn Mediterranean Fleet comprised of the eight oldest 
dreadnoughts supported by the First Cruiser Squadron, Fifth Destroyer Flotilla, several light 
cruisers, and—subject to the presence of a German battlecruiser in the Mediterranean—the New 
Zealand. The new Marksman-class leaders were to replace the several of the scout cruisers as 
the flagships of the First Fleet’s destroyer flotillas, improving the mobility of the flotillas in 
action and affording a savings in manpower (just over 100 men were needed to crew a 
Marksman, as opposed to 300 or so needed for a Boadicea or a Sentinel.) 
The value of this docket is enormous. Churchill’s minute, written on July 15th, is 
particularly insightful, beginning as it does: ‘I approve the Battleship organisation proposed both 
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for Home & Med
n.’345 As a following table illustrates, this organisation includes all four of the 
1914-15 dreadnoughts as coming into commission during the first quarter of 1917: 
Planned Dreadnought Organization for April 1917
α
 
1
st
 Battle Squadron 2
nd
 Battle Squadron 3
rd
 Battle Squadron 4
th
 Battle Squadron 
Mediterranean 
Fleet 
Marlborough 
Benbow 
Emperor of India 
Neptune 
Colossus 
Neptune 
 
King George V 
Ajax 
Audacious 
Centurion 
Orion 
Monarch 
Thunderer 
Conqueror 
Queen Elizabeth 
Warspite 
Valiant 
Barham 
Malaya 
Agincourt 
Resolution 
Ramillies 
Revenge 
Royal Oak 
Royal Sovereign 
Renown 
Repulse 
Resistance 
Collingwood 
Dreadnought 
Temeraire 
Bellerophon 
Superb 
St. Vincent 
Vanguard 
α Iron Duke was officially designated as Fleet Flagship, and independent of the Battle Squadrons. 
 
Owing to the outbreak of war, this scheme apparently got no further. Nicholas Lambert 
takes the presence of just two contracts for main gun turrets in the Ships’ Cover for the never-
built Renown and Repulse as ‘irrefutable’ evidence that Resistance and Agincourt were to be 
replaced with light craft.
346
 However, Ship Covers in general are composed of whatever working 
papers existed in the Department of Naval Construction and are not even close to a complete 
design or construction history. Furthermore, it is important to note that Renown and Repulse 
were to be built under contract in private yards, while Resistance and Agincourt were to be 
built in naval dockyards. In any case, neither of the two ships had been ordered when hostilities 
began. 
In view of this detailed plan, the question naturally arises of what happened to Churchill’s 
plans to replace Resistance, Agincourt, or both, with submarines or other torpedo craft that 
Nicholas Lambert so strongly argues in Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution and elsewhere? 
This question is given further gravity by the surviving early draft of Churchill’s The World 
Crisis where Churchill wrote that having secured funds for four battleships, he planned to 
                                                 
345
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‘transform two of these precious machines into thirty or forty submarines and torpedo-craft’ and 
had convinced the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of this policy with the support of 
Battenberg.
347
 This same draft offers the necessary clues. Firstly, Churchill wrote that this 
substitution plan was ‘a very difficult path to tread, full of hazards and pitfalls’, despite his 
‘overwhelming conviction’ that it was ‘best for the Navy’. He sent the First Sea Lord ‘to 
convince his professional colleagues’ to support the change, but his phrasing suggests this was as 
far as matters got.
348
 Surviving evidence from these ‘professional colleagues’ will be seen to 
imply Battenberg was less than successful. Finally, in his draft Church confessed that not only 
had he ‘not been able to arrive at any exact standard to govern the change’, but that he ‘did not 
agree with those who considered that the days of the battleship were ended.’349 
 The answer is, simply, that either no final decision had been taken on the ‘substitution 
policy’ prior to the outbreak of war, or Churchill had given in to the views of his doubtful 
professional advisors. Of the two, the second seems likely. Churchill wrote to Battenberg on July 
12
th
 of the substitution proposals that 
‘I am convinced that the time has come for action on these lines and although the 
steps are serious I do not feel any anxiety about taking them. They will add 
greatly to the war power of the Fleet and bring credit to all associated with 
them.’350 
 
The ‘steps’ were to replace the Resistance with fifteen improved ‘E’ class submarines, replace 
the Agincourt with six Torpedo Cruisers, and either substitute four light cruisers or four flotilla 
                                                 
347
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leaders and four more submarines for the ten destroyers.
351
 Churchill evidently wanted to have a 
full discussion of the matter at the next meeting of the Admiralty Board, set for July 15
th
. 
What happened next is extremely obscure and will likely remain so. The Admiralty Board 
did meet on July 15
th
, but the official minutes show no discussion of substitution, although the 
designs of both a ‘new Cruiser’ and the ‘New Torpedo Boat Destroyer’ (i.e. the ‘New Firedrake’ 
type) were considered and provisionally approved.
352
 In addition Churchill seems to have once 
again considered walking back from substitution as a whole, for in an unsent minute to the First 
Sea Lord he wrote 
‘I propose that at the Board Meeting next Wednesday we should simply deal with 
the Polyphemus on her merits and settle whether the design is or is not a good one 
without reference to any substitution. No doubt we shall have to refer to the 
possibility of substitution, but I do not wish to take any decision on the subject 
then.’353 
 
Considering that the volume of Board Minutes for 1912 includes George Lambert’s strong 
dissent against the Queen Elizabeth class’s approval it is very strange that an even more massive 
change in naval policy should pass unremarked in the official minutes.
354
 Furthermore, Churchill 
signed off approvingly on Leveson’s future fleet distribution on July 15th which included the 
Resistance and Agincourt as coming into service in 1917 with no mention of their replacement 
with torpedo vessels. Nor can it be assumed the inclusion of Agincourt and Resistance is down to 
D.O.D. Leveson being ‘out of the loop’ on the new substitution policy, since neither Churchill 
nor Battenberg made any effort, either before or after the July 15
th
 meeting, to correct the 
scheme’s assumption that all four 1914-15 dreadnoughts would be built. The extreme secrecy 
that a radical substitution policy demanded is irrelevant, as surely the top two men at the 
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Admiralty would inform one of the responsible Admiralty officials of its existence, especially 
since if Churchill’s draft memoirs were right both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer were aware of the plan. To not inform Leveson of such a change of policy would go 
beyond incompetence to deliberate—not to mention senseless—maliciousness. 
At this point war intervened. Although only two of the four dreadnoughts are known to 
have been officially contracted for, this is not proof the other two had been abandoned.
355
 Indeed 
the approved fleet distribution plan suggests strongly they would not be abandoned, and thus if 
any substitution of types took place in the implementation of the 1914-15 Programme, it would 
involve cruisers and flotilla craft, not the dreadnoughts. It is also possible that no final decision 
had been made.
356
 In the end, the remaining evidence is perhaps too vague to establish a 
definitive answer. It can, however, establish that the ‘revolution in British naval policy’ as 
Lambert calls it, was not the established course being charted by the Admiralty, or even a certain 
outcome of discussions that were overtaken by the march to war.
357
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Home Fleet Goes to War 
 
On June 28
th
, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his pregnant wife Sophie were assassinated 
in Sarajevo. The Austrian government were not terribly upset by the loss of the unpopular 
Archduke and his morganatic wife, but were prepared to use the event to attack Serbia, which 
was perceived as a major threat to the Dual Monarchy’s internal stability. Germany, partly 
encouraged by Kaiser Wilhelm (one of Franz Ferdinand’s few personal friends), offered their 
secret support for an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia, though this support was likely meant to 
be predicated on an immediate Austro-Hungarian invasion—a key distinction from the popular 
notion of a ‘blank check’.1 Subsequently the European powers lurched unsteadily towards war. 
Throughout most of this period, Britain had, with the exception of the Foreign Office, 
been preoccupied with other matters, such as the deteriorating situation in Ireland.
2
 The breakup 
of the Buckingham Palace Conference on July 24
th
, and the resulting spectre of armed clashes 
between Unionist and Home Rule factions had left Asquith ‘glum’.3 Still, Sir Edward Grey’s 
announcement to Cabinet ‘that the Ultimatum by Austria to Serbia had brought us nearer to a 
European Armageddon than we had been through all the Balkan troubles’ made an impression on 
the Cabinet.
4
 
Impressions made or no, the general attitude among the Cabinet can be expressed by 
what Asquith told Venetia Stanley: ‘Happily, there seems to be no reason why we should be 
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anything more than spectators.’5 The rest of the Liberal government was similarly disposed 
towards carrying on as usual, and it was unsurprising that most of the Cabinet departed to the 
countryside for the weekend. Churchill went to Cromer with his wife and children for some 
idyllic time by the seaside.
6
 Asquith returned to his weekend home in Sutton Courtenay, where 
he played golf and, in the evening, bridge.
7
 On the 26
th
, even the Foreign Secretary, having felt 
the situation was ‘not yet so critical that it was unsafe to be out of town even for the Sunday’, 
and left to fish for trout at Itchen Abbas.
8
 
One man who had not left London was Prince Louis of Battenberg.
9
 He remained in 
London through the weekend with his younger son, the future Lord Louis Mountbatten.
10
 Aside 
from his son, however, Battenberg was virtually alone at the Admiralty. With the other principals 
dispersed, the First Sea Lord was left ‘in charge of the Navy at the moment of the country’s 
greatest peril.’11 Until the Cabinet returned, practically the empire’s entire defence was in His 
Serene Highness’s hands, along with the many issues relating thereto. 
The most pressing issue was that the Test Mobilisation of the First, Second, and Third 
Fleets previously described was due to end on Monday the 27
th
 July. Once that ended the Second 
and Third Fleets would discharge their reservists and the First Fleet would disperse throughout 
the Home Ports and elsewhere.
12
 Though hostilities had not yet broken out, diplomatic cables 
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from Vienna suggested war might very well be ‘imminent’.13 Battenberg had already telegraphed 
his wife that he would be unable to join them in Russia that August.
14
 
The crucial day was July 26
th
, a Sunday. Churchill telephoned twice that morning from 
Cromer for news,
15
 and Battenberg explained that the situation was rapidly deteriorating and that, 
with war fast approaching, ‘a decision was required that very day whether to let the Test 
Mobilisation end the following morning…or whether the Fleets were to be ordered to “stand 
fast”’.16 The First Lord’s advice was something of a politician’s reply: he said that the First Sea 
Lord was in charge of the Navy but that delaying the end of the Test Mobilisation would have 
‘political implications’.17 Presumably Churchill was speaking of the diplomatic consequences of 
such an action, but relevant domestic considerations could not have been far from his mind either. 
This was not what Battenberg wanted to hear, and he complained to Mark Kerr two days later 
that ‘Ministers with their week-end holidays are incorrigible.’18 As diplomatic telegrams from 
overseas kept coming in, Battenberg may have been the only man at the Admiralty who 
appreciated the gravity of the situation, because Herbert Richmond wrote a few days later that: 
‘The Operations Division had no information to work upon on Saturday [July 25th] 
& knew nothing of whether the crisis was serious or not.’19 
 
With the War Staff—or at least parts of it—in the dark and his political superiors either absent or 
of little help, Battenberg took matters into his own hands. At 4 PM the following signal went out 
from the Admiralty: 
‘Decypher. No ships of First Fleet or Flotillas are to leave Portland until further 
orders. Acknowledge[.]’20 
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As mentioned previous, it was Sunday and the Admiralty was practically deserted. As a 
consequence Battenberg and the resident clerk ‘had to write out all the telegrams and send them 
off themselves.’21 The order went out just in time. The Home Fleet’s squadrons were already 
preparing to leave Portland and some had left already. The dreadnought Bellerophon was en 
route to Gibraltar, and the minesweepers, several cruisers, and the First and Second Destroyer 
Flotillas were at the Home Ports giving leave.
22
 More orders followed on quickly: 
‘Complete First Fleet with coal. Gunnery practices to be carried out from Portland 
can be continued.’23 
 
‘Before giving leave to the 6th and 8th Flotillas, further Admiralty approval is to be 
obtained.’24 
 
The members of the Cabinet were already returning to London as these orders went out, and 
‘when the Ministers hurried back late that evening they cordially approved my action, and we 
had the drawn sword in our hands to back up our urgent advice.’25 Churchill, who had decided to 
cut short his holiday after his second telephone conversation with the First Sea Lord,
26
 
congratulated Battenberg for his decision, and recalled: 
‘The First Sea Lord told me in accordance with our conversation he had told the 
Fleet not to disperse. I took occasion to refer to this four months later in my letter 
accepting his resignation. I was very glad publicly to testify at that moment of 
great grief and pain for him that his loyal hand had sent the first order which 
began our vast naval mobilization.’27 
 
Satisfied with the situation at the Admiralty, Churchill left to visit Sir Edward Grey in Eccleston 
Square. Sir William Tyrell, Grey’s Private Secretary, was also present. 
‘I told him [Grey] that we were holding the Fleet together. I learned from him that 
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he viewed the situation very gravely. He said there was a great deal yet to be done 
before a really dangerous crisis was reached, but that he did not at all like the way 
in which this business had begun. I asked whether it would be helpful or the 
reverse if we stated in public that we were keeping the Fleet together. Both he and 
Tyrell were most insistent that we should proclaim it at the earliest possible 
moment: it might have the effect of sobering the Central Powers and steadying 
Europe. I went back to the Admiralty, sent for the First Sea Lord, and drafted the 
necessary communiqué.’28 
 
A special notice appeared in the next morning’s papers to this effect. 
In the Home Fleet, Battenberg’s decision was not greeted with any undue alarm. ‘I cannot 
remember any particular excitement about this,’ wrote one officer many years later, ‘we seem to 
have taken it in our stride.’29  Aboard Marlborough the order was tersely recorded in what 
became the Grand Fleet Diary: 
‘Vanguard was to have sailed at about 5·30 pm. for Sheerness to give leave, but 
on asking permission to proceed, was ordered to remain. 
‘Agamemnon & Blonde had already sailed but were recalled & anchored in 
Weymouth Bay. 
‘The fleet was then informed that Admiralty directs that the movement to home 
port, to practice bases etc were postponed until further orders & first fleet remains 
at Weymouth till further orders. 
‘1st B.S. & 4th B.S. ordered to have steam to proceed inside Portland breakwater at 
5 am Monday to complete with coal. 3
rd
 C.S. to come outside to make room.’30 
 
Terse as this entry is, it illustrates how close things had run. Major units of the First Fleet had 
already begun breaking away to proceed independently to their home ports to give leave and in a 
few hours’ time more would have done so. 
The Admiral of Patrols was further instructed to seek Admiralty approval before allowing 
the Sixth and Eighth Destroyer Flotillas to grant leave.
31
 Worrying news came in from Norway, 
where the morning papers had reported that ‘German Fleet numbering 28 large ships received 
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orders to concentrate during last night at predetermined point off the Norwegian coast.’32 
Early in the morning of the 27
th
 the absent Bellerophon was ordered by wireless to return 
to Portland ‘with moderate dispatch’.33 The Admiralty issued a notice to the press that the Navy’s 
training schools would not re-open after the Home Fleet’s manoeuvres to keep the crews of the 
Second Fleet together aboard their ships.
34
 
More precise instructions went to the three Home Port Cs.-in-C. and to the fleet 
commanders. Further issuance of leave was to be stopped though no men were to be recalled. 
Peacetime appointments not already taken up by officers were suspended. Officers of the Second 
Fleet who had been mobilized for the Test Mobilisation were to re-join their ships, and those 
ships were to be completed ‘to full numbers so far as resources allow’. They were also ordered to 
take on full loads of coal, ammunition, and stores. All the Coastals and the Tribals in reserve 
were to similarly ‘be completed to full crews’. ‘These orders to be carried out as quietly as 
possible.’35 The Admiral of Patrols was ordered to ‘keep all his vessels and to be responsible for 
Scottish Coast including Firth of Forth and Shetlands.’ Responsibility for the Orkneys and 
Shetlands fell to the Home Fleet, which was given eight Rivers to operate from Cromarty ‘when 
ready’.36 Seaplanes were to be assembled (perhaps literally) at Grain Island, Felixstowe, and 
Yarmouth.
37
 The four Majestics designated for guarding the Humber were ordered to complete to 
Active Crews for transit, together with two armoured cruisers.
38
 These orders were largely 
written by Battenberg himself and probably given straight to the Admiralty clerical staff. As the 
tempo increased throughout the day, the First Sea Lord began relying on verbal orders written 
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down and relayed by officers like Captain Charles de Bartolomé.
39
 That afternoon Battenberg 
managed to tell Commander Domvile that he could not attend a wedding the next day.
40
 
In the mid-afternoon a telegram to explain what was obvious in Whitehall but might have 
not yet reached the ears of the Fleet was issued: 
‘SECRET. European political situation makes war between Triple Alliance and 
Triple Entente Powers by no means impossible. 
This is not the warning telegram but be prepared to shadow possible hostile men 
of war and consider dispositions of H.M. Ships under your command from this 
point of view. Measure is purely precautionary. The utmost secrecy is to be 
observed and no unnecessary person is to be informed.’41 
 
The need for secrecy and the ‘present political situation’ also impelled the Admiral Commanding 
Reserves, Arthur Farquhar, to suggest ‘that the land line communication between Whitehall 
and … W/T Stations should be made good.’ The matter was important because such 
communication lines ‘generally take two or three days to join up.’ While Farquhar felt the 
General Post Office staff could be left out of these matters, the concurring minute from 
Commander William Kettlewell explained that the ‘G.P.O. have already taken steps to prevent 
delay.’42 The Admiralty’s request for ‘direct telegraphic connection’ went through to the Post 
Office on July 29
th
.
43
 
Churchill, meanwhile, after consultation with Battenberg, had authorized the appointment 
of Flag Officers to wartime squadron commands and alphabetic Cruiser Forces left vacant during 
peacetime.
44
 Amongst these were: 
Cruiser Force B: Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair 
Cruiser Force D: Rear-Admiral William Grant 
Cruiser Force E: Rear-Admiral Henry Campbell 
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Cruiser Force F: Rear-Admiral Robert Phipps Hornby 
Cruiser Force G: Rear-Admiral Rosslyn Weymss 
Cruiser Force I: Rear-Admiral John de Robeck 
 
These appointments had been proposed to the First Lord only a few days previously.
45
 
The First Fleet, meanwhile, had set to work on preparing for sea. Although some ships of 
the First Fleet were able to coal immediately that morning, Marlborough ‘found little likelihood 
of coaling for the forenoon so training classes & Divisional drills were exercised.’46 While many 
ships were able to coal that day, aboard Marlborough the Grand Fleet Diary states that ‘Owing to 
indifferent coaling facilities at Portland it was not till 10·45 p.m. Tuesday [July 28
th
] that V.A. 
was able to report 1
st
 B.S. complete with coal.’47 Other troubles were encountered as well, and 
again Marlborough found herself getting short shrift: 
‘The state with the stores was not much better [than the coaling situation], 
lubricating oils etc were received & a certain quantity of consumable stores but no 
victualing stores & little fresh beef… some ships had only 1 days fresh food on 
board.’48 
 
The next day saw more urgent telegrams come in to the Admiralty. In response to a 
request for some of his allocated flotilla craft by the Admiral of Patrols, the C.-in-C. Nore sent to 
the Admiralty for ‘instructions… requested urgently’ owing to a lack of specific information in a 
previous Admiralty telegram.
49
 The Admiralty’s response shows they were still not willing to 
cancel extant leaves: 
‘Destroyers & T Bs [&] Light Cruisers & Depot Ships on Part I Monthly 
Mobilising List should be completed to full crews as soon as this can be done 
without upsetting Mobilisation approximations and without recalling men on 
leave.’50 
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C.-in-C. Nore responded: 
‘Not possible complete to full crews at present eight E class T.B.Ds. [i.e. Rivers] 
attached to First Fleet or vessels of Patrol Flotillas attached Chatham other than 
Ex-Coastals. It is anticipated they can be completed by Thursday morning 30
th
 
when first watch returns from Mobilising leave.’51 
 
The result of this slight dislocation—slight in comparison to the overall mobilization of the 
fleet—is recorded by Richmond: 
‘There was uncertainty on Monday 27th. As to where the 8 destroyers attached to 
C.-in-C. were to go in war, or what measures of defence were to be taken in the 
Orkneys & Cromarty.’52 
 
Shortly after noon the officer in charge at Devonport proposed to only issuing confidential books 
to one of the Majestics set to sail for Humber guard duty as the others lacked appointed captains. 
The Admiralty signalled its approval the next day.
53
 
From Portland, Callaghan requested a tanker to expedite fuelling of his ships, whose need 
for bunker fuel was then only being serviced by a 400 ton lighter.
54
 Shortly after five o’clock that 
afternoon, Callaghan received in quick succession two telegrams from the Admiralty which, 
aside from not responding to his requests for fuel, would hardly have eased his mind even if they 
had announced Churchill had sent every tanker in the Empire to Portland: 
‘Secret. The First Fleet is to leave Portland tomorrow Wednesday for Scapa Flow. 
Destination is to be kept secret expect to flag & commanding officers. As you are 
required at the Admiralty Vice Admiral 2 B.S. is to take command. Course from 
Portland is to be shaped to southward then a middle Channel course to the Straits 
of Dover. The Squadrons are to pass through the Straits without lights during the 
night and to pass outside the shoals on their way north. Agamemnon is to remain 
at Portland where the Second Fleet will assemble. Special arrangement for mails 
will be made by Admiralty in order to preserve secrecy.’55 
 
The Admiral’s reaction can only be guessed at. His request for a small amount of additional 
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logistical support was met by orders for his ships to proceed to war stations in utmost secrecy 
and for himself to proceed to Whitehall. The latter order was expanded on in the second telegram: 
‘Arrange to come to the Admiralty by first train tomorrow Wednesday with your 
own proposals on the war plan accompanied by any members of your staff you 
wish to bring. Iron Duke to meet you at Queensferry and rejoin fleet en route to 
its destination.’56 
 
Callaghan fired back: 
‘Assuming fuel requirements of fleet are being provided for by Admiralty. First 
Fleet will require approximately 25,000 tons of coal on arrival at Scapa Flow. 
About 2,000 tons of oil fuel is also required to complete ships and 4
th
 Flotilla will 
probably require some 4,000 tons in addition.’57 
 
There were other concerns besides the fuel situation, of course. One of these was 
communications. Admiral Jellicoe’s report on the 1913 Grand Manoeuvres had noted the need 
for additional communications staff.
58
 Now Callaghan told the Admiralty: 
‘In view of the amount of telegraph work principally in cypher coming through 
the Naval Telegraph Office now in Cyclops it is requested that Post Office 
operators may be embarked as soon as possible.’59 
 
The C.-in-C. was probably concerned about a repetition of the collapse of the communications 
network which had occurred during the 1913 Manoeuvres.
60
 In this context, his choice of the 
Cyclops, the repair ship of the First Battle Squadron, is intriguing. It suggests Callaghan was not 
then concerned of a surprise attack on his fleet at anchor, or of being confronted by an enemy 
force en route north to the Orkneys, since keeping his major communications node on a slow and 
practically-unarmed auxiliary was a major weakness should a surprise attack occur. 
Another potential concern was that the fleet was not yet concentrated, although as events 
would show there was little to justify any fear as regards this fact. Nevertheless it necessitated a 
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large number of telegrams to various ports ordering squadrons and flotillas into motion. The 
Fourth Destroyer Flotilla, at Queenstown, was ordered ‘to proceed to Scapa at once’.61 The 
Second Fleet ‘when complete’ was ordered to assemble at Portland.62 The destroyers Firedrake 
and Lurcher were ordered to join the Sixth Flotilla.
63
 
Captain Murray Sueter and the rest of the Air Department were also mobilizing 
themselves. On July 28
th
 Sueter provided Churchill with a list of German airships, both ready for 
action and ‘whose completion may be accelerated’.64 The next day Churchill, obviously worried, 
asked: 
‘Where are they? 
What is their radius of action? 
What cd they conceivably do against us.’65 
 
The same day Churchill with the support of the Sea Lords, requested an anti-aircraft gun to 
defend the Admiralty building, though D.O.D. Leveson considered it would be best for the gun 
to remain at Woolwich until the order was given to mobilize the Reserves.
66
 
 
July 29th 
Captain Ralph Crooke described the situation at the Admiralty on July 28
th
 as busy ‘but 
not unpleasant[.]’ By the 29th however, the Admiralty a place of frantic activity, and Crooke 
laconically noted, ‘War Panic begins.’67 When Commander Barry Domvile dropped in briefly he 
‘found confusion’.68 This confusion cannot have been helped by a message from the British 
Minister in the Norwegian capital which arrived midday: 
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‘All German war ships reported on good authority to have (left) Norwegian 
waters and to have passed the Skaw yesterday.’69 
 
Nevertheless orders were still being issued regularly and mobilization was proceeding apace. In 
response to Callaghan’s representations about fuel availability at Scapa Flow, the collier Lucullen 
was ordered to sail there that morning, with further ships following throughout the week.
70
 Net 
defences for the Humber guard ships were to be prepared and sent ahead to meet those ships on 
arrival.
71
 Approval was given to Third Fleet ships remaining independent commands for the time 
being.
72
 Queenstown dockyard sanctioned overtime pay to have the coast guard vessel Thrush 
ready to depart by August 5
th
 on the initiative of the Vice-Admiral Commanding without waiting 
for Admiralty approval.
73
 War College officers were recalled to London for duty in the 
Admiralty’s War Room.74 As these orders were sent out, the Admiralty was also concerned with 
new construction. At 1130 the Third Sea Lord held a conference to see what steps could be taken 
to expedite getting new ships into service.
75
 This had long been a concern, as Vice-Admiral 
Charles Anson had led a committee on the subject a few years before.
76
 
Amongst these various orders is one that marks a significant milestone in aviation. 
Inspecting Captain of Aircraft Sueter was given orders to prepare his craft for action. British 
naval aviation received its first marching orders, which read as follows: 
‘Inform I.C.A. for the present the duties of Aircraft are to be confined to affording 
protection against hostile aircraft. 
Scouting and patrol duties in connection with hostile water craft are to be 
considered secondary to this duty. 
All machines are to be kept tuned up and ready for immediate action.’77 
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The air force that received these orders was a far cry from the Hurricanes and Spitfires flying 
defensive sorties in another July in another war, but their orders were the same, and the pilots 
just as eager to prove themselves. 
That afternoon, with the situation ever darkening, Battenberg took the final plunge and 
issued the following order: 
‘All officers and men on leave are to be called by telegraph at once[.]’78 
 
This was followed by the Admiralty sending out the Warning Telegram. In Home Waters, this 
took the form of two coded messages to ‘C.Q.’, presumably all forces and bases in the British 
Isles. The first read ‘Rusticate 53 Certain Powers.’ The second simply read ‘Luminous four.’ The 
Historical Section copy of the second telegram has the following translation written below: ‘War 
Stations N
o. 2’. No such translation accompanies the first, but judging by copies of telegrams to 
foreign stations ‘Rusticate 53’ meant to prepare for war with ‘Certain Powers’.79 
Confirmations began rolling in the next morning. At 0958 the Nore Defence Flotillas had 
taken up their patrol stations.
80
 In the evening the Captain (D) of the Fourth Destroyer Flotilla 
reported from Kirkwall his ships would have filled their bunkers with oil by the morning of the 
31
st
, and that three of his ships were already at Scapa Flow patrolling the entrances.
81
 
The rest of the Navy was also in motion. Callaghan had called his subordinate Admirals 
to Iron Duke for a conference on the 28
th
. The second of these meetings is likely where the 
Commander-in-Chief informed them of the situation and gave them their sailing orders.
82
 The 
Fleet departed Portland at 7 AM on the 29
th
 ‘in Order 2nd B.S., 3rd B.S., 3rd C.S. (+ Achilles & 
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Cochrane), 1
st
 Lt C.S. (Southampton & Birmingham only)[,] 1
st.
 B.S., 1
st.
 B.C.S.[,] 4
th
 B.S., Iron 
Duke.’83 
The Channel was foggy that morning, although there was an alarming encounter with a 
German mail steamer ‘at this critical moment’, and it was believed the German ship carried 
wireless gear. The Fleet was ordered ‘to make such preparations for war as could be made 
without disturbing peace organization’. Then a short time later ‘to prepare torpedoes for War & 
to go into War routine forthwith.’ That afternoon, orders were issued for the night passage 
through the Straits of Dover. Ships were to be darkened and anti-torpedo guns issued 
ammunition.
84
 Midshipman de Winton recalled the passage: 
‘Ships were darked at night and we passed through Dover sometime in the early 
part of the night. (I had the first watch as midshipman of the starboard 9.2” turret). 
As far as I remember ships were at cruising stations, that is armament manned by 
one watch.’85 
 
As night fell, the squadrons pulled apart from each other—they were ordered to remain two 
miles apart from each other through the night. After the Warning Telegram arrived, ships were 
ordered ‘to raise steam for full speed by 1 a.m.’86 Night defence stations were maintained with 
guns loaded and breeches open. At noon the next day Iron Duke and her consort Oak were 
detached to Queensferry to retrieve Admiral Callaghan, who had spent the day at the Admiralty 
in conference with Churchill and Battenberg. Callaghan went north to meet his flagship that 
evening.
87
 Iron Duke and Oak were underway from South Queensferry to rejoin the Fleet by 3 
PM the next day.
88
 Meanwhile the fleet had the spent forenoon of the 30
th
 preparing for wartime 
conditions, including removing peacetime fixtures and fittings, though none were yet to be 
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destroyed or thrown overboard. Additional orders were given ‘that great care is to be taken that 
gun[’]s crews are always ready at shortest notice especially from dusk till 8 A.M.’89 
At the Naval Colleges many of the cadets found themselves in a hucker when the 
mobilization orders came, despite it having been expected for some time: 
‘The “Highflyer” cadets were in barracks in the R.N. College Keyham with the 
“Cumberland” Cadets. Both of us had been discharged the day before. There were 
about 90 cadets altogether. We were bundled out of the ship at short notice & 
pitchforked into the college with our hammocks & chests. The weather was 
beastly & so altogether we were decidedly “fed up” & simply longed for the War 
to begin, so that we could get away to our ships… it seemed too good to be true 
when at 3 in the afternoon we heard someone shouting “Mobilize at once.” Most 
people had gone ashore & I was just getting ready to go. The “Recall” & 
“Assembly” were sounded all over Devonport & soon everyone came rushing 
back…’90 
 
‘I was playing cricket for an XI from Dartmouth College at Kingswear. In the 
middle of the game one of the masters arrived on his motorcycle to say that the 
mobilization order which we had been more or less expecting had arrived. 
Everything was immediately [sic] stopped and a wild dash made for the College. 
On arrival there we at once got ready to leave the college as soon as possible. In 
anticipation of the mobilizing order we had already packed most of our gear so 
there was not a great deal left to do.’91 
 
July 31
st
 saw the Home Fleet appear at Scapa gradually throughout the afternoon, 
although the Fourth Destroyer Flotilla had already arrived the previous afternoon. The main fleet 
(less Iron Duke and Oak) anchored at 1830, having been preceded by the repair ship Assistance 
and four chartered auxiliaries. Fires were kept ready to make steam at four hours’ notice. Four 
scout cruisers were detached on picket duty, guarding the entrances.
92
 Iron Duke arrived with 
Callaghan at 0525 on August 1
st
. The same day, Churchill minuted Asquith on the possibility of a 
coordinated naval and military descent on points off the German and neutral coasts suitable as 
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flotilla bases, using the reports Bayly prepared in 1913.
93
 
 
Change of Command 
It will be recalled that Jellicoe, who had recently left the office of Second Sea Lord, was 
Fisher’s most trusted protégé. In 1910 he had written Balfour that Jellicoe was ‘Phenomenally 
young and junior, he will be Nelson at Cape S
t. Vincent until he becomes “Boss” at Trafalgar 
when Armageddon comes along in 1915 or thereabouts.’94 Fisher continued to sing Jellicoe’s 
praises to Churchill after the latter became First Lord. According to one letter from Fisher, 
Jellicoe had ‘all the Nelsonic attributes.’95 Churchill soon came to share this high opinion, and 
Jellicoe’s prestige was further enhanced by his actions in the 1913 Manoeuvres.96 To Fisher, 
Churchill wrote that ‘Jellicoe has done wonders & fully justified all your confidence in him.’97 
Therefore it had been little surprise when Jellicoe was chosen as Callaghan’s successor in the 
spring of 1914.
98
  
The changeover was set for October 1
st
.
99
 To aid the transition it had been decided to send 
Jellicoe to sea (his term as Second Sea Lord ended on July 30
th) as Callaghan’s second-in-
command, flying his flag aboard Centurion.
100
 However Churchill decided, apparently some time 
on the 30
th
 or 31
st
, that Jellicoe would replace Callaghan immediately upon the commencement 
of hostilities. Jellicoe was informed of this on the 31
st
 by Churchill and Battenberg, and the 
disclosure ‘came upon me as a great surprise’ as Jellicoe would later write.101 Jellicoe protested 
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replacing Callaghan on the eve of war, and left for Wick with the erroneous belief that the matter 
had not been finally decided.
102
 In fact that die had already been cast, as Jellicoe was carrying the 
sealed orders,
103
 handwritten by Graham Greene and dated July 31
st
: 
‘Sir, 
I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to inform you 
that, in the circumstances which will have arisen when the present letter will have 
been opened, they have been pleased to select you to be Commander in Chief of 
the Grand or First Fleet in succession to Admiral Sir George Callaghan. You are 
therefore forthwith on receipt of orders to open this letter to repair with it on 
board H.M.S. “Iron Duke”, show it to Sir George Callaghan as your authority for 
so doing, and arrange with him for whatever immediate steps may be necessary to 
make your succession to his command effective. Thereafter Sir George Callaghan 
will come ashore.’104 
 
Officially it had been explained to Jellicoe that Callaghan’s age and health made his ability to 
stand the strain of wartime command of the Grand Fleet a doubtful proposition.
105
 In light of the 
Bridgeman affair and Callaghan’s wartime service as C.-in-C. Nore, it is reasonable to doubt the 
veracity of this official explanation, and it would have been uncharacteristic if Jellicoe did not 
consider this. Whatever the truth of Callaghan’s physical condition, however, Jellicoe had other 
reasons to object to this sudden change of command. A. Temple Patterson writes that ‘Jellicoe 
was very strongly conscious of the invidiousness of superseding [Callaghan] in such 
circumstances and the difficulty of establishing relations with officers who might well feel 
resentment at what they would consider the injustice done to [Callaghan].’ 106  Captain (D) 
Charles Wintour of the Fourth Destroyer Flotilla put it more bluntly in his diary a few days later 
when he wrote that Callaghan’s sudden dismissal would ‘cause widespread indignation.’107 
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Jellicoe himself, being a long-time friend of Callaghan’s, was likely more than a little indignant 
himself, and from Wick he fired back at the Admiralty: 
‘Detained Wick by fog. Am firmly convinced after consideration that the step you 
mentioned to me is fraught with gravest danger at this juncture and might easily 
be disastrous owing to extreme difficulty of getting into touch with everything at 
short notice. 
The transfer even if carried out cannot be accomplished for some time. 
I beg earnestly that you will give matter further consideration before you take this 
step.’108 
 
From the Centurion he sent another protest after arriving at Scapa on August 2
nd
: 
‘Reference my personal telegram last night. Am more than ever convinced of vital 
importance of making no change. Personal feeling are entirely ignored in reaching 
this conclusion.’109 
 
Churchill’s reply that evening was definite: 
‘I can give you 48 hours after joining Fleet. You must be ready then.’110 
 
Jellicoe sent another exasperated telegram to his superiors at half an hour to midnight: 
‘Yours of second. Can only reply am certain step contemplated is most dangerous 
beg that it may not be carried out. Am perfectly willing to act on board Fleet 
Flagship as assistant if desired to be in direct communication. 
‘Hard to believe it is realised what grave difficulties change Commander-in-Chief 
involves at this moment. Do not forget also long experience of command of 
Commander-in-Chief.’111 
 
Apparently not satisfied that this message was sufficient, Jellicoe sent another early the next 
morning using language such that there could be no possible doubt as to interpretation: 
‘Quite impossible to be ready such short notice. Feel it my duty to warn you 
emphatically you court disaster if you carry out intention of changing before I 
have thorough grasp of Fleet and situation. 
I am sure Hamilton, Madden, or any Admiral recently in Home Fleet will be of 
my opinion.’112 
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Amazingly, Jellicoe was apparently still unsatisfied with this blistering missive, or perhaps he 
felt his language had been too strong, and he sent a third wire two hours later. Tacking a new 
course, Jellicoe emphasized the morale effect of Callaghan’s sudden replacement: 
‘Add to last message. Fleet is imbued with feelings of extreme admiration and 
loyalty for Commander-in-Chief. This is very strong factor.’113 
 
In the end, none of these messages were to any avail. The First Lord’s reply, received aboard 
Centurion in the early afternoon of August 3
rd
, was direct and final: 
‘Expeditionary Force will not leave at present, and therefore Fleet movements 
connected with it will not immediately be required. I am sending Madden to-night 
to be at your side. I am telegraphing to the Commander-in-Chief directing him to 
transfer command to you at earliest moment suitable to the interests of the Service 
I rely on him and you to effect this change quickly and smoothly, personal feeling 
cannot count now only what is best for all, you should consult with him 
frankly.’114 
 
This final telegram left no ambiguity. Those who describe other Admiralty orders of this time 
period—especially those relating to the Goeben and Breslau—as muddled and unclear might use 
this signal for an unkind comparison. 
Callaghan, meanwhile, was unaware of this drama playing out despite it directly 
concerning him. As James Goldrick suggests, the first ‘bald message’ the Commander-in-Chief 
received on the matter ‘must have come as a terrible shock’.115 The message arrived early in the 
morning of August 4
th
 and read: 
‘Their Lordships have determined upon, and H.M. The King has approved, the 
appointment of Sir John Jellicoe as Commander-in-Chief. You are to strike your 
flag forthwith, embark in the Sappho or other cruiser, and come ashore at 
Queensferry, reporting yourself at the Admiralty thereafter at your earliest 
convenience. These orders are imperative.’116 
 
The die thus cast, Jellicoe, with a reluctance that one writer felt to border on ‘self-
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deselection on grounds of unsuitability’, succeeded Callaghan as Commander-in-Chief Home 
Fleets, a post soon to be renamed Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet.
117
 Callaghan privately 
admitted to his friend Sir George Egerton (who it will be recalled left the post of Second Sea 
Lord as a result of a similarly sudden personnel change instigated by Churchill) that he ‘was 
treated abominably.’ However, Callaghan felt that ‘I have a clear conscience in having left the 
Home Fleet ready’ for Der Tag.118 
As a matter of interest, the Grand Fleet’s diary entry for the entire affair reads simply: 
‘V.A. Jellicoe was appointed C in.C in place of Admiral Callaghan who hauled down his flag & 
departed in Sappho for Queensferry.’119 
 
To War 
While the change of command drama played out, the Home Fleet was gathering at Scapa. 
Then occurred the first invasion scare of the war. The Admiralty received intelligence reports that 
three German transports had left the Baltic on August 1
st
. This information was duly passed on to 
Callaghan, who responded by sending the Third Cruiser Squadron plus Achilles and Cochrane 
‘full speed to Shetland Islands to prevent landing of troops’.120 Nothing was found. 
The War Telegram was issued by the Admiralty at 2300 on August 4
th
.
121
 The Home Fleet, 
and the rest of Royal Navy, was now at war. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Grand Fleet that Jellicoe took to war in August 1914 was without doubt the most 
powerful armada of men o’war ever assembled up to that time. It was an armada that ‘was ready, 
or, what was almost as valuable, believed itself to be ready.’1 Admiral Usborne recalled that 
‘when the Fleet sailed on the 4th we knew that our hour had come.’2 Beatty’s Flag Captain, 
Alfred Chatfield, felt that as the Royal Navy ‘had not fought for a century; it was time we 
repeated the deeds of our forefathers.’3 Aboard the old cruiser Endymion—one of the ships 
responsible for the northern commercial blockade—Cadet Geoffrey Harper wrote that ‘when the 
end of the watch came & 8 bells struck I thought “at last — we’ve begun War with Germany 
after all these years of talk — now we’ll see”. There was a ripping kind of “air” of perfect calm 
& efficiency about it. We knew the Navy had been preparing for a week & everyone was ready.’4 
The backbone of the Grand Fleet was the four Battle Squadrons, each of which had once 
been the core of an independent fleet: 
1914 Designation Original Designation 
First Battle Squadron Nore Division, Home Fleet 
Second Battle Squadron Channel Fleet 
Third Battle Squadron Atlantic Fleet 
Fourth Battle Squadron Mediterranean Fleet 
 
In just over seven years virtually the entire frontline strength of the Royal Navy had been 
brought together under a single command. 
Looking back it seems a clear line of evolution from the original Home Fleet of 1907 to 
the spearshaft of victory of 1918. That the original Home Fleet was the direct ancestor of the 
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Grand Fleet is unquestionable. What is questionable is the exact sequence of events that made up 
this evolution. The journey, not the destination, is the most important thing. With this in mind, 
there are two competing explanations for the beginning of that journey, i.e. the Home Fleet’s 
devising and creation in 1906-7. 
The first explanation is more or less the ‘traditionalist’ view espoused most notably by 
Arthur Marder.
5
 Drawing heavily on official Admiralty prints and the writings, published and 
unpublished, of key naval and government figures, the ‘traditionalist’ narrative is the same as the 
official explanations given in 1907: the Home Fleet was a further reorganization of the Royal 
Navy’s strength at home to both adjust to the changing geopolitical situation and further improve 
the efficiency of the navy’s considerable reserve strength. Left unsaid publicly, but obvious to the 
concerned parties on both sides of the North Sea was the creation of a powerful naval force 
whose only realistic opponent was the Kaiserliche Marine. All that followed was an outgrowth 
of Sir John Fisher’s original intentions for the Home Fleet. 
The second creation narrative for the Home Fleet is that advanced forcefully by Nicholas 
Lambert. Taking into account the same sources as Marder, Lambert employs many others and 
casts a jaundiced eye over them all, taking full account of Jon Sumida’s strictures that Admiralty 
policy in the Prewar Era was ‘a multi-level process that was influenced heavily by budgetary 
pressure, technical uncertainty, flaws in bureaucratic organi[z]ation, and the vagaries of chance.’6 
It is Nicholas Lambert’s contention that the Home Fleet was proposed and created in response to 
the severe financial strictures enforced by the newly empowered Liberal government and was 
meant to shift Navy’s primary weapon in the North Sea from the gun to the torpedo. The Home 
Fleet was so constituted that destroyer and submarine flotillas would be the true heart of the 
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organization, not the heavy warships which ‘historians have assumed… formed the core of the 
Home Fleet—taking little notice of the first sea lord’s [sic] claims that things were not what they 
seemed.’7 The subsequent evolution of the Home Fleet is regarded as an aberration and is of little 
interest except as an illustration of how Fisher’s original intentions were abandoned or ignored. 
On balance, the evidence supports Marder’s ‘traditionalist’ approach far more than 
Lambert’s with the exception of Marder’s lack of appropriate emphasis on the financial realities 
that spurred Sir John Fisher and his fellow members of the Board of Admiralty to propose and 
create the Home Fleet in the last half of 1906. The economies demanded by Chancellor Asquith 
and their broad support in Campbell-Bannerman’s Cabinet left the Admiralty, and especially 
First Lord Tweedmouth, with precious little room to manoeuvre. To safeguard what they could, 
with emphasis on the next year’s new construction programme, an offer was made that reduced 
the active fleets by eleven heavy warships—seven battleships and four armoured cruisers. 
By the time orders were issued for this reorganization in late October the goals had 
changed. Instead of the withdrawn ships going into reserve they were to form the nucleus of an 
entirely new command, which would also absorb the reserve units at the three Home Ports. This 
new Home Fleet was similar in conception and execution to a pre-Fisher reform of the Navy’s 
reserve ships carried out in 1902-3, but was on a much greater scale.
8
 When complete, the 
general situation would be ‘the Channel Fleet, strongest of the British fleets… at Portland, with 
two fighting wings thrown out, as it were, to cover the exposed flanks, one at the Nore and the 
Other (Atlantic Fleet) at Berehaven.’9 
But what of the multitude of torpedo-armed flotilla craft that would come under the 
command of the C.-in-C. Home Fleet in peacetime? The assumption that their assignment to the 
                                                 
7
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8
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9
 Marder, op. cit., p. 72. 
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Home Fleet meant they were to be the main striking force of that organization is based on a 
misunderstanding of the nature of the Admiralty’s plans for the use of flotilla craft during 
wartime. These plans had been developed under the same pressures that had led to the creation of 
the destroyer in the 1890s,
10
 and involved the use of destroyers to watch the exits of German 
ports as a observational tripwire ‘able to press home its investigations of enemy’s ports fronting 
upon the Narrow Seas and German Ocean, with a well grounded confidence that, if chased, it 
may show a clean pair of heels to an enemy in superior force.’11 The efforts undertaken to equip 
the destroyer flotillas with the best communications equipment available, first carrier pigeons 
and then wireless, confirms the importance of their reconnaissance capabilities.
12
 
The importance of the destroyer-based observation blockade to the Royal Navy’s 
strategic planning against Germany can be seen in the presence of observational patrols right off 
the Waddenzee coast from the 1907 War Plans through to the abrupt end of Sir Arthur Wilson’s 
tenure as First Sea Lord post-Agadir. The 1907 war plans also established the principle of 
strangulating of German commerce via distant blockade based on patrols between the Shetlands 
and Norway and the Straits of Dover.
13
 
The creation of the Home Fleet resulted in an awkward command situation: the new 
organization possessed the bulk of ships in home waters but was commanded by a flag officer 
junior to the C.-in-C. of the Channel Fleet. Had the Commander-in-Chief, Channel Fleet been 
anyone other than the obstreperous Lord Charles Beresford this would have probably been a 
minor matter. Indeed Beresford’s own actions had suggested there might not have been an issue; 
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he had previously written that Home Fleet C.-in-C. Sir Francis Bridgeman was eminently worthy 
of a fleet command.
14
 
The tragicomic farce that followed has to be rated amongst the most embarrassing 
episodes in the long history of the Royal Navy. If Fisher’s methods often seemed to lack tact as is 
sometimes claimed, Beresford’s lacked in both proportionality and simple shame. In the final 
analysis it is amazing Beresford held his command as long as he did. A less socially-connected 
officer would have been sacked after a fraction of Beresford’s insubordination, and indeed 
Beresford came within an ace of this fate numerous times, only to escape deserved punishment. 
Rarely has the malign influence of aristocratic politics on the functioning of an armed service 
been demonstrated so theatrically. Yet for all his defiance and troublemaking, Beresford was not 
an incompetent leading a group of useless sycophants: the subsequent service records of the 
Channel Fleet’s officers prove that. 
Nevertheless Beresford’s rebellion ended in his command being wiped out, albeit through 
administrative reorganization, not enemy action.
15
 The Channel Fleet ceased to be and was 
absorbed into the very organization Beresford and his acolytes had done their best to discredit: 
the Home Fleet. It was an undignified for an important command with a high public reputation, 
and not for nothing did some mourn its passing.
16
 
Dramatic as the Channel Fleet’s immolation at Beresford’s hands was, it was on a 
strategical level meaningless. It had long been decided the Home and Channel Fleets would be 
unified in wartime, rendering their peacetime nomenclature an irrelevancy. And for all his 
interference with the Admiralty, Beresford had little effect on the trajectory of their strategic 
planning for war with Germany. His muddled protests against the commercial blockade strategy 
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codified in the 1907 War Plans were by and large ignored. His major lasting contribution to the 
Navy’s warfighting repertoire was the experimental work the Channel Fleet did to equip fishing 
trawlers as minesweepers.
17
 
For all the impugning the Admiralty’s war plans of 1907-1911 have come in for, a careful 
analysis shows a consistent overall strategic conception and utilization of resources. What 
appeared to be a backwards close blockade of the German coast was in fact consistent effort to 
clear the away the major obstacle preventing Britain bringing what Colin Gray called ‘the 
leverage of sea power’ against Germany.18 There is no great mystery why war plans of the 
Prewar Era dealt with the preliminary phase of the war almost exclusively: until the German fleet 
was swept aside the exploitation of maritime dominance was theoretical. Whether the destroyer-
based observational patrols from advanced bases (either seized from Germany or built at sea 
from scuttled hulks and obsolete ironclads) would have been successful is an open and 
unanswerable question. What is not questionable is that the observational blockade plans show 
that the Prewar Era Admiralty had a consistent strategic vision which historians have rarely 
appreciated.
19
 
That the observational blockade paradigm died with Sir Arthur Wilson’s First Sea 
Lordship is symptomatic of another trait of the Prewar Navy. Since the advent of Fisher the 
service had become increasingly secretive and uncooperative with the outside world, as can be 
seen in the great decline in contributions by senior naval officers to, for instance, the Royal 
United Services Institution. For all the success the Admiralty had in protecting their finances—
and especially the funding of new construction—they consistently lost ground to the Army in 
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what discussions the generally apathetic Liberal governments occasionally held regarding 
Britain’s grand strategic plans. That the ‘Continental Commitment’ trumpeted by those like 
General Sir Henry Wilson was largely a bill of goods misses the fact it was still more substantial 
in the eyes of the Cabinet than the vague and often mysterious plans the Navy deemed to share 
with the Government, especially as the Anglo-French entente grew stronger. Bluntly, the War 
Office simply played the game better. That it took a belligerent outsider like Winston Churchill 
to bring the Navy back into competition on a grand strategic level says much. 
For all the good that Churchill did at the Admiralty—and much of what he did was good, 
at least prior to August 1914—his methods, like Fisher, often needlessly salted wounds instead of 
soothing them. The case of Sir Francis Bridgeman is the clearest example. Though never 
comfortable as an administrator, Bridgeman’s common sense, unrivalled sea command 
experience, and popularity within the naval officer corps made him an invaluable asset to the 
new First Lord. Unfortunately in temperament Bridgeman and Churchill were oil and water, a 
conflict only exacerbated by the young minister’s domineering manner and carelessness in 
observing the types of social niceties and peculiarities that the Prewar Navy had in droves. That 
the uneasy Bridgeman-Churchill partnership ended in a catastrophe may have been inevitable. 
What was not nearly so sure was that Churchill would escape the maelstrom as he did, more or 
less intact. In no small part this can be attributed to Bridgeman’s acceptance of the situation out 
of a desire to safeguard the service he loved. 
That Prince Louis of Battenberg, a serenely smooth and intelligent natural-born courtier 
should succeed Bridgeman comes as no shock—indeed simple prejudice had prevented him 
succeeding Wilson instead of Bridgeman. Battenberg was able to build on Bridgeman’s 
accomplishments—and these were not few in number—and keep the excitable First Lord on the 
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rails well enough (for the most part!) to complete a thorough transformation of the Admiralty’s 
strategic direction. In place of the now-unworkable observational blockade, the flotillas were 
joined with the battlefleet in a single combined unit of naval force unparalleled in strength. The 
proto-Grand Fleet’s great strengths have been often overlooked on account of its uninspiring 
wartime performance. That it never achieved the great and crushing victory it was created for 
should not detract from the achievement of its creation. 
No small part in that creation was played by its final prewar Commander-in-Chief, Sir 
George Callaghan. One of the original 1907 Home Fleet flag officers, Callaghan’s promotion 
upon Bridgeman’s recall to the Admiralty ushered in a transformatory period in the Royal Navy’s 
tactical operation. Having impressed the First Lord, Callaghan was able to exercise a wide 
influence over all aspects of the Home Fleet’s strategy and operations that rivalled those of the 
Admirals of the age of sail. From 1911 to 1914 Callaghan and his subordinates—including the 
much-maligned Sir David Beatty and his staff—synthesized a system of tactics and a command 
structure that, when war came, proved remarkably resilient under combat conditions. When 
Admiralty-mandated functions and missions proved unworkable, such as the experimental 
‘intermediate blockade’ dispositions of 1912 or the system of coastal defence patrols that failed 
in two successive Grand Manoeuvres, Callaghan with the assistance of an able staff organization, 
was able to force the Admiralty to change things to what was considered in the Fleet to be more 
effective arrangements. To a remarkable extent, the spear was giving orders to the spearman. The 
Grand Fleet that went to war in 1914 was as much Sir George Callaghan’s as it was Lord 
Fisher’s or anyone else’s. That he was sacked for Sir John Jellicoe on the very precipice of war 
has left him an undeservedly obscure figure. It is a full measure of Jellicoe’s own genius for 
command that he fought so hard to avoid taking the purple from the man who had done so much 
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to forge the weapon now being torn from his grasp. Had war not come, it is tempting to think 
Callaghan would have been a leading candidate to take Battenberg’s place at the Admiralty’s 
venerable top table. 
The fleet that Callaghan presided over was dominated by the heavy gun. Despite this pre-
eminence, the heavy gun was not the sole weapon Callaghan’s ships could bring to bear. The 
torpedo had almost a great an influence on the Home Fleet’s development. The long effort 
beginning with Sir William May to develop a system of tactics for the operation of destroyers 
together with the battlefleet was as integral to the development of the Home Fleet as the 
development and refinement of the dreadnoughts that formed the fleet’s core, or the work of men 
like Sir Percy Scott, Arthur Pollen, and Frederic Dreyer to optimize the capabilities of those 
dreadnoughts’ main batteries. The fleet submarine programme, which was pursued so doggedly 
immediately prior to the outbreak of war, is perhaps the ultimate example of how much the 
torpedo mattered to the battle fleet. 
Having established the torpedo’s crucial importance, it is well to warn against carrying 
that importance too far. Despite Sir Percy Scott’s mid-1914 admonition in The Times that the era 
of the dreadnought was approaching its eclipse,
20
 or Sir John Fisher’s longstanding and ardent 
advocation of the submarine, there is no sign that the dreadnought would be replaced as the pith 
and marrow of Britain’s naval supremacy any time soon if the records of the Admiralty are any 
guide. For all the efforts Winston Churchill exerted to promote the substitution of torpedo craft 
of all sorts for the annual dreadnought order in 1914, at the end of the day the battleship held the 
field. The never-implemented July 1914 scheme for the future organization of the Navy’s 
battleship and cruiser squadrons proves this. On the same day he was supposed to have put into 
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practice a revolution in the Navy’s force structure, Winston Churchill in fact minuted his 
approval of the old battleship orthodoxy.
21
 He did not do so out of surrender to a stale and 
conservative ‘gun club’. Rather, his reasons had everything to do with the unceasing issues of 
financial optimization, strategic calculus, and simple manning requirements.
22
 In the First Lord’s 
final analysis of July 15
th
, 1914, the rewards for throwing over the dreadnought standard were 
simply too marginal. Whatever the Navy’s plans for the torpedo-armed flotilla craft were in 1914, 
they would supplement the battleship in the Home Fleets, not replace it. 
                                                 
21
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